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Abstract 
The thesis seeks to explore one of the most singular features of Freudian thought, his 
radical position in the history of the ideas about language. One of my chief claims is 
that the Freudian endeavour is not oriented towards a conclusive theory of language as 
such, but of the conditions of its destruction, its exhaustion, its silence. 
The obscure centre of Freud's work, the passion for the shattering of language, 
manifests itself both as an affirmation and as a dissipation of the sense of speech, which 
cast some light upon the cardinal role of the notion of secrecy, not only in his 
comprension of language, but also in his conception of subjectivity. Thus, secrecy can 
be conceived as a fundamental feature of different facets of his writings. The first facet 
exhibits psychoanalysis as the inheritor of the progressive emergence of silence in the 
core of modern thought. I argue that the logic of secrecy which appears in Freud's 
early writings enacts the historical emergence of secrecy which pervaded different 
discourses of the nineteenth century. 
This singular logic had its origin at the confluence of the exalted discourses 
which enthrowned observation and experience in the positivistic conception of 
knowledge bred by the Enlightenment, the obscure cults of magnetism and the 
speculative conceptions of subjectivity which emerged from the crisis of the 
Enlightenment, with the rising of Romanticism and its powerful effects on the Western 
culture. The second facet exhibits the logic of secrecy as expressed by the acts of 
language. 
Secrecy introduces an inner discord in the meaning of signs: it reveals the 
obsolescence of the referential notion of truth. Allegory emerges from this discord as 
a privileged aesthetic and theoretical expression. Freud's theoretical creativity canceled 
the significance of the referential, discursive notion of truth with the violent 
implications of the notion of primary thought processes and a conception of primal 
experiences of pleasure and pain irreducible to the narrow margins of rationality. 
v 
The radical dissipation of the conventional foundations of semantic truth 
brought into focus an aesthetic -Baroqu~ conception of subjectivity. This vision 
pervades Freud's notion of psychical processes, and engendered a constellation of 
forms of theoretical expression: psychical processes were apprehended by allegorical 
figures: the fold, rhythm, movement, displacement involving paradoxical temporalities 
which offered a contrasting landscape of thought processes that informed desire and 
aroused anxiety; Freud created thus a theoretical chiaroscuro. A third facet involves 
two further Freudian notions: sexuality and pain. One of them, sexuality, is almost too 
notorious in Freud's work; the other, pain, was permanently and explicitly displaced, 
silenced, excluded. or even emphatically avoided in Freud's writings, and yet it is an 
notion inherent in his conception of subjectivity. Freud's subversion of the modem 
notion of experience might be thought of as founded upon his conception of the 
experience of pain as a constitution~ dimension of subjectivity, as its unspeakable, 
unapproachable, secret centre. 
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Introduction 
There are only fragmentary readings of Freud. Each new exegesis, every discourse 
which seeks to elucidate certain facets of Freud's work becomes, in tum, a singular 
echo, a variation of its senses; the new interpretation enhances with discording 
resonances the broad and difuse contours of its own sphere of sense. 
Nevertheless, never a new interpretation of Freud is obsolete. Freud's text 
seems to have foreseen even the obsolescence of the commentaries it arouses, 
responding·to their potential appearance with a meaningful, symptomatic repetition or 
variation of its arguments. For the interpreter, Freud's text appears as a hall of mirrors, 
which seems to reveal an unexpected physiognomy, an unforeseen feature with each 
slight displacement of the enquiring gaze, even with every slight displacement of the 
point of view. Like Borges' dreaming characters, Freud's writings seem to have 
dreamed, foretold and, in turn, interpreted their own later versions, the distorted 
shadows of their future interpretations. Each new reading of Freud's work appears as 
a symptomatic image of the original text itself. Each narrative or theoretical reflection 
incited by Freudian writing appears as a rarefied resonance of a restricted spectrum of 
dispersed textual shreds. However, each new unfolding of Freud's text creates a 
previously unpronounced sense which emerges from a silence, a reiteration, an accent, 
a breach, a fracture of a text. 
Perhaps, it was not an hyperbole to call this century "the age of Freud". Not 
simply because, as has been often aSserted, it enacts the enthrownment and exhaustion 
of the notion of subjed, nor because it has bred a most impressive variety of therapies 
akin to the Freudian psychoanalysis. Moreover, the reason for this appreciation might 
not be the social impact of the Freudian thought, clearly discernible in the peculiar 
trends of arguments which underlie the modern sexual revolution and its equivocal 
sequel: the contemporary receding of social strategies which involves both the crude 
contest to conventional prejudice and to conservative sexual policies. The 
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anthropologist Ernest Gellner has recognized in his analysis of the psychoanalytical 
mouvement ~e complex nature of the impact of Freudian thought in the institutional 
strategies of modernity: 
We are dealing with nothing less than an intellectual, moral and 
terminological revolution, on an enonnous, indeed a global scale. 
Changes in intellectual climate constitute something that is 
inherently elusive, and yet supremely important. I 
Gellner's appreciations of the relevance of psychoanalysis to contemporary culture are 
meaningful. Psychoanalysis might well be thought of as a pervading climate which 
extends well beyond the perceivable evidence. A broad explanation of the genesis of 
this climate can be built by relating only several disperse and evident factors: the 
everyday open or veiled, direct ~d indirect, deliberate or unaware quotations of 
Freud's words in an immense variety of social discourses; the slow impregnation of 
familiar speech with echoes or distorted shades of Freudian terms and conceptions, the 
invention and repetition of countless commonplaces which stand as authorized 
explanations of everyday behaviour, the building of fictitious taxonomies of psychical 
afflictions, the daily assailment of the Freudian notions carried out by the media, their 
persevering 'extortion of the common belief in the therapeutic efficacy of 
psychoanalysis and of the popular faith in its interpretations. But the intelectual climate 
nourished by psychoanalysis is also the outcome of a complex, diffuse interaction of 
contrasting discourses about the nature of subjectivity, and the historical social 
experience of the relevenace of settled, hermeneutic patterns informed by 
psychoanalytic discourse. 
"To begin is to be free -writes Harold Bloom provocatively-, and after Freud 
we are never free of Freud. "2 Paradoxically, this "loss of freedom", this "never [being] 
able to begin again", imposed on the modern sensibility by the "freedom" brought 
about by the Freudian subversion of the different conceptions of subjectivity exhibits 
one of the chief inner tensions in Freud's discourse. Perhaps, our age should be seen 
as a spectral symptom of Freud's discourse, just like Freud himself was undoubtedly 
a radical and multi-faceted symptom of the endeavours of Enlightenment and the 
cultural, epistemological and political struggles in contemporary society. The complex 
cultural evolution in this century shall remain at least partially unfathomable without 
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a clear understanding and exploration of the Freudian discourse and its interpretative 
force. 
But it is precisely Freud's conceptual kaleidoscope that exerts an unyielding 
fascination upon its reader. The variety and dispersion of interpretations are incited by 
the conflicting tensions in Freudian writing itself which unfolds as a pemanent 
reflection and refraction of his own textual accents and silences, presupossitions and 
reserves, monuments and wrecks. The spectacle of these metamorphosis of the text, of 
its disquieting series of mutations, expansions and repetitions, the evoked images and 
visions, lured any further reading. In modernity, the vision of sexuality which emerged 
from this contrasting landscape undergoes, in the social sphere, severe transfigurations 
which lead, in turn, to endless delusive conventional shapes of the subjective processes; 
it engendered countless parodic physiognomies and gave rise to theoretical masquerades 
built upon faint resonances of the literal and metaphorical powers of the Freudian text. 
Yet Freudian discourse aroused a fundamental anxiety regarding modern 
cultural and political processes, which unleashed a fertile and original enquiry about 
the nature of subjectivity, of non-rational phenomena, of the factors of subject's 
identity, of the role of narcissism and the roots of cruelty and domination, of the nature 
of destruction and the limits of expressiveness; it drove modern thought to the 
recognition of the need for a rigurous analysis of the cultural resistance against a 
complex reflexive meditation on the role of subjectivity in the genesis of contemporary 
knowledge and its intrinsic, unescapable silences. This anxiety has, in turn, given rise 
to a large-scale effort on the part of scholars and commentators to integrate into a 
congrous unity the heterogeneous and often conflicting premises which support the 
Freudian vision, and also to trace the historical conditions of its origins and 
development; Moreover, Freud's readers seek to deepen some of his ephemeral insights 
and transient illuminations, to unveil its inherent tensions, to recognize the specific 
resonance of the psychoanalytic notions in literary and philosophical discourses, as well 
as in aesthetic, political and ethical facets of contemporary thought. All this effort has 
not been carried out as a mere strategy for developing, clarifying and enhancing his 
essential insights on psychical processes. Rather, it reveals a deliberate striving for a 
definite comprehension of the failures of reflexive consciousness, of the experience of 
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the limits of language, of the subject's expressiveness, of the wrecking of the 
civilizatory process, of the roots of the psychical relevance of the extreme crucial 
experiences: of pleasure and pain. 
This endeavour involves a bold attempt, not to circumscribe and define an 
ontological stillness of the subject's identity, but to discern the web of diverging 
tensions, the manifold fractures and hollow regions of the subject's nature, its 
finiteness, the changing scene of devastation and self-invention of its intima~y, the 
transience and perseverance of desire, the ellusiveness and crudeness of social 
constraints, the fragility and steadiness of memory, the bareness and lavishness of 
oblivion, the opaqueness of the subject's experience, the differences which dissipates 
the unity of subjective processes and, simultaneously, shape the subject's identity. 
It is now a commonplace both of Freud's antagonists and of certain of his 
apologists to stress what might be called a "weak: paradox" of Freudian thought: he is 
either blamed or praised for seeking a rational explanation of the irrational. The 
weakness of this paradox resides in the indefinite sense of the notion of rationallity. As 
Freud himself remarked, rather than this weak: paradox, his conception illuminates a 
strong one: the notion of the unconscious enlarges and shatters, unfolds and dissipates, 
the seemingly clear, inequivocal significance of the notions of understanding and 
reason created by the Enlightenment: 
Die psychoanalytische Annahme der unbewuBten SeelenUitigkeit 
erseheint uns einerseits a1s eine weitere Fortbildung des 
primitiven Animismus, der uns iiberall Ebenbilder unseres 
Bewu6tseins vorspiegelte, und ander seits als die Fortsetzung der 
Korrektur, die Kant an unserer Auff~sung der auBeren 
Wahmehtmmg vorgenommen hat. Wie Kant uns gewarnt hat, die 
subjektive Bedingtheit WlSerer Wahrnehmung nieht zu iibersehen 
und unsere Wahrnehmung nieht fUr identiseh mit dem 
unerkennbaren Wahrgenommenen zu haIten, so mahnt die 
Psychoanalyse, die BewuBtseinswahrnehmung nieht an die Stelle 
des unbewuBten psyehisehen Vorganges zu setzen, welcher ihr 
Objekt ist. Wie das Physische, so braucht auch das Psychische 
nicht in Wirklichkeit so zu sein, me es uns erseheint. (Das 
UnbewuJ3te, SA, 1915, III: 130r 
-The psychoanalytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, as a further 
expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us, and, 
on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just 
as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our j>erceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be 
regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate 
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Overturning Kant's notion of object, Freud brings to light the relevance of the unstable, 
dynamic tensions of inner perception, its contorted and contingent contours and, 
nevertheless, its definitive role in the performance of reason, rather as an 
unpronounceable memory, as the remains of an unexpressible experience of pain, as 
a thought process which remains beyond the reach of categories and language. The 
inherent obscurity of an inner, irreducible "thing-in-itself' [Ding an siehl as the 
essential origin of any psychical process not only imposes on rationalism a particular 
strain, but obscures the notion of reason itself, bringing to light the informing power 
of an intimate and primordial, unbearable experience. 
The agonistic features of Freud's discourse have nourished countless and 
conflicting interpretations of his works. Different currents of philosophical and 
psychoanalitical thought have stemed from different stages of development of his 
conceptions, and found a support upon contradictory passages of his work or certain 
nuances, stylistic inflections and conceptual mutations disseminated in his writings. His 
enterprise has been seen both as a chapter in the history of confession and as the final 
subversion of the modern notion of truth, as a historical sequel of the regime of the 
sacramental universe of Catholicism and as a shattering of the convictions engendered 
by science. It has been conceived as the emergence of a "rational mysticism" and as 
the natural outcome of the dark currents of mesmerism; it has appeared both as the 
extreme consequence of the empiricist aims of Locke, Condillac and the postulates of 
Enlightenment, and as the exacerbation of the Romantic vision of subjectivity. Freud 
has been accused both of reductionism, of blind submission to the trends and 
constraints of the scientific thought in the nineteenth century, and of a chimeric 
conceptual imagination, likely to invoke the authority of ancient myths, of privileged 
poetic visions and of philosophical delusion. His thought has been characterized as 
speculative as well as pragmatic. It has been seen as a means to legitimate a dubious 
therapeutic procedure and as an amazing synthesis and development of the chief 
philosophical, scientific, medical and even aesthetic conceptions of his age. 
perception by means of consciousness with the unc0!lscious mental processes which are their object. Like the 
physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. (FP, 11: 173) 
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This work ~ks to explore one of the most singular feautures of the Freudian 
theoretical conceptions: Freudianism can be thought of as a definitive chapter in the 
history of philosophy of language, but a singular one. The approach to his radical 
position in the history of ideas about language will be guided by a central intuition: 
Freud's conception of language is not the progressive unveiling of previously 
inaccessible sense of speech; rather, it illuminates the moment in which phil~sophy 
abandons its dominant objects, words and sense, to dip itself in a foreign territory: the 
silent history of the shattering of language. The analysis of Freud's notion of 
experience implicitly involves the obliteration of the conventionally accepted 
conceptions of truth. In tum, the debasement of this central category of Western 
philosophy [truth] involved a profound review of the notion of experience itself. What 
emerges from this preliminary enquiry is the relevance of the notion of secrecy rooted 
in historical, philosophical and political grounds. Secrecy acquired in the political, 
philosophical and aesthetic thought of the nineteenth century a puzzling presence both 
cardinal and veiled. Freud's founding notion of experience which bore complex 
implications on the temporality of psychical and physical processes is of an unusual 
kind: it gives rise to an unforeseeable aesthetic conception of subjectivity. 
This approach demanded a manifold reading of the Freudian text. In the first 
place, from a historical point of view: I shall present Freud's thought as a moment in 
the modem history at which heterogeneous and even conflicting conceptions of 
language -medical, philosophical, anthropological and literary- converge to reveal 
chiefly the limits of subjectivity and language, which will lead to the notion of secrecy; 
chapter one is devoted to a brief exploration of this aspect. In the second place, I shall 
present secrecy as an aesthetic and discursive construction involving a radical notion 
of experience, and giving rise to Freud I s vision of subjectivity -a Baroque 
conception- founded in the particular role of pain and allegory both in his conception 
of subjectivity and in his very writing: chapters two and three expound the essential 
elements of this discursive and aesthetic approach. And finally, in the last two chapters 
-fourth and fifth- I seek to analyse Freud I s writing as a mirror image of the notion 
of subjectivity he constructs: Freudian text is shown as the expression both of the 
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experience of language as limit, and of the exhaustion of the subject's expressiveness; 
Freud took as.a radical, metaphorical model of the psychical shattering of language the 
medical theories of aphasia, and reflected in his narrative constructions the allegorical, 
finite nature of subjectivity, the secrecy inherent in the writing act; Freud's theoretical 
silences also revealed the constitutional role of the experience of pain; his allegories 
of sexuality exhibited the moulding force and the enlivening impuse of secrecy and the 
delusional patterns inherent in subjective construction of truth. 
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NOTES 
I.Ernest Gellner, The Psychoanalytical MovemenJ (London: Paladin, 1985), p.8. 
2.Harold Bloom, Introduction, in Sigmund Freud, 00. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1985), 
p.2. 
Chapter I 
Psychoanalysis and Secrecy: the Inherent Silence 
L The thresholds of representation 
Nineteenth century thought exhibits a tension which spans its different movements and 
currents and defines, not a conception of the world, but a discourse regime. This 
tension emerges from the confrontation between the "ontological primacy of the natural 
object" -an ontological conception that had become stronger since its appearance at 
the dawn of rationalism- and language conceived as an autonomous and contingent 
order. Kant's autonomy of reason foretold at the end of the eighteenth century an 
ensuing independence of language. The contingency of language and the bursting into 
the philosophical scene of the imagination invoked an essential bond between creation 
and language. H6lderlin writes: I 
lndem sich nemlich der Dichter mit dem reinen Tone seiner 
urspriinglichen Empfindung in seinem ganzen innem un aufiem 
Leben begriffen fiihlt, und sich umsieht in seiner Welt, ist ibm 
diese eben so neu und unbekannt, die Summe aller seiner 
Erfahrungen, seines Wissens, seines Anschauens, seine Denkens, 
Kunst und Natur wie sie in ibm und auBer ibm sich darstellt, alles 
is wie zmn erstenmale, eben deBwegen unbegriffen, unbestimmt, 
und lauter Stoff und Leben aufgelost, ibm gegenwartig, und es ist 
vorzuglich wichtig, daB er in diesem Augenblike nichts als 
gegeben annehme, von nichts positiven ausgehe, da8 die Natur 
und Kunst, so wie er sie kennen gelernt hat und sieht, nieht 
eher sprec~ ehe fUr ihn eine Spraehe da ist, d.h. ehe das jezt 
Unbekannte und Ungenannte in seiner Welt eben dadurch fur ibn 
bekannt und nahmhaft wird [ ... ]" 
The creative force of language corresponds also to the equally powerful strangeness of 
"While the poet feels completely seized by the pure tone of the original sensibility of his inner and outer life as he 
sees all around him, all of it so new and unknown, thc sum of all his experiences, his knowledge. his conceptions, 
his thoughts, art and nature both in and out of him present themselves as if it were the first time, thus unfathomed, 
undetennined, and the pure matter and life dissolved and it is speciaUy importBnt that in this moment he does not 
admit anything as already given, that he takes nothing positive as point of departure. that Nature and Art, as he has 
known and seen them do not speak to him before, no~ before there is for him a Language, this is, before what is 
now unknown and unnamed in his world become to him known and named ... (My translation) 
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the referred world. The claim of the primacy of the subject's power to name opens a 
breach which subverts the sovereignty of representation. The word no longer reflects 
or renders the object's absolute presence. The convolutions of the nineteenth century 
are rooted in deeply layered, yet slowly uncovering ground largely made up, 
paradoxicaly, from lost certitude: representation had irrevocably lost its illuminating 
and revealing power, its immediate relation to the world. The word had been divested 
from the theological virtue of encompassing the truth of Nature. A fracture in the 
whole order of things uncovered a profound, unsettling asymmetry between the world 
and the subjective experience. This asymmetry manifested itself in an assertion of 
irreparable loss: that of representation as epiphany, and the fusion of the word and the 
world. Beda Alleman, writing about Holderlin's conception of Nature in his 
Empedocles remarks: 
Cet qu'Empedocle ressentait comme une nostalgie legitime de la 
nature matemeUe, devient Ie Cours naturel elemellemenl hostile 
a l'homme; la Nature elle-meme devient desert sauvage et abime 
oil gitent les Titans. 2 
The nineteenth century established the primacy of the natural object and, with it, its 
unsurmountable strangeness; it asserted its ontological precedence over language. 
Romanticism witnessed a growing conviction of the nature's invincible resistance to 
any attempt to encompass it within the borders of universal notions and representations. 
The classical equilibrium between the world and its material images was lost; the 
reciprocal communication between the represented object and the sign that represented 
it was shattered, paradoxically enough, by the overwhelmiI)g power of language's self-
contained creativity. The response to the assertion of the ontological primacy of Nature 
was the proclamation of the dominion of language, of its creative, evoking power over 
the fading truth of the world. The hollowness at the core of representation is not a mere 
weakness of mind or weariness, it is the final revelation of the immense scope of 
imagination. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this, representation did not vanish as a crucial notion 
in western culture. It remained within it as an elusive token. Western culture remained 
captivated by the image, by analogy, and fascinated by the unfair symmetry of the 
mirror and its deceiving fidelity. 
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However, in time representation suffered an unexpected displacement: after a 
momentary eclipse during Romanticism, it reappeared in the late nineteenth century 
as the enshrining of metaphor: the word as an undetermined sovereignty, as an absolute 
origin. At the same time, the boundaries that separated the ontological domain of 
representation -as epiphany of the world- from the metaphor dissolved. After 
Romanticism, metaphor relieved and encompassed the theological notion of 
representation. This dialectic construction of metaphor gave it an unsettling breadth: 
in the face of the fading Nature, metaphor confused itself with allegory, 3 but emerged 
as the evidence of the autonomous imagination of language. Romanticism may be 
conceived as having set this threshold of representation. It is not a reaction against the 
Enlightenment, against the absolute autonomy and self determination of reason, it is 
not the rejection of Kant, but its aftermath, its misconstruction, its amplified and 
perturbing resonance. 
The ontological primacy of the natural object implied a conviction about the 
nature of both time and meaning. As a result of Kant's enquiry, after Enlightenment 
the intensity of the inherent conflict between the persistence of the natural object, and 
the sensations it arouses together with their immediate and unbounded temporality -
which attests its endurance, its sense of timelessness, its history that lies beyond 
historicity - was heightened by an awareness of the paradox of representation: the 
subjective origin of concepts appeared as foreign to the logic of language and, as a 
consequence, the representation of time inherent in the autonomy of language acquired 
an elusiveness which pervaded the whole sphere of the meaning of language itself. 
Metaphor was seen to bring to light a disquieting contrast within the sphere of sense: 
a harsh distinction between two horizons of meaning - reference and sense - but also 
another unsuspected feature of language: its symbolic dimension, which arises from the 
assertion of its linguistic sovereignty, its uncertainty, its ambiguousness and the 
undetermined potentiality of meaning that pulsates when the word is uttered and 
displaces and dissolves the boundaries of truth. 
But the main outcome of the recognition of the ontological primacy of the world 
is a radical turning aside of language from representation. Then the object- in-itself 
withdraws from displayed meanings, becQmes foreign to them; its merely adumbrated 
12 
presence transforms itself into an evidence of the language's non-representational truth. 
From the centre of the Enlightenment itself, tensions grew which foretold the flustering 
of representational order: the exaltation of sensations and the simultaneous decline of 
the normative canons of visual perception; the emergence of a fracture between 
apprehending a figure and attesting to its truth; John Ruskin wrote, in his 
characterization of great art: 
it includes the largest possible quantity of Truth in the most 
perfect possible harmony. If it were possible for art to give all the 
truths of nature it ought to do it. But this is not possible. Choice 
must always be made of some facts which can be represented, 
from among others which must be passed in silence, or even, in 
some respect, misrepresented. 4 
The eclipse of Enlightenment was also the time of the devastation of testimonial signs 
and of the paradoxical consecration, in the sphere of positive knowledge, of visible 
proof; observation appeared as a pledge of objectivity in the search for truth. These 
tensions were many and varied: the triumph of the eye and the declining power of 
form; the celebration of fonnalism and the distrust of sudden illumination and revealed 
truth; the advent of intuition as source of meaning and the resistance to the seductions 
of representation; the rejection of realism and the ecstatic hailing of efficacy -the 
culminating ascension of instrumental truth as a primordial value; the simultaneous 
exultant enthronment of the reflexive capacity of reason and its exclusion from the 
realm of self-cognition; the veneration of science and the jubilant admission of obscure, 
widely spread but deeply grounded myths bred by science itself; the darkness of the 
assumed infinite powers of science and the experience of· the weakening of the fabric 
of life; the coexistence of disbelief in the plenitude of representation and the 
dissemination of utopian thought; the founding of present truth upon nostalgia for an 
ancient heritage and the radical negation of the present that incited the emergence of 
political fantasies the expressions of which were to find a prominent role in the modem 
expectations of collective fulfilment. Thus, Modernity emerged from a vast 
constellation of contrasting but entangled images and conceptions: the vindication of 
the nobility of the historical lineage of contemporary civilization and the acceptance of 
the animal ancestry of man; the confrontation between the deification of positive 
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knowledge and the secularization of divinity; the sublime nature of imagination and the 
organic stuff Qf which the mind I S faculties are made; the ultimate value of subjectivity 
and the supremacy of sensation; the fusion of certitude and enigma, of eloquence and 
silence, of the potentially infinite power of reason and the finite nature of self, the 
denial of the divine and the ascension of theological hermeneutics which contributed 
to the vain apprehension of God I S fading presence. 
IL The emergence of silence as object: Condillac and the symbolics of 
sensation 
There is also a history of silence.- From the ancient silence of God to the silence of 
nature, word could be conceived as an accident of silence that emerged as a suspension 
of the divine will to revelation: a sign of human corruption or of sin. The nineteenth 
century encounters a threatening assumption: the silence of God turned into evidence 
of His death. Jean Paul, in a brief text which narrates a terrifying dream, announces 
the conviction of a godless universe, that precedes by almost half a century, 
Nietzsche's pronouncement of the dead of God: 5 
Jetzo sank ein hohe edle Gestalt mit einen unverganglichen 
Schmerz aus de Rohe auf der Altar hemieder, und aIle Toten 
riefen: "Christus! ist keine Gott?" 
Er antwortet: "Es ist keiner" 
Der ganze Schatten jedes T oten erbebte, nicht bloss die Brust 
allein, unci einer wn den andem wurde durch das Zittem zertrennt. 
Christus fuhrt fort: "Ich ging durch die Welten, ich stieg in die 
Sonnen und flog mit der Milchstrassen dutch die Wtisten des 
Himmels; aber ist keine Gott Ich stieg herab, soweit das Sein sein 
Schatten wirft, und schauete in der Abgrund und rief: "Vater, wo 
wist du?" Aber ich horte our den ewige Stunn, der niemand 
regi~ unci der schimmemde Regenbogen des Wesen stand ohne 
eine Sonne, die ibn schuf, tiber· dem Abgrunde und tropfte 
hinlDlter. Und aIs ich aufblickte zur unennessIichen Welt nach der 
gottlichen Augen, starte Sie mich mit eine leeren bodenlosen 
Augenhoblen an, und die Ewigkeit lag auf dem Chaos und 
zemagte es und wiederkauete sich.- Schreite fort, Misstone, 
zerschriet die Schatten, der Er ist nicht.· 
• A noble and graceful figure, with inextinguishable pain, descended upon the altar. And aU the dead cried: 
"Christ! Is there any God?". He answered: "There i.s none". The dead trembled, not just their chest; and the 
quivering tore them apart. Christ continued. "I went through the worlds, I climbed to the sun and flew along the 
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Nevertheless, Jean Paul's expression of despairing piety is not unprecedented. It might 
be seen as one of the many emerging symptoms which attested the sinking of 
theological warranties of truth. It reveals the visible face of the accumulating tensions 
produced by the enquiries which originated during the sixteenth century concerning the 
foundations of knowledge and which became evident during the last decades of the 
century of Enlightenment and the beginnings of Romanticism. 
Condillac, following the philosophical path of Locke, and which may be seen 
as a prelude to the immense critical enterprise of Kant, after a brief discussion of his 
conceptual system of sensations ~ defined by him as a "modification of the soul" -
asserts: 
Toutes nos sensations nous paroissent les qualites des objets qui 
nos environnent: elies les representent done, elles sont des idees. 
Mais il est evident que ces idees ne nous font point connoitre ce 
que les etres soot en elle memes; elles ne les peignent que par les 
rapports qu'ils ont a nous, et cela seul demontre combien sont 
superflus les efforts des pbilosophes, qui pretendent penetrer dans 
la nature des choses.6 
For Condillac, sensations were in themselves representations, but the impossible aim 
of which, to convey a knowledge of the object, is definitively cancelled. It will be 
observed that this reflection echoes the propositions of sensualism and constitutes an 
anticipation of the Ding-in-sich of Kant, and of the boundaries within which the sphere 
of the faculties is confined. In consequence, the faculties will not appear as constituting 
a tight, integrated system, but as a displaced articulation of heterogeneous layers. It 
expresses the intuition not only of the pure silence of things but also of the essential 
silence that pervades the word itself, rooted in an untraceable complexity of mute 
sensations. In his analysis of Condillac' s text, Derrida wrote: 
n existerait done \D1 premier materiau muet, un irreductible noyau 
de presence immediate auquel surviendraient des modifications 
secondaires, qui entrerait dans des combinaison, des relations, des 
Milky Way through the deserts 0 f heaven, but there is no God. I descended as deep as the limits 0 f the shadow 0 f 
Being and I cried to the abyss: "Father, where are you?". But I only heard the infmite stream which nobody 
governs. And the shimmering Rainbow of Being stood above the abyss without the creating sun. And when I stared 
at the incommensurable world looking for the godly eyes, it gazed at me with its hollow, bottomless cavities; the 
infinity dwelling in Chaos, it gnawed and chewed. Cry.stridencies! Scream shadows! For He does not exist! (My 
translation). 
liaisons, etc. Et pourtant cette metaphysique, cette metaphysique 
sensualiste (on ne peut pas Ie refuser cet caractere) serait aussi de 
part en part une metaphysique du signe et une philosophie du 
langage.' 
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The clear emergence of a primary philosophical concern about the subject and the 
limits of the cognitive faculties, brought to light the fragile, mutable and uncertain 
morphology of language. Condillac I s theory of sensations presupposes the possibility 
of a formal structure of language as the agent which incites invention, and is the sole 
means of achieving any valid taxonomy leading to knowledge. This formal structure 
is both a project and a myth; it involves the invention of a potential language and the 
speculative apprehension of its pure and distant origin; it postulates a primal logic, the 
logic of instinct which, by a radical inversion, transforms itself into logic as instinct. 
Condillac remarks: 
Nous avons remarque que Ie developpement des nos idees et de 
nos faculres ne se fait que par Ie moyen des signes, et ne se ferait 
point sans eux; que par consequent notre maniere de raissoner ne 
peut se corriger qu'en corrigeant Ie langage, et que tout art se 
rOOuit a bien faire la langue de chaque science. Enfm nous avons 
prouve que les premieres langues, a leur origine, ont ere bien 
faites, parce que la metaphysique, qui presidait a leur formation, 
n'etait pas une science comme aujourd'hui, mais un instict donne 
par la nature. 8 
As Derrida has observed, this was not stated in simple, clear thesis. In Condillac's 
conception, the limits of thought are fixed by an undecidable assertion defining at the 
same time the posibi/ity of calculating, defining and molding language to achieve its 
perfect final form and the perfection of the original language rooted in pure instinct. 
Perfection appeared both as an aim, as an attainable but distant end and as a point of 
departure, as a biological device inherent in man itself. These cardinal notions 
determine the dynamic displacement of Condillac's conception of understanding. 
The work of Condillac exhibits some of the most important discursive tensions 
within the Fn1ightenment: the figure of a formal scheme of language modifiable at will, 
as the outcome of a voluntary act, contrasts with the conception of a vague symbolic 
force which thrives from an uncertain genealogy that hinders the subject's appraisal of 
truth and, simultaneously, makes knowledge possible. Condillac anticipates the 
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appearance of instinct as a central concept for the comprehension of knowledge 
throughout the nineteenth century. This concept fused the myths of origin with a 
positivistic conception which stemmed from Natural History. Instinct was thus 
conceived as an original, logical scaffolding of signs, both as material support and as 
manifestation of knowledge. But this original pure and eloquent logical scheme was to 
be degraded in the course of historical events. Condillac's thought prefigures also the 
violent irruption of Rousseau's cult of metaphor as the original and unblemished ~peech 
act which had suffered a progressive decay throughout human development. 9 
Language is confronted as a distinct entity, as an instrument. Signs were seen 
as foreign to their own grammar, even as moldable matter likely to engender sense out 
of the capacity of its elements to combine according to specific and definite rules. 
Moreover, the combinatorial power of language appears as a mirror image of those 
human faculties discemable in the light of Condillac' s metaphysical allegories. A step 
was taken towards the invention of the radical conception of the autonomy of language, 
towards an irreversible uprooting of language from the sphere of subjectivity. The exile 
of language will, in fact, tum out into an exclusion of the subject - as a transforming 
agent - from the realm of symbol. In Condillac, language lacks identity: there is an 
inner cleft between the substance and the grammar of signs, as well as between the 
distortions of historical meanings and the formal precision of signs which is due to its 
imtinctuaI, timeless origins; nevertheless, it preserves an unyielding generating power. 
Language is thought to engender knowledge through the mysterious faculty of human 
understanding to combine formal, abstract tokens; the restless transformation of the 
notions which aim at the phenomena of the world was then conceived as arousen from 
the set of potencies of a virtual grammar of sensations. However, this power of 
combining operations was neither envisaged as totally subdued by man's will, nor as 
absolutely freed from it: language was seen by Condillac to an intrinsic "disposition" 
of signs to combination. Signs were conceived as linked by an inherent sympathy. 
There should be an essential, analogical binding between some, and an essential 
rejection of formal proximity between others. This sympathy, although obscure in its 
qualities and its sources, could be created by a singular act of naming. A name, a 
complex denomination, could restore a bfQken congruity among signs, a congruity that 
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reflects the appropriate response of sensations to the boundless silence of things. 
Condillac I s conception of analogy - of sympathy - implied a fundamental 
though equivocal notion: sympathy as a force of attraction, as a binding force, as a 
gravitational attribute of signs. Newton I s notions, constructed upon the idea of 
proximity and contact but also upon the evidence of efficient, distant action, revealed 
a delicate but intangible regime of interaction between bodies as well as a web of 
delicate equilibrium forces inherent in the whole universe of bodies. 10 Condillac I s 
fantasies preserved untouched or even magnified the force of Newton I s allegories 
which became as contradictory and exacting as in Hume's thought and in the 
speculative imagination of Kant. Nevertheless, the concept of a distant, "gravitational" 
bond between the signs advanced by Condillac overflowed the boundaries of language 
and revealed itself as a singular articulating figure which enbodied both the subject and 
his signs. The laws of attraction between bodies are universal, and this universality 
might be extended "figuratively" (Condillac), metaphorically, beyond the limits of 
physics. Thus, it should comprehend each movement, each measurable mass, each 
source of sensation, but also each contact and each relationship between the bodies: it 
encompasses·syntax and affection, even to become also a principle of human action. 
In fact, as we follow Condillac, the essential nature of the notion of force confounds 
itself with the name of sensation. Sensations spring from bodily efforts and resistances. 
This immediate corporeality conditioned and founded -the figurative operation is 
inverted- the physical nature of the sensations which, in turn, gave rise to the material 
conception of spiritual worlds. 
The works of Condillac exhibit the development of an "epistemological myth": 
the obscure nature of force, its position at the unattainable centre of contemporary 
thought around which revolves a paradoxical notion of language and, with it, a fragile 
image of self, already forged during the Enlightenment, displayed by signs which, 
paradoxically, announced its imminent collapse. Romanticism offered a first glimpse 
of the incurable wounds of the fragmented self. The depths of consciousness appeared 
as inhabited by an unfathomable animating geometrical, mute, and delicately balanced 
force: a source of enigma and misunderstanding, veiled in itself, but likely to define 
the position of self in the universe of mC:\.tter. 
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Condillac thus prefigures both the culmination and the breakdown of the 
Enlightenment project. The historical conception of language which turned into a 
progressive acknowledgement of its autonomous regime, of the effective force of its 
signs, produced, as a sequel, its formalization as a system and the rejection of 
theological foundations of representation, but also aroused the exalted vision of 
sensibility, the broadening of the cleft between body and mind and the mechanization 
of the soul, and the inescapable conviction of the fading presence of the world. This 
image of language led to the dominance of scientific patterns of thought as models of 
philosophical comprehension, as the horizon defining its profile of argumentation and 
style, its rhetoric of evidence which founded conviction. It is not surprising that 
Condillac's Traite des sensations was to become a main text in the initial years of the 
positivistic project to teach a language to deaf-mutes. His words signal the dawn of the 
conception which saw aberrations of language not as theological tokens but as 
pathological symptoms. It also signals the definitive exile of language from the realm 
of sacredness, the invention of language as a system and the recognition of the 
autonomous dynamic systems of phonology and syntax. It foretells the methodological 
austerity of· historical linguistics and, paradoxically, the final enthronement of 
sensibility, the defmitive emergence of self as an uncertain entity, afflicted by the 
foreign nature of language, a self tom apart from his own sense by dreams. 
III. Mesmer and the mystic rhetoric of secrecy 
Twelve years after the publication of the Traite des sensdtions, in 1766, Franz-Anton 
Mesmer obtained in Vienna his degree as a physician. His thesis, Dissertatio physico-
medica de planetarum injluxll , clearly showed that he was, like Condillac and Hume, 
profoundly influenced by Newton, but no less in debt to Paracelso or to Kircher. He 
was no less impassioned than Condillac in his search for a set of general laws 
governing bodies and phenomena, and the universalization of the principles of 
Newtonian physics. Mesmer and Condillac relied equally on a key rhetorical 
procedure: analogical reduction. Perhaps there were only two differences between 
them: Mesmer's capacity for faith and Condillac's awareness of the secretiveness of 
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sensations and of language. Mesmer had not yet experienced the advent of suspicion. 
Conceivably Condillac had. 
Mesmer assigned a privileged place to the gaze -and observation as the main 
instrument for acquiring knowledge- and reinforced a dominant characteristic of 
eighteenth century reflection about nature, the hierarchy of the senses and sensibility 
integrated in a system. Indeed, the nature of sensations seemed to take roots in the 
autonomous constitution of the senses; however, it totally depends on the subject's 
capacity to apprehend and compose into a whole the vast and complex sphere of 
impressions: 
L'homme est naturellement observateur. Des sa naissanee, sa 
seuI occupation est d'observer, pour apprendre a faire usage 
de ses organes. L'oeil par example lui serait inutile, si la nature 
De Ie portait d'abord a faire attention aux moindres variations dont 
il est susceptible [ ... ] La plupart des sensations sont donc Ie 
resultat de ses reflexions sur les impressions reunis dans des 
organes. 12 
But Mesmer's meditations encouraged a definite fusion of the exaltations which 
accompanied the dramatic apprehension of Newtonian mechanics and need for the 
support of institutional policies. The outcome of this fusion was a complex knowledge: 
Ie sa voir medical. Much more explicitly than Condillac - whose efforts were only 
indirectly incorporated into this twilight zone of latowledge zone between nineteenth 
century medicine and the erection of pedagogy into a distinct discipline -, Mesmer 
drew from this "Newtonian passion" direct conclusions about the nature of human 
bodies, the physiological perfonnance of nerves, and adequate therapeutic procedures: 
J'avancais, d'apres les principes connues de l'attraction 
universelle, constatee par les observations qui nous apprennent 
que les planetes s'affectent mutuellement dans leurs orbites et que 
la lune et Ie soleil'causent et dirigent sur notre globe Ie flux et Ie 
reflux dans la mer ainsi que dans l'~tmosphere; j'avan~ais, dis je, 
que ces spheres exercent aussi une action directe sur toutes les 
parties constitutives des corps animes, particulierement sur Ie 
syst~me nerveux, moyennant un fluide qui penetre tout: je 
detenninais cette action par I'intention et la remission des 
proprietes de la matiere et des corps organises, telles que sont 
la gra~ la cohesion, l'elasticite, l'irritabilite, l'electricite."13 
There is a metaphorical presence ofjluid as the agent of irritability as well as of gravity 
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and electricity. By virtue of fluid, cohesion appears as a natural disposition of the 
bodies. Fluid becomes both a fable and and an explaining principle, a narration formed 
by ciphered notions, patterns of thought drawn from different conceptual spheres and 
disciplines: physics and biology fused together in a surprising conception of 
physiology, neurology and the anatomy of the soul. The hydraulic metaphor was to 
remain as a fascinating, "magnetic" figure in the wake of the discourse of physics. 
Particularly at the boundaries of biology, physics remained as a model, as an id~1ired 
achievement of human knowledge. 
But beyond the explicit beliefs of biology, fluid appeared as the explicit 
negation of the central position of seeing. Indeed, the notion of fluid implied a dynamic 
interaction, a proximity, a contact of bodies. Nevertheless, the metaphor of the 
magnetic fluid provides an image for the bond between bodies which lacks any visible 
substance. It was the victory of radical transparency. As an all pervading presence, as 
the substance that accomplishes the cohesive aim of universe, as a non-perceivable, 
non-visible acting agent, this volatile, spiritual fluid was to negate the power of 
sensibility; this conception envisions the material evidence of the senses subdued to the 
speculative profile of a universal and unfathomable presence. Moreover, this intangible . 
substance, the fluid, had an additional power: it did not exert its influence over the 
body as a whole, but impregnated its intimate substances. The fluid metaphor dissolved 
the distinctions between inner and outer dimensions, the visible and the invisible, the 
animate and the inanimate, in a unified undifferentiated matter. The whole power of 
this conception had its source in the dissolving action of the rhetoric of secrecy 
projected upon the body of positivistic knowledge. The most significant outcome of the 
rhetoric of secrecy was the image of knowledge as semiotics: it brought about an 
hermeneutic of malady, a comprehension of affection only possible for initiates and the 
ciphered significance of symptom. 
But the therapeutic consequences of this enthroning of secrecy, the fascinating 
imprint of the whole universe on the still fragile conception of the nervous system, 
were by far the foremost manifestation of this epistemological myth; for the myth 
symultaneously founded, upon this rhetoric of secrecy, both a delusive psychological 
doctrine and a physiological mirage: a notion of personality, a canon for the 
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taxonomies of the pathologies of the soul, upheld by the metaphor of fluid dynamics 
which inspir~ the image of concealed maps of bodily diagrams of the motion of 
energy.14 Moreover, Mesmer's fantasies also contributed to found a broad regime of 
institutional strategies, a new dominion of seeing and controlling: education, 
pedagogy. IS 
Mesmerism can be seen as the singular point at which several currents of 
European thought converge: a point of inflection, both a culmination and a begining 
of an age, as an epigraph and an elegy, as a displacement of the patterns of seeing and 
the exhaltation of sublime reasoning, as the founding of a scientific myth and an 
unsuspected source of uncertainty, as a new domain for faith likely to displace the old 
one, as the expression of an enthusiasm for the occult accompanied by the development 
of a positivistic "dynamic psychology" and as a therapeutic practice built upon the 
hitherto unacknowledged virtues of hypnotism. But this convergence took place within 
an all-encompassing delight in secrecy. 16 
Mesmerism was not an extravagance which intruded in the quieteness and the 
hopeful serenity of the Enlightenment, nor an undermining of the certitudes of 
progress. Occultism was ingrained in the sphere of Mesmerism, and was a legitimate 
outgrowth of the driving forces of the Enlightenment: Newtonian physics, rationalism, 
religious fervour, devotion to progress, powerful biological models and Natural 
History, the tension between observation and imaginative inventiveness, speculative 
discourse, the political importance of new secret societies and sects, as well as social 
conflicts generated by the collapse of ancient institutions. Occultism sought in 
magnetism and in the enigmatic nature of energy, a refuge from Enlightenment itself. 
It sought this refuge despite sharing with science a passionate belief in the amazing 
magical power of positivistic knowledge, in imagination as an inherent promise of the 
future dominion of reason over nature and over man, and in a further, unfulfilled, yet 
legitimate promise of collective welfare. Occultism bloomed shielded by the exalted 
imagination of the French Revolution, by the enthusiasm it aroused; it appeared as the 
resonance of the praising of the sublime. Philipe Muray has vividly portrayed this facet 
of the nineteenth century: 
Balsamo use de son pouvoir hypnotique dans Ie but de provoquer 
la Revolution. Le mysrere Cagliostro passe dans Ie fond du decor, 
la cour de Louis XV se decompose, les societes secretes 
manipulatrices sont menees sans les savoir par Ie bout du nez, 
Marie-Antoinette est SOlIS I'empire de Mesmer, la Bastille tombe, 
les sectes jaillissent des pierres de la fortresse ecroulee, la 
bacchanale des occultes au grand jour commence. La politique. Le 
gouvemement des masses par les mages et des masses des mages 
par les mages de la masse. Les jeux sont refaits, les ames 
captivees, clest Ie delire et les temps modemes. 17 
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There is a primary social driving force in this mixture of insanity and exalted 
expectation: fear. "No passion -writes Edmund Burke- so effectually robs the mind 
of all its powers of acting and reasOning as fear" 18. Fear reveals itself in an awareness 
of the uncertain significance of signs; it instigates an hermeneutical urgency the basis 
of which is the evidence of a presence without meaning: obscurity and secrecy have 
become themselves evidence. There is a recognition of the exacting dilemma of truth 
as a sign that defies decipherment, inaccessible, and yet as the seed of political action 
and of aesthetic experience rooted in pain and pleasure. Fear thus appears at the 
conjunction of memory and promise, of scientific devotion and the delusions of 
immediate experience, of the degradation of the divine and the speculative deifying of 
theological principles. The history of fear entwines itself with the history of the passion 
for secrecy. Fear, obscurity and concealment also coexist in the conception of nature 
and of scientific enterprise: the nineteenth century witnessed a relentless confrontation 
of the self with this obscurity. Perhaps it was Edmund Burke who best expressed the 
inextricable emotion aroused by mute but eloquent presence; names, objects, 
. 
experiences, passions, conceptions and the inner conflicts within the boundaries of 
subjectivity. In his reflection on the sublime he writes: 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and 
danger, that is to say, whatever .is in any sort terrible, or is 
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is the 
product of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of 
feeling. [ ... ] The passion caused by the great and the sublime in 
nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is 
Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of soul, in which all 
the motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. 19 
Thus, signs of nature exhibited a extreme condition which was seen as the source of 
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the experience of the sublime and its paralyzing quality. The word astonishment, which 
acquired a ~ific resonance since Descartes, named the arrest of the meaning of the 
natural sign which, we should see, stems from the original experience of pain. Horror 
that accompanies pain confounding itself with its emotions, with danger and darkness, 
lies deep in the inner, regions of the stifled expression of astonishment. Horror dwells 
within the expression, concealed by the overwhelming experience of the sublime. The 
deep sense of horror itself lies unexpressed but is nevertheless active in the sudden 
silence which signals the advent of the experience of the sublime. Thus, secrecy 
appears as a privileged sign: a significant, undeniable silence recognizable as sign; it 
is the uncertain sign of vacuousness the source of which are pain and horror, deprived 
from any possible interpretation; a clear presence the meaning of which eludes any 
encompassing expression, but nevertheless awakens vigorous emotions. Fear is exalted 
as a powerful passion and at the dawn of the nineteenth century it is driven by a 
semiotic impulse, centered on secrecy and obscurity. 
IV. The intimate dissemination of anxiety: hermeneutics and the passions 
of history 
A partir du XIXeme siecle, Ie langage se rep lie sur soi, acquiert 
son epaisseur propre, deploie une histoire, des lois et une 
objectivite qui n'appartieot qu'a lui. II est devenu un objet de la 
connaissance panni tant d'autres: a cOte des etres vivants, a cOte 
des richesses et de la valeur, a cOte de l'histoire des evenements 
et des hommes.20 
This receding of language, induced by the recognition of the autonomy of signs as 
system, manifests the impact of the sudden social apparition of fear, not as a mere 
individual experience, nor as a recognizable response of a particular body to an 
identifiable agent, but as an object of the speculative mind. The Terror aroused by the 
political significance of the destruction of the bodies of the victims of the Revolution 
not only signified the abrupt transforma..tion of the Regime, but also illuminated the 
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changing boundaries and meaning of the self. The violence of French Revolution , 
which shape4 the new sense of enthusiasm and the new aesthetic weight of the 
exorbitant, of terror -the sublime as outlined by Kant's meditation on judgement-, 
emerged also as a complex object: that which by itself provokes horror, and reveals the 
limits of language and the boundaries of transcendental presence. This presence 
supports power beyond the will of man and is perceived as a nameless machine, a 
device capable of encompassing and obliterating the aims of divinity. It exhi~its the 
transient, undefinable, boundary signs that confirm, paradoxically, the absolute 
dominion of codes over the uninterrupted silence of God. Fear became corporeal and 
the primary source of the sublime. 
Fear dwells not on the boundaries of discourse but of language itself. The 
sublime does not reject discourse; rather it is loquacious; it excites an impulse to 
speech, as if the experience of having reached the limits of language, the immersion 
in horror, had unleashed a driving force that engendered a non-subjective, unending 
chatter, which deepened and in tum, exacerbated the hollowness of meaning. Words 
displayed for the first time the remoteness of their substance, now that they were free 
from the necessity for addressing an outer presence. Words appeared as both limitless 
in their capacity to represent and void of any essential meaningfulness. This vacuity is 
the root of both horror and the sublime. It is also the root of the attraction exerted by 
the despotic purity of revolutionary slogans. About the sublime proclamation of 
Robespierre: "Je suis l'esclave de la liberb~", Claude Lefort has written: 
Nous sornmes passes tres vite sur ces mots, quand nous avons 
juge qu'ils foissaient entrevoir Ie gouffre de I'ancienne oppression, 
Ie danger d'une rechute dans les tenebres du passe. C'est une autre 
gouffre qu'ils ouvrent a la pensee: l'aflinnation absolue de la 
liberte se confond avec sa negation; Ie sens se vide dans Ie non-
sens. Le dicible, en l'occurrence, serait que I'etablissemet d'un 
regime libre suppose Ie recours a des moyens terribles, que furent 
ceux du despotisme, pour en extirper les racines. Mais les mots 
de Robespierre portent la marque de I'indicible; ils briilent la 
langue de leur contact; I'articulation est defaite. Ici, la Terreur 
parle dans la devastation de la parole humaine. 21 
Meaninglessness is revealed as an essential feature of language. The autonomous voice 
of Terror has frightened the age as intensely as the massive and brutal, political death. 
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Perhaps this devastation of human speech and the sublimity of the sense it conveys, la 
Te"eur, has not received the attention it deserved -not even Foucault, who has 
devoted some enlightening commentaries to the notion of limits at the threshold of the 
nineteenth century, has meditated cogently about this specific manifestation of the 
limits of language. This "word" uttered as Terror is but the sign, the locus of a 
convergence of the sovereignty of language and the absolute authority of the realm of 
law. At this point at which the absolute nature of signs meets the irrevocable 
sovereignty of the law, the work of Sade arises as a sequel of the same conditions that 
gave rise to the Kantian ethic revolution: 
L'image classique De connait que les lois, specifiees comme telles 
ou telles apres les domaines du Bien et les circonstances de 
Mieux. Lorsque Kant parle au contraire de "Ia" loi morale, Ie mot 
morale designe Seulement la determination de ce qui reste 
absolwnent indetermine: la loi morale est la representation d'une 
pure fonne, independant d'un contenu et d'un objet, d'un domaine 
et de circonstances.22 
The moral law refers to nothing which might be presented to sensible intuition. It 
emerges as an absolute and independent principle. Thus, it has its own time, its own 
histories. It is loquacious, undecipherable; the mirror image of subjectivity, which 
becomes ever denser and displays its own imagination. Both understanding and moral 
behaviour are rooted in the extreme desolation of normativity: the autonomy of 
language was seen to reside in its impenetrable opacity. Secrecy is not a concealing 
strategy, but an inherent condition of the autonomy of moral law: it is the fate of sign 
itself; it involves the yielding of the subject to the Terror which has become itself part 
of this history of signs. 
The awareness of the opacity of language is but the latest stage in the fragmentary and 
widely dispersed experience of the tenacity of memory. Henceforth, "history", 
conceived as a positivistic knowledge, becomes foreign to the experience of man, it 
rejects his most intimate perceptions and his imaginative invention of the past. Perhaps, 
the most brutal impact of the acceptance by society of Darwin's hypothesis was neither 
the expUlsion of man from the summit of Creation, nor the infliction of an incurable 
wound on the narcissism of mankind -as-Freud once insinuated-, but the acceptance 
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of a sublime notion of history: Natural History. Natural history, as a scientific realm 
outlined in the nineteenth century, settles the taxonomies vaguely stated during the 
eighteenth century. The new awareness of the fragmentary nature of beings and an 
unprecedented sense of the density of time led to the enthronement of analysis as a 
privileged operation. Natural History is an astonishing statement about an inhuman and 
non-human transformation of things. The world emerged not as an essential, fixed 
universe of biological morphologies, but as a series of decaying beings that had left as 
only testimony their own debris. Genesis became an accidental incident, as did the 
vanishing of whole species: time offers the certainty of radical destruction; there is a 
full awareness of the finite condition of experience. But this finite condition of beings 
exposes itself as a series of events, as a temporal succession without any witness. 
Natural history, as created in the nineteenth century, inaugurated the notion of a history 
without a memory, a history lying beyond any power of evocation, a history that 
transcended presence, testimonies, narrations, myths or even fictions. It exhibited a 
mysterious notion of time: one which required the disappearance of identity and which 
concealed an inhuman truth while rejecting also the mirage of fixed taxonomies, a flXed 
path of Creation. The truth about the past was not to be found in revelation, nor 
derived from the eloquence of an ancestral faith, but as a empirical knowledge brought 
to light by the methodic enquiry into the residues of the men's life. History emerged 
as a settled, non-subjective, dispersed and enigmatic memory the integration of which 
was beyond the sphere of collective and individual experience; history remained always 
as an unperceived and latent, albeit vigorous presence. 
Thus, the development of archeology and its spectacular findings was not 
surprising. It emerged as another strand of knowledge, an intrusion into everyday life 
of the widely disseminated residual evidences of challenging origins, hidden from the 
eye, the supremacy of which had been affirmed by eighteenth century philosophy. It 
offered evidence of a truth which lay beyond the reach of the immediate and 
penetrating gaze. History became the justification of the existence of virtual signs that 
conceal an elusive truth: profundity became a feature of the experience of time; the 
virtual nature of signs expressed by the concept of history enclosed both a bounded 
memory and an exasperated unfulfilled promise. 
If, as Foucault has proposed, 
[since the Classical Age] la theorie de l'histoire n'est pas 
dissociable de ceDe du langage. Et pourtant, il ne s'agit pas, de 
lime al'autre, d'un transfer de methode. Ni d'une communication 
de concepts, ou de prestiges d'un modele qui, pour avoir "reussi" 
d\m cOte serait essaye dans Ie domain voisin. II ne s'agit pas non 
plus d'une rationalite plus generale qui imposerait des fonnes 
identiques ala reflexion sur la grammaire et a 1a tarinomia. Mais 
d'un disposition fondamentale du savoir qui ordonne la 
connaisance des etres ala possibilite de les representer dans un 
systeme de noms. 23 
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The fundamental relation between knowledge and a system of names was to be 
strengthened by the contributions of Natural History. Taxonomy appeared definitively 
bound up with the conceptions of time inherent in the modem conception of history. 
The bond between Natural History and language was to exhibit an unusual pattern due 
to the violence of the encounter with the conception of a non-subjective nature of time, 
the figure of a non testimonial history, the profile of an untraceable past restored only 
as a conjectural model, as a virtual system of rules and their successive 
transformations. But perhaps an even greater upheaval in the apparently harmonious 
relation between language and Natural History was to occur within the nature of . 
language itself and the figures that congregated about it: its nominative and ordering 
power was no longer seen to stem from its monolithic contours. The systematic 
combination of the elements of language exhibited, like any other functional organism, 
the turbulence of life; languages themselves became distant objects, animated by a 
strange kind of vital impulse.24 
Yet there remained undeniable links between language and thought. The speaker was 
enclosed within the sphere of an historical, living language, indifferent to his fate. The 
implicit fusion of the categories of understanding -in Kantian terms- and the names 
confered on them, exhibited its fundamental impact upon the Romantic conception of 
language, evinced, among others, by Schleiermacher's conception of understanding 
[Verstand] envisaged as a permanent struggle between two essentially autonomous 
spheres: language and psychology, each following distinct historical paths, each 
destined to distinct but nevertheless relat.ed fates: 
In 1819, Schleiermacher wrote:25 
Wie jede Rede cine zweifache Beziehung hat, auf die Gesamtheit 
der Sprache und auf das gesamte Denken ihres Urhebers: so 
besteht auclt alIes Versteben aus den zwei Momenten, die Rede zu 
verstehen aIs herausgenommen aus der Sprache, un sie zu 
verstehen aIs Tatsache im Denkenden.· 
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There is a rhythmical movement, a succession of moments, a distinctive set of accents, 
which characterizes each of these dimensions of understanding. Thus, understanding 
embraced -9CCOI'ding to Schleiermacher- two closed spheres: the sphere of language, 
which existed as a whole, preserving itself as an non apprehensible but compelling 
identity, and the psychological sPhere, which presented itself as the "totality of the 
thoughts". Understanding appears at the intersection of this historical totalities which 
. 
themselves resist apprehension. This impossibility of apprehension is stated by 
Schleiermacher himself: 26 
Sollte die grammatische Seite fUr sich allein vollendet werden, sie 
miisste eine vollkommene Kenntnis der Sprache gegeben sein, im 
odem FaIle eine volstandige Kenntnis des Menschen. Da beides 
nie gegeben sein kann, so muss man von einem zu andern 
Obergehen, und wie dies geschehen soil, darOber lassen sich 
keine Regeln geben"· 
The rhythmic patterns of interpretation of language and of psychological expressions, 
do not l~ to a definitive ending. This uncertainty incited in Schleiermacher the need 
to displace hermeneutics: he comes to apply its methods to the realm of art. But this 
displacement only intensifies the uneasiness: it removes understanding from the sphere 
of knowledge, only to root it in a universe governed by the impulse of sensations. This 
movement goes from truth to taste, from timelessness to rhythmic turbulence, from the 
observation and construction of evidence to faith and imagination. But the impossibility 
-Just as every act of speaking is related to both the totality of the language and the totality of the speaker's thoughts, 
so understanding a speech always involves two moments: to understand what it is said in the context of language 
[herausgenommen aus der Sprache] with its possibilities, and to understand it as a fact in the thinking of the speaker 
[Den.Unden). (Edited and translated by Kurt Muller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutics Reader, New York, Continuum, 
1985, p.74) 
.n order to complete the grammatical side of interpretation it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge 
of the language. In order to complete its psychological side it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge 
of the person. Since in both cases such complere knowledge is impossible. it is necessary to move back andforth 
between the grammatical and psychological sides. and 1'0 rules can stipulate exactly how to do this. (Kurt Muller-
Vollmer (editor), p.76. Emphasis added.) 
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of attaining absolute self-identity, leaves in interpretation slight warning signs when 
confronted to the impossibility of establishing the self-identity of language. The 
displacement of understanding [Verstehen] from the rational sphere to the domain of 
art hampers its endeavour; it does not attempt a synthetic comprehension of language, 
for it sees understanding as constrained by the subject's historical nature which 
embodies the whole domain of his experience. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the experience of secrecy acquired an unsuspected, 
unprecedented profile. It became inextricably attached to the notion and the experience 
of limits. Like the social experiences of fear, of silence, of pain and of truth in which 
it is deeply rooted, secrecy underwent profound transformations. These transformations 
which chiefly occurred in the social conceptions of knowledge, slowly emerged from 
the conjunction of the Romantic imagination and the endurance of the certainties of the 
Enlightenment. The histories of silence and of secrecy which had remained distant, 
even foreign to each other, became indistinguishable: both silence and secrecy named 
a sense which resided beyond the perceivable substance of language. The limits of 
understanding, so strongly evinced by the Enlightenment, illuminated the elusive, 
almost unperceivable limits of language. But the exploration of the limits of language 
in which the Romantic age became involved, also cast a shadow upon the notion of 
truth. Secrecy dwelt at the crossroads of there two contrasting limits. The emerging 
experience of secrecy revealed in itself a sense beyond sense. It gave rise to the 
flowering of exegesis. 
On comprend ainsi Ie renouvea~ tres marque au XIXe siecle, de 
toutes Ies techniques de I'exegese. Cette reapparition est due au 
fait que Ie langage a repris Ia densite enigmatique qui etait la 
sienne 8 la Renaissance. Mais il ne s'agira pas maintenant de 
retrouver une parole premiere qu'on y aurait enfouie, mais 
d'inquieter les mots que nous parlons, de denoncer Ie pli 
grammatical de nos idees, de dissiper les mythes que animent nos 
mots, de rendre a nouveau bruyant et audible la part de silence 
que tout discourse emporte avec soi lorsqu'i I s 'enonce. 27 
The exacerbated confrontation and the subtle fusion of the limits of truth and language 
might have moulded certain dominant patterns in the discourse of the nineteenth 
century. Visible signs revealed, by theIr mere appearance, an unfathomable sense 
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which abode beneath the surface of the signs themselves. There was an inner boundary 
of language. The limit of language no longer defined a foreign, excluded realm of 
sense. The limit itself was conceived as engraved in the body of signs. Silence ceased 
to be thought of as the casual collapse of language. It rather signalled not a voluntarily 
concealed object or sense, but an essential exhaustion of language, a cleavage in the 
substance of language itself. In the nineteenth century, the subject was constrained to 
face the empty voice of silence inherently embodied in the substance, the syntax, and 
the material evidence of signs. But he was also compelled to assume that this silence 
was not a contingency. Moreover, it was to be seen as pervading language, spreading 
out over its surface, leaving delicate, transient traces which lay unperceived on the 
visible substance of discourse. 
Psychoanalysis finds its place at this point of convergence of limits. But it is not 
to be seen as a simple sequel of the passion for interpretation which gave rise to the 
endless series of techniques of exegesis which dominated much intelectual activity in 
the nineteenth century. Psychoanalysis can be seen, paradoxically, both an exacerbation 
and a negation of exegesis. Moreover, throughout the different stages of the historical 
development- of psychoanalysis, the force of exegesis progressively declines; 
interpretation evolves into an uncertain search which disdains its own ground and ends. 
Psychoanalysis lacks the illuminating force of faith. Unlike exegesis, psychoanalytic 
interpretation has rejected the firm confidence in the existence of a primordial meaning 
which might have guided the whole enterprise. 
Throughout the Nineteenth century the path of exegesis became increasingly 
distant from that of psychoanalysis. Even if both exegesis and psychoanalysis reject the 
existence of fixed limits of sense, psychoanalysis took this rejection to almost 
un tolerable extremes. But while exegesis holds to the conviction of the essential nature 
of meaning, and devotes itself to the patient expansion of its boundaries, the confidence 
of psychoanalysis in the fundamental role of language dims. It is the invincible 
confidence in meaning that promts exegesis to a hasty, and even peremptory 
confirmation of the invincible creative power of language. However, if exegesis 
cultivates and tends indeed each new sprouts of interpretation, psychoanalysis identifies 
the progressive expansion of meanings as a disquieting resonance of the inner tensions 
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of the spirit and, in the last analysis, as a misleading appearance of deep, inextricably 
confused conflicting forces within the subject. 
Yet, exegesis arises from the subject's despair about meaning. It is also marked 
by the conviction of the unsurmountable foreigness of language. Each interpretation 
renews and confinns the ellusive, unfathomable nature of meaning itself; it exhibits the 
supererogatory sense of interpretation, its vacuousness. Paradoxically, each new 
exegesis, instead of approaching the subject's consciousness to the sough~ after 
meaning, broadens the cleft between consciousness and language. Language seems to 
move away, to become progressively foreign to interpretation. This experience of a 
fading language, brought about by endless interpretation, in tum, seems to emerge 
from an irreducible, ambiguous oblivion inherent in language. Interpretation forges an 
image of a remote, challenging meaning which lies in the bottom of language; and the 
remoteness of meaning appears as evidence of an essential indifference of language, 
an indifference which confounds itself with oblivion. Thus, language seems to remain 
foreign to the demands of memory. The boundaries of memory appear to emerge from 
the inherent obstinacy of language, from its resistance, from its indifference to the 
subject's demand that he should be capable of saying everything, of recalling 
everything. Instead, memory and language decay, become exhausted, mute. Language 
remains both the site and the root of an essential irreducible oblivion. It scribes silence 
on the core of the subject's experience. It It also dissolves any enduring trace of the 
singular relation of the subject to his language. Exegesis emerges as a lasting effort to 
overcome the delusive effect of the oblivion inherent in language, it arouses a relentless 
desire for memory. Exegesis becomes in itself a means of restoring evocation. 
Paradoxically, the nineteenth century saw both an exaltation and an exhaustion 
of symbol. Both conditions incited a strengthening of the fervour for interpretation, and 
often became inexticably bound up with it. The prestige of observation and detached 
description of phenomena acompanied the less perceivable endurance and 
metamorphosis of exegesis which unfolded the dense matter of symbol. The imperative 
of non-subjective observation as a condition of the construction of evidence and as an 
instrument of proof evolved simultaneously with the growing necessity for a 
trascendental, even obscure universe of categories, taxonomies and procedures which 
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promised to unveil the subject's most intimate condition. The positivistic view of 
knowledge grew besides an obdurate conviction in the obscurity of sense, the shattering 
of language and the experience of the darkening of the soul. 
Psyhcoanalysis is grounded in the serenity of the positivistic conception of the 
body, as well as in the exaltations of symbol, the dark roots of hypnosis and 
thermodynamics, and in the exegesis of intimate and fragmentary narrations, in the fine 
passions aroused by the discovery of the nervous tissues. Physiology shar~ the 
exultant vision of thermodynamics, and sought to build upon it the thorough 
classification of the maladies of language, of the patterns of its destruction -the studies 
on aphasia. But psychoanalysis also appeared as a echo of mesmerism, as an aftermath 
of the impact of the hypnotic recall of buried shreds of the past, unattainable to 
consciousness; it also had its origins in the archeological conception of memory which 
subtly pervaded the scientific approach to the nervous apparatus, nourished by 
symptoms which appeared as traces of language uttered by aphasic patients, and by the 
endless evolution of interpretation which enacted the social experience of the 
weakening capacities of evocation. Psychoanalysis encompasses two diverging, 
struggling visions: a positivistic, thermodynamic, material conception of the soul, and 
the ellusive, daunting landscape of the wreckage of language, the thwarting of memory 
by the violent imposition of the necessities of life. 
Psychoanalysis conceives meaning as unlikely to convey any certainty, any 
evidence about the subject's nature; it is this conviction that reinforces the final daring 
bid of psychoanalytic interpretation: it does not seek a sense, but strives after its own 
renewal. Language appears as an inner boundary of the self. Thus, psychoanalysis is 
in itself edified upon inaccessible ground: secrecy. But in the light of psychoanalysis 
this notion had to found a new definition: secrecy was to be seen not as an omited 
theme, an obliterated episode, a twisted occount of facts; a truth the unveiling of which 
has been defered, but as an inherent condition of language, a sense which emerges 
from the experience of the limits of meaning, of the force of silence which constrains 
the expressive power of speech. Paul Laurent Assoun remarked: 
Ce que Freud va decouvrir n'etait cache qu'en un sense. II 
n'attendait pas dans I'ombre d'etre debusque: il etait sous les yeux 
de tous, implique dans Ie langage de chacun des sujets. En ce 
sense, Freud n'aurait pas decouvert, mais designe a chacun des 
"usagers" la presence de ce que s'y notifie, inversant Ie 
mouvement etrange de l'inconscient, qui consiste a dire, tout en 
maintenant ce qui est dit dans I'insu. En ce sense, il a moins de-
couvert que manifoste, maintenant l'inconscient dans la purere de 
ses manifestations, sans les entraver, "donant a voir" ce qui est 
visible plutOt que cache. L'inconscient etait moins un "secret" 
qu'une manifostalion qUi rend aveugle d'etre trop claire (image 
deja o:dipienne), Freud, on Ie voit, n'avait decidement pas a 
decouvrir cette image, mais a inverser Ie mouvement qui tend a en 
detourner Ie regard, Ie rendant lisible.28 
33 
Assoun distinguishes some fundamental features of Freud's disruptive contribution both 
to the sphere of interpretation and to medical discourse. According to Assoun, the 
unconscious does not relate to language as cause to effect, nor as concealment to 
revelation, but as the implicit to the explicit sense of utterances. This relation relies 
upon an unexpected trait of the act of speech: the perceived, apparent wholeness of the 
act implies necessarily an unrecognizable, seldom perceived, dimension of sense. Some 
essential sense of the utterance remains unexpressed, excluded from the explicit 
meanings conveyed by the words. However, this excluded sense is manifested by the 
fragmentary glitter of residual experiences, the fleeting appearance of evocations, of 
slivers of unwitting gestures which enact forgotten representations. The foundations of 
the self's identity involves an excluded sense which remains implicit acting as a foreign 
force upon language; it transforms the meaning of words and engraves a tangible 
hollowness in the core of language. 
Moreover, Assoun refuses to assign to the unconscious the attributes of secrecy. 
He does not hesitate to affirm that the unconscious is rather a blinding -a dazzlingly 
clear- manifestation. However, as Edgar Allan Poe has convincingly shown in The 
Purloined Letter, secrecy is best hidden on the visible surface. Perhaps, Assoun' s main 
contribution is his conception of the Freudian interpretation, not as a procedure for 
disclosing a buried meaning, but for "making readable" the senseless signs scattered 
over the surface of language. To make these signs readable, the act of interpretation 
must recognize and depict the processes which have rendered them senseless. Secrecy 
may be conceived as this rendering undistinguishable of the potentially meaningful 
signs scattered over discourse, implied in the ultimate hollowness of the act of 
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utterance. 
V. Secrecy and the soul's affliction 
In 1766 Haller published his Elementa physi%giae. In this work, the notion of 
"irritability" was a cardinal element in an argumentation the aim of which was to draw 
a sharp distinction between normality and pathology, between health and sickness. 
Irritability could be seen as a fundamental, primary and undeveloped means of survival 
of any living being. The complete development of this elemental resource in human 
beings corresponds to the complex structure of sensation. A contemporary of Haller, 
the Scottish physician John Brown, broadened this notion: he coined the concept of 
"incitability" and defined it as "the-property that enables all live beings to be affected 
and to react". This incitability was the cornerstone for a taxonomical distinction which 
separated the normal and the pathological states. 
I have shown that health and sickness are one and the same state 
and that they depend on the same cause: the incitation, which 
varies only in different cases and in different degrees. I have 
already demonstrated that all the powers that produce health and 
sickness -and that sometimes they act with convenient degree of 
energy, and some other with too much force or excessive 
weakness- are the same ones. The physician must be only 
coocemed with the aberrations experienced through incitation, so 
as to carty them back by the convenient means to the point where 
the health resides. 29 
Nineteenth century medicine was to engage in a profound meditation on the boundaries 
between health and sickness; a boundary which, by the virtues of observation and the 
contributions of the emerging taxonomies of physiology and anatomy, promised a 
radical solution to the mystery of. the nature of malady. Freud was not an exception. 
Even at its later stage, Freudian text showed an openly confessed inclination towards 
a never clearly definite bond with biological thought and its fundamental categories. 
Throughout all his writings, from his early non-psychoanalytic papers to the Abriss der 
Psychanalyse (1938), there is an uncanny reappearance of the signals of the 
taxonomical universe of nineteenth century medicine; these are not meaningless 
residues, resistent relics, nor historical testimonies of a rejected theoretical construct. 
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These shreds of the biological discourse, these echoes of a weakened evocation aroused 
by the belief .in a virtually faithful and truthful scientific discourse, are not just faint 
images imprinted on the psychoanalytic thought; they are dispersed yet key pieces of 
the text itself. They forge a "paratactic" pattern of argumentation -in terms of Fran~is 
Roustang30_, this is to say, a non formal scheme of logical deduction which 
interweaves in various proportions personal experiences, clinical observations, 
anecdotes, literary quotations, according to changing and often incongruous con~tual 
frames and to unclear theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, this device proves persuasive 
by means of discontinuous conceptual patterns made up of severed fragments of 
heterogeneous texts and a peculiar, appropriate display of suitable evidences. Parataxis 
offered to psychoanalysis a formal narrative device founded upon repetition, analogy, 
allegory and silence, operations which displaced arguments and displayed discontinuous 
reasoning; moreover, it allowed the Freudian discourse to build itself upon a regime 
of elliptic allusions, of sudden digressions, of abrupt and unforeseen thematic 
appearances, of dazzling intrusions of the narrator's voice, often used as a refuge. 
However, this complex device does not undermine psychoanalytic images and the 
evokative power of its metaphors; it does not obstruct the capacity of Freudian 
reflection to illuminate unforeseen evidence of human behaviour; rather, it confers 
upon it an unusual elucidating quality; psychoanalysis appears as negative 
enlightenment. 
For all this, psychoanalysis remained faithful to Biology, accepting its 
progressive alienation, its foreign procedures, its incommensurable notional structure. 
Despite these incongruities, Freud obstinately preserved its concepts, transforming 
them into founding metaphors, assuming and embracing the conceptual heritage of the 
medical sciences. Psychoanalysis could not help viewing itself, in its unsettling 
remoteness from medicine, as having made a definitive choice: to confine itself to the 
fringes of positive science, although longing for its legitimacy; a paradoxical legitimacy 
which implied a menacing distrust of its theoretical achievements, and that, in the long 
run, would also bear testimony to the accuracy of its conceptual insights. Biology 
appeared, from the Freudian point of view, as bearing an essential truth, only 
incidentally misguided by a doubtful conception of mind. Freud's personal myth of 
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knowledge involved -even against his declared epistemological convictions-, at the 
final stages of psychoanalysis, a lasting, an image of a harmonic alliance between 
biology and the psychoanalytic conception of subjectivity. Despite his explicit denial 
of the faith in transcendental truth, psychoanalysis silently aspired to pronounce a 
definitive word, to reveal and consecrate decisive knowledge, to build a cohesive body 
of doctrine. The psychoanalytic truth should emerge from the final enthronement of 
Biology, in spite of its dubious conceptions and its methods of constructing evidence. 
Freud believed that the notion of the psychical apparatus demanded a definite and 
peculiar approach which implied a fragmented, disjoined view of psychical phenomena, 
the truth of which might appear only in the oblique light of disperse evidence and 
discontinuous discourse [lackhqft Sprache]. 
The nineteenth century enthroned a positivistic notion of symptom. Emerging 
from the fusion of a consecrated regime of observation and the positivistic belief in the 
visibility of perturbations, symptom invoked a peculiar visual semiotic, a speculative 
hermeneutic determined only by the powers of observation, a hermeneutic which 
claimed to be free from any convention, rooted only in instinct and biological 
necessity. The signs of symptom were not seen to convey meaning as an outcome of 
linguistic convention, but to reveal the truth of malady; symptoms were comparable to 
emanations the obscure soil of which, the perturbed nature of the being, awaited 
naming. Symptom demanded an accurate expression which would describe the mute, 
arid tokens of the body and bestow on them the fully illuminated identity of disease. 
The di sorder of nature offered an enigmatic effigy of the body which was to be 
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completely revealed by the rationality of diagnosis. Each symptom was the visible 
announcement of a whole set of obtruding disorders, of the perceivable derangement 
of the biological concord. However, symptoms preserved their essential muteness. To 
the medical eye, they remained as an organized web of silent or even concealed or 
imperceptible, menacing signs. Symptom exhibited the body as a rugged, unevenly 
illuminated geological fonnation, a chiaroscuro which offered a detailed though somber 
profile of its diseases. Symptom appeared as having an intrinsic relation to figure, 
interpretation and observation. The discernible although opaque, defiant signs which 
characterized a specific malady and spread over the surface of body seemed to compose 
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a regular, unifonn, exact universe. The dazzling logic of their repetition, the sharpness 
of their regular, emerging contours, the stillness of their physiognomy, all these 
features exacted a precise language. So did a fIXed order of designation, a uniform and 
repetitive chronology, a neatly comprehensive, thorough and compelling taxonomy, a 
faithful depiction of the essential nature of malady. Condillac's utopia of a formal 
language seemed to cu1mina.te in a fixed "grammar" of designations, in a rigid grid of 
descriptions and classifications of the perturbations of the body, in the intimate r~lation 
between the eye and the word which expressed the truth of abnormality, between the 
signs of the body and the essence of malady: 
Au-dessus de tous ces efforts de la pens6e clinique pour definir 
ses methodes et ses nonnes scientifiques, plane Ie grand mythe 
d'un pur Regard qui serait pur Langage: reil qui parlerai. 31 
Symptom was seen to appear on the visible body as an expressive outburst which 
exhibited the timeless geometry of pain, strictly determined by an inner bodily 
condition. However, the relation between symptom and the decaying organic substrate 
from which it emanates remained unclear; it was subject to a speculative transcendental 
reflection ~ut the link between cause and effect. With the notion of sympton, the 
speculative trends of thought which made of representation an issue reached their 
limits. The impossibility of harmony between language and object was clearly 
exhibited; the quest for an expressive rigour of the taxonomy and the comprehension 
of the essence of malady through classification was revealed to be a vain one. 
Symptom, as a visible token, demanded a more ambitious conception, which would 
envision it as a pure, pregnant sign in itself. Foucault retnarked: 
Le regard qui obseIve ne manifeste ses vertus que dans un double 
silence: celui, relatif, des theories, des imaginations et de tout ce 
que fait obstacle a l'immediat sensible; et celui, absolu, de tout 
langage qui serait anrerieur a celui. du visible. 32 
These two orders of silence stressed the enigmatic need for an expectant, unperturbed 
gaze to acknowledge the elusive nature of the deviant behaviour of the body. The 
"double silence" which surrounds the gaze revealed itself as a fundamental attribute of 
clinical observation. 
To remain faithful to its object,. the eye demands a deliberate oblivion of 
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language, a calculated muteness, an undeniable rejection of its own inherited universe 
of words. The gaze appears to apprehend a primordial vision. The moment of the 
gleam of the gaze is that of a radical, vigorously sought after suspension of language. 
This moment of the fulfilment of the observation transforms itself into the renewal of 
the experience of the primal instant in which the incarnation of the creation myth 
occurs. The notion of symptom bore the theological weight of the man t s original 
encounter with nature. The silent language of the gaze blooms on the fringes of 
language, foreign to the dense mass of inherited concepts, to reveal the limits of 
meaning, its failure, its dumbness, its vacuity. its useless effort in face of the emerging 
signals of a wounded nature. 
The exaltations of the gaze made evident the presence of secrecy which 
pervaded the intrinsic silence of words. Gaze was seen to expose an original speechless 
language which claimed to have been able to seize the essence of an absolute, 
irrevocable evidence of disease; it claimed to hold the key to the apprehension of the 
declining, vital force of the living being. Gaze seemed to strengthen the breeding 
power of secrecy only to expand its own pure, receptive capacity, to exhibit its full, 
silent power of recognition and its faculty of comprehension. 
Another crucial event contributed to enhance the captivating force exerted on 
the scientific mind of the nineteenth century by the compelling precision of the 
disciplined apprehension of gaze: the invention of the "physiology of reason" which 
followed upon by the discovery of the thermodynamic regulation of the brain, the 
medical capture of the soul. This capture was to reveal an uneasy condition of 
knowledge: the formal language of reason informed by the passion for taxonomy 
brought about the description of the nervous system and its related domains. Reason 
sought to explore its own material ground, to reveal its own physical limits, to plunge 
into its own soulless, spiritless dynamics. The soul disease had finally exposed its 
tangible root, a visible abode. There was a perceptible, yet hidden anchorage for its 
distorted functions. 
Nervous maladies, especially aphasia, were thoroughly described and classified: a map 
of the soul disease was drawn according to the faithful and detailed grid of conjectured 
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trajectories of excitation, of named territories of illness; a whole conception of the 
anxious muteness of the aphasic seemed to recognize its own imaginary territory in the 
sharply defined regions of the tissues of the brain. The measurable destruction of 
tissues accounted for the attested, numerous manifestations of muteness. 
The metaphysical conception of mind yielded to the arduous testimony of 
thermodynamics. Positivistic thought had achieved the surrender of language to itself. 
The taxonomical powers of the naming faculty subdued the image of language as a 
spiritual force. The weakening of the belief in linguistic transcendence provoked a 
more intimate anxiety: as language revealed itself as a physiological emanation, as a 
material echo of an effusion of energy, a firm shelter against fear also crumbled. The 
experience of the absolute limit of the human nature emerged from the description of 
language diseases in terms of energy. 
The biological conception of mental faculties, implied by Condillac' s theory 
of sensations, was to encompass the entire biological domain. Gall took it to a 
defInitive turning point, and later, the localisationist theory of language centers 
strengthened the speculative implications of this conception of mind: first Brouillard 
(1825) and then Broca (1861) established a definite correspondence between language 
and neurological stimulation; language became a part of the physical world, a 
thermodynamic process, an endless chain of physiological processes of charge and 
discharge of energy. 
Silence appeared obliquely: as an illness. The distortions of language behaviour, 
aphasia, the malady of muteness, revealed brain damage. A new neurological 
topography emerged from underneath the landscape of a typology of silence. The 
works of Helmholtz and Fechner, the onerous mystique of energy processes promoted 
by Ostwald, Hebart and Mach all laid bare a new and daunting paradox: the promise 
of knowledge paralleled the sense of strangeness provoked by the reduction of meaning 
to the silence of matter.33 Ernst Mach, in his influential book about sensations wrote: 34 
Ich kann den Verlauf eines physikalischen Prozesses durch einen 
sensiblen Nerv rum Zentralorgan verfolgen, von da seine 
verschiedenen Wege zu den Muskeln aufsuchen, deren 
Kootraktioo neue physikalische Veranderungen in der Umgebung 
bedingt. Ich moB hierbei an keine Empfmdung des beobachteten 
Menscben oder Tieres de~en. Was ich untersuche, ist ein rein 
physikalisches Objekt. Ohne Zweifel fehlt bier sehr viel zum 
Verstlndnis der Einzelhei~ un die Versicherung, daB alles auf 
"Bewegung der Molekiile" berube, kann mich fiber Meine 
Unwissenheit Dicht trosten und Dicht tauschen.· 
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However, the new "material" typology of silence, of a meaningless process which 
engenders meaning, of energy displacements that underlie the subject's utterances, 
strictly obeyed the rules of nineteenth century science. The exclusion of the immediate 
realm of the senses and the privilege accorded to physical process involved a singular, 
almost secret set of names, a foreign taxonomy of measurable but concealed processes, 
the presence of which was only to l?e testified to by a few initiates. Foucault describes 
the imperative rule of medical thought: 
La description, dans la medicine clinique, n'a pas pour sens de 
mettre Ie cache ou·l'invisible a la portee de ceux qui n'y ont pas 
acces; mais de faire parler aux seuls qui soient inities a la vrai 
parole.3s 
The description of aphasia and muteness did not acquire a deep, obscure sense: it was 
a simple matter of drawing the correspondence between wounds on the folding surface 
of the brain tissue and the observed barriers of language; it was a description of the 
disintegration of the cohesive structures of language. The distinct profiles of the 
different patterns of degradation of language led to the recognition narration and 
naming of brain areas that had been destroyed. 
As biology seemed to empty language from its own aura, to exhaust its 
idealistic resonances, to dissipate the mirage of deepness that veiled the physiological 
processes which burst upon the consciousness transformed into meaning and 
representation, it took advantage of a new visibility; it laid down the rules for a new 
hermeneutic: an exploring eye, a permanently unfixed gaze, the domain of which was 
to be the whole realm of acts of language. 
This move from depth to surface, the transformation of secret meanings into 
-, can foUow the development of a physical process through a perceiving nerve into the central organ, and from 
there on , can seek its different paths to the muscles, whose contraction will condition a new physical transformation 
of tile periphery. For this, , must not think of any sensation of the observed man or animal. What I am looking for 
is a pure physical object. There is no doubt that there is stiU a long way to go for the understanding of the 
individual, and the insurance that aU reference to the "movement of molecules" can neither comfort nor mislead 
me about my own ignorance. (My translation) 
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mute signs, the metamorphosis of the unfathomable essence of language into almost 
imperceptible _ marks; the restless displacement of the mystery that had translate 
revelation into reading, can be seen to be a central but obscure feature of Freud's 
enterprise: the radical metamorphosis of the silence which had remained inviolated at 
the very core of language. As we have already remarked, Freud's notion of symptom 
did not seek to unveil the presence of an obscure, buried agent of psychical malady, 
but to render into meaningful signs the complex and disperse manifestations of the 
perturbed soul. Freud sought to build symptoms out of apparently undecipherable, 
slight and unrelated traces. 
The transformation of blinding evidence into readable signs, the challenge of 
the luminosity of matter, is the operation that transfigures secrecy into symptom and 
thus allows the discernment of meaningful silence. However, there is an interval 
between the former state of blindness and the sudden recognition of signs on the 
surface of acts, of language itself. This hiatus insinuates a silent, unformulated 
hermeneutic strategy. It is the overlapping of signs over signs, signs over language, 
signs which emerge from the dissipation of language, from silence: inaudible tokens 
converted into visible, readable signs. A supplementary force operates the 
metamorphosis of silent evidence into a sign over deep layers made of signs. 
This uncertain hermeneutics, these new conditions imposed upon the 
deciphering of the visible signs, the abolition of the semiotic density of the visible 
physiological surfaces gave rise to the germ of psychoanalytic discourse. One 
additional piece contributed to this loquacity of the visible fractures of speech: the 
analogy between hysteria and aphasia. Hysteria appeared as the immediate 
manifestation of the subject's non-articulable narration of his own past experiences, as 
a sudden arrest of evocation, a distressing desertion of memory, as an unwilling 
abasement of speech, as a sort of mute display of the language of the body which 
revealed itself in the opacities of the flesh, which was evinced by the distressing power 
of silent and unrecoverable but devastating words. 
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VI. Writing silence 
The late nineteenth century experienced unforeseeable manifestations of silence: a 
conscious and even lucid rejection of the possibility of writing, the cessation of 
literature, the exaltation of silence as the final, manifest destiny of the poetic voice. 
Keats wrote: 
A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because 
he has no Identity -- he is continually in for -- and filling 
some other Body -- the Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and 
Women who are creatlD"es of impulse are poetical and have about 
them an unchangeable attribute -- the poet has none; no 
identity -- he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God's 
Creatures. It then .he has no self, and if I am a Poet, where is the 
Wonder that I should say I would right write no more?36 
Furthermore, the modem origins of literature foreshadowed, from the twilight of 
Romanticism, its outcome, both the suspension of the public consacration of literature 
and its rapturous enshrining. As early as 1823, De Quincey wrote: 
Dh mighty poet! Thy works are not as those other men, simply 
and merely great work of art, but are also like the phenomena of 
nature, like the sun and the sea, the stars and the flowers, like 
frost and snow, rain and dew, hail-storm and thunder [ ... ]37 
Later, in 1895, Mallarm~ will take to its highest point the exaltation of the 
disappearance of the poet, clearly anticipated by Keats. We can read in his Crise de 
vers: 
L'oeuvre pure implique la disparition elocl1toire du prete, qui 
cede I'initiative aux mots, par Ie heurt de leur inegalites mobilises; 
ils s'a1lument de reflets reciproques comme une virtuelle trainee 
de feux sur des pierreries, rempl~ant la respiration perceptible en 
l'ancien souftle Iyrique ou la direction personnelle enthousiaste de 
la phrase.38 
Writing affirms its own evanescent identity; it exposed in an unprecedented way, 
through the echoes of its harsh symbolism, the violence and distressing social decay of 
the certitudes, allowing itself to fully display its negative action. Language appeared 
through literature as a pure negative regime; the words did not carry an implicit 
statement on the plenitude of meaning, bot displayed themselves as a material limit, a 
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sovereign force foreign to the reach and will of the subject. Speech exhibited itself as 
a force able to dissipate the illusions of meaning and to uproot any truth foreign to that 
implied by the pure act of writing. As Romantic hermeneutics, as historical philology, 
as the Fichtean ego, the dominant conception of literature throughout the nineteenth 
century progressively pushed the writer into an unfulfilled and even shattered will to 
identity. Writing was conceived as the expression of a pure desire, grounded in a 
complex web of the conflicting powers of language. The longing for a literary id~ntity, 
which in Romanticism often turned back towards ancient models, had to face the 
paradoxical triumph of the expressiveness of the poetic I built upon the mounting 
dignity of a shattered self. The paradox of the self parallelled that of the simultaneous 
triumph and wreck of symbolism as the privileged means of achieving the social 
transcendence of the utterance lured by solipsism. Keats had written: 
Well -- I compare human life to a large Mansion of Many 
Apartments two of which I can only describe, the doors of the rest 
being as yet shut upon me --The frrst we step into we call the 
infant or thoughtless Chamber in which we remain as long as we 
do not tbink-- We remain there a long while, and 
notwithstanding the doors of the second Chamber remain wide 
op~ showing a bright appearance, we care not to hasten to it; 
but are at length imperceptibly impelled by the awakening of the 
thinking principle --within us --we no sooner get into the 
second Chamber, which I shall call the Chamber of Maiden-
Thought, than we become intoxicated with the light and the 
atmosphere, we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of 
delaying there for ever in delight: However among the effects this 
breathing is father of is that tremendous one of sharpening one's 
vision into the heart and nature of Man, of convincing ones nerves 
that the World is full of Misery and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness 
and --whereby. This Chamber of Maiden Thought becomes 
gradually darken'd and at the same time on all the sides of it many 
doors are set open -- but -- all leading to dark 
passages-- We see not the ballance of good and evil. We are 
in a Mist --We are now in that state --We feel the 'burden 
of the Mystery'. To this point was .Wordsworth come, as far as I 
can conceive when he wrote 'Tintem Abbey' and it seems to me 
that his Genius is explorative of those dark Passages.39 
In the final years of the nineteenth century, the sequel of Romanticism was clearly 
perceptible: perhaps for the first time, writing exhibited the word as a material, 
autonomous, foreign but disquieting resonance. Since Romanticism, the identity of 
literature is to be sought not in the unsuspected eloquence of meaningful constructions, 
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but in a negative devotion of poetic voice to writing, to a writing bound to abandon 
itself to the turbulence of the poetic matter, to the folding back of language upon itself, 
to the darkening of its own contours. 
Criticism, conceived as a deep reflection on the limits of language and a 
meditation on the ultimate foundations of expression, appeared then as an inherent 
disquieting facet of the poetic expression. Criticism revealed itself as the tragic fate 
invoked by the subject's awareness of the expressive limits of language, and, 
paradoxically, as the manifestation of his conviction regarding its purifying aim. This 
reflective movement became indeed the intrinsic, definitive trait of writing: "tout ce qui 
commande lla fois la litterature comme auto-critique et la critique comme litteraturelf40 
This double movement, this intrusion of criticism into literature and the abrupt 
metamorphosis of criticism as inherent in literature, this negative folding back of the 
ifTUlginative force of language upon language itself, was implied by the reflexive, 
distorting action exerted by poetic writing. The negative alliance of criticism and 
literature was conceived neither as the expression of the writer's simple, passing need 
for self-illumination, as a transient selrs passion for confining itself within its own 
language, nor·, on the contrary, as a simple circumstantial transfiguration of the poet's 
temper, a momentary intruding of discordant obscurity into the selr sinner, meditative 
voice. Also, this movement was not the intrusion in the text of the equivocal serenity 
of a confessional appetite whose imperative voice enacted the poetic impulse, what 
Keats himself named "egotistical sublime". 
Rather, each of these conflicting facets of writing, yet intimately bound together 
(literature experienced as self-criticism, and criticism conceived as an intrinsic power 
of writing), revealed a profoundly disquieting quality of literature. Romanticism 
disclosed the necessary, relentless confrontation of forces in writing. However, these 
two dominating forces -criticism and literanire- shared a common distrust of 
meaning. Since Romanticism, literature had ceased to be the ideal identity which 
embraced, in a single, synthetic, unperturbed expression, the conflicting exigencies of 
expression, art and criticism; despite their alliance, both criticism and literature, 
rejected any possible synthesis of their antagonistic aims. If literature evolved as an 
ambiguous experience it was perhaps because it could only heighten to an obscure 
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dignity the equivocal nature of language itself. Thus, literature emerged from the selr s 
diquieting a~ess of the boundaries of language, of the struggle between diverging, 
even contradictory, disrupting qualities of meaning. Inevitably, the poetry of the post-
Romantic period was bound to become aware of its own implicit, negative, 
unfathomable ground, the pervading insustantiality of meaning which, paradoxically, 
upholds the self-engendering impulse of literature, the relentless self-unfolding of 
poetic writing, the all-embracing aim of its symbolic action. Consequently, a cleft was 
perceived in poetic utterance between its uncertain, non-apprehensible grounds and the 
precarious glitter of its words; the silence became tangible, ingrained in the weave of 
poetic words. 
On the other hand, if criticism was to be considered not as a genre, but as an 
essential fOrce in literature, the inextricable yet unsurmountable duality of poetry -the 
agonistic entanglement of both criticism and liternture- should inform also its reflexive 
utterance; moreover, this duality of poetry, its expansive cleft in the midst of utterance, 
should inform language itself. Romanticism exhibited, in this inaugural moment of the 
modern concept of literature, with its essential impossibility of achieving a definite 
identity, the pervading vacuousness of language. Furthermore, it settled the 
impossibility, later exalted by symbolism, of conceiving language as pure meaningful 
matter; it made it possible to conceive writing as the purification of language from the 
contamination of representation. After the dimming of Romanticism, literature made 
of its own impossibility not only an obsessive, disquieting motive, it often turned this 
obsession into a mystical force, into a search for redemption in the essential hermetism 
of language. 
Therefore, the modern existence of literature might be seen as entirely built 
upon the paradoxical conception of language as both meaningful matter, and as the 
absolute limit of expression. Literature emerges as the enigmatic expression of this 
exile of language from meaning. 
Enigma remains latent in the impossibility of liternture to say its own truth, in 
its silence about the truth of its own limits. Silence in literature has been usually 
portrayed as the scandal of the willful though sombre retreat from writing, rather than 
as an extraneous, non-apprehensible body thrust into literature itself: Rimbaud, 
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H6lderlin, enact despair or madness, disenchantment or a glaring, bewildered 
wandering. Their rejection of literature is surrounded by the aura of the exorbitant. 
Their silence is conceived as an exceptional deed, yet delusive and obscure. In 
modernity, the unuttered source of the awareness of the negative horizon of language, 
of the absolute, intrinsic limit of the writing act, mixes itself inextricably with the 
secret, inexpressible urgency involved in the "deliberate" rejection of writing. 
The election of silence by the most articulate is, I believe, 
historically recent. The strategic myth of the philosopher who 
chooses silence because of the ineffable purity of his vision of 
because the unreadiness of his audience, has antique precedents. 
It contributes to the motif of Empedocles on Aetna and to the 
gnomic a100fuess of Heraclitus. But the poet's choice of silence, 
the writer relinquishing his articulate enactment of identity 
in mid-course, is something new. It occurs, as an experience 
obviously singular but formidable in general implications, in 
two of the principal masters, molders, heraldic presences if you 
will of the modem spirit: Holderlin and Rirnbaud.41 
Silence appears as a meaningful choice. The "election" of silence -if we can so call the 
madness of H6lderlin or even the revulsion which seems to have incited Rimbaud' s 
rejection of literatu~ has frequently outweighed the violence of their veiled though 
intimate recognition of the boundaries of expression, of the traces of the apocalyptical 
rotting of language which might be clearly perceived in Rimbaud's frantic rhythm of 
metaphors and his obstinate naming of limits. "Ie suis Ie maitre du silence", writes 
Rimbaud in 1£s Illuminations, and later, "Assez vu [ ... ] Assez eu [ ... ] Assez connu 
[ ... ] Depart dans la affection et les bruits neufs. 42 Rimbaud's writing is full of signals 
of silence, of the negative gestures which stem from a ·self-reflexive movement of 
language, pointing towards its own extinction. Metaphors crowd in Rimbaud's 
evocation of limits, plagued by the obsession of silence: 
Rouler aux blessures, par I'air lassan~ et la mer; aux supplices, par 
Ie silence des eaux et de I'air meurtriers, aux tortures qui rient, 
dans leur silence atrocement houleux. 43 
Finiteness appears as a dense set of metaphors of pain imprinted in the body: tortures, 
blessures, supplice; the alliance of writing, flesh, silence and pain, is simultaneously 
sheltered and eclipsed by visible signs of limit, of decay, of death. The transience of 
being, its finiteness, appears not only as a fatal condition of existence, "C'est cette 
47 
q,oque-ci qui a sombre", states Rimbaud; but as a constellation of signs, of expressive 
metaphorical stresses, as written images of the infliction of suffering: secrecy is the 
mysterious signal at the end of expression; it evolves as a sudden and unutterable 
perception of the exalted, lavish, decaying meanings of language. 
Literature announces, in the late nineteenth century, the decay of the plenitude 
of consciousness in modernity. Hofmannsthal, with astounding insight, reveals through 
the words of his character, Lord Chandos, an imaginary disciple of Bacon, the intense 
affliction involved in the loss of the meanings of language. Lord Chandos writes in his 
letter: 
Mein Fall ist, in Kiirze, dieser: Es ist mir vollig die Fahigkeit 
abhanden gekommen, tiber irgend etwas zusammenhangend zu 
denken oder zu sprechen. 
Zuerst wurde es inir allmahlich unmoglich, ein hoheres oder 
allgemeineres Thema zu besprechen und dabei jene Worte in dem 
Mund zu nehmen, deren sich doch aile Menschen ohne Bedenken 
geUiufig zu bedienen pflegen. Ich empfand ein unerkUirisches 
Unbehage~ die Worte "Geist", "Seele" oder "Korper" nur 
auszusprechen. Ich fand es innerlich unmoglich, tiber die 
Angelegenheit des Hofes, die Vorkommnisse im Parlament, oder 
was Sie sonst wollen, ein Urteil herauszubringen [ ... ] die 
abstrakten Worte, deren sich doch die Zunge naturgemaB 
bedienen muS, urn irgendwelches Urteil and den Tag zu geben, 
zerfielen mir im Munde wie modrige Pilze.44' 
Hofmannsthal clearly describes the exhaustion, the ruin of words, the triumph of 
silence, the language rendered barren by the dazzling perception of the world, the 
brutal, baffling intrusion of immediate evidence, born of perception, into the fading 
realm of words. In Hofmannsthal' s allegory, the power 0'£ the senses, the boldness of 
perceptions overwhelms the capabilities of language; experience and desire reject even 
the pronunciation of words simply to find an absolute fulfilment beyond the urgency 
of language. 
To Lord Chandos eyes, no space surrounds the dazzling objects. Their glare 
"'Briefly, my case is this: I have completely lost the facuhy to think or speak coherently of anything. 
Pint, it was progressively impossible for me to speak of an elevated or even a common topic, and later, to utter 
such words ofwhich every man make use without even noticing it. I felt unexplicably restless when pronouncing 
the words -spirit·, Rsoul- or "body •. I find it intimately impossible to state any judgement on the affaires of the 
Court or the events in ParIiamc:nt, or whatever you may think of. [ ... ] the abstract words of which any tongue must 
naturally make use, to state a judgement or to give th~ date. dissolved in my mouth like rotten mushrooms. (My 
translation). 
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eclipses everything beyond their own contours; the eye beholds nothing other than this 
captivating im:age and its inherent metamorphosis. The words desert him at this radiant 
moment. The advent of silence is the last stage of experience which, once it has been 
reached, makes the return to language an impossible endeavour. The indescribable, 
immediate contemplation of the object engenders the vertigo of truth, of the full 
apprehension of the senseless but immediate nature of the object, it plunges the 
consciousness into aimless expectation. The abrupt outburst of blazing holl~wness 
invigorated the self's resistance to the intrusion of words whose presence would impede 
the consummation of the confined but exulting perception. Secrecy exhibits itself-in 
Hofmannsthal's universe- as the imperiousness of perception. The wordless eye 
becomes the sole, immediate, invulnerable source of truth. The world is just a 
dispersed emergence of radiant, inert, arresting figures; words grow into violent, 
degrading presences, or into the deceiving and disquieting menace of the others' voices 
and actions. language fades in the presence of the overwhelming intensity of the mute, 
inner experience. 
Moreover, Hofmannsthal not only narrates the allegory of the triumph of a mute 
perception over the fragility of language; Lord Chandos' luminous episode also refers 
to the imperiousness of the destruction of the symbolic force of language: the shattering 
of the bond between words and remembrance. 
Mal1ann~, in turn, seems to have a similar experience of the decay of the 
meaningfullness of language. He recovers language not as a positive force at the 
disposal of man's will, but as secret, delicate, meaning full matter which has undergone 
a brutal distortion; a distortion called everyday meaning. The allienated word does not 
conceal an inner and unaccessible truth; its substance exhibits and veils the essential 
foreign condition of meaning. For Mallanne, writes Blanchot: 
rien de plus etrange a l'arbre que ·le mot arbre, tel que l'utilise, 
pourtant, la langue quotidienne. Un mot qui ne nomme rien, qui 
ne represente rie~ qui ne survit en rien, un mot qui n'est meme 
pas un mot et qui disparait marveilleusement tout entier tout de 
suite dans son usage. Quoi de plus digne de l'essentiel et de plus 
proche du silence?4S 
The word has been abused by usage which rends bare its essentially foreign, sterile, 
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silent nature. The potency of word to name has been completely lost. Only poetry 
recovers the power of language to name, but its meaning acquires a distant, resistent 
meaning. However, the violence of usage is intrinsic to the nature of word; Mallarme 
does not draws a sharp distinction between the precarious nature of the ruined meaning, 
and an unattainable essential core of language. It is the radical opacity of the intimacy 
between the meaningful word of poetry and the foreign sense of common usage, which 
paradoxically impedes any apprehension of the real nature of the word. What th.e pure 
word solely states is its the foreignness of its own material density, a substance which 
rejects transcendence, the plain, absolute evidence of its constitutional muteness. 
la parole po6tique n'est plus parole d'une personne: en eUe 
personne ne parle et ce qui parle n'est personne, mais il semble 
que la personne seul se parle. Le langage prends alors toute son 
importance; il devient I'essentiel; Ie langage parle comme 
essentiel, c'est pourquoi la parole confiee au poete peut etre dit 
parole essentieUe.46 
In the poetic experience the solitude of the poetic voice, the evanescence of its identity, 
the vacuousness of the poetic self, ally themselves to the power of language which 
acquires the appearance of a indifferent, foreign yet essential voice. However, the 
nature of poetic language -as Blanchot has stressed- is not its immutable condition, 
its untouchable, sacred purity, but a transient stage of words, a fragile vision of the 
sheer absence of language which provokes a bewildered shudder of the identity of the 
self. The purity of poetic language is this tresspass of meaning upon the intimate 
hollowness of speech. Paradoxically, the purification of language involves the fading 
of the uttering self, the defmite isolation of language as a pure creative potency. The 
purification of language through poetry involves an exorbitant ritual which empties 
language of its human resonances, only to transform it into a purified, foreign, 
animated, meaningful presence. This is a radical action: language endures the silent 
gesture of the poetic utterance, which leaves no other trace in language but the memory 
of the potency of poetry itself. Furthermore, the poem, which remains as the sediment, 
the verbal reminiscence of the poetical action, forges a strange mirage: language offers 
the deceiving image of poetry as the privileged means of the expression of the self. 
Deracinated from its original ground, verbal imagination, language resembles a 
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deceiving mirror: it seems able to reflect the recondite matter of the self, and to unveil 
his unacknowledged passions; language appears as a mouldable substance which 
conforms its expressive powers to deep states of the soul. This mirage is profoundly 
grounded in the concept of repleserltation, which constitutes one of the columns which 
support the Romantic imagination; a notion which crumbles with the advent of the 
crepuscular philosophy of the twentieth century. 
The rejection of writing imprints on language an imperceptible sign, a sign 
made of an abrupt silence, of the non-said, of potential but extinguished meanings. The 
interruption of language is readable only in this balked impulse, in the traces of its 
sudden extinction. Its meaning relies in the frangible, but potentially enduring memory 
of an act which leaves behind no other sign but that of cessation, of a violent silence. 
The mere extinction of the act of writing implies a peculiar unexepressed passion of the 
subject, an unfathomable urge to dissipate; it enacts the selr s cleavage; the selr s brutal 
fracture implied by writing remains as a tangible silence on the margins of the readable 
matter. 
Secrecy looms out from language as an aftermath of the obscure appearance of 
silence, which suggests the intimate rejection of language by the self. The non-said of 
this rejection becomes the driving force of the endeavour to interpret what has 
remained untold, to render this silence into a conceptual whole, to recognize the 
uncertain horizon of the self's unreachable intimacy conjectured through the scattered 
signs which adumbrate the limits of text. The non-said, enigma, silence and secrecy do 
not remain beyond the limits of sense. However, they obstinately congregate at the 
frontiers of the utterance; they constitute an elusive hollowness which shapes the act 
of writing. 
VIL Freud's silence: the crepuscular writing 
Throughout his life, Freud struggled against the desire to endow his work with literary 
power: literature was to him an ideal, a loss, a motive for rivalry; also a shelter, a 
horizon, a means of demonstrating the poignancy of his theoretical insights as a 
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privileged object of analysis; even as a symptom, as the privileged means for the 
knowledge of passions, instincts, perversions. However, literature is ingrained in 
Freud's text as an authoritative, suffocated voice able to back up numerous crucial, 
though extremely uncertain speculative postulates. Writing was also experienced by 
Freud in his everyday work as a challenging, opaque act impossible to master: his will 
to style was constantly foiled and his seldom yet lucid rejection of this will, determined 
Freud's infrequent, but intransigent choice of boldness over elegance, of sobriety over 
exuberance, of austerity over passion. These tensions are tangible in the fabric of 
Freud's writing -which was to win him a puzzling, conflicting award (the Goethe 
Prize, "the only important recognition given to Freud's work during his life .... 7)-, 
writing that would reveal several superficial yet meaningful aspects of the unsettling 
relation between "literature" and the psychoanalytic text. 
Much more important than Freud's stylistic conflicts is the inner 
epistemological, unresolved, conceptual discord, which often went unperceived, 
between the moulding pressure exerted by his literary experience and the bare 
imperatives of the positivistic mirage. Bowie has stressed Freud's ambiguous 
consciousness of the uncertain and singular nature of his own text: 
At the end of The Interpretation of Dreams Freud uses the term 
theoretical fiction [theoretische Fiktion] to describe a state of 
affairs that a given theory seems to require or predict but for 
which no supporting evidence could be found. Among 
epistemological categories the 'theoretical fiction' was a sony 
amphibian with a low chance of survival, but its sturdy-looking 
neighbors -theories proper- were themselves constantly 
threatened by predatory invaders entering science from the worlds 
of fairy tale and romance. 48 
In fact, Freud struggled obstinately and uselessly against those theories which, in his 
view, lacked the support of clearly observed and depictable evidence, or of empirical 
proof. This struggle occupies a cardinal place in the Freudian text. According to 
Bowie, 
[Both Proust and Freud] Even as they discuss the limitations 
under which the aeative writer labours, their desire-laden writing 
presses beyond them. Even as they trace the boundaries beyond 
which their text have nothing to say, their assimilative and 
expressive powers are calling these boundaries into dispute. n49 
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This tracing of the boundaries of the meaningfulness of the theoretical writing produces 
a discontinuous, self-reflexive, restrained writing which Freud turns against his own 
stylistic passion, to tame his own proclivity to abrupt digressions. Freud embeds in his 
argumentation, a self-criticism -in the Romantic sense-, and this criticism becomes 
a narration, a compte-rendu plagued by an obsessive and reiterative reinterpretation of 
his own texts. Freud is impelled to an obsessive retrograde reading, which he carried 
out unrelentingly, turning this backward glance to his own intellectual and theoretical 
path, into reiterated corrections which introduced an enigmatic punctuation in his texts. 
Therefore, Freud's writings display rhythmic delays, thematic deflections, visible 
hesitations and frequent withdrawals from the main stream of his narrative exposition, 
which hint at unsuspected resonances of the theoretical insights, or even suggest 
perturbing conceptual counterpoints to the explicit meanings of his theoretical insights. 
In Freud's writings the theoretical endeavour joins a subtle and dismembered narration; 
this narration presents a lavish universe of traces which unveils the resistances, fears, 
unresolved challenges which inform the Freudian writing; perhaps, it is this broken 
fiction that creates a narrative atmosphere close to that of an epic tale. The epic fiction 
of psychoanalysis is the site of an unrelenting struggle among Freud's partial and often 
contradictory views, experiences, analysis, reflections and intimate myths and 
romances. Also, his writing shows the effects of the constraints imposed, in the 
nineteenth century, on the the rules and habits of the gaze, on the distinct therapeutic, 
medical and moral universes, on institutional policies, and on the emerging crisis of 
language and meaning. Moreover, Freud's discontinuous, fictitious invention of 
himself revealed the pervassiveness of literature in his intimate sphere. The self-
reflexive obsessions of psychoanalysis became the theoretical enactment of the passions 
of literature. As Shoshana Felman observed: 
Literature, in other words, is the language which psychoanalysis 
uses in order to speak of itself, in order to name itself. Literature 
is therefore not simply outside psychoanalysis since it motivates 
and inhabits the very names of its concepts, since it is the 
inherent reforence by which psychoanalysis names its fmdings. so 
From the initial moments of Freud's psychoanalysis to its end, from his initial studies 
on aphasia and his early neurone model of the psychical apparatus, to the posthumous 
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Abriss der Psychanalyse, the image of a broken language seems to command the 
Freudian enterprise, distorting and deferring its aims of enlightenment. Freud seems 
to have been engaged, throughout his whole life, in an endless meditation on the 
extinction of language, of its limits, its obscurities, its silences, its fractures; Freud's 
privileged insights refer to the withdrawal of language from meaning, to the 
unfathomable rarefying of sense in speech. 
The late nineteenth century has been called the age of suspicion (Sarra~te). It 
has been thought of as the announcement of the twilight of an age dominated by the 
conviction of the wholeness of subjectivity, of personality, of language itself. 
Psychoanalysis sprang from the passing trembling of European thought which preceded 
the definite shattering of the idea of man as unity; it is the moment of the supreme, and 
perhaps last and vain effort to heighten the social belief in the dominion of 
consciousness upon action, knowledge and self-reflection. It also marks the culmination 
of the illusions of consciousnes, and the dawn of its definitive darkening. 
Psychoanalysis emerges at the breaking point of Western rationality. Several 
events prepare the sketch of its final portrait: the nineteenth century moves rapidly 
from the firm position of a notion of subjectivity enthroned by the sequels of 
Rationalism, to the fading shadow cast by the Kantian conception of transcendental 
subject upon the notion of reason. From Descartes to Hume, and then from Kant to 
Schlegel and Fichte, the tension between the sense of the notions of knowledge and 
subject grew; the progressive incongruity between the claims of the dominating images 
of reason and the figures of passion, between the power attributed to imagination and 
the uneasiness provoked by the unfathomable notion of taste became perceivable, 
tangible. The contrast between the conceptions of sensation and the powers attributed 
to consciousness seems to have been exacerbated. 
Thomas Mann once recalled a troubled assertion made by Freud himself, 
referred to the future judgement on his work. 51 
Freud hat zwar gemein~ die Zukunft werde wahrscheinlich 
urteil~ dass die Bedeutung der Psychanalyse als Wissenschaft 
des Unbewussten ihren Wert a1s Heilmethode weit ubertreffe.* 
*Freud'. opinion was that the future, apparently, will judge that the meaning of psychoanalysis as the science of 
the unconscious outweighs by far its value as a therapeutic method. (My translation) 
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Mann stresses an infrequent and even unpopular vision of the psychoanalytical 
discovery. For him, one and perhaps the chief value of psychoanalysis, is that it has 
exacted from its cultural universe the perturbed though quiet awareness of the intrinsic 
tensions of soul:s2 
ein hciterer Argwohl [ serene suspicion] ist mit ihr in der Welt 
gesetzt, ein entlarvender Verdacht [unmasking distrust], die 
Versteckheiten Wld Machenschaften der Seele betretTend.· 
The outstanding statement of Thomas Mann is built upon a single nuance, a slight, 
strategic displacement of his reflection away from the main thematic leitmotives of the 
nineteenth century. According to Mann, the synthesis of Freud's interpretation exposes 
an incurable disquieting affliction of the soul. Serenity and suspicion, unmasking and 
distrust, the lucid deferral of sense and the quiet skepticism -the suspension of the 
imperative of truth-, are expression of the encounter of thought with the image of an 
impending death, ingrained in the soul as a serene presence which rejects forgetfulness. 
The force of secrecy seems to support the theoretical significance of Freud's writing. 
·With him a serene suspicion has come to the world, an unmasking distrust relative to the concealment and the 
machinations of soul. (My translation). 
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Chapter II 
Invocations of Secrecy 
L Boundaries of language 
Secrecy appears as the foundation of the subject's experience of an untimely arrest of 
the act of speech brought about by the reflexive awareness of the inherent imposibility 
of the self to apprehend its own identity. 
Conceived so, it implies an uneasy awareness of an intimate, untraceable 
impulse' both to disregard, to dim or to uproot memories, as well as to stress, 
illuminate, or even to create them. It emerges from the subject's hesitation between 
reminiscence and the sense of oblivion, between the permanent invention and distortion 
of the past inherent in reminiscence, and the will to deny the fading of memory which 
foreshadows oblivion. 
The experience of secrecy involves the tension between the failure of the will 
to forget, and the failure to endure the sovereignty of forgetfulness. It conjoins the 
necessity and the inevitability of forgetting; they both forge the contours of the images 
it evokes. Furthermore, secrecy evidences the tension between the hampered will to 
remember, and the ineluctable experience of remembering. 
Thus, the singular expressive force of secrecy stems from the defaced image of 
the self -of the experience of its limits- and from the -exhausting tension between 
remembrance and forgetfulness, informed by the exacting demands of language. Kafka 
has expressed with stark clarity the inherent tensions of language: 
Ich schribe anders aIs ich rede, ich rede anders aIs ich denke, ich 
denke anders aIs ich denke soli und so geht es weiter bis ins 
tiefste Dunkel.· 
It is this darkness that adumbrates the nature of secrecy. It is the tension among these 
"J write di1fermtly from what I talk, I talk differently from. what I think, I think differently from what I should think, 
and so I sink in the deepest darkness, (My translation) 
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incommensurable layers of speech and expression that shapes the figures and the 
narration of reminiscence. Language imposes on secrecy its own inherent constraints 
which shape the contours of its expression. Reminiscences settle the contours of the 
self, of its history, also of its desire. Thus, the narration of reminiscences signals the 
limits of experience: that which defines the identity of the self. It imposes on the 
intimate impulse to reminisce, the foreign order of language and its cardinal impulses, 
the deflection of speech from its reference to the world and its intrinsic indiffe~nce to 
the necessity for expressiveness. Narration exposes through its autonomous relations 
and constrains the arduous boundaries of the expressiveness of the uttered 
reminiscences . 
. Moreover, this narration is the outcome of both the inherent traits of the order 
of language and the moulding pressure exerted on speech by the intrinsic symbolized 
presence of the community. The force of the community bond defines not only the 
nature and physiognomy of reminiscence; it also determines the force, the direction, 
the contours of speech which respond to the original impulse. Yet, it is not the other's 
presence, but its anticipated disappearance, which rules the utterance itself, which 
portrays the omitted territories, the shaded zones of speech, the dim, weakening 
allusions which signal the crepuscular convictions conveyed by the utterances. The 
actual reminiscence is a resonance of the memory of the other. It echoes his 
expectations. It enacts his disappearance, yet it also anticipates the self's own 
disappearance. 
The community bond, built upon the symbolized absence of the other, stresses 
the fictive, anticipated experience of death; its images become the driving force of 
reminiscences. These images enact the dominant force of the linguistic bond: words 
express only the finite, transient nature of the self; they are bound to unveil the bond 
of community as founded in the common expenence of the other's disappearance. 
Their only expressive force is drawn from this experience of transience, it refers to it. 
Words neither refer to an individual nor define an identity. The foreseen images of 
death -the experience of the absolute absence of the other- enact the bonds of 
reciprocity. They dissolve the contours of the self. However, the phantasy of death 
frees language from the attachment to _the subject; the words cease to bear the 
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resonances of the subject's identity; liberated from expressiveness, from the constraint 
of the other's. presence, they are addressed to nobody; uttered by the fading voice of 
the extinguished identity, language acquires a peculiar force. Perhaps, the images 
aroused by the anticipated experience of death stir a mixture of affects and inclinations, 
piety and fear, identification and rejection, acceptance and revolt, praise and 
blasphemy. The experience of the disappearance of the other also involves the 
disappeamnce of the self as other, the experience of radical solitude. Language.ceases 
to be rooted in the self. Utterance does not have its source in an identifiable voice. It 
is freed from a closed universe of reminiscences. Speech appears as an arbitrary set of 
ruled utterances which rejects expression only to narrate; yet, it narrates nobody's 
experience; it embodies nobody's voice. It is a perceivable, clear voice which rises 
from the background of a rarefied, harsh sound, from an empty body; it is a wandering 
voice which is capable of undergoing any transformation, of adopting any 
physiognomy. However, narration remains attached in an uncertain way to the 
reminiscences of the self, having already abandoned its expressive claims. It is this 
unfathomable relation between this pure, impersonal, inexpressive language and the 
imperatives gf reminiscence that constitute the core of secrecy. Secrecy can also be 
thought of as the resonance of the inherent, extreme tensions of language in the 
subject's narration, as the mairlfestation in it of the experience of the limits of 
language. Secrecy, regardless of the intangible constraints it imposes on the subject, 
appears as an evident, absolute, intrinsic limit of language; it is the act by which 
language disappears as a meaningful resource of expression and becomes, by its sheer 
. 
non existence the most significant force of subjectivity itself. In secrecy, silence has 
been driven to its paroxysm, signalling the extreme moment at which it meets its own 
impossibility to achieve expressiveness. As an invincible silence inherent in the 
relations of the self with its own reminiscences and in the limits of the expressiveness 
of language, secrecy confounds itself with enigma; both share timelessness, a 
challenging opacity, an irreducible, intruding, disquieting force; also, they exhibit the 
frontier of language at which it confounds itself with the exhaustion of life. Thus, 
secrecy emerges as both the yielding of the subject to the exigencies of its own 
disappearance, evoked by the exacerbation of silence, and a constraint on self identity 
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imposed by the namingforce of language. I will try to argue, in the following pages, 
that psychoan.alysis has built one of the most vivid contemporary reflections on the 
destiny of this relation between the subject and its own language, on the perturbations 
aroused in the subject by the exhaustion of language, by silence and the force [KrqIt] 
of negation of secrecy, inherent in language itself. 
Modernity, Richard Sennett suggested, has been built upon an enduring, yet dis~pting 
regime governed by the imperative of secrecy, which plays a definitive role in the 
moulding of contemporary profiles of subjectivity. This social regime has exhibited 
also the political usage of secrecy, legitimated by the intensified contrast between the 
public and the private; also it has allowed the exasperation of the need for a definite, 
recognizable profile of tile subject's public identity. Secrecy became a social dominant 
condition imposeded on the social patterns of expression. This regime progressively 
took hold of the collective habits of relation in the nineteenth century. The dominance 
of secrecy in social life derived not only from the structural conditions of a thriving 
bureaucracy, as Max Weber has convincingly argued, I but also from a particular 
collective anxiety, from an uncertainty about the grounds of reciprocity, in a peculiar 
orientation of the perception of the meanings of language and gestures, and the 
reconstitution of the patterns of sensibility. In his perceptive analysis of the sources of 
modernity, Sennett remarked: 
[In nineteenth century ·Paris] In "public", one observed, one 
expressed oneself, in tenus of what one wanted to buy, to ~ 
to approve o( not as a result of continuous interactio~ but after 
a period of passive, silen~ focused attention. By contras~ 
"private" meant a world where one could express oneself directly 
as one was touched by another person; private meant a world 
where interaction. reigned, but it must be secret. [ ... ] The belief 
that secrecy Is necessary when people are folly interacting gives 
the key to a second of the barometers of psychic distress in the 
society: the desire to withdraw from feeling in order not to show 
one's feelings involuntarily to others. Only by making your 
feelings a secret are they safe, only at hidden moments and places 
are you free to interact. But precisely this fearful withdrawal from 
expression puts more pressure on others to get closer to you to 
know what you feel, what you wan~ what you know. Flight and 
the seed of compulsive intimacy are absolutely joined: the sheer 
expression of an emotion, any emotion, becomes ever more 
important as so much work becomes necessmy to penetrate 
another's defenses to the point where he is willing to interact. 
The world of retail commerce indicates the terms of the 
most basic of these puzzles, the effects and the limits of 
capitalism on public life, in terms of mystification and in terms of 
privatization. [ ... ] The seeds of modem life are there, but there is 
struggle; nothing as yet could be taken for granted. 2 
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Secrecy, as a social imperative, gave rise to a radical transformation of the expressions 
of individual anxiety, which involved a vivid experience of the limits of language and 
of the sharp distinction between the meanings of intentional and unintentional 
expression; it also called for more severe attention to the disciplines of self-reflection; 
it involved a stress on the conflict between the expression of intimate experiences, 
sensations, and feelings, and the conventional meanings of signs; it exacerbated the 
distinction between the sphere of intimacy and the limits of the abstract exigencies of 
the public domain. Secrecy, as a growing social necessity engendered an unprecedented 
perception and a persistent experience of the boundaries of language and of corporal 
expression. 
However, as a socially relevant driving force, secrecy seems to emerge in the 
public sphere from a fundamental source, an intimate struggle of the self against his 
own language, a struggle bred by the constitutional tensions which shape language 
itself. The exacerbation of this struggle appears as an aftermath of the devastation of 
traditions entailed by Modernity as one of its principal means of achieving political 
legitimacy. Silence thus revealed itself as an ethic imperative which stems from the 
debasement of the expressiveness of the subject, from the restriction of the public 
expression and its confinement to the private atmosphere, and from the breakdown of 
the patterns of reciprocity in the relations of interchange. 3 
Modernity has made of the ethics of secrecy both an unperceived, deep-rooted 
condition of the satisfaction of the individual's need for identity, and a universe of 
values which protects the subject from the social risk of the immediate visibility of an 
intimate and feeble image of the self. Thus, secrecy acquired throughout the nineteenth 
century an ambiguous sense: it appeared as an equivocal pattern of dialogue originated 
by the wilful exclusion of the other from certain risky knowledge, while displaying the 
specific, visible tokens which establish the imaginary boundaries of the self: but it also 
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appeared as an condition of the private, individual identity, of the particular paths 
followed by ~e genesis of subjectivity itself; the identity of the subject was confined 
by secrecy to the fringes of language. 4 
This conception of the subject's identity, brought about and implanted in the 
social sphere, settled as a vague atmosphere which seemed to emanate from the 
devotion of European culture -encouraged by Enlightenment- to the rational 
construction of the self.5 Also, it was to be a definitive support for the invig~rated 
legitimacy of the policies of Modernity. However, these policies soon uncovered an 
unsettling series of paradoxes: in Modernity, the discursive strategies of secrecy were 
evidenced as an unrelenting device of political dominance. By an unexpected tum, the 
daunting emotions aroused by the effective use of secrecy as a delusive resource of 
political legitimacy, instead of undermining its political efficacy, contributed to the 
strengthening of simulation as a privileged political strategy. 
The public exploitation of secrecy for the ruling of the relations between 
citizens fostered, paradoxically, the deceiving belief in dialogue both as a privileged 
source of social legitimacy and as the characteristic domain of truthfulness. In this 
light, secrecy appeared merely as a pure, conscious, even meditated, strategy of 
concealment and as a sustained regime of calculated reflexiveness and analysis of the 
self. It is our aim to argue that secrecy goes well beyond the immediate boundaries set 
by the policies of Modernity and that it eludes any calculability, that it constrains the 
nature and development of meaning itself, that it constitutes an essential condition of 
the shaping of subjectivity. 
Secrecy takes roots in self reflection, which stems from the inquisitive gaze of 
the other. It is mainly from the other's obscure astonishment aroused by the expressive 
reticence readable in the subject's utterance, that secrecy forges its own profile and 
acquires its peculiar harshness. Therefore, secrecy might be interpreted as an odd, 
exacting gift, bestowed on the subject by the other; a gift which allows the vertigo of 
language to fully display, and consecrates, paradoxically, the abrupt exhaustion of 
language. The veiled and deceitful language of corporeal mimicry and gestural 
simulation overweigh speech as the dominant trait of self expression. Where words 
were expected, only uncertain, anxious, corporeal signals were to be elicited from the 
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spectacle of bodies, and stressed the imperative of silence. Those were revealing signs; 
they compulsively exposed silence, a surface of vacuous expressions, of eclipsed 
words; an unwitting, yet intrusive silence was imposed on the subject's expression as 
a condition of achieving his own experience; this silence might only be acknowledged 
as the signal of the potential presence of an absent other; the presence of the other is 
foreshadowed by his own silence. Missing words would implicitly be addressed to this 
imaginary presence. 
The recognition of secrecy requires the subject's total awareness of the signs 
which indicate, as disseminated residues, the covert presence of sense, the veiling of 
the mute meanings borne by the utterance. It is from the signs spread over the 
fragmentary and rarefied matter of language -voice, writing or image-, only 
perceived" as resonances of an empty utterance, that the dense relevance and the 
equivocal meaning of secrecy arise. But it is chiefly from the other's unacceptable 
absence -the-not-being-there-anymore of the other-, that the unarticulated but 
foreshadowed words of secrecy acquire their disquieting impact. Secrecy brings to light 
the relevance of an absence rendered visible only through the discontinuity of speech; 
the urgent need for the presence of the other is experienced through the traces of his 
eclipse, with the evocation of the primordial eclipse of the loved presence. The signs 
of this absence reside in the most profound layers of the subject's memory; the signs 
silently foretell the future death of the other and of the self, the experience of lost love. 
Secrecy evokes, by the intensity of the affection aroused with silence -and not 
by the mere appearance of silence itself-, the limit of expressiveness, of the bond of 
speech. The acknowledgement of this limit becomes the condition that secrecy must 
satisfy to reveal itself as an enduring link between two subjects; thus, this link, 
paradoxically, founds its identity upon a common experience of the hollow 
expressiveness of signs. But a cardinal facet of seCrecy, which is the violence of a non 
signified experience of death, remains unarticulated. 
Secrecy seems to involve an awareness of the silence produced by the seemingly 
willful concealment of a certain statement. The moment of interpretation is thus 
essential to the recognition of secrecy. )ndeed, it is interpretation that signals the 
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emergence of secrecy. It is interpretation that turns a perceived silence into secrecy. 
This is the moment at which the image of a conjectured transgression inherent in 
secrecy and shared by the hearer and the speaker, emerges from interpretation. 
Transgression becomes a negative but necessary link. The common recognition and 
acknowledgement of transgression, the violent tresspass into an indefinite though 
compelling sphere of expression, creates a potential, undetermined, relation. Secrecy 
seems to emerge from the infringement of the maxim 1110u must have said this" ~ M this" 
points towards an undefined, ignored, non specific object; but the maxim transforms 
itself insidiously through language usage into a general, vague though compelling 
imperative: MThou must say all, nothing must be excluded from your words·. 
The grim ethics which emanates from this imperative relies itself on an obscure, 
imaginary· trait of language: a boundless expressive capacity. The ethics of language 
evokes an imaginary, potentially infinite realm: "everything can be said". The rule, 
when it confronts the awareness of the deep roots of secrecy, exhibits speech as an 
indefinite enacting of transgression. Transgression becomes intrinsic to language, to the 
mere act of speaking. It is the mutual consciousness of transgression that confers upon 
secrecy its power to create a violent, intimate bond, which prevails over the tension 
inherent in the acknowledgement of concealement. 
The ethical condemnation of secrecy involves chiefly the act of concealment, 
of exclusion; it relegates the sense and the moral quality of the excluded utterance, to 
a secondary role. It becomes a contingent testimony born of the transgression. It is 
unimportant if it be false or true; it is the act itself, this pregnant, threatening silence, 
which must be signalled and proscribed. In this sense, secrecy is to be sharply 
distinguished from the lie, which involves the utterance of a false assertion. Unlike lie, 
secrecy calls up the prevailing, shapeless experience of senselessness and the sCandal 
of a visible act of concealment. 
Thus, secrecy involves a peculiar interpretation, neither of transgression itself 
nor of the significance of the uprooted meaning, but of their specific relation: it is this 
relation that is determined by pain and the memories of absence which leave no 
perceptible traces other than an impregnable silence, a relation which suggests the 
existence of an intolerable limit of expressiveness beyond the tokens of silence and of 
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concealment. 
AnyhQw, the transgression of the ethic norm of saying it all does not involve 
the rejection of the norm. It seems to be only the outcome of a reflexive movement, 
an acknowledgement of the frail rule which determines the boundless capacity of 
speech. However, the mere existence of this rule as an ethic imperative entails the 
existence of the unarticulable. Thus, transgression involves both an exasperated 
recognition of the rule as well as of an experience the source of which resides Qeyond 
meaning. 
The interpretation of secrecy reveals itself as the evidence of transgression and 
complicity, as the unveiling of the limits of morality and language, as the vain 
endeavour to discern the sources of concealment. It forges a disquieting link between 
the speaker and the hearer, a paradoxical link moulded by an experience foreign to 
language, forged against or even beyond the boundaries of the norm of speech. 
Paradoxically, this interpretation both links and isolates the involved subjects. It 
confines them to an absolute solitude provoked by the broken solidarity of language 
and by the mutual acknowledgment of transgression. 
The aim of secrecy, from the moment it appears, is to endure, to persevere, to 
remain endlessly unveiled; thus, the solitude born of secrecy becomes an absolute 
condition of the self, the condition of an exclusion provoked by the subject's exile from 
the expressiveness of language, and impossible to overcome. The aim of the speaker 
is an impossible one: to establish and preserve the bond of expressiveness beyond the 
community of language. Secrecy breaks this community of language and founds it 
again upon the paradoxical link of the mutual acknowledgment of transgression. Placed 
beyond the boundaries of the norm of speech, beyond the community informed by 
language, beyond a community Conjoined by voices, which originates from fading 
identities, from the luminosity of death, the subject is confined to the singular language 
of secrecy. Keats had brilliantly foreshadowed this dominant experience of the subject 
shaped by the conception of self in Modernity, the joyful though brutal disappearance 
of the identity of the self in the spread voices of the others. Keats admits as his own, 
those voices which emerge from beyond language, from beyond the boundaries fixed 
by transgression. 
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When concealment lacks this essential ground -the limits of expressiveness, the 
prevailing force of pain, the experience of this paradoxical community-, and it appears 
just as a conscious, deliberate strategy of speech, the aim of which is to distort 
evidence, to get a peculiar benefit, then, secrecy becomes a masquerade, a strategy to 
exert power on the hearer. 
A hasty approach to secrecy has made of it a wilful, individually envisaged 
strategy aiming to veil, to defer the appearance of truth on the equivocal su~ace of 
discourse. Thus, secrecy has often been conceived as a mere strategy of speech and not 
as an essential condition of language; it seems only to veil momentarily an utterance 
which later might be brought to light. It has been thought of as the result of a 
concealing maneuver, as the expression of the subject's reluctance to confess a 
senseless or harmful guilt. From this point of view, secrecy only exposes a previously 
calculated failure of meaning, a voluntarily ruined interpretation. Secrecy appears as 
a way of concealing even a harmful, unacceptable, impure, yet neatly representable 
object, or a shameful incident. It also implies heavy assumptions regarding the 
autonomy of the self, or the ego as the absolute origin of any evocation, any 
remembrance, any representation, or any thought. 
According to this deceiving conception, any reminiscence must be created by 
a sovereign self and is confined to the subject's own memory; it remains within the 
inaccessible realm of his private experience, having had its source in a singular, 
autonomous, unconstrained self. 
However, secrecy remains foreign to the mascarade; it appears to the self as the 
evidence of a boundary of language revealed to him by the scandalous images of his 
own death. It signals the actual, unrelenting presence of death on the subject's 
horizons. In last analysis, secrecy ·stems from the experience of the absence of fellow 
men, an absence which distorts the mirage of a still, transcendental, all embracing 
language. As we shall see, Freud seeks the origin of the subject's constitutional 
experience of absence in an unsatisfied primal necessity, in the experience of the 
definitive ecUpse of the primordial object of love, early in the subject's life; this early 
experience of absence foreshadows the representation of death. It is from this early, 
nameless, unspeakable intuition of death tbat the presence of the other gets its intrinsic 
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relevance, its meaningfulness; yet, it is this nameless, yet dominant intuition which 
anticipates the. experience of the hollowness of language, of the limits of its naming and 
illuminating power. This early intuition seems to be the ground from where the 
singular identity of the self springs. Blanchot wrote: 
Si la communaut6 est r6v6lee par la mort d'autrui, c'est que la 
mort cst cUe-memc la veritable communaute des etres mortels: 
leur communion impossible. La communaute occupc done cette 
place singuIier: eIIc 8SSlIDC l'impossibilite d'un etre communitaire 
comue..get. ~ communaute assume et inscrit en quelque sorte 
I'impossibilite de la communaute [ ... J Une communaute est la 
pR9Clllation a ses membres de leur verite mortelle [ ... ] Elle est la 
prcsentation de la finitude et de I'exces sans retour qui fonde 
I'etre-fini. 6 
If the e~perience of community is. constituted by the mutual bond of language, then 
language itself must embody the crucial experience of the other's death as a cardinal 
feature of its own nature. However, this feature remains foreign to any expression; 
there is no communion in the experience of death, the bond between the dead and the 
survivor reveals an invincible assymetry; the sense of death emerges from the 
perceptions of pain and the self reminiscences of disappearance, of the missing 
presence of the other. Death lacks any proper image or sense. The community bond 
-as Blanchot has remarked- is built upon the scandal of the certainty of the other's 
death, and upon the affection aroused by the early emergence of self-identity; an 
identity engendered not by the mere presence of the other, but by" the primal certitude 
of his annihilation. Death appears on the horizon of the self as an appalling experience 
of the early absence engrained in the core of thought and of language itself. 
In the light of these reflections which refer secrecy to the experience of the 
limits of language and to the inexpressible experience of the other's absence as an 
anticipated representation of death, the ordinary use of the notion of secrecy reveals 
itself as a mirage. Secrecy, conceived as a deliberate conCeaIment of certain event, as 
a wilful exclusion of a definite statement, remains alien to a reflection upon the 
inherent limits of expression involved in the notion of secrecy and its subjective 
foundations. 
The eloquence of Bataille's simple, disquieting confession, \tce que je pense, je 
ne l'ai pas pense seul", is enough to shatter the self's image of autonomy and to arouse 
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the consciousness of the brutal, delusive, yet unavoidable mirage of solipsism. The 
decay of thi$ mirage, which accompanied the breakdown of the domain of the 
"philosophies of consciousness", has conferred an unexpected meaning upon secrecy. 
The distrust of these "philosophies of consciousness", which has become a 
distinctive feature of twentieth century thought, involves the vague but deeply rooted 
feeling that the spring of secrecy, of "concealment", remained foreign to the subject's 
decisions, informing his speech surreptitiously. In this light, secrecy is not. to be 
conceived just as the result of an intimate but wilful decision; perhaps it is not even 
governed by a will to exclusion. In secrecy, the words seem to lose their relation to the 
world. The capacity of fiction, often conceived as an ancillary feature of language, 
becomes dominant, almost oppressive. The word ceases to refer to a specific object, 
to a clearly determined event, or to certain discourse; it is driven not by the object 
itself, the nature of the event, or the intrinsic meaning of discourse, but chiefly by an 
effective yet unfathomable compulsion. The source of the force of fiction which sets 
the boundaries between the impure and the pure, the unspeakable and the admissible, 
the conceivable and the unthinkable, escapes experience. Words seem to be uprooted 
from subjectivity and imposed on the consciousness as if they were derived from an 
ageless, timeless regime. The subject's perception of his inner tensions also faded with 
the eclipse of the expressiveness and the references of language. 
However, the inconditional surrender of the word to the plenitude of fiction 
arouses the memories of absence. The absolute plenitude of fiction seems to arise from 
the experience of the eclipse of the primal human link, from the early experience of the 
fading away of the loved object, originally unnamed, unnameable; the force of fiction 
seems to spring, paradoxically, from this non- relatable catastrophe, from a non-
signified aftliction; even if it remains as an unacknowledged, suffocated, yet indelible 
reminiscence. 
The non-signified absence of the other culminates in the signified denial of the 
identity of the self. This denial has two main facets: the ruin of its sovereignty and, 
simultaneously, his experience of isolation, an isolation which is not the confinement 
of the subject to its own identity, but the dissipation of identity, the encompassing 
experience of a pervading pain, the acknowledgement of the failure to preserve itself 
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from the violence of the primal, silent experience of absence. 
This absence shapes the identity of the subject, while preventing it from 
immediate communion with its fellow men, while pervading his own language with the 
echoes of the denial of the identity of the self. Blanchot writes: 
L'etre cherdJc, DCD pas I etre r6c0nnu, mais a etre contest6: il va, 
pour exister, vers rautre qui Ie conteste et parfois Ie nie, afin qu'i1 
DC 0Qi1l11x:nce d'Stre que dans cette privation qui Ie rend conscient 
(c'cst II l'origine de sa conscience) de l'impossihilit6 d'etre lui 
memc, d'insister comme ipse ou, si l'on veut, comme individu 
separe: ainsi peut-etre ex-istira-t-il, s'eprouvant comme 
exteriorit6 toqjours pr6alable, ou comme existence de part en part 
6clatCe, no se compos ant que comme se d6c0mposant 
constamment, viol~t et silencieusement. 7 
The .existence of the subject deriyes from an original negation, Blanchot claims, 
echoing a negative, Hegelian conception of the subject's existence. This Hegelian view 
lightens the emergence of human identity; it stresses an enigmatic condition of the 
moment of emergence of self. A primordial origin of a consciousless being animated 
both by desire, which involves a demand of love, and by the necessity for preserving 
desire; it is this relentless search for the other's love which involves the paradoxical 
necessity for Perpetuating an unsurmountable difference between the subject and the 
other, the need to remain foreign to the other's sphere, to remain a desiring being 
foreign to the other's identity; it is this original impulse towards the other which 
demands its rejection as a means of preserving the tensions of love. And it is this 
rejection, this painful, unspeakable abolition of the original impulse of desire, brought 
about by the other's rejection, that forces a reflexive f1JOvement of the individual; 
consciousness emerges from the apprehension of the signification of rejection. A deeper 
recognition than the mere acceptance of a demand for love originates from this 
experience of strangeness. It is neither love nor absence, but rejection that the being 
demands at this primal moment. Consciousness arises from an original condition alien 
to language, founded upon the paradoxical impulse which drives him towards the other. 
Thus, consciousness arises from a primordial negative experience of meaning. 
This denial, this negative expression of the other, which engenders the identity of self, 
turns into a sundering of the self from the other; it abides in the meaning of language 
and confers upon the subject's word a contradictory force, at once a condition of 
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reciprocity and an essential, unsurmountable barrier. 
The kjnd of negation to which Blanchot alludes, the denial of recognition, 
involves a strong paradox. The construction of the singularity of the self requires the 
recognition of a most singular feature, that which defines the self s own identity, and 
remains unmitigatedly foreign to the other, escaping the communion of speech. It must 
arise from its recognition by the other, must be pronounced by the other's voice. This 
paradox lurks in the core of secrecy: the unutterable feature which defines the i~entity 
of the self, while remaining meaningless to the other, has been afforded to the self by 
the other's negation, by the other's disquieting rejection, which constitutes both an 
acknowledgement and a demand for identity; the unutterable identity of the self appears 
as a gift from the other. 
However, this "negative" gift, received by the self from the other, provokes a 
contradictory effect: the word received from the other inevitably bears the certitude of 
his death; it arouses the subject's awareness of the extraneous signs which are a prelude 
to the other's disappearance. The singularity of identity exhibits in its silent, 
undecipherable signs, its own foreign and unfathomable provenance. The paradox 0/ 
identity is this: there is no self reflection which can restore the meaningfulness of the 
signs of the subject's own identity, the signs which separate him from his fellow men; 
yet these signs stem from the other's disappearance which defmes, in last analysis, the 
identity of the self. The other's negation intrudes as an extraneous body; thrust into the 
self, it creates and shapes the identity of the self. Secrecy confounds itself with this 
intrusive negation; it appears as the very source of language. It abides in its core. 
Negation seems to have its origin in an unperceived/olding back of speech upon 
itself: the act of naming involves the subject's undepictable awareness of the language's 
inherent, yet unexpressed reference to a missing, unapprehensible universe of objects, 
the presence of which is only foreshadowed as a vague atmosphere which surrounds 
any interpretable, symbolic expression. As Saussure emphatically argued in the early 
years of this centuryB, the signs of language presuppose an inherent, concealed but 
manifold negative relations among signs.9 The meaning of each sign involves the 
meanings of other existent, potentially present but unuttered, silent signs; these non-
manifested meanings, in tum, drift along, implicitly, with the utterance; they remain 
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nebulous spheres of sense, indirectly lightened by the gleam of explicit signs. Negation 
embodies some of these shadows of sense, it confers upon them a material presence, 
it transfonns them, in tum, into evidence. Negation brings to light the implicit sphere 
of unarticulated but intrinsic meanings of signs. The looming of these potential, 
obscured utterances, marked with the signal of negation, renders into recognizable 
signs the intrinsic limits of language. 
The power of negation to create the expression of intangible but efficient 
meanings and to render visible formerly imperceptible tokens of language implies both 
the capacity of language to allow the reflexiveness of speech, it reveals the ability of 
phrases to fold back upon their own expression, to unfold them, to impose on them an 
analytic grid or to constrain them to fiction. The reflexiveness of language implies the 
capacity of acknowledging these tenuous, almost unfathomable, divergent meanings, 
and the force exerted upon speech by their unuttered density. 
Secrecy thus is informed by the force [Krqfi] of negation, by this potency of 
speech to evidence the frontiers of its own explicit utterances. Secrecy proper implies 
a reflexive, self enveloping movement of speech; this folding back of speech upon 
itself can be thought of as provoked by the determining experience of absence, by the 
nameless rejection at the origins of language, by the pain which abides at the margins 
of speech -at its SOUICe-, transformed into a mere intangible yet undeniable presence . 
ingrained in the experience of language itself. However, this reflexive movement of 
speech, in tum, leaves its own signals on the sequence of articulated signs. As speech 
folds back upon itself, it displays a series of traces of a meaning which will remain 
uninterpreted, and which will be preserved as a tacit, never elicited evidence of this 
reflexive movement. Secrecy exhibits, through the signs inherent in negation, the 
reminiscences of the primordial- absence which bear the tokens of the subject's 
singularity . 
In this light, the paradox ofidentily is not the only one to be involved in secrecy. Two 
more paradoxes inform the ethical frame of secrecy; the first one of them is the 
paradox of expressiveness: the violence of the ethical imperative and the impossibility 
of meeting its conditions arouse, in tum9 emotions which must remain unexpressed, 
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and which will emanate from the collapse of the ethical frame brought about by either 
the deliberate or the unwilling rejection of the aim to wholeness that rules the 
expressive utterance; the second one is the paradJJx of concealment: for secrecy to exist 
it is necessary that the traces of the concealment are clearly, unequivocally interpretable 
from the surface of discourse, but for this interpretation to be reliable it would require 
an impossible, intimate appraisal of the correspondence between the subject's inner 
impulse and a conjectural interpretation of his own utterance. 
This conjunction of paradoxes gives rise to an ethical scandal which broadens 
the breach between the impossible exhaustiveness of narration, its fictive fairness, and 
the abstract violence of the imperatiVe of faultless veracity. The shattering of the ethical 
frame which supports the identity of the self, also obliterates the profiles of the 
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subject's identity, and renders its inherent signs irrelevant. 
Oddly enough, the subject builds up his own identity upon this crude weave of 
paradoxes. The physiognomy of speech mirrors that of a community settled upon the 
subject's delusive desire for the other; if the subject's desire aims at rejection, then the 
truth of his own assertions lacks the ethical support of the vision of meaning as truth. 
His own frail identity looms from the mirage of a sovereign self. The subject is forced 
to build his own moral sphere from the remains of the ethical frame of his own speech. 
This weave of paradoxes exhibits the different moments which characterize the 
dynamics of secrecy. Rejecting his own identity and accepting his own intimate, 
unarticulable, ethical stigmatization, the subject outlives the actual destruction of his 
own chimerical identity while admitting the deceiving essence of speech. 
A cardinal experience is involved in this struggle to preserve the self despite the 
wreck of his identity in the broken sphere of ethical paradoxes: the subject's acceptance 
of secrecy as an intrinsic limit to the community bond -()f the speech itself-, derived 
from the loss of the primordial affective attachment, signifies its silent impregnation 
in the flesh; secrecy as a limit experience involves the silent, corporeal memory of an 
elementary pain. 
Therefore, secrecy holds to the disquieting experience of pain engraved on the 
primal grounds of subjectivity, a stealthy pain which emanates from the negative 
Sources of identity, and from the testimQny of the other's disappearance, the other's 
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death. Secrecy exhibits itself as a foretoken of the disappearance of identity. 
Howeyer, the irreducible silence of secrecy has nothing to do with the ineffable. 
Rather, the tangible signs of negation and silence in its expression disclose and exhibit 
the limits of the expressiveness of language; they reveal the tacit exhaustion of 
language which breeds secrecy; they render into meaningful expressions the shapeless 
yet brutal experience of absence. 
The experience of absence expresses itself as a negative imperative: the ~ubject 
is constrained to experience the limits of language, the meaningless expression of the 
outburst of pain. Pain is rendered meaningful and has a privileged expression in the 
narration which visibly enacts the impending absence, an absence inflicted on the 
subject by the other whose presence conveys an implicit menace; it foretells its 
impending disappearance; its spectral, anticipated death, shatters the subject's fantasies 
of identity; yet, it stirs the essential affects of community -the community in death-, 
which do not hold to any particular feature of the other, save its mere presence. Thus, 
it is the unreserved acceptance of pain that reveals the yield of the subject, and of the 
sense of his own words, to the sole absence of the other; it is the experience of pain 
that exposes- the utmost weakness of the identity of the self, the untruth of his 
sovereignty. The experience of pain ends inevitably in the rejection of the illusion of 
identity. 
The ruin of identity can be conceived as an aftermath of the subject's inability 
to signify the primordial remains of the early shattered image of the loved presence: 
the traces of a bodily movement, of a vocal discharge, of the sounds of his own scream 
which signals the disappearance of the other. These un signified remains, which refuse 
any deliberated evocation, can be thought of as the sources of secrecy. Thus, the 
transgression of the ethical rule of "saying it all" seems only a stratagem to elude a 
painful experience, which, however, has already taken place; it can also be conceived 
as an effort to veil, to weaken the degrading force of this primordial memory, as the 
attempt of memory to surrender to an as yet non-existent identity -the identity of the 
self-, and to suffocate the unrelenting need for the other's presence. 
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lL Secrecy andforbiddance 
However, secrecy, as a symbolic expression of the rejection of a primordial pain, is 
foreign to a mere strategy to lessen the intensity of an actual pain or to achieve welfare 
or happiness. 
Writing about the nature of secrecy, Descombes argues: 
Ce ne serait donc pas pour me proteger, comme on dit, que je 
cache mes pensCes ? On ne se tait que par interet: tene est la 
comprehension utilitariste du secret, selon laquene l'homme 
cherchant en toute autre chose son interet "bien compris", 
calcule sa conduite dans Ie sens de ce qui lui est avantag~ a 
l'occasion mentir ou dissimuler.lo 
A very ~tricted notion of interest attibuted to utilitarianism gives Descombes the 
occasion for a weak argumentation against the, so interpreted, demanding stiffness and 
shorcomings of these conceptions of ethics. However, chiefly due to Bentham's 
reflections and Mill's programatic works which explored a complex ethical dimension 
of utility, this notion broadened its former, reduced, bounded meaning. The notion of 
interest was firmly associated first with happiness (Bentham) and later with pleasure 
(Mill). DesCombes argues against utilitarianism, following Poe's notion of 
perverseness. 
an innate and primitive principle of human action, ~ paradoxical 
something, which we caJJperverseness [ ... J it is, in fact, a mobile 
without motive, a motive not motivirt. Through its promptings we 
act without comprehensible object. I I 
Descombes argues, following Poe, that it is possible to coneeive, on inductive grounds, 
that it is the "facultY' of perversion which induces the subject to secrecy, ruling it and 
overweighing the potency of p~ rational calculation. In this light, it is not interest 
which determines secrecy, but perversion: 
Cest la facuIte perverse de se precipiter, non dans ce qui semble 
boo., mais bien dans ce qui £emble mauvais.12 
For Poe, the ruling power of the faculty of perversion becomes evident not by the force 
of an ethical deduction, but by inductive lucidity. It escapes any derivation from ethical 
principles. Descombes remarks: "Le bien etre du heros de la nouvelle de Poe consiste 
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l ne pas avouer un crime parfait, accompli en lui, dont personne ne peut sou~nner . .,13 
Descombes {ails to discover in Poe's remark a negative impulse of secrecy: the 
subject's longing to regain the absolute sensation of the primal pain. Poe's text, depicts 
an irresistible, aimless impulse, an awkward kind of pleasure, which drives the self to 
destruction. It emerges from the pleasure provoked by the preservation of the secret 
of the murder of the other. In Poe's text, the unveiling of an evil secret is in itself the 
source of a dark pleasure which fuses in a common experience salvation and death. 
However, Descombes' explorations and proposals about the ruling efficacy of 
thefocuJtl perverse, based upon a dubious reading of Poe's text, does not contravene 
the premiSes of utilitarianism which defIne interest as the founding driving force of 
secrecy. A feature of Poe's conception, disregarded in Descombes' reading, is his 
stress -readable in the stark repetion of the word- on both the unmotivated motives 
of. perverseness -its lack of a comprehensible aim-, and the deceptive, shapeless 
character of right or wrong (in Poe's words). The particular sense given by 
utilitarianism to interest, conceived in the light of ethics, goes beyond a naive contrast 
between good and bad; pleasure can be conceived as the aim of the ethical action which 
renders the ·meaning of the notion of bad completely foreign to rigid, general 
calculations and universal strategies to achieve what is conceived of as right. An ethic 
governed by pleasure aims to exhaustively rule the exploration of the singular traits of 
the individual's behaviour. Poe's recognition of the ethical relevance of reflexive 
perverseness, driven by the vertigo of transgression (indifferent to the fact that it might 
lead to self destruction), only exposes a yet unexplored facet of the utilitarianism 
imperative: the self's experience of the symbolic manifestation of absence, of death, 
may be thought of as an essential and compelling condition of identity. The yielding 
of the self to its own will to destruction is not envisioned either as evil, or as fatal; 
rather as a contradictory, vain striving to achieve a full, yet negative identity: an 
identity achieved by this aimless transgression. Thus, identity appears as a deceiving 
vision: a fascinating yet barren visage which hinders the acknowledgement of the 
impossible autonomy of the self. 
Forbiddance seems to be the force which impells the subject to tum to the 
symbolic sovereignty of secrecy in IUs exhausting, sterile struggle against the 
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supremacy of absence. Forbiddance, as a singular act which negatively represents acts, 
exerts on the subject a crucial force, symbolicly expressed. Its object ~ften 
unfathomable, as happens with secrecy- is pure representation. Forbiddance, in the 
last analysis, seems to be bred intrinsically by the need for language to define its own 
boundaries, not by rejecting deviances and unacceptable utterances, nor by settling the 
patterns of legitimate usage, but chiefly by banning expressions and representation 
which must not be apprehended as language proper. Language turns back upon _ itself, 
by a reflexive operation, to fix its own limits, to define the absolute, unsurmountable 
outemess which, in tum, shapes its own unfathomable yet positive identity: 
la locution interdite, qui niera qu'elle ne soit aussi de langue? S'il 
nlen etait pas ains~ eUe serait simplement cette limite ou la langue 
se suspend et se confinne en Tout: point besoin alors de regie qui 
la qualifie comme eXclue; bien con~ue, la fonction de la langue y 
suffirait Or il faut toujours un jugement explicite, car rien 
autrement de la locution incorrecte ne l'annoncerait comme telle; 
c'est d'etre a certains egards dans la langue, qu'eUe reclame d'en 
etre Ccartee. Or, qu'm y prenne garde, telle est bien la structure de 
toute prohibition, et la prohibition de langue ne se distingue pas 
de ce point de vue de celle qui pese sur Ie sexe.14 
The intimate. need for secrecy stems from this original forbiddance that constitutes 
language itself. Moreover, the reflexive impulse of the language does not restrain its 
effects to its own sphere, it drags along with it the whole spectrum of images which 
shape the identity of the subject. Without forbiddance, there is no experience of limit. 
Without forbiddance, the subject would be doomed to exhaustion, suffocated within the 
boundless wholeness of language, lost in its vastness and imaginary unity. 
However, forbiddance signals the limits of language from within language 
itself.15 What remains unsaid, unuttered, even unimaginable, is the origin of the 
subject's obsession with the forbidding utterance. Yet, the need for forbiddance is not 
incieted solely by language; it arises from the subject's experience of limits. It is the 
limit experienced by the subject, his confinement to an experience of community 
foreign to the meaningful force of language, which seems to incite the sentence of 
exclusion. As Milner has remarked, forbiddance cannot be seen as a purely exclusive 
rule. It does not confound itself with the mere pattern which allows the recognition of 
a unacceptable use of language, or a tran~ression of grammar. Forbiddance does not 
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preserve the subject from misunderstanding or from the miscarriage of a performance 
rule. It even cJ.oes not have an essential relation with taboo or the exclusion of an issue 
or meaning from linguistic interaction. Forbiddance seems to emerge from the 
paradoxical expression of the subject's experience of an impossible utterance; it is the 
expression of the experience of senselessness posited from within sense itself. Thus, 
forbiddance exhibits the paradoxical identity of language: it confirms the illusion of the 
wholeness of the symbolic universe, of the intimate unity of language; it also exposes 
its broken regime of expression. 
Therefore, forbiddance might be conceived as a primal moment of secrecy. 
Despite the fact that secrecy may also appear as an occasional, marginal expression, 
dependent of incidental, consciously designed strategies of speech and argumentation, 
it remains, through its essential link to forbiddance, an oblique expression of the 
inescapable exhaustion of language. However, secrecy cannot be taken as an abrupt 
collapse of language. It is not a rash silence thrust in the smooth stream of speech. 
Unlike explicit forbiddance, secrecy seems to express an unpronounced sign alien to 
meaning, which abides, nevertheless, within the boundaries of language. 
Perhaps, the acquisition of language is neither -as some linguists might posit-
the imposition of a foreign grid, imposed on the subject's experience, shaping and 
ruling the structure of linguistic behaviour, nor a defrnite and finite set of rules of 
lexical units and grammatical categories intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Language 
does not seem to be an inner, transcendental gift to the human soul, entangled in the 
thread of the subject's faculties. Indeed, language does take the appearance of 
extraneous, immutable matter, able to subdue the acquired experience to its unrelenting 
logic. However, langUilge is entirely engendered by and its effects are totaly 
comprehended in utterance. The eriigmatic force which compels the subject to acquire 
language remains foreign to its matter and logic. Julia Kristeva has distinguished 
sharply between the symbolic and the imaginary dimensions of language, following 
Lacan's conception. In the sphere of the symbolic, Kristeva counts "I'exercise du 
discours selon les regIes logiques et grammaticales de l'interlocution"; while she ranges 
among the imaginary manifestations "Ia representation de strategies d'identification, 
introjection et projection, qui mobilisent rimage du corps, celles du moi et de 1 'autre, 
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et qui utilisent les processus primaires (deplacement et condensation),,16. These domains 
do not remaip foreign to each other. Imaginary relations preserve their oblique and 
indeterminate relation to the formal elements of language and speech, although they 
cannot be reduced to them; they also exert a deranging influence on language itself. 
L'imaginaire est un kaleidoscope d'images du moi a partir 
desquelles advient Ie sujet de l'enoociatioD. Cela ne doit pas nous 
fatt oublier que l'imaginaire prolonge ses effots jusqu'aux 
modaliles psychiques anterleurs a ['identification speculatre, 
c'est Q dire jusqu'aux representations psychiques des affects 
soumis aux regles jluctuantes d'assimilation et du rejet, de la 
condensation et du deplacement l7 
The particular identities of those subjects involved in speech, the peculiar subjective 
posi~ons taken by speaker and hearer by means of the pure appearance of the word, 
are defined by the singular profile of their imaginary images of the self. Moreover, 
Kristeva is inclined to recognize a regressive effect of this imaginary relations and their 
topography of speech on the reminiscences of primal wordless relations and even on 
the deep primordial grammar of representations -in Freud's terms, condensation and 
displacement. Thus, imaginary relations shape the different patterns of symbolic 
performance· and confer upon the primordial grounds of language their particular 
psychical force. 
The three stages, implicitly distinguished by Kristeva ir:t the emergence of the 
contours of the evoked topography of speech, reveal the complex temporality of the 
images of the self. Also, they unveil the paradoxical condition of the notions of 
condensation and displacement, which seem to appear both as operations of symbolic 
nature, and as disquietirig non-symbolic representations; these non-symbolic 
representations manifest themselves as mute, meaningless but powerful means to create 
the primal memories of psychical objects. They emerge from the subject's intimate, 
unattainable inner sphere, as psychical powers displayed prior to any identification; 
they also involve traces of perceptions with which they build representations of objects 
and memories of fading images allowing for the reminiscence of emotions which 
antecede and prepare the incorporation of language itself. 
Furthermore, the imaginary facets of speech originate in these primal psychical, 
wordless representations, in this protean displacement and lodgement of affective 
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energies, in this shifting of the mutable intensities of sensation and desire, in the 
perennial yet unrecognizable mourning for an ancient, nameless loss. They cannot 
remain imprissioned in the compelling bonds of language. Kristeva' s imagiMire 
represents certain limits of language: it both precedes and follows language; it 
anticipates it and later it falls back upon it to disrupt the regularity of its boundaries; 
it does not yield -1lCCOrding to Kristeva- to the ruling aims of conventional 
symbolism; rather, it surrenders to "fluctuating", adventitious rules which stern from 
the moving intensities of the subject's relations to foreign or intimate objects, to 
foreign or intimate emotions; it emerges, in last analysis, from the "rejection" of 
painful perceptions or the "incorporation" of the perceptions of satisfaction; from the 
lasting memories of singular sensations, governed by desire and aroused by the 
perception. The rejection of a representation can emerge only from the early 
reminiscence of pain ingrained in the act of representation; it does not involve the 
memory of the actual painful object, but the memory of the sensation of pain itself. 
Thus, language may be conceived as bounded up with and shaped by these margins of 
silent representations, of an uncertain web of intensities; consequently, it appears as a 
universe of signs composed by the convergence of heterogeneous symbolic -one stable 
and conventional set of rules- and non-symbolic, "fluctuating" rules, invigorated by 
the fundamental, subjective intensities aroused by the experience of loss of a 
primordial, fading presence. Thus, the "fluctuation" of the imaginaire, as Kristeva 
names it, exposes desultory, rhythmic patterns of affection, mute experiences of 
absence referred to the singular, uncertain profile of the primordial, painful object 
relation. 
Kristeva's assertions on the primary nature of displacement and condensation, 
and on the fluctuating nature of their rules entail consequences for the reflection about 
the conception of silence and secrecy inherent in language. 18 It forces a redefinition of 
the conception of both silence and secrecy, and of their relation. 
A special quality of silence is that its appears with the tension between language and 
the subject's perception of himself; the silent affections, the oblique reminiscences 
aroused by the subject's reflection on his..own thoughts, emotions and desires, about 
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his own inclinations and atavisms, about his own darkness and abjection, are 
irreducible tQ the endurance, the conventionality, the difuse yet recognizable 
boundaries which shape the meaning of words; this tension emerges as a perceived 
halting of speech, as an often veiled, undecipherable vanishing of the utterance, 
originating at the convergence of symbolic and non-symbolic subjective determinations; 
this silence is rooted in the opaque residues of the speaker's early experience of 
absence. It is this quality of silence that reveals secrecy. Secrecy appears at. these 
margins of reflexion, it is readable in these silences, in these mute tensions, which 
shadow the enigmatic, pervading presence of pain, the barren, timeless shudder of 
mourning. Silence then becomes an imprinting of secrecy upon language. 
However, silence unlike secrecy, exhibits itself as an expressive, meaningful, 
decipherable suspension of language. It is a neutral substance, a void yet recognizable, 
conventional sign. For silence to become a relevant expression of secrecy it must 
emerge from an abysmal turning back of silence upon itself. Silence must evoke 
silence; it must appear as an inextricable, dense sediment of mute signs. Consequently, 
in secn"JCY silence is cast upon silence by forbiddance. The expressive power of words, 
language itself, is pervaded by this dense silence which arises from the grounds of 
forbiddance, of the intrinsic limits of language; it is from its disperse presence in 
speech, that silence acquires equivocal, disquieting meanings and a vague but powerful 
expressiveness. Unlike meaningful silence, secrecy appears as an ominous emptiness, 
an almost intangible veil which encumbers the perception of speech. But the 
consequence of reflexive perception is not the subject's dominion of the meanings of 
speech; rather, it is uncertainty. An uncertainty which might drive interpretation to an 
endless circle or perhaps suspend in indefinite astonishment the attempt to decipher the 
weave of silence. 
Margins of silence, which in tum, surround the- experience of forbiddance, 
might incite a restless, drifting evocation. Therefore, silence, when built upon the 
remnants of language, is not experienced only as missing words, or as a weakness of 
language, but as an obscurely determined shattering of the expression in actual 
dialogue. Silence as a crude token of secrecy, emanates like an intangible, pure 
sensation, from the deeply fragmented but apparently uninterrupted flow of speech, 
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from the mirage of the plenitude of meaning, from the full accomplishment of the act 
of speech. This singular, dense, reflective silence of secrecy can be understood as the 
resonances of the self's intimate, primordial experience of pain, rendered into a barren 
symbolic matter, into an absent significance of actual signs. 
Language then reveals itself neither as an inner source of identity, nor as a permanent 
and stiff frame, imposed by a transcendental, foreign power on the inner realm. of the 
subject's experience, a frame able to define by itself the present and future profile of 
the subject's identity. The fabric of language, made of a weave of forbiddance and 
silence, is but an edge of the mirage of the subject's identity, a perpetual boundary of 
his history, the resistent substance of his reminiscences, the texture of his enduring 
atavisms. Secrecy, indeed, remains within the sphere of apprehensible meanings; it is 
neither surrounded by a sacred prohibition, nor threatened by the infliction on the 
subject of unbearable stigma. Yet, pain sets the boundaries of speech and ceases to be 
just a necessary condition of secrecy; then, secrecy and forbiddance become almost 
indistinguishable. It attains the force and prevalence of law and determines the fate of 
the subject's· identity . 
Secrecy condenses the violence implied by the entangled temporalities of 
speech, which drag along with them the representations of excluded and yet intruding 
remembrances, and the tireless threat of a brutal fact, of an obscene, abject and 
unsuspected truth. It is the key notion of experience,19 that condense these temporalities 
of speech, the emergence of remembrances and the wilful rejection of a truth intrinsic 
to the subject's own history. 
III Inessentilll secrecy: from enigma to power 
1. Secrecy and enigma 
There is a necessary, yet paradoxical relation between interpretation and secrecy. 
Interpretation does not dissipate secrecy; it spreads out its signs over the entire 
discourse; it disseminates through the whole text its perturbing power. The inner 
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fissures and margins of meaning are rendered visible. Interpretation unfolds the silence 
of the intrinsic, boundless effusion of a mute, expressive force in the linguistic 
expression. Interpretation proliferates. It branches endlessly. It provokes an endless 
generation and dispelling of discourses, out of a single feature of speech; it expands the 
surface of meanings. It does not fill the clefts in the fragile spirit of words. Rather, it 
multiplies their implications: in each unfolding of discourse, in every equivocal 
expression, in any potential ambiguity of the words, interpretation engenders 
unprecedented, unreadable opacity; it preserves, as an evocative wake, shreds of signs 
which remain foreign to or untouched by interpretation itself, signs which circumscribe 
revelation, seeking to assert the plenitude of its meaning while unveiling its 
impossibilities, exhibiting the enfeebled impulse of deciphering. 
Interpretation has often been conceived as a means of achieving enlightenment, 
as a revelation. But interpretation is nothing more than an attempt which never 
obliterates the tensions in speech which emerge with enigma; rather, interpretation 
propagates through discourse its own fractures and strains, inscribing them in its tissue. 
Enigma appears to be the magnetic centre of interpretation, it has been 
understood even as its absolute origin. Simultaneously, enigma represents a rarefying 
of meaning which names and conceals the truth of text; it preserves this truth as an 
actual horizon of meaning; Eventually, interpretation evokes the revelation of enigma 
as the actual disclosing of a potentially comprehensible meaning. It is the simultaneous 
invention of the impossible centre of the meaning of text and the narration of its 
mythological origins. 
Paradoxically, interpretation must preserve the enigmatic force which lies in its 
origins. It must maintain an intimate relation with it; it must preserve the traces of an 
original enigma. These traces are the features which define its identity, which confer 
sense upon interpretation. Without them interpretation loses its imaginary illuminating 
force, it becomes an indifferent, plain discourse, a dispensable gloss. Interpretation is 
recognizable as such only because it entangles in its own weave of meanings, the names 
and bounds of enigma and declares its invincible opacity. 
Secrecy shares with enigma the virtues and the potencies of this pervading 
opacity, which convokes interpretation. _However, each of them implies different 
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temporalities. Secrecy appears as a weakened, transient enigma. Indeed, secrecy is not 
conceived as an unsurmountable opacity but as an obstinate silence embedded in 
discourse, a silence which veils what should have been said. Silence appears only as 
a non essential enigma, as a contingent barrier in language which can and will be 
finally overcome. Nevertheless, the intensified, different senses of temporality involved 
in secrecy imply the intense force of history foreign to the timelessness of enigma. 
History involved in secrecy appears as a dense atmosphere of reminiscences and 
residues, as ciphered territories of evocation and as a promise of a narrative expansive 
eloquence: secrecy is another facet, an obscure one, of the lure of eloquence, the 
incitation to an infinite interpretation. 
But interpretation involves the recognition and the naming of the different temporal 
layers of discourse. Enigma and secrecy confer a different mythical meaning on their 
own concealment. The timeless and subjectless, collective nature of enigma joins the 
sacred representations, veiled by ritual, concealed to the profane gaze, preserved from 
the presence and even the proximity of the impure. Secrecy, in tum, preserves 
significant tensions comparable to those of enigma, yet it founds its own creed: it 
allows a personal history to intrude upon the fabric of narration, and it shelters in its 
silence a brief and transient belief. Interpretation, thus, deepens the fissure between 
enigma and secrecy. It exhibits secrecy as a finite, historical and ethically burdened 
enigma. Concealment has been etablished by interpretation as the common feature of 
enigma and secrecy. This feature bestows on interpretation the timeless and finite, the 
challenging purity of enigma and the perturbing moral resonances of secrecy. 
Thus, interpretation can appear as an effort to elucidate, both in secrecy and in 
enigma, the springs of concealment, the obscure name shielded by silence. This effort 
never dissipates the discursive tensions aroused by the mere appearance of enigma or 
secrecy. Moreover, interpretation is seen to embody the concealed as a fixed magnetic 
lacuna in its own textual unfolding. Around this still, unreachable centre, whirls the 
moving web of interpretation. The centre is this hollowness which remains invincibly 
foreign to signs. Interpretation signifies the mythology of enigma, the opaqueness of 
secrecy. Therefore, the concealed remains both inside and outside the limits of the 
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interpreting text: it appears as a foreign, distant, extrinsic token; and simultaneously, 
as an inherent creature of interpretation, sheltered by its own restlessly proliferating 
discourse. However, it is interpretation that creates concealment as its own centre. 
Interpretation appears with the formulation of enigma, with the expression which 
conceals the secret token. Concealment does not precede interpretation, rather it 
emerges with it. The pace of interpretation is, from the beginning, uncertain. It is 
impossible to recognize the origins of enigma and the founding interpretatjon of 
secrecy. Interpretation appears always as an echo of the concealed, as its emanation. 
Nevertheless, the concealed emerges only with interpretation, it is bound up with it. 
The concealed is never perceived other than as a distressing, vague, symbolic breach, 
a daring, mute universe of signals without any definite origin or profile. 
An uncertain alliance, an inextricable fusion between secrecy and enigma arises 
from the hermeneutic act. Secrecy seems to rely upon the potential boldness of sense, 
upon the existence of a visible path which goes from the unutterable to the asserted, 
from the unknowable to certainty, from the ellipsis to explicit syntax, from conjectural 
histories to exhaustive narration, from enthymeme to syllogism. Nevertheless, 
hesitation defines this region in which enigma and secrecy meet, in which the sense of 
absence emerges as an ambiguous signal both of the unapproachable, primordial loss, 
and the intimate misapprehension of the non-said. Secrecy bears a solid conviction of 
an actual, deep-rooted sense; it exhibits itself through those shreds of signs scattered 
through the text of interpretation, as a shadow of the debasement of a potential sense; 
it incites just a ventured guess as to the nature of a fading presence. 
2. Secrecy as the political use of concealment 
Secrecy exerts still another perturbing effect which relates it to the exercise of power, 
with the stIategies of simulacrum: concealment as the sheer exhibition of concealment; 
concealment as the mimicry of concealment; concealment of the concealment of 
nothing; concealment as the sheer exhibition of the power to conceal, the reckless 
concealment of the impossibility of concealing. Concealment, then, folds back upon 
discourse to impress on its surface the features of the masquerade of concealment. It 
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develops its power to create its own image out of the smooth surface of meaning. 
Descombes has suggested a paradoxical feature of secrecy: it should be sayable. 
What has remained secret must be meaningful to others. The missing utterance should 
be painlessly brought to light. However, this condition would renders interpretation 
useless. Yet, despite the intelligibility of the concealed utterance, the need for 
interpretation persists. The relevance has nothing to do with the eventual disclosure of 
the concelled object, but with the exposure of its profound, obscure sense. 
Interpretation seeks to ellucidate the springs of the relation between the act of 
concealment, and the explicit meaning of the concealed. It is this relation that confers 
its most singular traits upon secrecy. It is this relation that resists any interpretation 
which aims to exhaustiveness, that escapes the eloquence of signs, that renders 
interpretation simultaneously sterile and imperative. It is this relation that remains 
obscure, inaccessible, secret beyond secrecy. It renders comprehensible the singular, 
inexpressible ground of secrecy; not of the veiling, concealing discourse, but of the 
explicit signs which would denounce the will to conceal. 
In secrecy, the sense of the utterance experiences a profound metamorphosis: 
concealment ceases to evoke an oblique, equivocal sense; its meaning ceases to be the 
uncertain, dim luminescence irradiated by the dispersed residues of the concealed. The 
prohibition involved in secrecy seeks to exclude an utterance from the universe of the 
other's expectations. But this utterance must leave on the surface of language pure 
traces which should alert the interpreter about the poignancy of what has been banned. 
However, here prohibition is but a mirage. It seems to reduce secrecy to the pure, 
autonomous act of concealment. The utterance adopts a definite sense; it exhibits an 
apparently explicit, though bewildering meaning: it restrains the whole meaning of an 
utterance only to stress the will to preserve secrecy, to exalt the fictive possession of 
the buth. The whole utterance turns into nothing but the opprobrious expression which 
flaunts the will to conceal, and the full, exclusive possession of the silenced truth. 
Secrecy reveals the exertion of power as a dreary discursive strategy; it becomes a 
reflexive gloss of the concealing utterance. It reveals a negative significance of its own 
expressive signs: 
On Ie voit, la question du secret est bienwt politique. C'est mame 
Ja question poUt/que par excelence, pusque Ie pouvoir est Ie 
pouvoir de dire. [ ... ] Le secret donne a celui qui Ie d6tient du 
pouvoir de Ie dire ou non, done de separer ceux qui l'entendront 
des autres.20 
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This manoeuvre renders meaningless what has been concealed; rather, it is the very act 
of concealment that has been illuminated. Secrecy as strategy reveals itself as a 
paradoxical, positive force: as the force of the concealed declines, its relevant sense is 
replaced by sheer action; meaning emerges only from the violent excluding gesture of 
concealment which exhibits its paradoxical capacity to create meaningful signs out of 
the pure exhibition of its negative Power. By the ambiguous act, secrecy can be made 
to appear as a spectacle which extenuates the force of its own opaqueness. The 
spectaculat nature of the ritual action which informs secrecy creates an unusual bond 
between the visible and the invisible; unexpected signs are rendered perceptible, but 
only as meaningless, enigmatic signs, which might be thought of as sprouts of the 
concealed. The ritual of secrecy alone, the collective acquiescence in the concealment, 
confers upon secrecy a meaningful force which thrives with the image it evokes of the 
potential disclosure of the concealed. Secrecy reveals itself as a futile, vacuous but 
invincible strategy to achieve power; it builds upon a meaningless statement the whole 
mascarade of concealment. Nothing relevant has been veiled, but the simulacrum of 
veiling is enough to engender power. Revelation dissipates the compelling force of 
strategic secrecy. It provokes the exclusion of the self from the site of power. Yet, 
strategies of secrecy acquire an uncertain dignity by fulfilling the intrinsic promise of 
secrecy: its own extinction. The power of secrecy, when it emerges as a sheer 
discoursive, political stratagem, is founded upon an oblique paradoxical menace: to 
comply with the ethical dictum of saying it all. 
IV. Secrecy: rhythm and time 
1. Time and memory: the mechanics of forgetfulness 
By a strange effect, secrecy transforms concealment into a paradoxical will to 
forgetfulness, and, in tum, it informs the privileged memory of experience. The rituals 
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of secrecy thus appear as a relevant but constantly metamorphosized resources of 
memory. As Descombes has remarked while trying to elucidate some of the peculiar 
traits of secrecy: 
La volonte d'oublier comme la volonte de ne pas savoir signifient 
I' impossibilite d'oubli, Ie savoir trop lourd a porter.21 
This difference stressed by Descombes between forgetfulness and will to forgetfulness 
becomes the crucial trait in the inextricable relation between memory and secrecy: 
while forgetfulness implies silence as an uncertain, yet effective suppression of a 
representation intensely charged with affection, a violent response to the urgencies of 
life, will to forgetfulness involves an impossible oblivion; it incites the subject to break 
down the resistances of memory; it manifests the subject's intimate struggle to dissipate 
an undesired memory, an attempt to suffocate the images aroused by early experiences, 
the obstinate presence of what should have been completely banned from the 
experience of the self. 
Secrecy also involves the ambiguous expression which confounds will to 
concealment, will to forgetfullness and will to ignore. Will to forget and will to ignore 
arouse discordant emotions. The will to ignore reveals the previous existence of a 
desolate state of mind, which refuses to acknowledge any further disquieting 
perreption. Yet, the subject's will to ignore knows nothing about its haunting, fictitious 
object; it vaguely glimpses it; its spectre looms out from the images the subject fears; 
secrecy must faintly adumbrate the meaning and nature of what has been excluded from 
speech. 
Both, the will to forget and the will to ignore, seem to converge in the most 
radical manifestation of secrecy as a stratagem of power. The excluded truth becomes 
a tangible substance, the possession· of which appears as the privilege of an illuminated 
group. After having gone through the path of purification until its ultimate stage, 
revelation which comes with sacredness dissipates secrecy . Yet, it demands a restricted, 
ciphered language likely to exhibit the violence of its intrinsic, brutal limits. The 
subject's imaginary capacity to expose the limits of language becomes the root of 
power, it confounds itself with the possession of truth which uphel~s the right to 
exclude, to uproot the other's from the sphere of transcendental sense, to annihilate 
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them as symbolic, meaningful presences. 
However, ritual action announces the revelation brought about by the proximity 
to sacredness and its language which, by itself, helds an absolute, unrestrained power 
and adumbrates the path into truth. Descombes sees in mathematics the modem 
example of a sacred language acquired by ritual initiation: 
ce secret que Ie wIgaire ne peut pas entendre n'a besoin d'etre 
defendu, il sc protege tout seul. On aurait beau crier partout que 
personne n'y comprendrait ri~ honnis les purs. Par consequent, 
seules les mathbnatiques pures sont veritablemente secretes, 
parce que mathematiques.22 
True [~ritables] secrets, Descombes suggest, are sheltered by a barrier of language, 
which can only be broken by initiation. Initiation as a ritual becomes an intimidating 
spectacle, the enacting of sacredness, the visibility of purification. The ritual initiation 
to the deciphering of the concealed is a privileged source of power. Interpretation then 
becomes a gift. The subject achieves the power to break through the barriers of 
language into the sphere of speechless illumination. Thus, sacred interpretation 
conjoins concealment and unveiling; initiation bestows on the subject the clue to the 
hermeneutics .of secrecy. The limits of language are stridently, exorbitantly exhibited, 
only to consecrate their transgression; sacred interpretation both lightens and shatters 
the limits of language; it reveals the unarticulable nature of truth. Initiation demands 
purity which also involves the contempt for and even the forgetfulness of vulgar 
language. The access to truth excludes the profane, and the plenitude of sense is only 
revealed to the chosen, to those illuminated by divinity. Only the consecrated can be 
admitted to the presence of truth; all others are doomed to remain beyond the reach of 
its glare. Descombes considers true secrecy as a strategy to achieve political efficacy, 
through the acquisition of secrecy as an instrument of intimidation in the exercise of 
power. 
The visible weave of the signs which announce secrecy appears to be the 
outcome of an intimate ritual in which secrecy and an aim to purity, to the sacred 
converge. Secrecy thus involves an intimate relation between negative promise 
-secrecy as a complicity in muteness, which signifies the acknowledgement of the 
promise to suffocate any allusion to a shameful, abject item-, and explicit prohibition; 
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between the subject's intimate, yet stale promise to unveil an unutterable painful image 
which abides in the core of self, and the conviction, aroused by a thorough 
reflexiveness, of the existence of a forbidden sphere of sense, preserved from profane 
words, ciphered in a private language. Secrecy then approaches mysticism. However, 
mystic rapture is not an exceptional moment of ritual, devotion and prayer: perhaps it 
is only the exaltation of certain of the moment of the dissipation of sense inherent in 
extreme fervour, when silence becomes sacred, timeless; it confounds itself with 
secrecy and revelation. 
However, strategic secrecy, publicly exposed and recognized, does not illuminate the 
nature and the force [Krqfl] of negation of secrecy conceived as an inherent expression 
of the self s experience of limits. 
Secrecy mixes the inherent force [Kraft] of negation embodied in prohibition 
and that of the imperative. Thus, its force thrives from the exhaustion of the meaning 
of speech tnulsfigured into a promise of oblivion and an imperative of silence; yet, it 
defers its full comprehension until the subject's own atavistic, regressive impulse has 
not restored the primal sense of prohibition which somehow signals the strange but 
frightful time of absence; a primordial prohibition without rules which springs from the 
subject's early, meaningless impotency. Secrecy becomes the sheer, vain expectancy 
for the advent of sense, of revelation. Unlike promise which entails the sense of its 
future fulfilment, secrecy has only one final aim: to preserve itself undeciphered until 
its own extinction, which should occur only with the death of those who possess the 
clues to the relief of truth. The intimidating power of the concealed should be 
extinguised by revelation. The powerful image of death should eclipse the intrinsic 
horizon of language. Thus, secrecy must pronounce simultaneously the promise of the 
imminent unveiling of mythic truth, and the promise to resist revelation the imminent 
of adumbrates death. Perhaps the alliance of secrecy with death appears as the deep 
root of language, and remains as the main feature of concealment ruled by pain. 
The two promises involved in secrecy imply separate and conflicting senses; 
each of these promises imposes a different shape on the subject's experience of time. 
There is no undivided subject of secrecy. There is neither a singular force in the 
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meaning of words nor a definite identity likely to embody an agonistic, ruinuous, 
incongruous exigencies of both promises. While promise demands the deliberate 
commitment of the subject to its fulfilment, secrecy exacts the disappearence of any 
intention to uncover the deep core of secrecy. 
In secrecy, the speaker faces the unrelenting awareness of the risk of an 
impending betrayal of the yet non~essed. He experiences the violence of the abrupt 
hermeneutic relevance of proliferating, untimely emerging traces of concealment. In 
secrecy, the dim stimuli that surround the keeper of the secret turns into potentially 
meaningful presences. Thus, secrecy intensifies the significance of the perceived 
through expectation. It stresses the hermeneutic relevance of immediacy. An urgent 
need for sense, coherence and completeness impels the subject to the hermeneutical 
endeavour which gets hold of every shape, every contour, every token which emerges 
from his environment; the interpretation that stems from secrecy seeks to apprehend 
the potentially discemable significance of a growing crowd of objects. Nevertheless, 
this avidity for interpretation demands, in tum, the fading out of the subject, the 
absolute primacy of the concealed, a longing for what has been definitively excluded. 
It forces the subject to admit the extreme paradoxical experience of time which defines 
the hermeneutic endeavour; it compells the subject to acknowledge the moment of 
concealment as that which sets the boundaries of self only to intensify the radiance of 
its crepuscular image. Secrecy exacerbates the subjective tension which emerges from 
the demand of the disappearance of the other as the necessary condition of the 
extinction of the self. 
The experience of secrecy calls to mind Freud's quotation of Schelling in 
relation to lithe uncanny": 
Unheimliche nennt man Alles, was im Geheimnis, im 
Verborgnen... bleiben solte und hervorgetreten ist. (Das 
Unheimliche, SA, 1919, IV: 248f 
Secrecy demands, not the revelation of the occult but its mere visibility of its traces, 
the visibility of negative images, images of that which did not have any previously 
··Unheimlich· is the name of everything that ought to .have remained ... secret and hidden but has come to light. 
(PF. 14: 345). 
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conceivable or perceivable shape; images of a feeble, conjectured object or state of 
things; imag~ of what was only a gap, a hollow, nothing; the concealed rises with the 
stigma of its non-existence: it exhibits the dark, contrasting profile of the excluded 
object. In secrecy, as in the uncanny, speech signals the contours of the missing object, 
and exhibits the traces of the act of exclusion, it exposes the shade which has become 
the vacuous promise of presence and, simultaneously, the marks which call the 
attention of the will to concealment. The experience of the uncanny is woven ~th the 
thread of a primordial passion, a sombre, daunting attachment to disappearance. It is 
the nature of the experience of the uncanny that supports the stupor which shapes the 
structure of secrecy. 23 
However, unlike the uncanny, secrecy does not exhibit an immediate allegory, 
a tangible representation of what has been excluded; its allegory is harsher, brutal. The 
sign which represents the exclusion is silent, stale; it challenges the attempts of 
comprehension; it rejects the quiescent, petrified assurance of a name. 
An act leaves no other traces that its effects. Then, it must be inferred from its 
consequences. Thus, there is no proof of secrecy but secrecy itself. Silence is 
equivocal, manifold. Associated with oblivion, with disregard, with blindness, none' 
of them inherently bound to secrecy, silence is no proof of it. There is no other 
guarantee of secrecy than the intimate, painfully experienced limits of language. But 
this guarantee is paradoxical. It convulses the whole experience of language; it 
overturns the certitude of the intrinsic wholeness of sense. Secrecy loses its specific 
meaning; it contaminates the whole language. It disappears in the disappearance of the 
firmness of sense, of sense itself. Thus, secrecy confronts the subject, not only with 
physical and symbolic death, but with an appalling promise, that of the essential 
disappearance of meaning; secrecy· is the vivid experience of the forgetfulness inherent 
in language. 
The rhythmically scattered tokens of secrecy evoke the rhythms of exclusion, 
but they also anticipate the extinction of time forecast by the imminence of revelation. 
Secrecy refers implicitly to the rhythms of silence, to the pace of its appearances, to 
its dissemination, to the successive branching of its series. Secrecy appears as an 
inherently equivocal act: as a strategy _ of speech and as a narration ruled by the 
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paradoxical striving of the aelf for identity. 
Seaecy invokes and demands the other's awareness of a missing sign, of a gap 
which makes the utterance uncertain. It defers indefinitely the meaning of language; 
it postpones indefinitely the advent of certitude. Secrecy appears as a never fulfilled 
promise of a future sense; for secrecy to appear, interpretation must rely on the 
expectation that the scattered tokens of the concealed, the shreds of silence which 
exhibit themselves dispersed over the speech, will lead to the final discovery ~f the 
concealed. Beyond the transgression enacted by secrecy, there must reside the purity 
of sense. However, the guarantee invoked by secrecy must not be a fragile, passing 
one. The desperate aim of secrecy is perhaps never to be forced to yield; it longs to 
preserve an endless silence, to perpetuate it, to shelter without relief the concealed, 
painful vacuousness of sense. A metaphor of timelessness and of impregnable purity 
is ingrained in secrecy. It must imply the acknowledgement of an actual, yet non 
signified act which has built up unsurmountable boundaries to the apprehension of 
meaning, an act that indicates the existence of a suppressed meaning which has been 
kept beyond reach. 
It is the experience of the contrasting, agonistic experiences of time, that 
betokens the inscription of hollow at the centre of the subject's symbolic universe. 
Secrecy consequently appears as an expanding web of rhythmically spread traces of 
silence, as an unavoidable, symbolic enactment of negation and as the preservation of 
hollow evidence of the limits of intimacy and speech: secrecy exhibits a manifold 
temporality which involves the atavistic, primal attachment of the subject to the non 
said and to the disappearance of the other, embodied and signalled in language and 
exhibited as a quality of mere acts of speech. 
V. The frontiers of representation: secrecy and abjection 
As we have already suggested, secrecy can be conceived as different both from silence 
and from enigma, although inextricably entangled with them. However, its singular 
ethical condition confounds itself with the moral repulsion involved in the significance 
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of abjection. Like secrecy, the singular intensity of the affections aroused by abjection 
is neither referred to unequivocal identifiable sources, nor does it hold to ciphered 
meanings within the boundaries of the self. Abjection implies an invincible 
ambiguousness of the boundaries of intimacy, which makes impossible to recognize the 
sources of abjection. No object is essentially abject; like the sublime, abjection seems 
to define a singular position of the subject which confronts its object; abjection shares 
the intimate nature of passion; it appears as a singular emotion which emanates from 
the subject's sombre, undefinable attachment to a perceived feature of the object. Like 
the sublime, like language itself, abjection seems to define an intrinsic, ethical, 
mystical condition of the object itself. Abjection, "like the sublime", renders into a 
recognizable physiognomy a lavish, inner affection; thus, abjection seems to emanate 
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from the object, to intrude upon the subject's intimacy, to ruin the mirage of a benign 
environment. Abjection incites the subject to misinterpret his perception of intimacy, 
to confuse the inner and the outer. Accordingly, the object of secrecy frequently 
assumes the figure of abjection; it affects its ethical coarseness, its equivocal 
perception. However, as Descombes has keenly remarked, there is a sharp distinction 
between secrecy and the abject, which in turns swerves from the essential patterns of 
the non said. He writes: 
La definition du secret est contradictoire, eUe en fait un dicible 
indicible. L'interdit au sens de I'abject est aise a cornprendre, 
puisque je n'ai besoin de savoir, done de dire, ee a quo; je 
repugne pour y repugner, vu queje i'evile du fait merne d'avoir 
dit autre chose, cette autre chose dont il est I'abjection. En autre, 
je peux dire que je condamne ce propos comrne insense, teUe 
action comme honteuse. n va de soi, en revanche, qu'on ne peut 
demander Ie seaet qui a celui qui est dans Ie secret. Impossible de 
publia" partout 'qu'il ne faut surtout pas dire que Ie roi est nul. La 
eondomnation porte el sur Ie dil el sur Ie dire.24 
The abject, suggests Descombes, may be named, but secrecy may not. The sole 
articulation of the name of the secret dissipates secrecy, but, Descombes claims, 
naming the abject does not dissipate it. However, silence is not foreign to abjection. 
In secrecy, the concealed seems to be pervaded by abjection, and its name must be 
avoided. It rejects any familiarity or proximity; the advent of the name of the abject 
strikes speech like a catastrophe. It appears as an abrupt, yet transient shuddering of 
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language, a wreckage of communication, a territory of speech in which the affection 
must not linger; indeed, the abject is a cardinal, negative force which sets the 
framework of speech; it is also a daunting representation, the source of which remains , 
however, foreign to language. Although it also shares its intimate nature with the 
experience of the sublime, the subjective origins of abjection are clearly distinguishable 
from the roots of terror and of sublimity. 
The abject lacks any conventional anchorage, it does not obey any recog~izable 
rule, it inevitably gives rise to an experience which cannot be shared or even 
communicated faithfully; it is a sheer subjective experience which condenses manifold 
past events, fusing reminiscences of different ages, of contrasting affective intensities. 
Like secrecy, the singular experience of abjection is not aroused by a tangible, 
characteristic feature encountered in an actual action or object; it is not a reply to a 
mere violation of the law; moreover, the experience of abjection emerges as a 
resonance of an extreme, unspeakable violence, of a trespass that extends into an 
ethical territory beyond the mere violation; often, the experience of abjection is 
awakened by the evidence of the intolerable magnitude of the transgression. It is this 
unspeakable nature of an action, or the arbitrary -yet significant or even allegorica1-
feature of the object of abjection able to arouse crude rejection; the experience of 
abjection can be seen as a peculiar response of memory, of the vast and incongruous 
residues of representations which inform the intimate narration of our own history, to 
the perception of the unspeakable nature of an act or its tangible traces. 
However, the tension between the silence implied by the abject and secrecy does 
not reduce to a simple opposition between two different strategies of concealment. As 
Descombes stresses, the abject is nameable; however, there is an intimate force which 
restrains or even suffocates its appearance in speech. Indeed, this unusual conjunction 
brings to light a seldom contemplated enigma of speech: the anxiety and eagerness 
involved in naming. The enigma of silence frequently veils its negative counterpart: the 
enigmatic condition of the speakable, of what can be named, or referred to. 
Paradoxically, what can be spoken of insinuates, through theforce of its sole existence, 
a stealthy weakening of the certainty of sense. The enigma of secrecy casts a shade on 
the purity of speech. It reveals the negatiye source of its force. The force of utterance 
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springs from the potential force of meaningful silence, of secrecy. 
But the naming of the abject, its open, explicit condemnation -contrary to 
Descombes' assumption-, might be thought of as a ritual which renders into 
conventional symbols the evil nature of the condemned. Having yielded to the 
collective ritual of purification, that which has been abject tum into an evil token, 
foreign to secrecy or abjection. It transforms itself into a specific, political facet of the 
act of exclusion. The naming of the abject frees the object from its original, intimate - , 
intensity; it admits a conventional profile and takes on sharp contours with a definite 
name; it is identifiable by means of clearly recognizable social categories; its origins 
seems to take roots in an atmosphere extrinsic to the subject's intimacy. The social 
ritual of condemnation involves intimate emotions but it enacts repulsion by the means 
of conventional, regular attitudes. Moreover, the deep force which keeps the abject on 
the fringes of the subject's symbolic sphere, and charges it with an exceedingly 
negative, unspeakable sense, is subdued by the collective stigmatization itself; the 
intimate repulsion transforms itself into collective purifying violence, through the act 
of condemnation. The naming of the abject illuminates the condemned object to 
definitively conceal the real source of the subject's repulsion. The exorbitant matter of 
the abject experience remain untouched by its open condemnation. Not only does 
abjection remains beyond the reach of political efficacy, it perturbs the subject's 
political acquiescence. Abjection reveals an irreversible breach within the inner 
tensions among the strategies to achieve power; it reveals the vacuousness of the 
strategic endeavour to impose political control on the symbolic dimensions of 
subjectivity . 
Thus, the abject appears as a singular, extreme manifestation of secrecy 
dominated by fear and which becomes apparent in the subject's will to preserve himself 
from an appalling presence: 
II y a, dans I'abjection -, une de ces violentes et obscures 
rooltes de I'~tre contre ce qUi Ie menace et qui lui parait venir 
d'un dehors ou d\m dedans exorbitant, jete a cOte du possible, du 
tolerable, du pensable. C'est 18, tout pres mais inassimilable. Ca 
sollicite, inquiete, fascine Ie desir qui pourtant ne se laisse pas 
seduire. Apeure, il se detoume. Ecoeure, il rejette. Un absolu Ie 
protege de I'opprobre, it en est fier, il y tient. Mais en meme 
temps, quand meme, eet (}Ian, ee spasme, ee saut, est attire vers 
un ailJeurs aussi tentant que condamne. In1assablement, comme 
un boomerang indomptable, un pOle d'appel et de repulsion met 
celui qui en est habite litteralement hors de lui.2S 
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The abject names the irreparable dissipation of the settled boundaries of the identity of 
the self. Residing neither inside nor outside the self, the abject object threatens the 
certainty of its identity; it charges it with menacing, overwhelmingly intense affection. 
The affection itself becomes a menace to the imaginary boundaries of self. It is the 
presence of a menace which arouses the intensity which defines the experience of 
abjection. This experience provokes in the subject, as in Winnicott's psychotic, "a 
shudder at the advent of a catastrophe that has already occured" (Barthes).26 The 
abjection not only obliterates the sharp boundaries between the inside and the outside, 
but between the real and the fantasited, between the already experienced and the mere 
anticipation of the experience. It is this sudden collapse of the temporal and spatial 
limits experienced by the self and referred to an abject -thus painful, threatening, 
marginal- object, which makes the experience of abjection, a privileged manifestation 
of secrecy: 
l'abject, objet dw, est radicalement un aclu et me tire vers la OU 
Ie sens s'effondre.[ ... ] je la supporte car j'imagine que tel est Ie 
desir de l'autre. Surgissement massif et abrupt d'une etrangete 
qui, si eUe a pu m'etre familiere dans une vie opaque et oubliee, 
me ban:ele maintmant comme radicalement separ6e, repugnante. 
Pas moi. Pas fa. Mais pas rien non plus. Un tlquelque chose" 
que je ne reconnais pas comme chose. Un poids de non-sens qui 
n'a rien d'insignifiant et qui m\~crase. 27 
For the subject to endure the pain aroused by abjection, he is bound to admit the 
violent role of desire, a desire that fractures his identity. The object fades away 
outweighed by the experience and the significance of pain, an experience which 
dominates the entire subjectivity and involves the definitive shattering of the subject's 
profile, confounding it with its object. This strangeness emerges from the subject's 
attachment to the painful disappearance of a tangible figure and his repulsion. The 
identity of the subject is overcome by the force of an absolute menace. The menace 
involved in the experience of abjection is impersonal, an abstract destiny imposed on 
the subject as an inherent condition of his existence; it resembles a tragedy whose hero 
would hurl himself to destruction driven by an inescapable godless will. Menace stands 
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as a tangible evidence, as a presence in itself. It occurs in the subject's experience as 
a betokened fate. 
The act of speech which expresses the experience of abjection reveals the 
intensity of an atavistic sensation, of an unacknowledged history engraved upon the 
subject's speech. The experience of abjection is built upon a fantasy of an actual 
presence --a revolting presence- which becomes a source of sense, a "real presence" , 
a figure which condenses the subject's incongruous history and offers a distressing 
guarantee, not of truth but of a brutal, yet lasting certainty. Thus, the experience of 
abjection, like secrecy, conceals deep perturbation. It calls for an unrelenting 
endeavour of regressive interpretation. Both experiences implie the belief in the 
impossible promise of historical redemption. They settle the conditions for a historical, 
symbolic expression of time. 
VI. Secrecy and the ptll'adox of in itiu m: exclusion and seriality 
Pierre Boutani8 has mentioned a meaningful attribute of secrecy: 
Ie secret se donne ou refuse comme tel, se rerere Ii un initium qui 
sera figure ou represeotC, non aboli; par 18 chaque secret instaure, 
avec la separation entre les choses, une separation du temps: if 
est au principe d'une suite, ou d'une serie.29 
The interpretation of secrecy forges both the presence of the concealed and the speech 
patterns of its exclusion. The act of interpretation suppresses the distance between two 
facets of secrecy: an atavistic shadow cast upon the universe of the symbolized 
experience, and the representation of a yet unfathomable presence. The act of 
interpretation confounds these two facets: it presents secrecy both as an impure, 
ambiguous symbolism expressed through metaphor or ellipsis, and as sheer allegory. 30 
The banishment of things created by secrecy involves divergent chronologies. Boutang 
remarks: it separates the concealed from the evident, the representation from the 
represented, the original statement of concealment from its successive interpretations; 
also it draws a boundary between the subj~ts which might bear the inherent silence of 
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secrecy and those which shall remain foreign to it. Furthermore, it signals the 
difference between the non-signified universe of actions and the secret proper. It 
demarcates the manifestation of secrecy as a strategy of speech which confers upon 
silence its specific efficacy, from silence which remains as the essential core of 
language, as the clue to significance which informs the intimate experience of 
hollowness. 
Accordingly, secrecy comprehends a manifold, paradoxical representa~on of 
time: it unfolds as a heterogeneous series of signs, of utterances, of accents, as well as 
a mute succession of enigmatic and proliferating traces spread over expression. As 
Boutang insinuates, the series of signs which expands itself about the mythical, timeless 
source of secrecy -this initium, mentioned by Boutang-, exposes the radical paradox 
of a timeless, primordial event which gives rise to a turbulent entanglemelll of divergent 
threads of discourse. Secrecy lays bare the paradox of an endless and changing series 
of interpretations and discursive objects which exhibit the finiteness of language. 
The emergence of secrecy out from the primordial vestiges of experience 
unleashes the dissemination of silence over the whole universe of signs; it engenders, 
claims Boutang, series of signs, constellations of manifold expressions of time which 
might grow endlessly. Interpretation stirs this serial movement while displaying its own 
mythology of origins; but it still preserves the force of this mythological origin as the 
potential centre upon which the series of interpretations should converge. Interpretation 
reverses the mythological genesis of secrecy. It exhibits itself as a secondary moment, 
as an effect, as a resonance, as an ancillary resource in the struggle to restore the purity 
of sense, to recover the lost object in the origins of the act of concealment. 
Nevertheless, interpretation not only creates the concealed nucleus of enigma and 
secrecy; also it evokes vague emotions linked to a non-depictable, archaic age. An 
image of primordial time, associated with the mythical centre which has emerged from 
faded memories of the subject, seems to precede the interpretation of secrecy. Secrecy 
involves fictitious images, the mirage of an origin of secrecy and of a primordial 
episode as the source of concealment. Interpretation presupposes this mythological 
source of the concealed; moreover, it portrays the mirage of its own path: 
interpretation seems to appear as a sequel of secrecy, a reply to it. 
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Moreover, after its emergence, a single interpretation of secrecy does not inhibit 
the utterance. of new interpretations; on the contrary, the interpretation of secrecy 
becomes a lasting source of new interpretations. Even when such interpretations which 
seem to have finally brought to light the original truth -chiefly those interpretations 
that emerge and present themselves as both the origin and conclusion of an enigma-, 
are able to assert only their own contingency; in the last analysis, they emerge from the 
same mythological centre, from the mirage of a timeless ground, a mirage that has 
been forged by interpretation. Therefore, interpretation is submitted to a paradoxical 
tension which obliterates its own sense without alternatives: once it has delineated the 
indistinct contour of the concealed and signalled it as its own origin, it avers, by this 
sole act, the derived, secondary sense of the origin. The image of the origin emerges 
as an outcOme of interpretation itself. The primordial condition of the origin of secrecy 
is reversed by the interpretation itself. The image of the origin rises as the aftermath 
both of the attempt to interpret and of the decay of its ellucidating force. Secrecy 
embodies this hermeneutical paradox: interpretation yields to secrecy that which has 
been entirely constructed by an hermeneutic endeavour; however, secrecy turns the 
interpretation .of its own veiled, concealed object into a mere adventitious commentary, 
or gibberish. Lacking a centre, each new tum of the interpretation distorts its original 
source or recreates an imaginary new origin; it "discovers" a new and profoundly 
concealed object; paradoxically, it creates, by the force of its own assertion, an 
unforeseen atavism. Secrecy becomes a manifold constellation of manifold enigmatic 
sources, which, in tum, does not calls for one interpretation, but for a series of distinct 
and often discordant images and utterances. The peculiar attributes of secrecy 
disintegrate: their temporal references endure a permanent, disquieting derangement 
and their evocative gleam dims. The sense of their narrative sphere lacks a necessary 
mythical anchorage. 
Secrecy involves the weakening of the specific profiles of interpretation. As secrecy 
loses its own unique, essential origin, the interpretations it begets confound themselves 
in an inextricable expanding web. 
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The act of secrecy does not give rise to a single prototype of interpretation: each 
paraphrase, ~h new translation of the unveiled text of secrecy obeys no fixed rules. 
Once secrecy has emerged as virtual centre of a textual universe, it exhibits a lavish 
imagination. Its regime goes indetermined. 
Secrecy does not prevail over interpretation. The ruins of interpretation 
announce the decline of secrecy. The uncertainty of the outcome of interpretation does 
not reside only in the invention of a virtual, hollow centre, of the enigmatic obj~t, but 
in the actual construction of its inaccessibility. It is interpretation that creates the 
perception of a destroyed continuity of meaning. It is a truism to say that neither a 
definite interpretation has privileged objects, nor that a specific object has a particular 
interpretation. Any object breeds countless interpretations. However, the bonds 
between different interpretations are weak. Each interpretation breeds its singular 
opacities. Incommensurable silences are implied in the encompassing and unfolding 
movement of the cycles of interpretation. When interpretation claims to have unveiled 
the concealed meaning, when it claims to have restored the absolute continuity of sense 
and dissipated all the lacunae, sealed the accomplished meaning of the word, envisaged 
its truth, then interpretation itself vanishes, fades before its own revelation, becomes 
indifferent, sinks in the shade of the dazzling apparent truth. Interpretation ceases to 
exist as such with the triumph of the unveiled. Interpretation becomes a simple 
attestation, a testimony, perhaps a discovery: its conjectural force decays and might be 
extinguished. Its pretension of annihilating the meaningful force of the concealed is 
consummated by its own failure and crumbling. The obliteration of the concealed, 
which can be conceived as an utter hermeneutic achievement, transmutes the 
interpretative text into a plain presentation of evidence, it prepares its own 
forgetfulness. As truth confounds itself with evidence it falls into indifference: 
interpretation and its fictional truth both hurl itself into extinction. 
Yet, interpretation indeed threatens secrecy. As secrecy persists, the avidity of 
interpretation creates hollows in every object, in each layer of language, in each 
utterance; interpretation can forge opacity in each feature of speech and the act of 
speech. There is neither a privileged object of interpretation, nor a singular destiny for 
it. Its destiny, in a strong sense, is to utter a vagrant sense; interpretation is nomadic, 
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it lacks any attachment, it only arouses a fleeting certitude and passing oblivion. 
Secrecy even allows the emergence of those texts that long for the forgetfulness 
of secrecy. The oblivion of secrecy is the moment at which the hermeneutic impulse 
is unleashed, in which silence is imposed on silence; it is the oblivion of oblivion, the 
exclusion of exclusion. The silence about secrecy is the significant folding back of 
silence upon itself, upon the concealed core of secrecy. The silence imposed on the 
tangibility of silence appears as the sudden cessation of the compelling po'Yer of 
secrecy. Secrecy preserves itself as an impregnable uncertainty, as the exacerbation of 
a meaningful though puzzling silence. 
However, secrecy and its own forgetfulness both unfold as a single series of 
traces spread over discourse. Secrecy may disappear in its own silence; furthermore, 
the equivoCal significance of silence may be outweighed by the evidence of secrecy. 
Still, there is a clear distinction between them: the obstinate swelling of the series of 
interpretations which encircle secrecy contrasts with the fragility and evanescent force 
of the interpretations of silence. Secrecy, even if partially revealed, preserves its 
cardinal residues, significant facets of enigma, untouched by proliferating 
interpretation. 
To forget secrecy is not to suffocate it but to displace it, to enliven its stealthy 
fertility. Thus, this forgetfulness does not cancel secrecy, it only defers its appearance 
or transforms it into a pure potentially meaningful trace of a dissipated presence. 
However, each vast, encompassing sphere of reminiscences which strives to achieve 
the oblivion of secrecy remains as a prisoner within its own dense, tacit sphere . 
. 
Moreover, a denser concealment is the result of the successive sediments, 
foldings of interpretation; concealment, invigorated by the encompassing movements 
of commentary and paraphrase, of elucidation and invention, is not a definite end. 
Paraphrase or elucidation, commentary and the 'achievement of an invention do not 
culminate in an identifiable, definitive sense, in a proper meaning; rather, its only 
possible epilogue is either silence or gibber, jargon which seek to screen secrecy, the 
wreckage of evocation, the exhaustion and disappearance of secrecy, the extinction of 
community beneath sound and fury. The interpretation of secrecy, thus, transforms 
itself into the imagination of emptines~, of a faltering of utterance, of its own 
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dissipation and the proliferation of its own resonances. It states the radical question of 
the boundaries. of speech. The limits of interpretation appear as the core of the uttering 
act. The interpletation of secrecy emerges, as it faces its own enigma, as the testimony 
of the exile of sense beyond expression. 
VIL Rhetorical utterance as a limit of language. The shades of allegory 
Rhetoric has frequently appeared both as a discipline and as a means of language: as 
the radical exaltation of its powers and a tacit acknowledgment of its limits. it both 
disdains and exposes the boundaries of language; it debases the expressive power of 
current Speech and seeks in the exaltations of style and in the "material imagination" 
of words the means to overcome its own limits. Conceived so, rhetoric is seen to 
distort the experience of language, to make out of it a scandalous yet disquieting, 
exacerbated use; to heighten of its expressive potencies and its formal features. 
Rhetorical expressions, conceived naively as a a distortion of the "natural" regime of 
expression, ~ttest to the capacity of language for an inordinate expansion of the 
expressive capability of certain symbolic actions and gestures. Moreover, from an 
ethical point of view, rhetorical utterance has often been envisaged as the verbal means 
to conceal and to lie without openly trespassing upon an intolerable ethical domain. 
Rhetorical utterance, thought of as an instrument of persuasion, has not vainly been 
associated with sophistry and suspected of distorting the direct meaning of language, 
of evading the implicit statement of what has actually ~n said. In this light, the 
rhetorical utterance broadens the hollow territories of language. Rhetorical expressions 
enacts the inner force which seeks to discompose language, which compels it to become 
foreign to itself, constrained to its own singular,' autonomous resources. 
Yet, rhetorical utterance can also be conceived as an exemplary exhibition and 
exploration of the limits of language, indeed, as the most striking evidence of the 
manifold nature of these limits. Rhetorical utterance exhibits, both the intrinsic, 
immanent boundaries of language, and the inherently limited conditions of speech 
which emerge from the nature of symbolic interchange. Rhetorical utterance both 
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settles and defeats the structure of language. For them to exist, language must offer the 
illusion of the_ existence of a definite sense of utterance, which must be delineated as 
an autonomous, but nevertheless intrinsic territory of meaning. Therefore, rhetorical 
expressions appear as enacting expressive intemperance, as sudden, subtle but evident 
deviations of language, as unessential, violent deflections of speech, which testifies the 
deceiving qualities of meaning. The usual image of rhetorical utterances encompasses 
every identifiable "deviation" of language; it appears as both art and trea~hery. 
However, there are some elusive traits of rhetoric: every trope or figure involves a 
hesitation, an uncertainty, a sudden loss of the usual frames of meaning. I.A. Richards 
wrote: 
where the Old Rhetoric treated ambiguity as a fault in language, 
and hoped to confiBe or eliminate it, the new Rhetoric sees it as 
an inevitable consequence of the powers of language and as an 
indispensable means of most of our most important utterances. 31 
Moreover, the ambiguity to which Richards alludes is neither a special case nor an 
accident of language, nor a well defined condition of linguistic usage; besides, its 
relationship to rhetoric is only vaguely stated. Indeed, ambiguity seems not to be an 
ancillary conCept of rhetoric; rather, it appears to define an intrinsic trait not only of 
rhetoric but of language itself; it is a negative concept: it exclusively names the loss of 
the definite contours of meaning. Ambiguity in any of its manifestations does not name 
only two or more neat, definite, sharply defined though simultaneously evoked 
meanings. It also calls forth a zone of uncertainty of beclouded or darkened meaning. 
Ambiguity stirs up the feeling that something is missing i~ speech, that an inner bond 
of language has been broken. However, the missing link, the suppressed feature of 
speech, the unnamed and unpronounceable definite matter which language lacks, 
multiplies its virtual meaningful resonances. 
Rhetorical utterances turn into significant features bOth the perceived emptiness 
of language, and the profusion of its accu;nulated layers of significance. They exhibit 
the desegregation of language, its fragile clustering of transient, fading contours of 
words. The passion for rhetorical utterance is always accompanied by the glittering 
violence of astonishment. To the subject's consciousness, the unuttered, which 
threatens the sense of speech, is outweighed by the potential proliferation of the 
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unfolding of language. Thus, the non said remains a concealed, violently opened 
fissure in the .imaginary homogeneity of language. 
What rhetorical utterance uncovers is not only the extreme fragility and 
curtailed nature of the patterns of language usage, but the framing force of negative 
tensions within language. Rhetorical utterances exhibit an intimate, deep relation to 
secrecy. With secrecy we confront the immanent limits of language and the pressure 
of the non said upon interpretation. 
As we have previously recalled, according to the crucial intuition of Saussure, 
language [langue]32 is the outcome of the reciprocal action between negative relations 
which settle the boundaries of signs: "Ia valeur de n' importe quel terme est determinee 
par ce qui I' entoure", writes Saussure. And immediately he adds: "Ce qui est dit des 
mots s' applique a n'impone quel terme de la langue, par example des entites 
grammaticales. ,,33 The set of negative relations that defines signs, suggest Saussure, 
shapes also the entities in every domain of linguistic expression. The sign, and with it 
the total structure of linguistic entities, is conceived by Saussure as the material result 
of the cluster of negative relations which determine the structure of language. Thus, 
the entities of language have no essential identity; their specific profile emanates from 
the spectrum of various negative relations. Therefore, meaning, according to 
Saussure's interpretation, is but a spectral figure, a concept shaped exclusively by the 
negative relations which structure language. 
I.A. Richards, from a completely different point of view, still defines meaning 
in terms of a pure negative relation, this time, between word and context: 
What a word means is the missing part of the contexts from 
which it draws its delegated efficacy.34 
These contrasting points of view agree upon the negative nature of meaning. This 
image of m~ing illuminates, from a different angle, the notion of rhetoric. The 
conception of rhetorical utterance ceases to insinuate the idea of a superfluous deviation 
from an immediate, straight, transparent language. In this light, the rhetorical utterance 
enacts, turns into visible, tangible signs, the negative tensions of language. Meaning 
"draws its efficacy" from a certain kind of generalized elliptic relation: it is a sort of 
"complementary" ellipsis, a sphere of implicit, unarticulable, uncountable meanings that 
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remain unpronounced, yet inextricably allied to the words. That which disappears from 
the context is. to be found in the meaning, and the meaning of word appears as an 
elliptic expression of the complete significance of the missing objects and actions of the 
context. Besides, ellipsis entails interpretation as a crucial moment of the emergence 
of m~g. Therefore, the time of interpretation is ingrained in the material presence 
of word. Ellipsis imposes on the meanings of signs a new accent: it transforms the 
relation between speech and time. It involves a deferral of the sense of speech; it 
introduces a delay which disquiets language, blurring its immediate relation with a 
potential, transcendental realm of sense. 
This new relation of rhetoric and the subject's experience of time makes 
possible to apprehend the intimate relation between rhetoric and secrecy. Secrecy 
- . 
becomes apparent not only through an ellipsis in speech, but through a generalized 
ellipsis which informs language itself. 
However, what distinguishes secrecy from the inherent non said of rhetorical 
utterance is another feature of its relation to time: as we have already commented, 
secrecy necessarily involves resistance to revelation and the sense of the imminence of 
its unveiling,· of its disappearance. Rhetorical utterance and secrecy both constrain 
language to expose the inherent negative tensions of language and speech; but the 
interpretation of rhetorical utterance, although elusive, bears down on the 
presupposition of a definite sense. Rhetoric is built upon the invincible conviction of 
the plenitude of sense. 35 
Secrecy, on the contrary, displays itself in speech as radically uncertain rhythms 
of stress and silence, as tokens of the discontinuous time of narrated events: indeed, 
as we have already stated, it unfolds as a mythical theme; at the horizons of secrecy 
both moments of language, creation and extinction of sense, fused into a narration 
charged with the force of myth,36 the myth of the origin and destiny of speech. 
The myth of secrecy, its eschatology, is enacted by the tensions between the 
expression of temporality in language. It demands an abrupt, transient image of 
me4lling. It rejects any still vision of the restless unfolding of language. And yet this 
myth also demands a thorough, delayed creation of the mirage of the depth of language 
and the forging of its evidence. Rhetorical expression expose the paradoxical temporal 
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tensions in this mirage: metaphor, ellipsis, and enthymeme display not only a 
taxonomy o( the rhetorical signals of secrecy or enigma, but a taxonomy of the 
conflicting expressions of time in the mirage of secrecy. The relevance of the notion 
of time goes beyond its narrative constraints, the thematic imperatives or the rules of 
gender which determine meaning. It shatters the regime of signs. In his, in many ways 
astonishing essay about German tragedy, Benjamin introduces the category of time as 
the definitive frontier between symbol and allegory:37 
Uoter der entscheideodeo Kategorie der Zei~ welche in dieses 
Gebiet der Semiotik getragen zu habeo die gro6e romantische 
Einsicht dieser Denker war, liiBt das VerhiUtnis von Symbol und 
AIlegorie eindringlich und fonnelhaft sich festlegeo. Wahreod im 
Symbol mit der Verkliirung des Uoterganges das transfigurierte 
Antlitz der Natur im Lichte der Erlosung fliichtig sich ofIenbart, 
liegt in der AUegorie die facies hippocratica der Geschichte als 
erstante Urlandschaft dem Betrachter vor Augen. Die Geschichte 
in alJem was sie Unzeitiges, LeidvoIles, Verfehltes von Begin hat, 
pJiigt sich in einem Antlitz -oein in einem T otenkopfe aus.· 
Allegory remains foreign to the advent of intrinsic, transient mirages of language. It 
stems from the sovereignty of language in face of history, of memory. Benjamin gave 
a puzzling name to this profile of the temporal tension which defmes the narrative 
expression of history: dialectic in stillness [dialektik im StillstandJ, that is to say, a 
mute and resting dialectic. 38 Allegory is formally non interpretable, since it remains 
peripheral to the imperative imposed by language on the expression of time. It is also 
threatening because it affirms that a negative presence, absence, loss, even 
meaninglessness can provoke and shape the experience and the expressions of time: 
allegory transforms itself into an unfathomable figure' which exhibits a shapeless 
glaring residue of the obliterated sense; divested from its identity, allegory reveals 
itself as a mere gesticulation which points to a timeless verge of experience. 
Thus, allegory manifests the close relation' between the dialectic of secrecy and 
the dialectic of exclusion, in which the enigmatic nature of the experience of the limit 
1t is possible to define and fonnulate persuasively enough the relation between the symbol and the allegory, in the 
light of the crucial category of time, the introduction of which, in this field of semiotics, constitutes a great fmding 
of these Romantic thinkers. While in the symbol, with the transfiguration of decadence, the transformed visage of 
nature reveals itself fleetingly in the light of redemption, in allegory the jacies hippocratica of history presents itself 
to the observer as a primordial, petrified passage. All that which history has of timeless, of painful, of unsuccessful, 
exhibits itself in a face; or better, in a skull. (My translation) 
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of language stands as a menacing thematic core. Allegory expresses the terror aroused 
in the subject. by the shadow of concealed presence which looms as an announcement 
of death, of the crepuscular condition of beings -the concealed presence appears in 
allegory not as a thing in itself, but as tokens of the absolute experience of finiteness-, 
as an apocalyptical, immutable sign which illuminates the transient nature of life and 
the dominance of death. The menace implied by allegory has its source both in a 
memorable experience, and in the tacit experience of the other's death. Allegorx seems 
to have a definite meaning, to exhibit deep, inequivocal evidence; rather, it uncovers 
the ontological ground of secrecy. Secrecy, as ingrained in the allegory, fuses in its 
recondite figures not only visible bodies and hollowness, its enigmatic composition 
allows the hollowness to represent origin and destiny. Paradoxically, it pertains both 
. 
to the sphere of sense and to its outerness. Benjamin wrote: U[Allegorie] zwar bedeutet 
es genau das Nichtsein dessen, was er vorstellt."· Benjamin's conception of dialectic 
involves the notion of absolute ontological finiteness, which displays itself through 
allegory, repIesenting an arbitrary and fixed figure. The cardinal attributes of allegory, 
Benjamin suggests,39 are "das geheime, privilegierte Wissen, die Willkiirherrschaft im 
Bereich der. toten Dinge, die vermeint4.iche Unendlichkeit der Hoffnungsleere"··. 
Paradoxically, its stillness unleashes an interior force that exhumes, illuminates and 
masks the unbearable vision of finiteness. This interior force of allegory, exhibits itself 
as a fragmented figure, as the curtailed significance which strives for a limitless power 
to engender an infinite, compulsive interpretation. 
VIIL Secrecy: interpretation and allegory 
Jean-Luc Nancy has pointed out40 the double sense inherent in the notion of 
interpretation: that engendered by a closed circular movement of deciphering, and that 
which emerges from the impulse of interpretation to disseminate and to unfold itself. 
It is this last impulse which drives interpretation from one object to another, from one 
*'Thc aUcgory lignifies precisely the non-being of what it represents (My translation) 
-the 1ICICrc:t and privileged knowledge, the arbitrary regime of the realm of the death things, the pretended infinite 
of the absence of hope. (My translation). • 
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rhythm to another, from one text to another; interpretation is envisaged as straying 
endlessly. The. rigid borders of knowledge collide and fuse as interpretation wanders. 
This deracination, this wandering of interpretation, is stressed perhaps by a suspicion 
that language itself stems from beyond individual consciousness. Foucault has explicitly 
remarked: 
Ie langage, en tout cas Ie Jangage dans les cultures indo-
europ6enes, a toujours fait naitre deux sortes de sou~ons: 
- D'abord, Ie ~n que Ie langage ne dit pas exactement ee 
qu'il dit. Le sense qu'on saisit, et qui est immediatement 
manifest6, n'est peut-etre en realite qu'un moindre sense, qui 
protege, resserre, et malgre tout transmet un autre sense; eelui-ci 
etant ala fois Ie sense Ie plus fort, et Ie sense "d'en dessous". C'est 
ee que les Grecs appellaient l'allegoria et l'hyponofa. 
- D'autre part Ie langage fait naitre eet autre sou~on: qu'il 
deborde en quelque.sorte sa forme proprement verb ale, et qu'il y 
8 bien d'autre choses au monde qui parlent, et qui ne sont pas du 
langage. Apres tout, it se pourrait que la nature, la mer, Ie 
bruissement des arbres, les animaux, les visages, les masques, les 
couteaux en croix, tout eela parle; peut-etre y a-t-il du langage 
s'articulant d'une maniere qui ne serait pas verbale. Ce serait, si 
vous voulez, tres grossierement, Ie semalnon des GrecS. 41 
The exorbitant eloquence of language, the semafnon which comprehends every being 
and infringes the order of articulated language, makes of the mute signs of beings a 
potential source of sense; secrecy becomes an intrinsic power of matter; it becomes 
omnipresent; it seems to impregnate the mere appearance of things. Things do talk, but 
their language stays beyond the realm of language; they talk with eloquent yet obscure, 
silent signs. Nevertheless, between allegoria and semafnon there is an intimate relation; 
the profusion of language is just an allegorical turn of. language upon itself. The 
unpronounceable language of things can be represented by words, but this 
representation only admits the form of the allegory. It is feasible then for speech to 
signal the language of things without apprehending its meaning; language exhibits a 
distorted figure of the enigmatic sense of the language of things. The semefnon emerges 
as an admissible model of allegory, a model which must acknowledge its essential 
inadequacy, the limited force of its analogies; the semel'non preserves an irreducible 
vacuousness which resists any interpretative attempt. 
For interpretation to be meaningful, it demands a momentary oblivion of 
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allegory; interpretation invokes the full expressive force of language which, 
paradoxically, is nourished by its own allegorical power, by its capacity to enact non 
linguistic forces. The allegory, however, empties language from its own meaning; it 
obliterates the relevance of words. It thrusts language into a never ending 
metamorphosis. But this metamorphosis is not a mere resonance of the thing it is 
neither its mimesis nor the revelation of its essence. Allegory and its metamorphosis 
are completely foreign to the nature of the represented. The only relation among them 
is the nebulous, vagary, yet obscure, subjective force of analogy. Allegory becomes 
the negation of its own source, with which it nevertheless preserves its intimate 
relation, which makes of it the most powerful expression of secrecy. 
If allegory has to be defined in the light of Benjamin's reflection as that which 
"signifies precisely the non-being of what it represents", it implies a negative force of 
interpretation, the sheltering of secrecy. 
Benjamin's definition of allegory, only defined by its oblique reference to the 
obscure impulse and substance of evocation, both involves and rejects the words 
disposition to restore by the way of analogy or mimicry the meaning of the represented 
object. Indeed, from a certain point of view, allegory is built as a capricious analogy, 
based on a peculiar though elusive resemblance, which does not stem from the meaning 
of words but from a non-linguistic force [Kraft] clearly betokened by a figure. The 
outstanding feature of allegory is that it both rests upon a meaningful analogy, and 
rejects the constraints imposed on its meaning by the echoes of the represented object. 
Indeed, in allegory words do signify, but their meaning adopts the fuzzy contours of 
. 
a shadow projected over a sheer potential hermeneutical universe. In allegory language 
hesitates: there is a breach between the full force [Kraft] of meaning of the word, and 
the meaningful capacity of allegory to hint at non-existence. 
Thus, secrecy seems to emerge from thIS almost imperceptible hesitation of 
language, which reveals the sudden weakness of its meaning. Interpretation seems to 
follow allegory, although it does not elucidate it. Allegory remains the potential, yet 
timeless origin of interpretation. It is possible to assert that interpretation is not, as 
certain hermeneutics have claimed, a privileged instrument for the comprehension of 
the unknown taking the known as a point of departure. It does not expand the realm of 
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sense. Rather, interpretation seems to reveal only a tension between signs which couple 
different sph~res of secrecy; the intrinsic secrecy of language and the powerful force 
of allegory. 
Allegory appears on the boundaries of the interpretative act: as its origins and 
as its end. Interpretation appears as a relief, it introduces in the turbulence of signs a 
moment of certainty. Yet, whenever interpretation seems to have achieved the plenitude 
of sense, the final quietness of meaning, his certitude immediately reveals i~lf as 
based, paradoxically, upon an intimate discord of the meanings of its own words and 
signs; it reveals itself as the outcome of an unavoidable misreading of the times of the 
voices, the evoked worlds and the subjective tokens it itself comprehends. Interpretation 
hurls itself into forgetfulness. Perhaps the subject, captivated by the forgetfulness 
inherent in"" interpretation, stifles the painful tension which arises between the stillness 
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Chapter III 
Secrecy and Psychoanalysis: the Turning Points of the Freudian 
Text 
l Baroque structures in Freud's theory 
1. The Baroque atmosphere 
Freud' s Vienna, the city of Musil,_ Broch and Kraus, of Wittgenstein and Mauthner, 
of Schoenberg, Berg and Webem, of Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal, of Kokoshka and 
Klimt was also the home of the nin~teenth century renaissance of the decorative arts. 
Vienna, the centre of the country which Karl Kraus once described in his famous and, 
in a sense, prophetic apothegm: Austria is "the experimental field for the end of the 
world" [die Versuchstation des Weltuntergangs] I , was to become a universe of 
exasperating contrasts. Kraus' relentless ironic and even sardonic writing burst upon 
the intellectual scene, presaging the radical crisis which was to exhaust an entire 
European culture. The arrogant eurocentric values of the nineteenth century were 
already crumbling, as was evident in the opaque and exacting conflict of manners, 
aesthetic expression, economic practice and belief plainly visible in the modes of a 
decaying society. Hermann Broch depicted with abrupt but accurate strokes, the 
disintegrating structure of the system. While facing the stealthy violence which 
anticipated the devastation of the coming war which was .to consume the continent's 
universe of values, Broch alerted Europe to the breach in the contemporary sensibility 
weakened by an invincible, growing sense of futility. The sudden dissipation of a 
nebulous ethical system -Broch suggested-, revealed a devastated landscape, exposed 
between what it had been and what it was to be: 
Uod daB dieser Sachverhalt bereits rum allgemeinen BewuBtsein 
vorgedrungen ist, wird allenthalben sichtbar, wird zur Ahnung, 
daB das Zwischenstadiurn des Nicht-mehr und des Noch-nicht, 
daB dieses Zwischenstadiurn, in dem die Verwirrung des 
Untergangs sich mischt mit der Verwirrung des Suchens, den 
Ausgangspunkt zu einem neuem geistigen ZusammenschluJ3 
bilden muJ3.·2 
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The metaphor of this transitional, intermediate territory between the no-longer and the 
not-yet revealed the struggle between two seemingly similar and yet antagonistic 
universes. In Vienna, a Baroque atmosphere and a dominant decorative style coexisted; 
they gave rise to the wasteful exposure of aesthetic manifestations which Broch called 
evil, that is to say, those auvres showing the intrusion of dogmatism, and the 
restriction of freedom brought about by the proliferation of theatrical gesture, scenery, 
and aesthetic grimace. Yet Vienna I s atmosphere enlivened aesthetic and intellectual 
expression, pervaded nevertheless, by the sense of finiteness and death inherent in the 
Baroque impulse; it encouraged asceticism, and yet favoured lavish and factitious 
emotions which became visible features of style. Baroque allegory represented the 
intimate but agonistic analogue of the passion for decoration. The crisis of significance 
which characterizes the Baroque universe, was to emerge side by side with the 
exacerbation of the simulacrum of sense, with the triumph of appearances, with the 
strained expression of faith in the plenitude and timelessness of being, and the boldness 
of evidence. 
There are, in spite of their deep and, in a sense, essential differences, several 
meaningful analogies between the cardinal features of the historical cultural profile of 
the society which bred the Viennese proclivity for the exaltation of the facade, of the 
seductions of the mask, and those which invigorated the Baroque. An analysis of these 
historically distant conditions seems to reveal societies which have been born of the 
abrupt metamorphosis of the collective, exuberant but anxious contemplation of 
impending death, the lasting conviction of the existence of a definite limit of sense, an 
almost tactile experience of time, and the visibility of finiteness. In his analysis of the 
anthropological conditions of the emergence of the Baroque, Duvignaud asserts: 
L'idee que la duree qui nous habite et nous compose precipite son 
mouvement polD" nous arracher Ii la culture que nous avons heritee 
ou qui nos a ete transmise, cette idee nous decompose et nous 
• And this state of affairs [the crumbling of the prevailing values) has already been forced into the general 
consciousness. h will be visible everywhere; it might encourage the assumption that the intennediate stage between 
the no-Ionger and the not-yet, where the confusion provo~ed by the crumbling merges with the confusion provoked 
by the learch, must constitute the point of departure for a new spiritual union. (My translation.) 
terrifie. C'est la ce qu'on peut nommer l'allure catastrophique de 
cette 6poque [Ie Baroque]: decouverte de civilisations differentes , 
etnergence d\me technologie inconcevable auparavant, expulsion 
de la magie et de la force divine de la matiere, deplacement de la 
puissance par la richesse economique, revelation de la rentabilite 
et du marche.3 
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In the Baroque, Duvignaud suggests, the individual becomes foreign to his own 
traditions because of his violent expUlsion from the cosmogonic universe which flXed 
the coordinates of his universe of beliefs, of his sensibility, and of his singular 
experience of time. It is this radical uprooting of the self from the dense history of his 
collectivity, that thrusts him into a certain rarefied, terrifying solitude, beyond 
collective bonds. And it is this uprooting that intensifies, in tum, the experience of 
time as finiteness. 
However, the affinity of the conditions between the two distant historical 
periods may seem not to support a strong parallelism in the modes and patterns of 
expression. Indeed, the supremacy of the passion for decoration at the end of the 
nineteenth century may lead to manifold and ambiguous interpretations of its cardinal 
features: on the one hand, the facade appeared as the surface capable of exhibiting the 
essence of inner spaces; the human face was believed to evince the true inner self, 
which could be deciphered from distorting visible signs; on the other, physiognomies 
were also seen as autonomous expressive devices; the exasperated expressive force of 
their theatrical displays of signs dominated the scene as if they have been liberated 
from the silent, veiled profile of the self. The physiognomy of bodies and of objects 
became ambiguous: simultaneously, they appeared as aesthetic, formal, devices; they 
also loomed as tangibles tokens of the secret, private domains of the self, exaltating, 
in turn, the social relevance of the concealed. The pompous expressiveness of 
decorative arts, and of art as decoration -art as.a scenic, decorative device-, at the 
end of the nineteenth century has a counterpart in the ascension of symbolism and of 
an invincible hermetisism in art. Proliferating styles of composition and tumultuous 
contrasts of aesthetic currents and variations of consecrated styles characterize the 
cultural abnosphere of Vienna. The constraints imposed on physiognomies intensified 
the violent, moulding action of codes and conventions upon expression. They drove 
them to exhaustion. As Guerin writes: 
Une Coonomie mercantile en expansion continue accumule aussi 
bien Ie capital que les signes du prestige attache a la techniqUe et 
a I'argent La surcharge decorative justifie par l'esth6tique les 
exigences de I'abondance, de la consomation et du gaspillage sur 
lesqueUes Ie capitalisme avance ronde sa prosperit6. A I'inverse, 
iI y a dans la vaIorisation de I'accessoire ornamental une negation 
de la rationalit6 productiviste qui peut porter une charge de 
theitraIit6 subversive. 4 
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The exasperated expressiveness, the hyperbolic visibility of signs, the theatrical 
surfaces, quietly turned the visible signs into hollow opacities, the force of which 
resided only in the power of allegory. However, the emptiness of signs corrupted the 
proliferating manifestations of the enterprise of the decorative arts. A fatigue of the 
senses, saturated by the dense weave of signs exposed in decorative expressions, 
corresponded to a fatigue of language, as a wearing away of the meaningfulness of 
signs. Perhaps, it was them that manifested the crumbling of the "rationality of 
expressiveness" in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The poverty of this 
"rationality" also reveals the enduring social tensions which were to become evident 
in the triumph of the irrationallity of certain strategically built, "rational", social 
devices -market, totalitarianism, bureaucracy-, and in the diffuse, yet devastating 
violence of the sheer subversive power of the actions which challenged the ethical basis 
of conventional rationality. 
From Broch I s remarks we can derive still another relevant insight. There seems 
to be a peculiar proximity, even a non-renounceable intimacy between the Baroque and 
the force of the non-said. Silence seems to have dominated surreptitiously the 
"intermediate stage" [Zwischenstadiwn] between the decaying universe of norms and 
the restoration of the social web of relations in the European nineteenth century crisis. 
The primacy of spectacle and decoration in Vielma reveals the unremarked, but all-
pervading presence of silence, the definitive wreck of expressiveness. However, the 
passion for sheer scenic expressions, and chiefly for certain of its intrinsic obscure 
tones, adumbrated the alliance of ritual and the social experience of death. 
Writing appears as a sombre intermediate between the virulence of the inner 
election of mutism, and the exorbitance of theatrical voices. There is a cleavage 
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between the primacy of stage, of scenery, and the written language. The late decades 
of the nine~nth century constitute an age in which a darkening and isolation of a 
written word took place. Its singular features were eclipsed by the disseminated and 
ostentatious presence of the harangue and of declarnative styles, by the passion both 
dreadful and fertile, for the pure sonority of language. As the metaphysical confidence 
in the endurance of the written matter declines and transforms itself into a purely 
instrumental vision of written text, the devotion of the writer to meditation, enlivened 
by the impulse and the necessity to realize the imaginary wholeness of language, leads 
him to embrace the hermetic endeavour; the writer forges a conception of poetic 
language as a dense, all embracing universe of echoes. Language becomes an oblique, 
invincible enigma which imposes itself upon the act of writing, a power able to exhibit 
through the emerging echoes of the words, the elusive yet compelling force of fictional 
truth. But written language was also seen as a spectre composed of the residues of the 
live, actual, dispersed oral speech. 
Freud's conception of subjectivity exposes in an exemplary fashion this 
paradoxical relation between perceptible, yet dissipating spoken word, and the manifold 
images of writing: as we shall see later, Freud I s conception of writing is implied in his 
cardinal conception of mnemic trace, in his image of super-ego as a sort of inward 
"written voice" which determines the definitive structure of subjectivity, and in the 
metaphor of the "writing-pad"s that stands, in Freud, for the relation between the 
agencies of subjectivity. Thus, subjectivity itself seems to originate in the written 
images of oral narration; it is writing, in the guise of memory, made up of ensuring 
traces of the subject's experience engraved upon his mind, that rules the subject's 
destiny. Thus, Freud's conception echoes contradictory conceptions of language: it 
reflects, on the one hand, the impact of the image of oral speech, as a dissipating yet 
determining perception of signs, of a voice the source of which is the similarly 
dissipating presence of the object of love, and, on the other, an image of memory as 
a universe of inner, primordial, indelible inscriptions which bear testimony to the 
history of the subject's desires, as a web of traces gathered into impregnable 
hieroglyphs written upon the core of subjectivity, which can only be deciphered 
through the interminable endeavours of oral speech. 
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2. The Baroque: the fold and allegory 
Deleuze's conception of the sense of speech as produced by a serial displacement of 
the meanings casts an oblique light upon Benjamin's notion of allegory. In this light, 
allegory can be conceived as a definite expression in which converging series of 
countless meanings seem to acquire a definite profile. Inherent in allegory is the 
inevitability of the ultimate failure of representation. Moreover, the specific sense of 
allegory seems to point towards this failure of the representation, towards its own 
impossibility to achieve a definite form. Allegory, seen like this, becomes the 
expression of this intrinsic opaqueness of the representation, which reveals the 
expressive" exhaustion of language. 
Allegory exhibits the absolute porousness of text. It transforms the endless 
unfolding of meaning into a fixed image produced by a peculiar regime of composition. 
Also, it represents the essential element in the fabric of the Baroque. It brings together, 
at a single stroke, the otherwise dispersed and unrelated series of meanings and 
expansions of. the sense. An undetermined number of possible interpretations coexist; 
they emanate from the written or the painted image as a dense echo, of sedimented 
layers of interpretation which seem to fold back, one upon the other. The endless 
folding back of the interpretations upon themselves, endows the allegorical 
representation with a powerful creative force which redeems it from a state of mere 
resemblance. 
Thus, allegory can be thought of as the sedimentation of meanings condensed 
around an isolated though pregnant utterance, around an abysmal impulse to represent, 
or around an uncertain image; it appears as the comprehensive expression of manifold 
layers of potential senses, exposed by a narrated passage," the very utterance of which 
confers upon it meaningful force. This image of allegory as stratified foldings of sense 
reveals the relevance of a simple constructive principle. Allegory can be thought of as 
a form of expression informed by the endless folding of interpretation upon itself. In 
this sense, it exhibits itself as the outcome of what Deleuze identifies as the 
constructive principle of the Baroque: the fold. Indeed, the Baroque, according to him, 
can be defined chiefly by this operative concept. 
Ie critere ou Ie concept operatoire du Baroque est Ie Pli, dans 
toute sa comprehension et son extension : pli selon plio Si 1'011 
peut etendre Ie Baroque soient-elles. Si nollS voulons maintenir 
l'identitC op6ratoire du Baroque et du pli, it faut done mootrer que 
Ie pli reste limite dans les autres cas, et qu'il connait dans Ie 
B.oque tm affraocbissement sans limites dont les conditions sont 
determinables.6 
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In the Baroque, the fold does not appear as an isolated category, or a circumscribed 
construction. Rather, it implies the urgency of creation. Each fold expands its own 
original space; it is the source of its own growing density and yet it brings forth a 
proliferation of inner cavities, the dissemination and expansion of empty spaces. The 
surface turns upon itself to create its. own temporal and spatial density. In the Baroque 
-
aesthetic expression engenders, by continuous folding, a universe of contrasting spaces 
intimately coupled: with each fold the saturation of the space increases. The fold 
creates both depth and porousness. Yet it enhances the contrast between inward and 
outward signs, between light and shadow, between the lasting and the transient. 
Le monde a deux etages seulement, separes par Ie pli qui se 
rCpeacutc des deux cOtes suivant \D'l regime different, e'est l'apport 
baroque par excelence.7 
But the expanding porosity produced by the folding of the surfaces engenders, 
similarly, an endless series of inner layers, of interior limits which become tangible 
frontiers surrounding a growing volume of hollows. Porosity exacerbates the idea of 
limits: each pore is constituted purely by a surface which encircles vacuousness. The 
difference between the inner and the outer is to be found in the very substance of the 
matter. However, the surface which shapes the pore, simultaneously separates and links 
different, autonomous spaces. Porosity takes to its limits the inner differentiation of 
spaces and their manifold bonds. 
Quand Heidegger invoque Ie ZWiefalt comme Ie difIereneiant de 
la difference, it veut dire p.vant tout que la differeneiation ne 
renvoie pas a un indiffereneie preaiable, mais a une Difference 
qui ne cesse de se deplier et replier de ehaeun des deux cOtes, et 
qui De deplie l'wl qu'en repliant I'autre, dans une coextensivite du 
devoilement et du voilement de I'autre, de la presence et du retrait 
de l'etante.8 
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The movement of the fold implies its potential expansion, its condensation and its 
unfolding. ~h potential, new folding foretokens the unaccountable condensation or 
expansion of its own proper space. The folding expresses in itself the material, 
exuberant imagination of limits. 
Moreover, perhaps the most important feature of the Baroque is that this folding 
movement, as Heidegger remarks, is also a rhythmic alternation of unveiling and 
concealment. The folding is then the outcome of the intimate tension betw~n the 
impulse to create an encompassing new surface, a new facade, new visible signs, and 
the urgency to veil a previous layer of sense. It is not the surface in itself that produces 
the veiling of the sense; rather, it is the folding movement of the expressive surface 
which engenders concealment. The fold then both evidences and masks the concealing 
movement of expression. But the fold also expresses another intimate tension of the 
Baroque form: for the Baroque -writes Benjamin- "Verwandlung aller Art, das war 
ihr Element; und deren Schema war Allegorie·" . 9 There is an intimate relation between 
allegory and metamorphosis, chiefly the transformation brought about by this obstinate 
folding. 
Thus, "concealment is not the outcome of a single expressive episode. Rather, 
it pervades the whole spectrum of expression. The Baroque involves an endless, serial 
metamorphosis of aesthetic and theoretical expression. It is not only the expressive 
manifestation of the tensions intrinsic in aesthetic endeavour produced during the serial 
development of the sense in itself; it also exhibits the tension between the temporalities 
of written and the spoken word, between the unyielding monotony of codes and the 
transience of allegory, between the evocation of affections and the fragility of the 
words that express them. The Baroque also exhibits the subjective tensions between the 
experience of the imperceptible" but unsettling finiteness of language, and the 
expression of this finiteness in the visible weave' of poetic language and the aesthetic 
signs. These contrasting yet proliferating tensions are characterized by the aesthetic 
building-up of inner and outer spaces of sense, by moving boundaries between sharply 
differentiated territories of meaning, of contrasts between irreducible spheres of sense 
-
-its element was the metamorphosis of every fonn; and its scheme was allegory. (My translation) 
123 
which have their origin in the expressive potentialities of language itself. Benjamin 
wrote: 
Lautliehes ist unci bleibt dem Baroek ein rein Sinnliches; die 
Bedeutwtg ist in der Sehrift zu Hause. Und das verIautbare Wort 
wird nur g1eiehwie von einer unentrinnbaren Krankheit von ihr 
heimgesueht; Un AustOnen brieht es ab und eine Stauung des 
Gefiihls, das sieh zu ergie6en bereit war, weckt die Trauer. 
Bedeutung begegnen hier und wird noch weiterhin begegnen a1s 
der Grund der Traurigkeit -10 
The Baroque, according to Benjamin, emerges from the debased expressive capabilities 
of the meaningful, pronounceable word and its reduction to sheer sensual force. The 
morbid decay of the significance of spoken words strengthened the strict framework 
which, moulds the meaning of written language. This metamorphosis of meaning 
corresponded to a dramatic mutation in manifest affections. The meaning of the spoken 
word was suffocated by the sensual tones of speech itself and by the meagre sensuality 
and diffuse potency of meaning in the written language; meaning thus weakened 
brought to light the intimate, hermetic relation between language and the emotions 
aroused by the visions of imminent death, of transience of life. In the Baroque, 
escatological visions incited by written language coexisted with the lavish sensuousness 
of the bodily agitations consequent upon the theatrical display of language. 
However, this tension between speaken word and written language does not 
define by itself the whole universe of the Baroque. The breach between the written and 
the spoken language seems to echo the broader, yet more intense and enigmatic 
antagonism between image and speech~ The conflict between written and spoken 
languages, casts some oblique light upon another uncertain, boundless relation: the 
images of the body and the allegorical proximity of death; this relation is evident in the 
allegories of Holbein's potbaits and their hermetic echoes, the desire for remembrance 
and the apprehension of death linked to the impulse to represent of the face, to capture, 
in an image the afflictions and the app"oaching extinction of the soul. The only 
affections -Benjamin claims- which remain uninhibited are sadness and mourning 
"In the Baroque the articulated sound was, and still is, strictly sensual, while meaning feels itself at home in writing. 
And the pronounceable word has been struck at the root as by a fatal disease; the word crumbles just in the moment 
of its uttering, and the emotions that were about to spriJlg up arouse mourning. Meaning appears here, and will 
continue to appear, as the ground of sadness. (My translation) 
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which become the mute, silent, enigmatic, secret force of the allegory. 
A car<;linal feature of the Baroque enterprise is the aim to achieve a timeless 
writing, one capable of encompassing the whole universe of potential senses. Writing 
seems able to embrace all by the means of the complex resonance of allegory "das 
Ganze der Kulturwelt -remarks Benjamin- von der Antike bis zum christlichen 
Europa auszusprechene"11 The allegorical writing of symbolism echoes the exorbitant 
pretensions of Baroque artists. Allegory offers for interpretation hermetic signs in 
which merge the resonances of the dense history of symbols of the whole cultural 
world. Allegory seems to invoke the figures of the past both as memories and as eternal 
archetypes, instruments of interpretation able to reveal the transcendental system of 
invariant forces within the universe, and offer a circumstantial display of images 
reflecting the ephemeral and deceiving conditions of existence. 
Paradoxically, allegory emerges in the wake of oblivion. It is the oblivion of 
the historically specific conditions which brought about the perception of systematic 
resemblances between the allegory and its canonical meaning, -the particular 
conditions which motivated the invention of an analogy between lived experiences and 
the spectrum of the symbolic patterns of an age-, that engendered the blinding opacity 
of allegorical language. Allegory relies on interpretations built upon this oblivion 
which, in turn, determine its suggestive and enigmatic depth. It thus rises from a 
contradictory movement of language; from an expression which turns back upon itself, 
only to efface from the signs it employs, all traces of the material, historic processes 
of bodies and of the intensities of actions; the obliteration of the signs of the affections 
. 
and intensions which gave rise to and surrounded the primordial expression, sunders 
the allegory from its meaningful origin. What remains is only the relic of a web of 
signs which points chiefly towards the hollowness, the oblivion which surrounds it. 
Rejecting the signs of time, allegory seeks to express both the absolute, primordial state 
of language and its confining limits, the last darkening of meaning; it seeks to 
comprehend wholly the sense of human experience confined within its own boundaries 
of creation and apocalypse, birth and death. 
"to express the whole cultural world from the AntiquitY to the Christian Europe. (My translation) 
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Moreover, allegory is the singular outcome of the precipitation of the senses and 
of language j,nto a relentless series of interpretations, expressions and constructions 
built upon an absolute, reluctant silence, upon the presence of imminent death and the 
conviction of the wastefulness of signs, and an impotent recognition of its ominous 
inevitability . 
Allegory thus admits a serial, boundless metamorphosis of its senses, the 
restless creation of interpretations; its crowded meanings exhibit a shapeless, uncertain 
structure. But the serial composition of the figures induces two possible movements: 
an expansive interpretation which breds new signs, narrations and symbols and 
interpretations which turn back upon its own signs to unfold their potential meanings; 
the interpretation of allegory either unfolds itself in countless variations and 
interpretations, or becomes reflexive, it dips into its own substance, it becomes a 
search for the sense of its own constitutive signs; it seeks the sense of its own enigmatic 
identity; interpretation may tum upon its own motives; it may immerse itself in its own 
self engendered universe of meanings. What appears as a primal aesthetic figure, as a 
primal written image, gives rise to an interpretation which folds upon itself, increasing 
its own density expressed by a figure of immeasurable, impenetrable opacity: a 
metaphor within metaphor, a figure which projects its image upon its own original 
shape, folding ceaselessly, engendering a relentless reflexive movement. Jean Rousset 
has remarked that the metaphor in the Baroque, 
it force de se "filer", en vient it dresser une veritable composition 
autonome derriere laqueUe I'objet se trouve si bien dissimule qu'il 
faut Ie deviner~ on se trouve en presence d'un deguisement 
rhetorique qui est l'equivaIent de ce que tentent les architectes de 
fa~ades autonomes tels que Borromini it Sainte-Agnes. 12 
Nevertheless, in this spinning out of the series of either reflexive or disseminating 
discourse, the expressions of finiteness are clearfy decipherable, even stressed. But it 
is not just the finiteness of sense, or the edge of the serial chaining of images and 
shreds of language that is highlighted; it is the finite nature of the subject that appears 
as the cardinal trait of the Baroque expression: the subject's death is readable in its 
proliferating inner fractures, discontinuities and exacerbated expansions of discourse. 
The Baroque, concludes Jean Rou~set, 13 arouses hostility towards the finished 
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work; it is the enemy of any stable form. The intrinsic impulse of Baroque composition 
is to trespas~, and to dissolve obstinately its own form at the precise moment of 
achieving a definite profile. If the form of any composition implies a certain steadiness, 
the persistence of certain features, even relatively fixed rules of genre, then the 
movement and instability which define the Baroque seem to be confronted by an 
inescapable paradox: to achieve identity, the Baroque work must dissipate its own 
identity. The Baroque identity of a work demands, for any creation to be congruent to 
its aesthetical conditions, either the reJection of any achieved form, of its own identity, 
or the election of a definite form which would establish its identity, denying, thus, its 
Baroque nature. The only solution to this paradox is allegory. The aesthetic 
construction must remain an endless, even shapeless endeavour, a constant invention 
and destruction of its own form. Consequently, Baroque expression exhibits a fruitful 
tension between the aim to totality, to identity, and the experience of transience, 
fragmentation, finiteness. The Baroque artist longs for the massive, he feels the urge 
to be bold, the desire for weight, but still he holds to the experience of disappearance. 
The written and visual expressions of the Baroque expose their own rejection of its 
formal elements; they reject the rigid mould of the genre, and display obsessively the 
figures and narrations which echoe the opposition between the moving profiles of the 
worldly objects and the final, fixed grimace of death. 
By expressing the tension between the aim to totality and enacting its own 
disseminating force, Baroque works explore the limits of meaning intrinsic to their own 
endeavour. The Baroque work dismembers its own wholeness; its sense is outweighed 
by the isolated prominence of its own fragments; each fragment becomes a totality in 
itself which comprehends the equivocal fate of language, the dense images of the 
allegorical tale crumbles; the wholeness of the allegory exhibits a fragile, unstable 
relation among separated members of a violently shattered cluster of figures, shades of 
words which loom as menacing, autonomous, living members severed from a frail and 
transient body. In the Baroque, Benjamin claims, 
Die Worte erweisen sich noch in ihrer Vereinzelung 
verbingnisvoll. Ja man ist versucht zu sagen, schon die Tatsache, 
daB sie, so vereinzelt, noch etwas bedeuten, gibt dem 
Bedeutungsrest, der ihnen verbliebt, etwas Drohendes:14 
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This residual meaning of the isolated word condenses the contradictory, threatening 
force of Baroque constructions. On the fringes of the conventional framework of 
language, the menacing sense of the autonomous allegorical word emerges as a 
contingent, although forceful formation: it is simultaneously a marginal figure, and a 
looming, manifold, yet also conventional emblem. However, the autonomous life of 
the fragment, the preservation of its severed, glaring sphere of signs, cannot prevail 
over the core of meaning. Rather, fragments integrate into uncertain constellations of 
decaying and emerging totalities. 
Heinrich Wolflin, in his c~cal study of the Baroque, defines it by a series of 
reappearing, unresolved contrasts: the Baroque merges the representations of ascending 
movement and those of stillness and heaviness, proper to classicism; its aim is to 
arouse disquiet and not serenity; it explores rhythmic series instead of regular metrics; 
the Baroque privileges the curve over the straight line; the intoxicating lavishness of 
forms constitutes the inextricable, bold presence of Baroque composition. These 
coexisting, accumulated tensions impose themselves on the perception with an 
unpredictable intensity. Wolfflin wrote: 
Eine Steigenmg dieses Princips der Spannung liegt da vor, wo das 
Verletzend-unbeJriedigte [die Uruuhe des Werdens die Spannung 
eines verinderlichen Zustandes] gegeben wird."1 S 
The Baroque not only represents fmiteness, and provokes despair and anxiety; it also 
seeks to arouse these emotions in whoever immerses him'self in its atmosphere. The 
perturbing amalgam of tensions which give rise to the singularities of the Baroque lead 
to the preeminence of secrecy: 
"even isolated, the words reveal themselves as fateful. We will dare to say that even tom apart from each other, 
they continue to signify; this mere condition confers a certain threatening character to the residual meaning they 
have kept. (my traslation) 
"'"'The heightening of the principle of tension occurs when dissatisfaction [provoked by the tension of a changing 
slate, by the distress provoked by that which must come) turns into a cause of suffering. (My translation). 
Wo immer dagegen etwas ubereinander geschoben ist, ist ein 
Unfassbares und damit ein Bewegungreiz gegeben. -.6 
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WOlfflin points out the relation of the fold to the unfathomable. However, the 
unfathomable, which constitutes the core of Baroque expression, -as we have 
previously posited- is engendered by signs from which the historic and temporal 
references have been uprooted. As Benjamin suggests, it is the disappearance of all 
traces of context and memory from the physiognomy of signs that allows the fragments 
of a symbolic action to acquire an allegorical meaning. Thus, the Baroque can be 
conceived as an exhausting effort to build with residual, severed images or narrations, 
a conventional, a11-encompassing, universal symbol of finiteness. But the failure of 
interpretation to comprehend the Baroque universe implies the exhaustion of 
. . . 
inteJpretatioo itself, and the dissipation of sense consequent upon its allegorical density, 
which leads to the total consummation of language: the Baroque engenders a decay of 
the force of meaning; the boundaries of the expressive force of expression dissipate and 
its specific meaning is outweighed by the exultant sensuousness of signs. This decay 
imposes itself on the consciousness as a conclusive proof of the imminence of death 
which arises from the only possible experience of death -loss of the other. Mourning 
-Benjamin claims-, involves the extinction of the speech impulse and the experience 
of the expressive limits of narnIng stirs in the subject an incurable and ontological 
affliction. 
Es ist in aller Trauer der Hang zur Sprachlosigkeit und das ist 
unendlich viel mehr als Unflihigkeit oder Unlust zur Mitteilung. 
Das Traurige fiihlt sich so durch und durch erkannt vom 
Unerkeunbaren Bemumt m sein -selbst wenD der Nennende ein 
Gottergleicher und Seliger ist- bleibt vielleicht immer eine 
Abnung von Trauer. --.7 
The relation between being named, that is to say, to receive from the other the 
equivocal gift of identity -Benjamin suggests- involves the certainty of the other's 
·when one thing it superimposed to another the unfathomable occurs, and then, the attraction to movement it 
created. (My translation) 
-evay time there it mourning it appears a fondness for speechlessness which is much more than an incapacity or 
unplcaaure to communicate. Whoever experiences mourning feels totally known by the unknowable. To be named 
-even by someone blessed by or similar to God- ~ntinuously awakens the presentiment of mourning. (My 
translation) 
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death and the acceptance of the subject's own impending silence. The sole pronouncing 
of a word, of parne, confers on muteness a meaning, born of the other's disappearance. 
Every name seems to be pronounced on the fringes of life, at the crepuscule of 
expression. Naming does not seem simply to attach a label to a thing, or to relate 
habitual1yby a lasting habit, a chain of sounds to a perception or a classified parcel of 
the symbolic universe. Naming, as Benjamin sees it, casts the shadow of its 
disappearance upon the named object, and also exhibits in the naming voice ~ces of 
the subject's own death. Thus, naming is itself the cipher of the shattered expressive 
force of allegory. Allegory appears both as a paroxysmic act of naming which seems 
to pronounce the disappearance of the named object and of the uttering voice, and as 
evidence of the subject's sombre awareness of this disappearance . 
. 
Thus, paradoxically, because allegory denies the boundaries of interpretation 
while stressing the limits of the expressiveness of language, its "indistinct and dense 
openness" expresses the infinite unfolding of the experience of loss. Allegory yields an 
infinite series of meanings, a divergent unfolding of senses; it is built upon the 
experience of the imminent emptiness of the name, upon the experience of transience. 
3. Freud and the Baroque 
The Baroque physiognomy, shaped by the limitless deployment of the fold, portrays 
the theoretical scandal of the Baroque: the image of proliferating inner boundaries of 
expression, internal surfaces which cut and engender internal voids. 
Freud's conception of subjectivity discernible in hi's writings reveals the action 
of the same operative concept as the Baroque: the dominion of the fold. Freud's 
writings seems to mirror the subject's passions, preesenting them, as in the Baroque 
portrait, as motifs and characters. Monique Schneider has remarked that Freud's text 
can be seen as a sedimentation of dense layers of virtual images of subjectivity; the 
facade and secrecy become relevant tokens neighbouring powerful freudian metaphors: 
the mirage and the subterfuge. 
A I'interieur de cet espace theorique lui-meme strati fie, Freud 
pourra faire jouer un mecanisme de recouvrement et de censure, 
semblable a celui qui s'exerce dans Ie refouJement: la temporalite 
correspondant aux exigences de l'ideologie regnante sera 
maintenue en position de facade ou de bouclier, pennettant a des 
schemes temporels plus frondeurs, jouant avec la ruse et la 
mensonge, de commander clandestinement des regions 
psychiques abrlteeS. 18 
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Monique Schneider perceives a cleavage between two spheres of Freud' s conceptual 
work: one comprised by dateable elements, which refer to the immediate conditions of 
his thought, and a layer of text of uncertain, ambiguous temporality. Freud's 
theoretical constructions are seen by Schneider as a textual facade, a visible, 
immediately comprehensible universe, set in a particular historical moment, and a 
darkened interior space, a theoretical reflexion which lies beyond this facade of dated 
language. There is a shadow line which lies between them which resembles repression, 
but it is not. Freud appears to wield the instrumental notions of cheat and lie as tokens 
of a deeply buried scheme of primordial memories which inform a realm of sense 
abiding beyond language. His theoretical universe seems to be forged by a relentless 
meditation not only on the limits of the subject's psychical structures, but on the limits 
of any written expression of a theoretical approach to subjectivity. The constructive 
principles of Freud's writing echoe both the operations of concealment, and the 
deceiving, stratified expressions which exhibit the shades of censorship and repression 
governing the dynamics of subjectivity. 
Psychoanalysis involves as an essential condition of its own theoretical 
endeavour a singular sense of silence. Silence, in the theoretical framework of 
psychoanalysis, appears neither as a meaningful gap in the act of speech, nor as a 
casual interruption; rather, it is conceived both as a qu3Jity of language itself which 
intrudes upon the smooth unfolding of speech, and as an intrinsic, unfathomable 
opacity, as a fracture, but also as a resonance which surrounds a specific utterance. 
This silence reveals the existence of a scandalous singular, unconventional, non 
interpretable sign which defines the emerging identity of the subject. But this 
redefinition of silence involves the radical transformation of Freud's notion of 
language. Gantheret points out the subtle displacement of the sense of speech provoked 
by the suffocated outburst of silence: 
Quant a I'analyse, je lui donne une priorite, par ce qui I'ordonne 
tout entiere: Ie silence. Car si I'analyse est parole - on nous I'a 
assez rabAchef - c'est parce qu'eUe est d'abord et avant tout, en 
fondation, silence. L'angoisse, les soucis, la quotidiennete, les 
symptOmes, qui s'y deversent, trop-plein de corps, y trouvent 
I'entour d'un espace qui les empecbe de coller a vif a la chair, leur 
donne une autre peau, les fait se dire, c'est-a-dire exister 
humainement, avec un ecart.19 
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The very existence of anxiety and the disquiet which springs from the episodes of 
everyday life, signs which infonn bodily experience and the expression of the impulse 
which animates human existence, are due to silenced action, the eclipsed intrusion of 
a fundamental experience. Secrecy then, in the light of the experience uncovered by 
psychoanalysis, does not name the sense of a mere manipulation of language. Neither 
does· it name a definite act nor a strategy of concealment -a deliberate mutenes-, but 
an awareness of the edges of experience, of the extreme limit of language, of the 
boundary on which language becomes the only trace of an exhausted represention and 
on which the anxiety provoked by emptiness arises, illuminating the failure of 
language. Yet, the reflexive folding back of language upon itself is not just the 
exclusion of a memory from the possibility of conscious recall, or a hindrance to 
reminiscence; in itself it both preserves and conceals what has been said. Moreover, 
it stresses an often disregarded though essential feature of meaning, oblivion. It is from 
the fertile power of oblivion that meaning acquires the force of representation. 
Freud's essays in psychoanalysis did not only shatter the compelling, utopian 
ethic which secrecy transgresses -the utopia of absolute transparency of meaning, of 
total communication of sense, of exhaustive expression of the self-, but conceived this 
shattering as a condition every subject should fulfil to achieve its own identity. Yet, 
psychoanalysis never explicitly renounced to this utopia, which arose from the fictive 
triumph of reflexive consciousness. The utopia of ·the transparency of expression -the 
imperative to "say it all"- is bound to create in the subject's moral domain an 
invincible tension which defines the fate of subjectivity. Psychoanalysis adumbrated an 
astounding, paradoxical ethic of secrecy, which rejected the dominion of reflexive 
consciousness. Secrecy, after Freud I s psychoanalysis, no longer reveals an ethical 
transgression, but a destiny intrinsic in the human condition. Secrecy -as a non 
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meditated experience which, nevertheless, offers a tangible evidence of the limits of 
language- in(orms subjectivity. It becomes a potential, relevant sign of the subject's 
identity which resists emerging interpretations. The subject's identity is shaped by the 
ethical framework grounded upon the rarefied, unfathomable signs 0/ silence, and by 
the mourning involved in the imperative o/naming, o/na"ating. The missing sense 
alluded to by secrecy can also be conceived, in the light of Freud's conceptions, as an 
experience of the intrinsic resistance of sense. There seem to be meanings that_ resist 
articulation. There seem to be expressions which shall remain foreign to the spoken 
word. And it is the subject's non reflexive awareness of the intrinsic resistance of 
language ~s resistance, manifest in his silence-, that must be assumed by him as 
an irrenounceable condition of his own identity. 
However, the subject's awareness is not induced by the intensity of his own 
intimate tensions. Rather, according to Descombes, it is a product of the intrinsic 
asymmetry of dialogue. 
Des lors que je parle, il y a des ehoses que je De peux pas dire. 
Non puce que je les ignore, ou puce que mOD propos anterieur 
y repugne; au CODtraire, je les sais et tout ce que j'ai pu dire les 
appeUe. Mais je De peux pas les dire a 10;, ou ce n'est pas mo; qui 
puis les faire entendre. Tu ne dois pas I'entendre, done je ne Ie 
dirai pas, si e'est a toi que je parle. Si to I'as entendu, to ne I'as pas 
entendu de moi. La raison du secret n'est done pas en moi, mais 
chez 10;.20 
It is because the other is perceived as a threat to the subject's own identity, that the 
boundaries of language, that the exhaustion of expression comes to light. But this limit 
is perceived as an uncertain hindrance which rules every talking impulse; the 
foreboding of the non said impregnates every moment, each gesture, the very utterance 
of a single statement: "tout ce que j'ai pu dire les appelle" , writes Descombes. 
Language acquires an unexpected, hyperbolic metaphorical depth: the word 
encompasses all that a subject might know: its potencies, and also its impossibilities. 
Secrecy turns each word into a subtle evocation of the absolute limits of the utterance 
which stems from the imaginary, menacing identity of the other. Each word becomes 
an autonomous universe of sense which seems to turn itself into an speculative grain 
of allegory, while invoking its own limits. 
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4. The Baroque dimensions of Freud's writing 
As an expressive presence, the Baroque work seems to be shaped by the passion for 
secrecy and pervaded by it. Eugenio d' Drs in his discussion of the limits of the notion 
of the Baroque asserts: 
Hoy se tiende [ ... ] en proporcion creciente a creer que: primero~ 10 
barroco es una constante hist6ri~ que se produce en epocas tan 
alejadas como el Alejandrinismo 10 ha estado de la 
Contrarreforma, y esta del 'Fin-de-siglo'~ es decir~ 
antonomasticamente, el fin del siglo XIX y de la 'Transguerra', 
que nuestra civilizacion occidental acaba de vivir; y que se ha 
presentado en las regiones mas diversas, en Oriente no menos que 
en Occidente. Segundo~ se trata de un fenomeno que interesa no 
8610 aI arte~ sino a toda la civilizacion y hasta, por extension, a la 
morfologia de la naturaleza [ ... ] Tercero~ su caracter es normal y, 
si se puede hablar aqui de enfennedad, es exactamente en el 
mismo sentido en que decia Michelet que 'Ia mujer es una etema 
enferma'. Cuarto~ 10 barroco, lejos de encontrar su origen en el 
estilo clasico, se Ie opone mas fundamentaImente todavia que el 
romanticismo; el cual no es, en suma mas que un 
desenvolvimiento de la constante barroca.21 
If the Baroque, as Eugenio d'Ors has remarked, does not define a certain type of 
aesthetic composition or a fortuitous trend in art, but defines a spirit, a nature, a 
morphological invariant of certain historical processes,22 then it is possible to conceive 
it as a cultural regime, the force of which resides in the widespread subjective 
experience of secrecy admitted historically as an essential condition of expression. 
What might be called the Baroque impulse of the late decad~s of the nineteenth century 
took root in the dominant patterns of the aesthetic of Romanticism and acquired a 
dramatic and ambiguous profile --characterized by both exultant, theatrical 
manifestations with a decaying expressive power, and a suffocated expressiveness 
pervaded by an exacerbated inclination to hermetic forms- in final years of the 
century. 
A dominant impulse in writing in the late nineteenth century seems to conform 
with what Gerard Genette conceived as "typical Baroque": the Baroque is -in his 
view- a complex pattern informed by 
amplificati~ proliferation des episodes et des omements 
descriptifs, multiplication des niveaux narratifs et jeu sur cette 
multiplicite, ambiguite et interferences menagees entre Ie 
repr6sente et sa representation, entre Ie narrateur et sa narration, 
effets de syncope, affectation d'inachevement, recherche 
simultanee de la "forme ouverte" et de la symetrie.23 
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But Baroque writing -thought of as engendered by the multiplication of narrative 
layers, the dominion of ambiguity, the exaltation of the dense weave of meaningful 
effects due to the interlocking elements of narration- does not remain as a singular, 
aesthetic expression; it does not appear as an autonomous, extravagant outburst of the 
expressive force of an age; it is neither an isolated cultural object, bounded to display 
a bundle of inordinate and exuberant features, nor a frivolous exhibition of an object, 
shaped by Ute relentless, conventional rules of a decadent, passing style: 
Le baroque, s'il existe, n'est pas une ile (et encore moins une 
chasse gardee), mais un carrefour, une "etoile" et, comme on Ie 
voit bien a RaIle, une place publique. Son genie est syncretisme, 
son ordre est ouverture, son propre est de n'avoir rien en propre 
et de pousser a leur extreme des caracteres qui sont, 
emdiquement, de tous les lieux et de tous les temps. Ce qui nous 
importe en lui n'est pas ce qu'il a d'excIusif, mais ce qu'iI a, 
justement, de "typique" - c'est-a-dire d'exemplaire?4 
Freud's writings seem to correspond to the broad outline of the fundamental traits of 
the Baroque offered by Genette. Genette's defmition mentions, perhaps as a casual 
example of the Baroque, the Roman display of manifold architectural styles which 
remained clustered in a tight unity made from the discordant, yet compelling variations 
of building procedures and aesthetic conceptions. This casual mention illuminates an 
often intrusive obsession in Freud's writing: his passion for Roman architectural and 
archeological spaces. The exploration and classification of relics and traces of buildings 
of different historical ages became in Freud's universe, as has been frequently stressed, 
an eloquent allegory of the psychoanalytical enterprise. The eloquence of the allegory 
of Rome is not adventitious. It evokes an im1ge which constitutes not only a significant 
testimony to Freud's passion for scenery, but an allusion to the web of heterogeneous 
discourse which Freud himself invoked throughout his conceptual work -literature, 
philosophy, physiology, thermodynamics, history, aesthetics, archeology, 
anthropology-, and to the changing dimensions of psychoanalytic discourse, which 
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shifted between allegorical and descriptive methods, blending Freud's own 
reminiscences .with fragments of narrations of his patients and other psychopathological 
examples, and an astounding collection of mixed evidence from contrasting facets of 
reality. Freud's crucial definition of his meta psychology as a threefold analytic 
enterprise, simultaneously economic, dynamic and topographical, is a relevant example 
of this amalgamation of theoretical elements. He achieved an astounding synthesis and 
coalescence of notions, which emerged at the confluence of disciplinary boun<;laries. 
In spite of the rigidity and narrowness of his personal, moral, and epistemological 
convictions, his conceptual imagination exhibited itself as exorbitantly loose, heterodox 
and open. Freud's manifold historical, autobiographic, literary, aesthetic and 
philosophical references blended in non-harmonical structures with medical evidence 
and theoretical authorities, to consituted lavish but nonetheless convincing evidence of 
legitimacy. 
Despite the immediate perception of these features, Freud's writing is an 
intricate, challenging and contradictory examples of the Aujkillrung. As Malcolm 
Bowie remarks: 
in the works of Freud the rational discourse and the rational 
scientific ambitions of the nineteenth century reached a 
adminating point, but they overreached themselves in the process 
and began to disintegrate irreversibly.2s 
The irreversible disintegration of Freud's Enlightenment heritage had a singular 
outcome: the creation of a transitional, disturbing body of knowledge, founded upon 
a fictional structure. Freud's reflexion nourished a saturate;<l fragmentary text confined 
within the margins of rigurous reflection, at once austere and confessional, descriptive 
and speculative, empirical and fictional, entangled in arguments of exorbitant variety 
and discouraging monotony; his amazing regime of argumentation was derived from 
self-reflections which did not reject such imaginary creatures as literary deductions, 
allegorical inferences and interpretative observations: "Secure knowledge --<;onc1udes 
Bowie- would bring him [Freud] unspeakable terror". This insecurity marks his 
devotion to metaphorical and allegorical patterns of exposition. Freud seems to be 
constantly disquieted by the paradox of his "reticent passion" for the obscure 
phenomena at the edge of the subject's experience, and by his own fervent search for 
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the illuminations the source of which was delirium and psychical malady and which 
cast a sharp light on common life. He passionately but secretly exposed a daunting 
landscape of scatological representations embedded in his own psychoanalytic 
discourse. 26 
Freud hails science and deplores the obscurities of speculation. He rejected the 
will to totality exhibited by seemingly comprehensive theories which lacked any 
empirical foundation; he spurns the impregnable sphere of occultism, resistent t9 any 
evidence which might perturb his own regime. Freud emphatically rejected "the 
blinding glare of a faultless theory" [den blendenden Glanz einer lackenlosen Theorie] 
(Psychoanalysis und telepathie, GW, 17: 30). However, to have chosen the positive, 
empirical alternative did not shield him from the intrusion of the inherent darkness of 
.. ' 
his fragmentary writing. Sarah Kofmann remarks: 
Freud revendique pour sa throrie Ie droit au fragmentaire, au 
lacunaire. Contre la lumiere speculative, aveuglante trop 
aveuglante, iI en appelle au droit Ii l'obscurire.27 
Rather than the obscurity of the topics, Freud seems to have chosen the darkness which 
stemmed froin. silence and elision, from the hesitant textual unfolding of his conceptual 
endeavour. Perhaps he exhibits an exacting and meaningful imperative: not to admit 
in his writings the invincible opaqueness of dogma, but to reveal the disquieting 
chiaroscuro of the destroyed unity of medical allegories of psychical phenomena. The 
fragmentary nature of Freud's text represents something more than a definitive wager; 
he strives to achieve a text capable of incorporating a vast range of tonalities; he 
arouses and shapes the belief of his readers in his exorbitant formulations with an 
impressive spectrum of knowledge, erudition and argumentative skill. Often, Freud's 
expositions trespass on unacceptable explanations; they even lack fair empirical 
support. 
Moreover, his writings strongly resemble an articulated Baroque optic device, 
which offers to the dazzled observer an aberrant image of the subjectivity or an 
enigmatic anamorphic image of it. The reading of Freud I s work arouses sensations that 
resemble those stirred up by the Great Style, which Wolfflin described as the main 
characteristic of Baroque work: 
Der Barock beabsichtigt eine andere Wirkung. Er will packen mit 
der Gewalt des Affects, unmittelbar, iiberwiltigend. Was er giebt 
ist nicht g1eichmassige Belebung, sonder Aufregung, Ekstase, 
Berauschung. Es geht BUS auf einen Eindruck des Augenblicks, 
wibrend die Renaissance langsamer und leiser, aber desto 
nachhaltiger wirkt. Man mOchte ewig in ihr dem Bezirk weilen. 
Vom Barock crfabren wir momentan eine starke Wirkung werden 
dann aber bald mit einer gewissen Oedigkeit entlassen. Er gibt 
kein gliicldiches Sein, sondern ein Werden, ein Geschehen; nicht 
das Befriedigte, sondem das Unbefriedigte und Ruhelose. Man 
fiihlt sich nicht erlOst, sondern in die Spannung emes 
leidenschaftlichen Zustandes hineingezogen. ~ 
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Wittgenstein bears a testimony to this experience of disquiet, of the dissatisfaction 
aroused by the reading of the Freudian text. He explicitly and emphatically remarked 
the paradoxical nature of the intense aesthetic tension in Freud's work. He emphasized 
the unbearable, inhospitable nature of psychoanalytic theory. He was outspokenly 
suspicious of its fragmented development, of its apparently incongruous conceptual 
unfolding, of the changing orientation of its concepts, of the accumulated resonances 
of meanings which crowded Freud's unrelenting, allegorical style and which 
embarrassed the reader while exerting on him an irresistible attraction. Wittgenstein 
exposes the paradoxical response to the Freudian text, which provokes a restrained 
attachment, while arousing a detached and tyrannical attraction to it.29 
This passionate, paradoxical strangeness provoked by Freud's text was also 
experienced in his immMiate intellectual, medical and philosophical environment, but 
it was to produce its most powerful and persisting impact on its later readers: Freud's 
writing exerts simultaneously a compelling attraction, and grips its readers, while 
arousing in them incurable suspicions. Freud's· text might be portrayed in the words 
which Alberti used to describe the sensations aroused by Baroque architecture: "That 
those who stare at it do not think they have apprehended it completely but just a part, 
and thus they must tum their heads to see it again as they walk away".3O 
"'The purpoae of the Baroque is different. It strives to, directly and overwhelmingly, captivate with the power of 
a&ct. Ria comribWon is not a unifonn enthusiasm, but an astonishment, an ectasis, a rapture. It seeks to give an 
allpacuiun of the inIfant, while the ac:tion of the renaissance wort is slower and silent but also more enduring: one 
would like to ltay endleuly in his realm. The Baroque exerts a strong action upon us, but fleetingly, it abandons 
us·very 1OOIl, leaving us wah a sensation of uneasiness. It does not restore the plenitude of being but its becoming; 
~ is. mere incident; it does not satisfies; rather it arousqI dissatisfaction and disquiet. One does not feel hoerated 
but driven into a passionate state. (My translation) 
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Moreover, Freud's empiricist model of knowledge was undermined by his own 
paradoxical C9oviction of the impossibility of consciously achieving a complete 
comprehension of itself. Nevertheless, he was often furtively assailed by disbelief: for 
him, inferential procedures, assumed as an undisputed point of departure in scientific 
enterprise, were subverted by his own assumption of the fatally curtailed powers of 
consciousness: 
Man mu6 sich dann auf den Standpunkt stellen, es sci niehts 
anderes aIs cine unhaItbare AnmaBung, zu fordero, daB alles, was 
im Seelischen vorgeht, auch dem Bewu6tsein bekannt werden 
mOssc. (Dos UnbewufJte, SA, 1915, ill: 126f 
Freud echoes with this phrase an undesired but strong conviction derived from the 
sombre optimism of Enlightenment apd which encouraged the visions of Romanticism: 
there exists an irrestible force within the realm of consciousness which eludes the 
efforts of self-reflexion but which imposes its own conditions on knowledge. In his 
anthropological considerations, Kant had already avowed: 
DaB das Feld unserer Sinnenanschauungen und Empfindungen, 
deren wir uns Dieht bewu6t sin<L ob wir gleieh unbezweifelt 
sclilieBen kOnnen, daB wir sie haben, d.i. dunkeler Vorstellungen 
im Menschen (ODd so auch in Tieren), unenne61ieh sci, die klaren 
dagegen nur unendlieh wenige Punkte derselben enthalten, die 
dem Bewu6tsein offen liegen; daB gleichsam auf der groBen Karte 
unseres GemOts nur wenig Stellen illuminiert sind."]' 
Freud does not deny that the unknowable is an irreducible condition of knowledge. 
Furthermore, he uses this axiom as a definitive argument against the pretentious claims 
of speculative philosophy and occultism, which considered the completeness and 
exhaustiveness of a conceptual system as convincing evidence of their truth. 
Throughout his work, Freud sustained an ardent defense of the relevance of 
fragmentary notions. Freud was never reticent .about the uneasiness he felt when 
confronting speculative thought, yet he was willing to conceive it as the mythical, 
-we must adopt the position that to require that whatever goes on in the mind must also be known to consciousness 
is to make an untenable claim. (FP, 11: 168) 
-That the field of our intuitions of the senses and sensations of which we are not conscious, although it can be 
undoubtedly deduced that we have them, that is to say, dark representations in men (and aJjo in animals), is 
boundless, and that, on the contrary, only infmitely few are the number of clear points open to consciousness; just 
as in the huge map of our spirit only too few places are illuminated. (My translation) 
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almost cosmological force of understanding which animated the theories of subjectivity. 
Despite Freu~' s open rejection of it, speculative thought was to be embodied in 
psychoanalysis both as a threatening, undesirable extreme of thought, which should be 
avoided at any cost, and as the allegorical figure of a ghost, of a witch without whose 
intercession no progress can be made. 
Die Hexe Mctapsycbologie nlimlich. Ohne metapsycbologisches 
Spekulierm und 1'heoretisieren - beinahe hlUe ich gesagt: 
Phantasieren - kommt man bier keinen Schritt weiler. (Die 
endltche un die unend/iche Analyse, SA, 1937, Erganzungsband: 
364f 
This duality in Freudian thought is riot only a definitive feature of its reflection and its 
text, but also of his conception of subjectivity itself, and of the root of the subject's 
. 
anxiety. As· Rosolato has remarked, after Freud's enterprise has taken the exploration 
of subjectivity to its limits:32 
iI y a irreductiblement un inconnu inconnaissable. II ne peut ctre 
aboli et constitue la finitude en tant que limite de tout savoir, et 
jusque dans Ie champ des experiences possibles pour I'ctre 
humain et que I'interdit de I'inceste pose dans Ie symbolique. Et 
cd inconnu est au coeur de I'angoisse, de son intensite affective, 
et dans tout detresse. A I'inverse, Ie savoir peut bloquer toute 
progression de connaissance, car il affermit la position de ne pas 
savoir que I'on De sait pas (ou encore que ce qu'on sait 
intellectuellement ne correspond pas 8 un eprouve, 8 une 
experience). Dans la prise de conscience qui suit la decouverte de 
cet inconnu, I'apres coup, dans I'analyse, a un effet capital. 33 
At this limit sa voir and connaissance become antagonists. Savoir intrudes upon the 
singular process of connaissance. Conventional, broad knowledge hinders the 
progressive comprehension of the subject's singUlarity. This comprehension can stem 
only from the encounter of self-reflection with anxiety, from the subject's admission 
of the limits of his own illuminating project. The roots of the sense of anxiety remain 
foreign to the insights of self-reflection. Then, secrecy -this emergence of the 
hollowness of sense, of its limits, in the iolding back of thought upon itself- is not 
only engendered by the subject's experience of limit itself, but by the reflexive 
"The witch metapsychology. Without metapsychologjcal specUlation and theorizing -I had almost said 
'phantasizing'- we shaU not get another step forward. (T~nninabl~ and inl~nninabl~ analysis, SE, 1937,23: 225) 
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awareness of the limits of knowledge signalled by the presence of anxiety, and the 
resistance of ~ety to being rendered into any form of language. 
Moreover, the obstinate, reflexive movement of thought defers the formation 
of sense, and it is this deferral that engenders a silence which also remains foreign to 
the encompassing reflections of language. This silence gives to the subject an 
experience of limits which puts it on the fringes of language itself, foreign even to an 
image, to sense. Freud's notion of deferred action (NachlrlJglichkeit) is an example of 
the multiple synthesis which emerges from this folding back of interpretation upon 
itself, from reflexive language, from the actual patterns of creation of sense. The 
deferred action delimits a process of non-meditated reflection which does not only 
embrace the meaning of language and the profile of the subject's identity; it determines 
. ' . 
the way the subject imagines time, and sets the conditions for outbursts of psychical 
malady; it silently reveals the violence exerted on his present perceptions by his own 
experience. 
The deferral of sense appears as an essential condition of subjectivity which has 
its origins in the unattainable memory of nameless objects and experiences, in relics 
of past, in images and vestiges of perceptions which reject reminiscence while 
preserving their intense affective root. It is this defenal of sense, aroused by shreds and 
vestiges of memories, by fragments and shades of presences, that sheds a sharp light 
upon the "empirical" requirements of objective knowledge. 
Freud's apology of the fragmentary went hand in hand with his 
feeling that the inductive nature of psychoanalysis as an empirical 
science was a virtue and a great burden, going as it did against his 
deeper inclinations and forcing him to enCer reluctantly into 
prolonged logical demonstrations. 34 
Freud's faith in the empirical nature of psychoanalysis expressed itself in the 
fragmentary, piecemeal and equivocal formulas of his theoretical imagination. He 
enacted in fragmentary text his resistance to a consistent and faultless theory of the 
precariousness and failures of the subject's comprehension of his own impulses. His 
V'ritings are animated by a broken yet restless breath. He held to a shattered yet dense 
nanation, made out of discordant sources, linked by mere resonances; he admitted the 
intrusion of contrasting, heterogeneous ev~n contradictory logics, which distorted the 
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smoothness of his "tireless logical constructions". 
Freud'.s writings are dominated by traces of cleft images, which are linked by 
proliferating resonances and echoes, ]ayers of reminiscence and evocation; perhaps, his 
writing mirron his conception of the subject's nature. 
Despite the pervading presence of silence and of hollowness in Freud's writing, 
its tireless impulse seems to be dominated by the fear of hollowness which 
characterizes the Baroque. 
Typically, Freud's composition is processive, not uniformly 
unidirectional but still progressive amid its ebbs and floods. Its 
essence can be to an extent appreciated by a glance at the change 
from the Ciceronian to the Baroque style in the 16th century. 35 
But .Freud's Baroque is not coQfined to the extremely exigent and disquieting 
constructions of his written arguments. It impregnates the whole psychonalytic 
enterprise. 
Il The thematic spectrum of the Freudian Baroque 
1. Freud's paradoxical conception of primordial meaning 
The paradoxes of Freud's conception of the roots of meaning appear in his early 
writings, particularly in the Enrwu1j einer Psychologie (1895), which seems to have 
remained the constant, silent reference and the foundation for further developments of 
the psychoanalytic theory. In the Freudian scheme, the limits of the expressive capacity 
of language are not the outcome of a progressive devastation of sense, but an original 
condition of subjectivity. Language-emerges from non-linguistic structures. Conceptual 
judgement emerges from the fundamental structures of speechless perception and 
memory. Meaning is thus the outcome of a paradoxical folding of perception upon the 
primary structures, which constitute the unaccountable conditions of subjectivity. 
Primary conditions does not evolve into different structures; rather, while remaining 
essentially unchanged, they engender the basic structural conditions for the acquisition 
of language. But words do not replace or displace the primary processes. They are an 
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adherence, a supplementary instrument of regulation, the logic of which is radically 
dissimilar to ~ primary processes from which they spring. Words do not regulate the 
relative quantities and levels of bodily energy but the orientation of its discharge and 
the symbolic nature of the perceptions which set this orientation. Words, in a first 
analysis, do not determine the relation between concepts and reality. They rather imply 
the relation between primary processes and reality. Primary processes are conceived 
as a stratified weave of perceptions the associations of which are resistant to any 
conceptual determination; rather, they reflect the dynamic aims of the subject, 
impulsed and governed by the need for satisfaction. The determining logic of thought 
ceases to be meaning itself, but the requirements of strictly subjective, bodily energy 
relations, well beyond the relation between the word and the world . 
. 
Freud links his conception of meaning to the subject's memory of the 
primordial experience of salis/action, the subject's memory trace of the original 
encounter with a vital object which has aroused a pure, primary reaction; primary 
process take their impulse from a tension between memory traces of perceived objects, 
a primordial judgement, the sketch of a thought produced by conflicts between 
memories and perceptions engendered before the acquisition of language, foreign to 
words, but which anticipates the fundamental structures and capacities of conscious 
thought. Indeed, the primordial experience of satisfaction appears at the moment when 
the perception of the object finally matches the appropriate memory and unleashes an 
adequate subjective response. It is the moment of the actual -silent, wordless-
emergence of a primary symbolization. The subject's identity, the limit between him 
. 
and the other, is wealdy but definitively settled, as an outcome of the pure tension 
between contradictory impulses of energy and diverging traces of perception. 
Within the homogeneous, all encompassing universe of the newborn, the 
originally boundless, primordial perception ignores the subject's own limits, and is 
absolutely unaware of the foreignness of the objects and of others. Yet a primordial 
signal of his own strangeness is his experience of pain. He suffers and there is no 
adequate, autonomous reaction to attenuate his pain. It is pain that seems to signal the 
boundaries and identity of the body, the singularity of perception. Also, there is a 
memory both of the experience of pain ~the experience of the violent, compelling 
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necessity-, and of the impotence of his own means of achieving a satisfaction. The 
experience o~ pain, which forges the primal identity, becomes embodied in the 
indelible, though unarticulated memory of the earliest appearance of the satisfying 
~bject. 
Desire reveals, in these early writings, the nature of the primordial absence: it 
is the consequence of the primordial, objectless necessity which arouses a motor 
reaction. The signs of necessity confound themselves with the memory of the a1?sence 
of the primordial object of satisfaction. The primordial pain associated with this 
awareness of necessity, will only yield to the presence of the foreign, satisfying object. 
In turn, the memory of satisfaction seems to veil the primordial memory of the 
presence of pain, which, nevertheless, will leave a concealed trace and will set a 
. 
definite bOundary to the subject's experience. From then on, the tensions aroused by 
the need for nourishment will confound themselves with the experience of pleasure 
which emerges from the dissipation of pain. The memory of the object will fuse 
satisfaction and pleasure, and will stir, in an organic impulse, the silenced memories 
which anticipate the absence of the object, the end of satisfaction, the "emergence of 
pain. The self-perception of the tension which grows with necessity, will eventually 
turn the extinction of pleasure into a signal of the sexual necessity associated with the 
absence of the object. 
A subtle metamorphosis turns the actual signals of the object of satisfaction into 
threatening signs of its future disappearance. The traces of this object acquire an 
invincible equivocity: they merge the memory of pleasure with the tokens of the pain 
consequent upon the future, unavoidable disappearance of the object. Thus, desire 
excites the representations which encompass the vast heterogeneous universe of those 
objects which awaken both the concealed memory of pain and the urgent need for 
satisfaction. However, it is the severing of this "single object from the sphere of the 
subject, the incurable malady of identity that requires the extinction of the intimate, 
essential alliance with the other, that determines the absolute singularity of its traces 
in memory. The singular memory of this object bears not only the equivocal traces of 
the primordial fusion of pain and pleasure, but the silent stigma of the emergence of 
identity, of the appearance of definite lil1)its to the subjective sphere which sever the 
144 
essential bond with the primordial object. It is the subject's striving for the restoration 
of this prim~ bond, the search for an object the perception of which will conform 
to the ttaces of the lost object, that seems to be the origin of the obscure obstinacy of 
desire. 
Meaning will have as its primal structure the intricate map of pathways through 
which the subject's impulse has sought intimate traces of the extinguished presence. In 
the primordial moment, before the definitive loss of the primordial object, trull) does 
not differ from the intimate correspondence between the perception of the actual object 
and the memory of the object of satisfaction. At that moment, truth is foreign to words. 
It is the threshold at which pain ceases. Truth confounds itself with the encounter with 
pleasure and the echoes of future, unavoidable pain. Truth is the fusion of the 
. 
experience of satisfaction, the anticipation of pain, and the memory of the primordial 
perception of the loved-object, and thus extraneous to language. This primordial 
scheme of truth will have an enduring and definitive impact upon the subsequent 
structures of subjectivity. It is the foundation of narcissism. Freud constructs a fictional 
narration of the subjective origin of truth. "Where does the falsehood come from?", 
asks Kristeva.· She answers: 
Ie mythe ovidien devoile ainsi la concomitance du narcissisme et 
du faux [ ... ] Le faux viendrait du fait que I'on n'arrive que 
rarement a s'identifier pleinement avec cet ideal: soit qu'il ne tient 
pas, soit qu'i1 est demoli, soit que Narcisse aide par sa mere croit 
n'avoir pas besoin de lui parce qu'il I'est deja (ideal pour sa 
mere). 36 
The origin of falsehood, for Kristeva, is to be found in· the wreck of the subject's 
identity shaped by the impulse of desire and governed by unarticulated reminiscences 
of the lost object. The narcissis~c catastrophe which constitutes the source of 
falsehood, emerges from the remains of the original, shattered link between the subject 
and the loved object. Yet, the nature of the primordial object is uncertain: both its 
inward and outward nature. As object, its identity entirely depends upon the spectrum 
of the attributes which respond to the demand of satisfaction. It is its ability to respond 
the need for satisfaction that is the sources of its objectivity. And this nature cannot be 
different from its representation in phantasy. 
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Later on, Freud seems to abandon his passionate attachment to an incipient neural 
conception at. the early stages of his work. From then on, he will avoid naming 
physiological entities; the earlier descriptions of energy processes acquire a 
metaphorical sense; his image of the neuron as the anatomical site of memories yields 
to a powerful, allegorical topography of the soul; and the physiological conception of 
the subjective structures of memory and action which obey thermodynamic laws 
~hiefly Fechner's principles- turns into the spectre of an instinct -drive [Trieb]-
governed by the delusive phantasy of the love object in the psychical realm. 
Nevertheless, Freud's neuronal conception proved to be more than an 
inadequate physiologically or histologically based theory, or a minor, forgettable 
chapter in the chronicle of his efforts to grasp the elusive nature of desire and 
unconscious acts; it also proved to be more than a pure spatial model, or a mere 
topography able to order and classify the formal attributes of the psychical universe. 
The neural theory remained at the later stages of Freud's theory as a fertile scheme of 
thought ingrained in the conceptual body which defined the fate of the psychoanalitic 
enterprise; it engendered the material, tangible allegories of his conceptual 
representations of clinical experiences, and determined the architecture of his 
theoretical fiction; it underpinned Freud's metaphors which represent the dynamics of 
the subject's symbolic behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the disappearance of explicit mentions of the "neuron theory" is 
disquieting. Jacques Le Beuf concludes an extremely suggestive work on Freud's 
neuron model with the following, remark: 
Freud abandonne-t-il son Project? C'est plutot son Project de 
1895 qui I'a abandonne, largement tombe dans Ie refoulement. II 
nous est revenu enfragments, pour beaucoup au fit des pertes et 
ruptures.31 
The neuron theory, although only briefly and hastily outlined in the Entwuif einer 
Psychologie, allowed Freud to confront s:;veral issues which would become essential 
contributions to his later theory. 
Indeed, the neuron theory of representation was developed for the first time in 
an early work which preceded the outburst of the conception of the psychical apparatus 
formally described in Die TraunuJeutung. Freud's Zur Auffassung der Aphasie (1891) 
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develops some cardinal concepts which would constitute the cornerstone of his theory 
of the uncon.scious. However, the neuron theory was found unable to cope with 
Llcisive, insurmountable objections, and it was silently abandoned. In spite of this, it 
kept its hold on Freud's conceptual imagination. It became a secret point of reference 
in his theoretical reflection. 
Loose metaphorical echoes of the neuron theory constituted a support for 
Freud's conception of repetition as an essential attribute of desire. A fund~enta1 
feature of this theory is the seemingly inconsistent notion of referential meaning 
implied in its conception of thought: in his early work, the primordial structures of 
judgement are -in Freud's view- only the result of the fixations in the neuron charged 
with the energy aroused either by perception or memory. It is the tension between the 
. . 
perception and the memory of the loved object which constitutes both the primordial 
speechless, unutterable structures of judgement -of thought-, and the absolute 
foundation of desire: 
lim Wunschvorgang] Es kOlU1en sieh mehrere FaIle ereignen. 
Erstens: gleiehzeitig mit der Wunsehbesetzung des 
Erinnenmgsbildes ist die WahrnehmWlg desselben vorhanden; 
dam faIlen die beiden Besetzungen iibereinander, was biologiseh 
nieht verwertbar is~ es entsteht aber au6erdem das 
Realitatszeiehen von c.> aus, naeh welehem erfahrungsgemaB die 
Abfuhr erfolgreich ist. Dieser FaIl ist leieht erledigt. Zweitens: die 
Wunschbesetzung ist vorbanden, daneben eine WahrnehmWlg, die 
nieht ganz, sondem nur teilweise mit ihr iibereinstimmt. Es ist 
niimlieh Zei~ sieh zu erinnem, daB die 
Wahrnehmungsbesetzungen nie Besetzungen einulner 
Neurone sind, sondern stets von Komplexen. Wir haben diesen 
Zug bisher vemaehlassigt; es ist jetzt an der Zei~ ibm RechnWlg 
zu tragen. Die Wunschbesetzung betrefl'e ganz allgemein 
Neuron a + Neuron b, die Wahrnehmungsbesetzung Neuron 
a + Neuron c. Da dies der hiiufigere Fall sein wird, hiiufiger als 
der der IdentitAt, erfordert er genauere Erwiigung. Die biologische 
Erfahrung wird a~ch bier lehren, daD es unsicher isl, Abfuhr 
einzuleiten, wenn die Realititszeichen nicht den ganun 
Komplex, sondem nur einen Teil davon bestltigen. Es wird 
Aher jetzt ein Weg gefunden, die Atmlichkeit zur Identitit zu 
vervollkommnen. Der Wahmelummgs-Komplex wird sieh durch 
den Vergleich mit anderen Wahrnehmungs-Komplexen 
zerlegen in einen Bestandteil Neuron a ebe~ der sieh meist 
gleichbleib~ Wld in einen zweite~ Neuron b, der zumeist variiert. 
Die Sprache wird sp8ter fur diese Zerlegung den Terminus Urteil 
aufstellen Wld die Ahnliehkeit herausfmden, die zwischen [dem] 
Kern des Ich Wld dem kens tan ten WahrnehmWlgsbestandteil, 
den wechselnden Besetzungen im Mantel und dem inkonstanten 
Bestandteil tatslchlich vorliegt; wird Neuron a das Ding und 
Neuron b dessen Tltigkeit oder Eigenschaft, kun dessen 
Prldikat beoennen. 
Das Urteilen ist also ein • Vorgang. welchen erst die 
Icbhemmung ermiglicht und der durch die Unlhnlichkeit 
zwischen der Wunschbesetzung eines Er(innerunpbiJdes] 
und einer ihr Ihnlichen Wahmehmuogsbesetzung 
hervorgerufen wird. Man kann davon ausgehen, daB das 
Zusammenfallen beider Besetzungen zwn biologischen Signal 
wird, den Denkakt zu beeoden und die Abfuhr eintreten zu las~. 
Das Auseinanderfallen gibt den Ansto6 zur Denkarbeit, die 
wieder mit dem Zusammenfallen beendet wird. (Entwurfeiner 
Psychologie, GW, 1895, Nachtragsband: 422f 
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The surreptitious and fragmentary appearance of shreds of the Entwuif throughout the 
Freudian enterprise. the lost fragments, have often been missed or have fallen into 
oblivion. The wide dissemination of the nameless, non-identifiable, though determining 
contributions of the EnIwwf at different stages of Freud's theories, reflects the fragility 
and the sb'ength of the psychoanalytic Baroque. 
Indeed, Freud's conception of subject derived from an "asemantic semanticism" 
-judgement without words- has its origins in the myth of primal satisfaction. The 
sudden cessation of the subject's satisfaction provoked by the disappearance of the 
loved object entails the need for judgement, to discern the difference between the actual 
perceived presence and the memory of the object of satisfaction. 
Olin the process of wishing] Several possibilities may occur. In the fIrst case: simultaneously with the wishful 
cathexis of the mnemic image, the perception of it is present. If so, the two cathexes coincide which cannot be made 
use of biologically but, in addition, the indication of reality arises from w, after which, as experience shows, the 
discharge is SUCCC:8lful. This case is easily dealt with. In the second case: the Wishful cathexis is present and along 
with it a perception which does not tally with it wholly but only in part. For the time has come to remember that 
perceptua1 cathexes are never cathexes of single neurones but always of complexes. So far we have neglected this 
feature; it is time to take it into account. Let us suppose that, quite generally, the wishful cathexis relates to neurone 
a + neurone b, and the perceptual cathexis tQ neurone a + c. Since this will be the commoner case, commoner 
than that of identity, it calls for more exact consideration. Biological experience will teach here once again that it 
i. unsafe to initiate discharge if the indications of reality do not confmn the whole comple ... but only a part of it. 
A way is now found, however, of completing the similarity into an identity. The perceptua! complex, if it is 
compared with other perceptual complexes, can be dissected into a component portion, neurone a, which on the 
whole remains the same, and a second component port;on, neurone h, which for the most part varies. Language 
will later apply the termjudganent to this dissection and will discover the resemblance which in fact exists between 
the nucleus of the ego and the constant per-ceptuaJ component [on the one hand] and between the changing cathexes 
in the pallium and the inconstant component [on the other); it [language] will call neurone a the thing and neurone 
b its activity or attribute in short, its predicate. 
Thus judging is a • process which is only made possible by inhibition by the ego and which is evoked 
by the dissimilarity between the wishful cathexis of a memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to it. It can 
be inferred from this that coincidence between the two cathexes becomes a biological signal for ending the act of 
thought and for allowing discharge to begin. Their non~oincidence gives the impetus for the activity of thought, 
which is terminated once more with their coincidence. (SE, I: 327-328) 
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Language -in Freud's conception- does not expunge this primordial structure 
of judgement. Moreover, words obliterate the evidence for it, while preserving it as a 
covert process which continues to act upon the symbolic judgement. Furthermore, 
language appears as a means of mitigating the intrinsic violence of the memory of the 
original loss of the loved object. Paradoxically, it is the capacity of language to inhibit 
the pain of the loss that consummates the disappearance of the actual presence of the 
object in the subject's experience. It imposes on the underlying structure of perceptual 
judgement the representations inherent in language; it dissolves the inner relation 
between the traces of the object and its perception; memory loses its autonomous force, 
obscured by the shadow of words. The object is no longer a real presence nor an 
evocation aroused by traces of memory, but is distorted by the presence of words; it 
remains in memory as an obscure, lost, isolated relic of something which once was a 
sought after, apprehensible presence. 
Subjectivity proper, in the Freudian conception, originates at the boundaries of 
self-perception, settled both by the appearance of the other -which ceases to be a 
non-discemable, interior presence and thus reappears as a foreign, transient, 
threatening perception-, and by the extinction of the primordial satisfaction. 
Subjectivity is the incipient awareness of desire, of the cleavage between satisfaction 
and its object. The subject's primordial, uncertain identity is produced by the absence 
of the other; thus, the disappearance of the other's image paradoxically creates the 
subject's own identity and the identity of the missing object, evidence of which is only 
the memory of pain and scream, the non-signified traces of the sensations aroused by 
. 
absence -the primal language of desire. The subject experiences a rhythmic fading 
and appearance of the loved object and makes of language the support of this absence 
and the means of mitigating it. The frontiers of the subject, which separate his own 
sphere from the world, appear with the memory of the primordial experience of pain. 
It is this memory of pain that sinks him in the vertigo of time, and endows him with 
an awareness of temporality. 
It is pain that creates the experience of time. In Freud's conception, the path 
from perception and consciousness to the unconscious, confounds itself with the 
progressive shaping of the subject's experience of time inherent to consciousness. In 
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Freud's view, the traces of perception do not betoken in themselves either succession 
or change, they do not bear the signals of their own chronology; they form timeless 
sediments of layers of memory. The passage from the conscious perception of the 
outside world to the inner psychical space can thus be seen as the metamorphosis of 
signs of temporality into signs of timelessness, but also as the passage from the world 
of stimulus and absences, of succession and disappearances, of processes and fadings, 
to the sphere of fixed, indelible residues through the path of language. 
The notion of specific action, which proved to be fundamental to the early 
conception of psychoanalysis, sought to elucidate a facet of the transformation of the 
symbolic structure of desire. In Freud's neuron theory, the notion of specific action 
-which was originally sketched throughout his correspondence with Fliess- was first 
thoroughly developed in the Entwuif. It derived from an early dynamic concept of 
primal satisfaction, and aimed at deciphering the nature of anguish. 38 
Ein primares Nervensystem bedient sich dieser so erworbenen 
QTl', urn sie durch verbindung and die Muskelmaschinen 
abzugeben, und erhalt sich so reizlos. Diese Abfuhr stellt die 
Primarfunktion des Nervensystems dar. Hier ist Platz fUr die 
Entwicklung einer Sekundarfunktion, indem unter den 
Abfuhrwegen solehe bevorzugt und erhalten [werden], mit denen 
AufhOren des Reizes verb\Dlden ist, Reizjlucht. Hiebei besteht im 
allgemeinen eine Proportion zwischen Erregunsq[ uantitat] und 
[ der] zur Reizflueht nOtigen Lei stung, so daB das 
Trdgheitsprinzip hiedurch nieht gestOrt wird. 
Allein, das Tragheitsprinzip wird von Anfang an 
durchbrochen dureh ein anderes Verhaltnis. Mit [der steigenden] 
Komplexitat des Inneren [des Organismus] nimmt das 
Nervensystem Reize auf aus dem KOrperelement selbst, endogene 
Reize, die gleiehfalls abgefiihrt werden sollelt Diese entstammen 
Korperzellen und ergeben die grojJen Bedurfnisse, Hunger, 
Atem, Sexualitdl. Diesen kann sich der Organismus nicht 
entziehen wie den A ujJenreizen, er kann ihre Q nicht zur 
Reizjlucht verwenden. Sie h(Jren auf nur unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen, die in der AujJenwelt.rea/isiert werden milssen. Z. 
B. Nahrungsbedurfnis. Um diese Aktion, diespezijisch genannt 
zu werden verdient, zu vol/fohren, bedarf es einer Leistung, die 
unabhdngig ist von endagener QTJ'~ im allgemeinen list sie] 
groBer da das Individuwn unter Bedingungen gesetzt ist, die man 
aJsNot des ubens bezeichen kann. (Entwurf einer Psycho!ogie, 
GW, 1895, Nachtragsband: 389-390r 
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In his Entwu1f einer Psychologie, Freud posited, while trying to explain the initial 
pressure of the need upon the subject's experience, that a "specific action" [spezijische 
Aktion] is the subject's response to the painful inner pressure of the mounting levels of 
energy, intensified by the disappearance of the other; it is conceived as the means by 
which the subject attempts to bring about the transformation of the external world in 
an unfruitful effort to restore the presence of the satisfying object; thus, the specific 
action is the expression of the subject's struggle to escape pain. What is involved in 
this early endeavour to avoid pain is the experience of an interior tension strengthened 
during the subject's encounter with ~e absence of the loved object, an experience turns 
into an early memory of a vain effort to overcome this painful absence. 
Reizaufhebung ist bier nur moglich durch einen Eingriff, welcher 
im KOrperinnem die Qr}'-Fntbindung fUr eine Weile beseitigt, und 
dieser Eingriff erfordert eine Veranderung in der AuBenwelt 
(Nahrungszufuhr, Nahe des SexuaIobjektes), welche aIs 
spezijische Aktion nur aufbestirnmten Wegen erfolgen kann. Der 
menschliche Organismus ist ZUDachst unfarug, die spezifische 
Aktion herbeizufiihren. Sie erfolgt durch fremde Hilfe, indem 
durch die Abfuhr auf dem Wege der inneren Veranderung ein 
erfahrenes Individuum auf den Zustand des Kindes aufinerksam 
gemacht [wird]. Diese Abfuhrbahn gewinnt so die hochst wichtige 
Sekundarfunktion der Verstandigung, und die anflingliche 
Hilflosigkeit des Menschen ist die Urquelle aller moralischen 
Motive. (Entwurfeiner Psycho!ogie, GW, 1895, Nachtragsband: 
4 lOr-
"A primary nervous system makes use of this Qrl' which it has thus acquired, oy giving it off through a connecting 
path to the muscular mechanisms, and in that way keeps itself free from stimulus. This discharge represents the 
primary function of the nervous system. Here is room for the development of a secondary function. For among the 
paths of discharge those are preferred and retained which involve a cessation of the stimulus: flight from the 
stimulus. Here in general there is a proportion between the Q of excitation and the effort necessary for the flight 
from the stimulus, so that the principle of inertia is not upset by this. 
The principle of inertia is, however, broken through from the first owing to another circumstance. With 
an [increasing) complexity of the interior [of the organism). the nervous system receives stimuli from the somatic 
element itself ~genou. stimuli which have equaUy to be discharged. These have their origin in the ceUs of the 
body and give rise to the major needs hunger, respiration. sexuality. From these the organism cannot withdraw as 
it does from external stimuli; it cannot employ their Q for flight from the stimulus. They only cease subject to 
particular conditions, which must be realized in the external world. (Cf., for instance, the need for nourishment). 
In order to accomplish such an action (which deserves to be named 'specific'), an effort is required which is 
independent of endogenous Qrl' and in general greater, since the individual is being subjected to conditions which 
may be described as the exigencies of life. (SE, I: 296-297) 
The removal of the stimulus is only made possible here by an intervention which for the time being gets rid of the 
~Iease of Qrl' in the interior of the body; and this intervention calls for an alteration in the external world (supply 
of nourishment, proximity of the sexual object) which. as a specific action. can only be brought about in definite 
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Freud sees in this primal experience of pain the origin of a non-linguistic yet 
meaningful relation with the other; the spring of an urgency which gives rise to a vocal 
discharge, a non-symbolic release of energy. This vocal discharge which has no 
intrinsic significance is construed by the other, as an incipient communication. In a 
sense, it succeeds and becomes the sign of the experienced helplessness of the subject. 
Freud goes to assert that it is the wordless, asymmetric, non-int~ntional 
communication, made of the other's elucidation of the child's mere bodily signs, which 
forge a primordial, mute ethics. This primordial ethic is tied in the subject's memory 
to the experience of a foiled act. 
The images of the birth of the subject's identity in Freud's early notions of 
. 
experience of satisfaction and of specific action, were rendered in terms of a 
paradoxical, allegorical model of the neuron as the basis of psychical processes, 39 
which paid a visible tribute to the nineteenth century concept of association. Indeed, 
the fictional core of his theory was to be exposed as a weave of concepts taken from 
the biological and thermodynamic fields of enquiry which became a shapeless yet 
powerful allegory of the psychical processes. 
The neuron theory contemplated the elementary pair of bound components of 
judgement -subject and predicate- as founded upon the relation between two neurons 
which conveyed the empirical contents of their respective meanings. Truth then 
becomes an intimate, physiological experience which springs from the disappearance 
of the difference between the neuronal contents involved in perception and memory. 
One first sequel of the original conception of judgement is the theoretical opposition 
between the identity of thought and the identity of perception as developed in Die 
Traumdeutung (1900) -perhaps the most ambitious and successful of Freud's 
works-: 
ways. At tint, the human organism is incapable of bringing about the specific action. It takes place by extraneous 
help, when the attention of an experienced person is drawn to the child's state by discharge along the path of 
internal change. 
In this way this path of discharge acquires a secondary function of the highest importance. that of 
communication. and the initial helplessness of human beings is the primal source of all moral motives. (SE, I: 317-
318) 
Der Primarvorgang strebt nach Abfuhr der Erregung, urn mit der 
so gesammelten Erregungsgro6e eine Wahrnehmungsi<ientitAt 
[mit dem Befriedigungserlebnis herzustellen; der 
SekundArvorgang hat diese Absicht verlassen und an ihrer Statt 
die andere aufgenommen, eine DenkidentitAt zu erzielen. Das 
ganze Denken ist nur ein Umweg von der als Zielvorstellung 
genommenen Befriedigungserinnerung bis zur identischen 
Besetzung derselben Erinnerung, die auf dem Wege dber die 
motorischen Erfahrungen wieder erreicht werden soil. Das 
Denken muB sich fUr die Verbindungswege zwischen den 
Vorstellungen interessieren, ohne sich durch die Intensitaten 
derselben beirren zu lassen. (Die Traumdeutung, SA, 1900, IT: 
571f 
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Clearly, despite the obvious disapPearance of any reference to the neuron model, the 
same tacit scheme informs the development of the explanation. The relation between 
the neurons which appeared formerly as the reservoir of the contents of memory has 
been rewritten as relations between memories alone. The original duality of the neuron 
relation which occupied a crucial pos~tion at the early stages of psychoanalytic theory, 
fades away to give rise to new notions of memory and perception, which befogged 
-without explicitly refuting- the previously posited inner, subjective nature of truth. 
Freud '.s exposition of the notion of experience of satisfaction, derived from the 
neuron theory, fully exhibits the force, and the suggestive power of his elliptic writing: 
the tension between identity of thought and identity of perception -which is the origin 
of judgment in Freud's language theory- will support implicitly the notion of 
repetition, conceived as an essential feature of the psychical apparatus and of desire. 
Freud never explicitly put forward a conception of memory. However, in the origins 
of psychoanalysis an implicit theory of memory seems to be an essential element in the 
conception of spedjic action. Later,. the concept of specific action was to be refounded 
on a dynamic conception of perceptual recognition, related to what Freud was to call 
"The primary process endeavours to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that, with the help of the amount 
of excitation thus accumulated, it may establish a 'perceptual identity' [with the experience of satisfaction]. The 
secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its place - the establishment of 
a 'thought identity' [with that experience]. All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a 
satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an identical cathexis of the same memory 
which it is hoped to attain once more through an intermediate stage of motor experiences. Thinking must concern 
itselfwith the connecting paths between ideas, without be~g led astray by the intensities of those ideas. (FP, 4: 762) 
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the "necessities of life", Freud's obscure AvarKTj [Not des Lebens]. What remained 
a key, yet u~explored element of the definition of specific action was its definitive 
dependence upon endogenous processes of energy discharge, the aims of which 
appeared to be subtly diversified. The pathways through which the subject's internal 
energy was discharged as a response to the perceived presence of the object, were to 
be sharply distinguished from those involved in a mere motor reaction. 
Specific action is never a pure motor discharge able to regulate by i~lf the 
level of the internal energy. It is governed by the presence of a well defined, 
recognizable, object -the loved object- the image of which has been engraved on the 
substance of memory, determining the unrelenting orientation of desire and the aim of 
its perception. Thus, specific action is the privileged, symbolically governed means to 
discharge accumulated inner energy and to ensure the effective domain of the principle 
of inertia. 40 
Paradoxically, it is not the privileged, constitutive aim of the specific action to 
achieve the exclusion of the painful-pleasure-giving object from the sphere of the 
subject's experience, but to assure its permanent presence. The primordial structure of 
the psychical apparatus aims to ensure the presence of this ambiguous but desired 
object within the ambit of effective action. This is accomplished with the intervention 
of memory traces, some of which will be charged with energy when the excitation 
exceeds the capacity of the system. However, as Freud conceives it, the excitation 
stirred by the rising levels of energy agitates the whole psychical apparatus. The 
residues involved in the release of the endogenous energy form a dense web of 
variously assorted and autonomous, although intimately assembled, sets of related 
traces. In his thorough revision of the Entwurf, Forrester distinguishes these separate, 
variable densities of the entangled memories that constitute the psychical apparatus: 
[while seeking to repeat the experience of satisfaction] The level 
of unpJeasure in the psychic apparatus increases. A second 
attempt to bring about the i:=xperience of satisfaction now follows: 
the pathway of internal change, by which the 'expression of the 
emotions' is produced. These seemingly random innervations of 
the muscular system, which include screaming, are all aimed at 
discharging the accwnulated Q through motor pathways. [ ... ] The 
ego, while inhibiting the movements of large Q in 1ft, allows small 
Q to retrace the facilitations that are connected with the 
representation of the wished-for object, the breast, and the 
representation of the wished-for action sucking. In this way, the 
ego finds a set of facilitations that correspond to a set of 
representations of actions, whose performance will result in 
perceptual identity being attained. Having successfully 
conducted this process of thought, which result in thought-identi-
ty, the ego releases the pathways that thought has found to lead to 
the memory of the experience of satisfaction: both a preparatory 
set of actions and the specific action itself are carried out. 41 
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Indeed, the specific action is the tangible, culminating stage in a complex set of the 
representations not only of the object, but also of actions of a different .re 
-;Jreparatory and specijic- which lead the subject to overcome the perceptual 
difference between the original satisfying object and the actual perception of the aimed 
at object seeking the provisory extinction of unpleasure, even of pain. However, the 
extinction of unpleasure -that is to say, to achieve the identity between the contents 
of memory and those of perception, which unleashes the discharge of the endogenous 
energy in the system- involves, with the perception of loved object, a complex set of 
memory traces produced by the subject's perception of its own actions and motor 
discharges, of their actual effect on the perceived reality, and of the sensations aroused 
by them; thu~, the specific action might be conceived as a dense weave of relations 
among traces of perception of a different nature, of bodily reactions, of the surrounding 
world, indeed, of a vast spectrum of sensations. The repetition which animates desire 
involves the restoration of this vast web of dissimilar memories. 
However, desire and pleasure does not only set in motion contradictory and 
heterogeneous processes: they also reveal the contradictory nature of the loved object. 
Desire holds to paradoxical memories of the primal object: on the one hand, the 
memories of an intricate satisfaction -at once physiological and affective, nourishing 
and pleasurable, arousing and relieving-, of vast and manifold spheres of actions 
associated with unpleasure and its cessation are inextricably fused to the perception of 
that single, incomparable object; on the other, the memories of the experience of the 
frustrated restoration of the complex primal image of the object. Thus, desire preserves 
the inextinguishable, spectral presence of the object, and, simultaneously, the 
experience of its loss. Pleasure, on the contrary, seems to be free from the constaints 
imposed on the soul by the primal image: both identity of thought and identity of 
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perception, seem to obey different and non-comparable dynamics. Freud will posit, 
chiefly in Di(! Traumdeutung, the independent nature of the identity of thought and 
identity of perception; however, the potential convergence of these autonomous 
processes is the condition of the satisfaction of the need, and of the fulfilment of desire. 
Still, the conditions for the extinction of unpleasure -extinction conceived as the 
sensation produced by the coincidence of both identities-, remains obscure. 
This unelucidated though cardinal theoretical issue will constitute the conceptual 
foundation of the Freudian conception of subjectivity. It seems that beyond the initial 
presence of the primordial satisfying object, the only way in which the coincidence of 
both processes might be achieved is by restoring the primordial image of these 
"preparatory movements" which led to the satisfying object. The subject's perception 
of his act of speech, or rather, scream, as a mere motor discharge, as squandered 
energy, is embodied in these traces of the preparatory movements and the experience 
of the motor discharge. It is this memory of the set of movements and sensations 
inherent in the primal satisfaction, that makes the restoration of the sought identity 
impossible. The singular physiognomy of this memory of potential actions and 
sensations -which constitute the memory of the loved object- remains a timeless, 
fixed, yet meaningless image, linked to primordial vocal discharges and affective forms 
of language. The primal object of satisfaction is then condemned to become an 
inarticulated psychical trace, the content of which derives from intense memories of 
primordial language. From the moment of the definite eclipse of the primal loved 
object onward, any other presence will be doomed to arouse these memories in part, 
and even if it is capable of mitigating unpleasure, it will appear to ,be a foreign, 
transient object, and the pleasure it arouses a mere surrogate of true satisfaction. 
2. Thought and desire 
A cardinal issue of Freud's complex approach to desire is the structure of thought 
process: thought is conceived as a relational process that develops across a large web 
of traces of perceived objects and attributes, and which precedes both the subject's 
acquisition of language and the construction of self-reflexive identity. This silent, 
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speechless thought process, nevertheless foreshadows the logical structure which 
informs s~h. According to Freud, the primordial perception of the loved object 
engraved on memory is the outcome of a cleavage in its representation. The memory 
of the object undergoes a three-stage fragmentation: the memory trace of the essence 
of the primordial thing [Das Ding] is detached from the memory of its features. The 
dual structure of the memory of the object seems to mirror the dual structure of 
proposition. However, the actual perception of the contingent physiognomy of later, 
similar objects, experience an analogous cleavage. The relation between the structures 
of wordless judgment defines the congruence -the identity- between the structures of 
the memory traces of the primordial and immediate object. This cleavage in the 
perception of the object also involves the speculative and disquieting assumption of the . 
existence of the essential, yet recognizable nature of the object, distinguishable from 
an evanescent semblance made up of a mixture both of transient and enduring 
characteristics. However, as has been already suggested, the non-essential profile of 
the object reveals itself as a dense entangled pattern of memories, both of the 
perception of the object itself and of the reflective perception of the actions by which 
the subject has achieved satisfaction. 
The profile of the object does not only remain as an open spectrum of qualities, 
a virtually infinite aggregate of attributes -a conception borrowed by Freud from the 
philosophical conceptions of John Stuart Mil142, and explicitly developed by him in his 
Zur Auffassung der Aphasie (1891)-; at this primordial moment of the subject's 
~xperience, the object also incites a singular, ambiguous aesthetic experience: it 
~imultaneously arouses in the subject, by the sole virtue of its presence or absence, 
:Iesire and fear. This underlying, wordless propositional structure, which foretells the 
lCtual presence or absence of the object, also supports the unspeakable, actual aesthetic 
iense of the object; the identity of the object undergoes a ceaseless metamorphosis, 
llternatively threatening and seductive. Freud's conception seems to follow the 
lineteenth century idea which assumes that the predicative relation of judgement 
)resupposes its two-member structure: the subject of the proposition is linked to its 
,bject which depicts the constellation of its attributes. However, he introduces a 
neaningful, though bold assumption: theJhought process is impelled and invigorated 
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by desire, which, in tum, springs from the experiences of pleasure and pain brought 
about by the ~isappearance or presence of the loved object. The primordial structure 
of thought, supported by the successive cleavages of the perception, takes roots in a 
primordial aesthetic experience which oscillates between satisfaction and abjection, 
pleasure and pain, the love and the terror inherent in the sublime. 
But, if we follow Freud's arguments, the primordial structure of the proposition 
does not only mirror the primordial relation of the subject with the object of its desire, 
also it reflects the impulses, the constraints and the imperatives which rule the 
transformations of the subject's phantasies. Freud thoroughly developed these 
implications in Ein Kind wird geschlagen (1919), in which he condenses, in the 
allegory of an unfolding grammatical process of logical propositional transformations, 
the manifoid process of the shaping of the psychical identity, of perversion, expressed 
as the narrative motif of a violent, masochist relation. Freud will tum frequently to 
these logical-grammatical allegories -as he does chiefly in Die Vemeinung (1925)-
for an explanation of the inextricable entanglement between the construction of the 
subject's truth, the emergence of its identity and its aesthetic experience which has its 
origin in pain and abjection.43 The function of the negative particle -nein [no]- both . 
logic and grammatical, reveals, according to Freud's intricate exposition, an indirect 
signal, a linguistic residue of repression which evinces the allegorical role of the 
primordial propositional structure in the fictional origin of the subject: the appearance 
of negation in discourse is chiefly residual evidence of the repression undergone by an 
evoked representation, but also -and this strengthens its allegorical sense- the token 
and the residue of the emergence of its own identity. The non-referential meaning of 
the negative linguistic particle embodies the whole history of repression from its own 
origins and thus, must be considered both as the residue and the consequence of the 
genesis of the subject's identity. 
Consequently, the process which reads to the fulfilment of the subject's desire 
does not only require that the mnemic traces associated to the image of the original 
experience of satisfaction should be charged with energy44, but it also presupposes the 
complex conjunction of different sets of attributes of the perceived object, that certain 
"essential" features of the perceived primaLthiog [Das Dingt5 are echoed by changing 
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attributes both of the perceived thing and of the complex repertoire of its preparatory 
actions. Ho~ever, Freud's passionate fidelity to empiricism led him to reject any 
transcendental conception of a thing-in-itselJ, for he considered this a mere idealistic 
and speculative postulate;46 Freud's own singular thing-in-itself was rooted in a pure 
analytic sediment of the subject's primordial perception of the thing, gathered into a 
definitive, non-decaying single mnemic representation. Freud seems to have replaced 
the Kantian speculative notion of thing-in-itselJ, which implied a transcen4ental 
subject, with an uncertain theoretical image of an indestructible memory, which he 
probably developed during his research on aphasia. Thus, the primal thing [Das Ding] 
should be a fixed nucleus of the traces of the perceived primal object, a hardened 
sediment of features, engraved on the soul as a perpetual shadow of the overwhelming, 
fully satisfying presence. It is this fixed nucleus of the traces of the primal thing that 
will command the subject's response to the changing physiognomy of objects. 
Thought does not reduce itself to the various perceptions entangled in the core 
of a simple image. On the contrary, thought can be conceived of as an expanding grid 
of associated representations, as the thickening of the residual layer of the perceived 
aspects of the object. The invariant residue of the perception of the primal thing rules 
the aim of the senses; the mnemic residue of the object which arouses desire and 
determines the unfettered repetition of the search for satisfaction has, in Freud's 
writing, an allegorical basis the neuron:47 in his allegorized anatomy of the early 
Entwuif, the neuron a becomes the definite locus of the essential features of an object. 
From an imaginary conception of the bodily tissues, he derives a speculative, even 
. 
scandalous image of the "psychical substance". Another neuron, neuron b, is the 
conjectural location of the memories of changing attributes and contingent actions 
regarding the invariant core of the thing. The neuron c represents the predicate of 
another judgement, the content of which condenses the contingent attributes and actions 
derived from other reappearances of the primal object or of a new one. Thought is, 
consequently, the process which contrasts and compares the contents of neuron b and 
C, provided that they refer to a common essential content of perception deposited in 
neuron a. The thought process thus expands, piece by piece, the fragmentary 
perceptions associated to the primordial object, and weaves a vast web of attributes and 
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potential actions attached to it. Thought process -Freud posited- refines 
[vervollkommen] resemblance and transforms it into identity. [die 1hnlichkeit zur 
Identitl1l Zll vervollkommen]. Resemblance might thus be seen as a slight, almost 
imperceptible, primary shiver aroused by the concurrence of the perceptions of a 
definite object in the psychical apparatus; the moment of the mythical, primal 
confrontation with the satisfying object is that at which the identity of perception and 
thought involves the memories of actions which lead to the disappearance either of pain 
or displeasure. 
This peculiar distribution of memories among neurons, in turn, gives rise to an 
ontological. and mythical assumption: there must be an essence of the object 
itnInedkItely apprehensible by perception, the traces of which will be engraved without 
.further alteration as obstinate, unchanged monuments on the subject's soul. The object, 
as it appears to the primal perception, as it responds to the primal need of the being, 
is thus apprehended as a whole. Freud conceived it as the mythical origin of 
subjectivity and its perceptions as a primordial event which fuses the ontological core 
of this object and its contingent metamorphosis. Nevertheless, his devotion to 
induction, which led him to conceive the invariant dimension of the desired object as 
derived from perception, also demanded from him, paradoxically, the formulation of 
a speculative thesis which was to be the cornerstone of his conception of desire: indeed, 
the primal object of satisfaction yields its absolute, essential nature to a perception 
informed by desire, and imprints its figure upon the fictive substance of the soul, at the 
mythical instant of its appearance, when it first comes to the suffering child. But 
Freud's anxious search for empirical support for his reflection also demanded an open, 
evolving image of the object, conceived as the enduring memory of the perceptible, 
changing shapes of the original, satisfying object. 48 
For Freud, the accomplishment of the thought process is the primordial 
condition of the absolute fulfilment of desire. The primordial object provides an 
absolute pleasure which fuses affection and nourishment. The energy spent in 
satisfaction, Freud remarks, does not reduce itself to a motor or energy discharge. 
Desire, driven by the contradictory tensions of memory and perception, detaches itself 
progressively from other physiological needs and becomes attached to sexual excitation. 
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While in its origins, satisfaction seems to be just the aftermath of a discharge of 
energy, brought about by the sole presence of the mother during the nourishment of the 
child, later, sexuality will acquire a distinct quality. It will become foreign to the sheer 
sensation of motor discharge, and its intrinsic features will derive from the nature of 
the relation between the sensation of the discharge and the complex memory of the 
primal loved object. 
There is a progressive separation of affection and physiological need~. The 
thought process becomes incapable of accomplishing the identification of an object 
which embodies the total universe of the primordial experience. Affection is 
progressively extricated from successive experiences of nourishment and physiological 
fulfilment. The primordial encounter with the object becomes an isolated memory, the 
silent expenence of an unaccomplished thought process which seeks vainly to restore 
the inner, primordial identity of memory and perception. The subject progressively 
frees itself from dependence upon the presence of the other for the satisfaction of the 
need for self-preservation -nourishment. However, the sexual excitations remain 
attached to the memory of the primordial experience of satisfaction: 
on assiste a une separation de I'une et de I'autre, puis que la 
sexualite, tout entiere d'abord appuyee sur la fonction, est en 
meme temps tout entiere dans Ie mouvement qUi la dissocie 
d'avec la fonction vitale. [ ... ] Desormais, l'objet est abandonne, Ie 
but et aussi la source prennent leur autonomie par rapport a 
l'alimentation et au systeme digestif. Avec Ie su~otement nous 
arrivons au second "caractere" , qui est aussi un "moment", 
etroitement lie a I'etayage qui Ie precede: l'autoerotisme.49 
The patterns of the thought process undergo an irrevetsible metamorphosis. Once 
isolated, the essential, invariant memory of the primordial object will never again 
match new, intrusive perceptions. However, the memory of the experience of 
satisfaction is an essential part of this primordial', isolated memory of the lost object. 
What constitutes the sought identity of the perceived object remains foreign to the 
content of the memory of the primal object and the original experience of satisfaction. 
From the moment of the sundering of physiological needs from the symbolic 
constraints of sexuality, the thought process will no longer be directed at the essential 
core of the perceived object, but at its contingent perceivable traits. In terms of the 
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neuron allegory, this amounts to an absolute inversion of the structure of the thought 
process. Ins~d of neuron a -the perceived invariant of the object- determining the 
orientation of the thought process, it is neuron b -the associated set of functions and 
actions which aim at the contingent perception of the object- that commands the whole 
process of representation and the paths of the discharge of energy. The memory of the 
essence of the primal object becomes an isolated relic, linked to the ineffaceable trace 
of the primordial experience of satisfaction. The physiognomy and structure_ of the 
primary thought process has undergone a subtle but definitive transformation: the 
primal object ceases to be sought. Instead, the memory of its perceptual invariance 
becomes a model of the wished-for object. This transformation defines the ontological 
roots of desire. 
. 
The primary thought process, which shapes both the identities of the subject and 
the form of the perceiVed spectre of the world, reveals itself to be manifold in nature. 
Its search for identity has experienced an absolute metamorphosis: the excitation alone 
becomes the signal of the subject's search for satisfaction, commanded by the desire, 
dependent upon the unconscious relations between ephemeral perceived profiles and the 
trace of the primal loved object. Repetition -the essential feature of desire, the search 
of the absolute restoration of the original bond with the primordial object- becomes 
a restless, yet vain effort to achieve this primordial satisfaction and remains confined 
to the experience of pleasure. The thought process undergoes a new metamorphosis: 
it ceases to seek the identity between the primal memory and perception, but is satisfied 
by mere similarity. Repetition, the restoration of the original experience, is impossible 
and unleashes an allegorical search for the object. 
However, the allegorical nature of the search will only be fully acknowledged 
by Freud in his work on narcissism in 1915, with the specific significance he confers 
on the notion anaclisis [Anlehnung]. The dual nature of desire becomes clear: it aims 
for identity and seeks mere similanty of the immediate perception and the non-
symbolic memory of the primal experience. In Freud's view, the subject's anaclitic 
election of the object reflects the cleavage of perception and memory, undergone by 
the object itself. The memory of the perception of the primal object is eclipsed in the 
subject's experience by the intricate, den.se fog of the perceived attributes of actual 
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objects, by the contingent, evanescent shade of their psychical representations, by the 
meanings of t!te words that name them, by the sheer number of their associated senses 
and figures, by their position in subject's history. 
The memory of the primal object of love appears as a relic of an object the only 
surviving evidence of which is desire itself. The desired object is Freud's theoretical, 
singular image of the Kantian thing-in-itself. so Freud's own Ding an s;ch, his thing-in-
itself -both essential and primordial for his whole intellectual enterprise- con~titutes 
a pole the intense magnetism of which continues to rule actions of the subject ecliVsed 
by the experience of the contingent attributes of an actual, real object. What once were 
marginal attributes of the object, become its acknowledged centre; the features which 
arouse the subject's passionate attachment. However, the presence of the primordial 
. 
image of the object does not fade away, does not dissipate because of this inversion. 
It remains and thrives. 
It is the simultaneous coexistence of divergent, dual patterns of a mute primary 
thought -the folding upon itself of the primary process which informs the action and 
the desire of the subject- that defines the main and puzzling characteristics of human 
sexuality. Consequently, desire can be conceived as the sequel of a confrontation 
between memory traces of words and of perception; as a symbol-driven process 
detached from its physiological base, yet nourished and invigorated by it. In Freud's 
terms, it is the essential paradoxical structure of thought that defines the complex 
process of anaclasis [Anlehnung]SI, the obscure relation between the biological ground 
of psychical processes and their autonomous evolution • 
. 
If pleasure and unpleasure are sensations aroused by the discharge of energy, 
then they must yield to the symbolic constraint of primary thought which informs 
sexuality. The discharge of energy wholly depends upon the perceivable signs of the 
actual object and not upon the deep, preserved, memory of the irrecoverable perception 
of the primordial love. The symbolic nature of the pleasure principle is now 
discernible. However, the pleasure principle can also drive the subject to the limit 
experience of hallucinatory satisfaction. Pleasure seems to be achieved only by the 
mere discharge aroused by the presence of a suitable object. The difference between 
pleasure and satisfaction broadens. 
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Freud reserves the equivocal, yet suggestive term -full of historical , 
philosophical.and literary resonances- of pleasure principle, for the naming of the 
intricate set of constraints on the biological, mnemic, perceptual processes and motor 
reactions of the subject which unleash the effusion of energy and bring about the 
experience of pleasure. But pleasure principle can rather be thought of as a counterpart 
of Brentano's "structural intention"s2, as a necessary relation between the whole 
structure of consciousness and a privileged acknowledged attribute of the objects .of the 
world. Freud's pleasure principle becomes foreign, in a sense, to the ethic significance 
of pleasure put forward by the empiricists, preserving, nevertheless, some of its 
features. The conception of the symbolic determination of desire also unveils an 
essential alliance between the sources of pleasure and hallucination. 
By the intrusion of the memories of words in consciousness, the subject has been freed 
from the mere circular, tyrannical repetition of the direct, immediate response to a 
perceived image ressembling the wished-for object. Thus, language forges time; it 
introduces the chance of an equivocal yet essential delay between perception and 
pleasure. However, repetition holds to the deeper, silent and wordless, compulsion of 
the primary thought which rules the significance of the symbolic universe in the 
subject's action, and which emerges, in tum, from the subject's history. 
The physiological excitation commanded by the symbolic constraints of desire, 
can lead to the creation of the hallucinatory presence of its object. Hallucination, in 
Freud's early vision, is just a singular, deficient evocation, which has failed to 
acknowledge the signals of the displayed images that reveal its inner provenance. Thus, 
the "hallucinatory presence" creates an obscure object, the sources of which appears 
neither as inner nor as outer; it seems not to spring from perception, nor to arise as an 
evocation. It obliterates the essential, subjective 'functions of language; hallucination 
turns language into isolated, matterial objects, emptied of their symbolic content, 
changing them into pure resonances of the dominating primary processes. Moreover, 
hallucination might be, when it manifests itself at late stages of the subject's 
development, the exorbitant exposure of a shattered language, overwhelmed by the 
rising power of timeless images, the spectre of which fuses evoked remnants of words. 
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disquieting sonorities, and unruly traces of perception. 
Hallucination is in itself an unfruitful repetition: it represents the obstinate, 
unchanged reappearance of an non-representable object, it enacts the symbolic force, 
the tenacity of a non-symbolic identity. Hallucination portrays the exasperation of the 
subject's desire. The multiplicity of the objects involved in the thought process of 
desire, the slight but significant mutations in the ephemeral traits of the diverse 
physiognomies of the wished-for object, imply also the pliable fabric of the thought 
processes. Desire and perception no longer serve the aim of the experience of 
satisfaction. 
The obstinate repetition of the search for the loved object involves a succession of 
fading objects and mutating identities of perception, a rhythmic sequence of absences. 
The wishful cathexis -the charge of energy that triggers the impulse of desire- is not 
simple repetition. It implies the structural transformation of the "ontological" time 
involved by desire. As we have already seen, there is a tension between the persistent 
reappearance of desire, the unchanging object of its search, and the transience and 
fragility of perception. The experience of satisfaction holds to the unexpressed, 
unspeakable physiognomy of the image of the primal love object. The primordial object 
is condemned to convey a sense of wholeness, irreducible to fragmented, surrogated 
images. 53 
Poser Ilexistenee dlun objet originaire, voire dlune Chose, a 
traduire par-dela un deuil accompli, nlest-ce pas un fantasme de 
theoricien melancolique?' . 
nest catain que I'objet originaire, eet "en-soi" qui reste toujours 
a traduire, la cause ultime de la traductibilite, nlexiste que pour et 
par Ie discours et Ie sujet deja constitues. Clest parce que Ie 
traduit est deja la ,que Ie traductible peut etre imagine et pose 
comme excCdent ou incommensurable. Poser I'existenee de eet 
autre langage et meme dlun autre Ciu langage, voire dlun hors 
langage, nlest pas necessairement une reserve pour la 
metapbysique ou pour la theologie. Ce postulat correspond Q 
une erigence psych/que que la meta physique et la theorie 
occidentale ont eu, peut-etre, la chance et l'audace de 
representer. Une exigenee psychique qui nlest eertes pas 
universeUe: la civilisation chinoise nlest par exemple pas une 
civilisation de la traductibilite de la chose en soi, mais plutOt de 
la repetition et de la variation des signes, clest-a-dire de'la 
transcription. 
L'obsession de l'objet originaire, de l'objet i traduire, suppose 
qu'une certaine adequation (certes imparfaite) est collSideree 
possible entre Ie sigue et, non pas Ie referent, mais l'experience 
non verbale du referent dans l'interaction avec I'autre. Je peux 
nommer vrai. L'ctre qui me deborde - y compris l'ctre de l'affect _ 
peut trouver son expression adequate ou quasi adequate. Le pari 
de Ia traductibilite est aussi un pari de maitriser l'objet originaire 
et, en ce sens, une tentative de combattre Ia depression (due a un 
pre-objet envahissant dont je ne peux faire Ie deuil) par une 
cascade de signes destinee precisement i capter l'objet de joie, de 
peur, de douleur. La m~taphysique, avec son obsession de 
traductibilit~, est un discours de la douleur dite et soulag~e par 
cette nomination meme. On peut ignorer, d~n;er la Chose 
originaire, on peut ignorer la douleur au profit de la l~giret~ 
des signes recopi~s ou enjou~s, sans dedans et sans v~rit~.[ ... ] 
L 'homme occidental, au contraire, est persuade de pouvoir 
traduire sa mere - il y croit certes, mais pour Ia traduire, c'est-a-
dire la trahir, Ia transposer, s'en liberer. Ce m~lancolique 
triomphe sur sa tnstesse d'etre s~par~ de l'objet aime par un 
incroyable effort II maftriser les signes de sorte II les /aire 
correspondre II des vecus originaires, innommables, 
traumatiques. 
Plus encore et en definitive, cette croyance dans Ia traductibilite 
("maman est nommable, Dieu est nommable") conduit a un 
discours fortement individualise, evitant Ia stereotypie et Ie cliche, 
aussi bien qu'a Ia profusion des styles personnels. Mais par Ii-
meme, nous aboutissons a la trahison par excellence de la Chose 
unique et en soi (de la Res divina): si toutes les manicres de la 
nommer soot permises, la Chose postulee en soi ne se dissout-eUe 
pas dans les mille et une manicres de la nommer? La traductibilite 
postul6e aboutit en Ia multiplicite des traductions possibles. Le 
melancolique potentiel qu'est Ie sujet occidental, devenu 
traducteur acharne, s'acheve en joueur affrrme ou en athee 
potentiel. La croyance initiale en la traduction se transforme en 
une croyance dans la performance stylistique pour laquelle l'en 
d~a du texte, son autre, rut-il originaire, compte moins que la 
reussite du texte meme. s.t 
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It remains unclear at which stage of the development of subjectivity does the primal 
loved object achieve a fixed identitY, and become a closed, autonomous entity, which 
resists the mutations of the turbulent flow of perception. It is not clear when the 
swelling sphere of the mnemic attributes of the primal object gives rise to a fixed, 
secret memory. However, from that conjectural moment onwards, the search for the 
ephemeral achievement of satisfaction is not governed by the wish to recover the lost 
object, but to grasps a simulacrum of it. 
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3. TImeless residues: the fixed image of movement 
. 
Memory is the name conferred upon the fixed, unavoidable, images of the absent; it 
is also the name given to the representations of past and passing actions. It names the 
enduring, obstinate network of the perceptions of past presences engraved on the 
voluble substance of the subject's soul. But memory may also be conceived either as 
recalled reminiscences or intrusive images thrust upon the continuous flow of 
perception. Memory introduces into the subject's experience of time a discontinuity 
which suspends the implacable course of consciousness. With memory, the ordered 
succession of perceived events crumbles. There is a sudden enhancenment of 
experience and an untimely outburst of remembrance; but some intrusive image may 
overCome the dissipating force which disperses gliding, recalled images; remembrance 
might hold to the unyielding signs of the unrecognized fate which looms from memory, 
perturbing the pace of the soul ruled, as it is, by the intrinsic impatience of perception. 
Yet, perceivable pain and memory share this common feature: both dam the trodden 
path of autonomous perception. They disturb the succession of perceived images of 
events. They introduce opaqueness in the perception of duration, and impose a singular 
inflection on the subject's experience of time. 
It has often been remarked, that perhaps the source of Freud's hesitatant 
conception of memory was the twisted narration of hysterics, their cunning yet 
unwilling amnesia, their proclivity to selective forgetfulness. Hysteria reveals 
contradictory impulses originated in the divergent senses of the traces, in the psychical 
processes they trigger, which drive the subject to seek both 'enduring remembrance and 
oblivion. According to Freud's early account of hysteria, certain experiences are 
severed from any meaningful evocation, despite the persistence of memories which 
remain as active, forceful, yet silent and unspeakable images, engraved on the mind; 
they resist the subject's will to narrate. Yet the sense of this resistance that shatters the 
expression itself remains unfathomable. 
However, from Freud's point of view, it is quite clear that it is the 
physiological process, the production of quantities of inner energy, that governs the 
reappearance of the memories of the unformulated episode under the appearance of a 
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symptom, a mere bodily signal which resists interpretation. There is a disquieting 
relation betwet;n certain enduring "modifications" of the pathways along which bodily 
energy discharges, and the symbolic expression of the affective intensity linking to the 
residues of the memories of lost objects. 
The simultaneous cleavage and intrinsic link of physiological processes and 
symbolic expressions, which serve common ends and seems to share a recondite 
teleology, the only tangible sign of which is the sensation of pleasure, define one of 
Freud's most obscure, yet nevertheless outstanding, theoretical contributions. 
Freud dislocated the meanings of the notions of associotion and (re)presentation 
[Vorstellungen], and redefined their commonly accepted relation, which, although 
severely constricted by the psychoanalytic conceptual framework, was to prove one of 
Freud I s steadiest contributions to the conception of subjectivity throughout the 
successive stages of development of psychoanalytic theory. 
The peculiar relation of association and representation, as Freud understands it, 
seems to derive from the need to find a particular theoretical guarantee for the 
exigencies of a dynamic notion of repression. This relation is founded on a radical 
conception of the shattering of language, and on the observation of anxiety as a 
pervading force originating in the cleavage of language and memory. The shattering 
of language impose on the capaciiy of evocation a profound disturbance. Hysteria, as 
Freud stressed, springs from the singular impossibility of words to present the complex 
web of perception, memory and thought, because of the deranging intrusion of intense 
affection in the psychical sphere. It is this overwhelming affection that shatters 
language, preventing words from preserving its constitutional bond both with the 
affective process and with memories, and completely obliterating their capacity to 
represent the "state of things". Moreover, this force, which disjointed the components 
of the word originally fused into a whole, remains foreign to language, even to 
representation; it is a non-representable, secret force, which engenders an 
Ulifathomable, yet inevitable experience, possible because of the intrinsic structure of 
language itself; it is this force which abstracts the intensities of affection from the 
ordinary substance of the word, and consequently it sets the boundaries of the subject's 
experience. It produces a peculiar, symbolic experience, which drives the subject to a 
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paradoxical, negative expressiveness: the subject is seized by unwilling muteness, the 
limits of the su1>ject's expressiveness appear as the untraceable effect of an effusion of 
energy capable of destroying the meaningful consistency of words. Nevertheless, there 
is a sense conveyed by this destruction, an unpronounceable yet effective sense which 
can stir in the subject, in spite of the intangible nature of the broken signs, an enduring 
disquiet. Yet, the substantial components of the word, which are dismembered by the 
bursting energy, engender in their crumbling the very sense of the destruction.. The 
ruined language renders visible the violent effusion of inner energy; it bears testimony 
to a suffocated act of language. The sense of destruction, even if it remains foreign to 
representation, to any means of expression, is conveyed by the distinctive remains of 
the wrecked act of nomination. 
In Freud's conception, it is only when the subject reaches the upper stages of 
sexual development, that the effective and dynamically efficient impact of the 
repression will be fully acknowledged. However, this delayed awareness does not 
amount to a full comprehension of the process and to the recognition of its sources; 
they remain obscure, foreign to consciousness. 55 The pain of the hysteric, aroused by 
this series of indeterminate meanings and contradictory experiences of time, reveals an 
unspeakable anxiety stirred by the meaningless remains of this unbearable experience 
of the wreckage 0/ language. However, in hysteria it is not the word alone that has 
been rendered impossible; rather, it is the very possibility of a complete narrative 
action, the wholeness of the narration that has been obliterated. This experience of the 
weakness of speech, of the curtailed impulse to narrate, is also evidence of the limits 
of the subject. Hysteria appears as the evidence of the destruction 0/ na"ation that 
issuesfrom mniniscence,/rom the cleavage of the unity o/the word, the dismembering 
of which entails the impossibility· of representing the subject's own history. The 
· unoccomplished, ephemeral impulse to restore the meaningful continuity of experience 
contrasts with the indelible engraving of the residues of the painful primal experiences 
which remain urfonnulaled. Thus, the main issue of psychoanalysis is not to elucidate 
the lasting tension between an image of the word as such and its trace in memory, but 
the illumination of the subject's inability to fully restore the relation between the 
dispersed elements of representation. Freudian psychoanalysis has bestowed on us the 
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privilege of the awareness of the muteness of our own history; of the secrecy inherent 
to our own i~entity, which also defines our own language; of the awareness of an 
intense affection which paradoxically eludes and devastates language, and burdens the 
subject's image of its own identity. 
Freud's implicit notion of memory seems to closely resemble here that of Bergson. 
Indeed, Bergson conceives remembrance as a breaking point in the subject' s ex~rience 
of time. It is the subject's means to escape the siege of the external stimulus; hence, 
memory can be depicted as the dynamic condition of mind which isolates the subject 
from the stream of images of the wOrld; simultaneously, memory thrusts him into the 
core of life, for memory becomes an active force able to transform the development 
, .' . 
of action and the image of the future: 
la force interieur qui pennet a l'etTe de se degager du rythme 
d'ecoulement des choses, de retenir de mieux en mieux Ie passe 
pour inf)lICDCQ' de plus en plus profondement 1'8venir, c'cst a dire 
~ 8U sens special que nous donnoDS a ce mot, S8 memoire. S6 
The hysteric perturbation simultaneously hampers and evinces this movement which 
paradoxically' darkens and enhances the subject's experience of time. Memory, as 
might be inferred from the characters and episodes forged by hysterics, cannot be 
conceived as a fixed set of obstinately recalled images, nor as the digressive tale which 
manifests a universe of distorted or partial engravings of evanescent perceptions. 
Rather, hysteria manifests itself in the subject's fiction which enacts the non-
representable breaking of language as a gap in the n~tion; this gap stands for a 
secret, non-expressible, forgotten episode in the history of the subject. Hysterics 
exhibit in their own narration the signs of the timeless intrusion of a diffuse, 
untraceable, yet compelling force which drives them to swerve endlessly from their 
original narrative intention. In hysteria, the fragmented memory seems to shield the 
subject from the urgent demands of his immediate environment and suspend or cancel 
his own narrative will; it is memory that provides him the substitute satisfaction 
attained by the mere hallucinatory presence of the loved object. But it is also memory 
that prevents him from creating a singular, new experience. 
Despite this notion of memory, Freud's conception still holds to the notion of 
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trace, which inevitably evokes a universe of acquired and perhaps definite 
representations. This notion appears to be a complex symbolic matter. It exposes the 
radical asymmetry between the conventional meanings of symbol and the significance 
of the primal experience. Moreover, according to Freud's conception, the symbol 
remains foreign to the trace itself; the conventional symbol --chiefly language- is 
nothing more than debris which, however, is likely to evoke images, fictional 
allegories which stir the excitation of the primal experiences, but not the memories of 
the experience itself. This mnemic symbol represents the material, yet merely 
conjectural, relic of a forgotten episode. However, with the notion of trace, Freud 
seems to have moved away from Bergson's dynamic conception of memory, and to 
have yielded to the seduction of associationism. Indeed, association calls to mind the 
image of· a relation between located entities which emerge from perception as a 
constellation of settled presences, as a finite inventory of signs. 
In a first analysis, Bergson's interior force [force interieur] seems to be opposed 
to Freud's ineffaceable substantial relics -the traces- which are vaguely transcribed 
from outer perception to the delicate registers of memory and which resemble a simple 
map of memory. Memory appears thus, in Freud's terms, as an assortment of simple, 
clearly circumscribed material signs able to avoid the erosion provoked by the cessation 
of perception or physiological decay. Each trace seems to preserve its full capacity to 
reproduce a specific scene, a definite perception. But these traces remain foreign to the 
subject itself, they "act as a sort of foreign body" [nach Art eines FremdkiJrpers wirkt] 
(Entwwfeiner Psychologie, GW, 1895, I: 85) beyond the reach of words, constituting . 
the core of unspeakable experiences in the Omphalos of subjectivitf1. 
Yet this foreign body, which in Freud's early clinical work will be "associated" 
with trauma, is but a testimony born of hollowness. The trauma only reveals itself as 
a memory of a loss or a fault, of an inexpressible, experienced intensity which 
confounds itself with pain; it reveals itself as the remains of the ephemeral cessation 
of the flood of life, an informulable episode the force of which suffocates the impulse 
of memory. Trauma becomes the frightful evidence of a symbolic destruction which, 
nevertheless, eludes the force of representation: the notion of trauma expresses the 
impossibility of narrating an abrupt, piercing perception capable of stirring the 
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subject's emotion linked to the image of the primordial pain of the absence of the loved 
object. 
Freud, despite his relative coincidence with Bergson in the need for a dynamic 
notion of memory, approaches it from a completely different point of view. According 
to Freudian assumptions, memory cannot be conceived as a deposit of images, but 
should be seen as an intricate map of the intensities and the displacements of inner 
energy . .58 The objects of memory derive, in the last analysis, from their fun~ental 
link to the dual structure of the experience which is build upon memory of primal 
satisfaction and pain. 
But the link to these primal experiences also imposes on the memory different 
forms of resistance. The dynamic tension which defines memory derives from the 
. .' ... 
specific content which Freud gave to the thermodynamic distinction between bound and 
free energy. It is this distinction that led him to the separation between a memory, 
topographically defined, and the dynamic implications of mnemic traces; memory was 
then located, with the fixed representation of word residues, in the preconscious, while 
the entangled tensions in the thread of the mnemic traces inform the unconscious. 
Die Vorginge des Systems Vbw zeigen - und zwar gleichgiiltig, 
ob sie bereits bewuBt oder nur bewuBtseinsflhig sind· eine 
Hemmung der Abfuhmeigung von den besetzten VorsteUungen. 
Wenn der Vorgang von einer VorsteUung auf eine andere 
ubergeht, so hilt die erstere einen T eil ihrer Besetzung fest, und 
nur ein kleiner Anteil erfiihrt die Verschiebung. Verschiebungen 
und Verdichtungen wie beim Primiirvorgang sind ausgeschlossen 
oder sehr eingeschrlinkt. Dieses Verhiltnis hat J. Breuer 
veranlaBt, zwei verschiedene Zustande der Besetzungsenergie im 
SeelenIeben anzunehmen, einen tonisch ge~undenen und einen 
frei beweglichen, der Abfuhr zustrebenden. Ich glaube, dafJ diese 
Unterscheidung bis jetzt unsere Iiefste Einsicht in das Wesen 
der nervlJsen Energie darstellt, und sehe nicht, wie man um sie 
herumkommen soli. Es ware ein dringendes BedWfnis der 
metapsychologischen Darstellung - vielleicht aber noch ein allzu 
gewagtes Untemehmen -, an dleser Stelle die Diskussion 
fortzufuhren. Dem System Vbw fallen femer zu die Herstellung 
einer Verkehrsfahigkeit unter den Vorstellungsinhalten, so daB sie 
einander beeinflussen k6nnen, die zeitliche Anordnung derselben, 
die Einfiihrung der einen Zensur oder mehrerer Zensuren, die 
Realitatspliifung und das RealiUitsprinzip. Auch das bewufJte 
Gedachtnis scheint ganz am Vbw zu hangen. es ist schar/von 
den Erinnerungsspuren zu scheiden, in denen sich die 
Erlebnisse des Ubw jixieren. lind entspricht wahrscheinlich 
einer besonderen Niederschri/t. wie wir sie for das Verh(J/tnis 
der bewufJten zur unbewufJten Vorstellung annehmen wollten, 
aberbereitsverworjen haben. (Dos UnbewufJten, SA, 1915, lll: 
148f 
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Freud's hesitation about the content of memory traces does not obscure the clearly 
defined duality of the memory: the different yet inextricable natures of preconscious 
and unconscious psychical processes, which derive from distinct dynamic behaviours. 
The dualism of memory also bears testimony to the vicissitudes of the agonistic relation 
between the primal terms of the subject's experience: pain and satisfactio~. The 
misleading apparent simplicity of the relation between them veils the underlying 
uneasiness of the conceptual tension of Freud's thought. Freud suggests there is a 
difference between traces according to the nature their different sources: the enduring 
traces of the excitation which result from the outpouring of the energy, the facilitations 
[die Dauerspur der E"egung (Bahnung)], and those which stem, in the last analysis, 
from the mere perception of the outer world. The origin of the traces seems to stress 
a fundamental spliting of Freud's universe: the inner world sundered from the outer 
world. However, the conflict between these two spaces and these sources ressembles 
the Baroque condensation of the opposition between the endurance of the traces and the 
extraordinary fragility of the perceived images, as well as the opposition between the 
complex dynamics of the repression undergone by the primordial representations and 
the unobstructed flow of energy which characterizes the perception of the outer world. 
Perception is not only directed outwards, it can also tum inwards. Perception 
can fold inwards seeking to comprehend the signs of its own inner experience: the 
-The processes of the system Pea. display -no matter whether they are already conscious or only capable of 
becoming conscious- an inhibition of the tendency of cathected ideas towards discharge. When a process passes 
from one idea to another, the first idea retains a part of its cathexis and only a small portion undergoes 
displacement. Oisplacc:rncnts and condensations such as happen in .the primary process are excluded or very much 
~cted. This circumstance caused Breuer to assume the existence of two different states of cathectic energy in 
mental life: one in which the energy is tonically 'bound' and the other in which it is freely mobile and presses 
towards discharge. In my opinion this distinction rcpre~ents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present 
into the nature ofnervoUB energy, and I do not see how we can avoid making it. A metapsychological presentation 
would most urgently call for further discussion at this point, though perhaps that would be too daring an 
undertaking as yet. 
Further, it devolves upon the system Pes. to make communication possible between the different ideational 
contents 80 that they can inOucnc:e one another, to give them an order in time, and to set up a censorship or several 
censorships; 'reality testing' too, and the reality principle, are in its province. Conscious memory, moreover, seems 
to depend wholly on the Pes. This should be clearly distinguished from the memory-traces in which the experiences 
of the Ua. are fIXed, and probably corresponds to a special registration such as we proposed (but later rejected) 
to account for the relation of conscious to unconscious ideas. (FP, 11: 192) 
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perccivm signs of the world fuse with the reflexive perception of the inner processes. 
Thus, perceptiQll builds the "inner" body following the models of the exterior objects; 
it creates a fictional density of the self, the phantasm of its own depth which, in tum, 
tranSforms itself into a fictive memory, an experience of the subject's own body, of its 
own identity. In this reflexive perception which blends the inner and the outer, memory 
takes as their privileged object the unsignified experience of inner processes, the energy 
which goes through the facilitations and which charges the psychical traces of the 
perceived outside world. 59 
The appearance of the features of perception in the theoretical reflection 
frustrated any possibility of a straightforward conception of the representational 
process. Freud offered an alternative conception of the origins of representation: 
memory signs emerge as a result of displacement of inner energy which sets the 
dynamic psychical conditions of repetition and inhibition of this moving charge. 60 
Freud's conception is notoriously obscure. Indeed, it broadens the breach 
between the physical and the psychical. But it also suggests a complex, Baroque 
entanglement of both universes. It might be said that the image of the separation must 
have emerged· from a crucial insight which paved the way for the conception of the 
unconscious; in this view, the fictive image of physical interiomess articulate both 
universes -psychical and physi~ into inextricable yet incongruous unity bonded by 
this perception, by this inward, inherently interpretative perception. The concept of the 
unconscious appears on the shadow line which separates the diverging schemes of 
psychical and physical causality which govern psychical processes. These schemes are, 
. 
on the one hand, "natural" determination, ruled by the principle of inertia and by the 
dynamics of free and bounded energy, and on the other, psychical determination, the 
logic of which involves the coexistence of the schemes of speachless thought, and 
traces of actual language. The dark source of action might be this struggle between 
physical and psychical constraints, the incongruous relation between perception and 
memory, or rather, the conflict between the complex unutterable, non-symbolic logical 
patterns engendered by the breakdown of representation. 
Freud insisted upon the necessity for inner thought processes to manifest themselves, 
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driven by word residues which should convey the excess of energy. As unconscious 
processes -unconscious thoughts- can exist without being perceived, it is only this 
lasting relation to words which can render unconscious processes into sensations. 
Abgekiirzter, Dieht ganz korrekterweise sprechen wir dann von 
WlbewuBteo Empfindtmgen, halteD, die Analogie mit unbewuBten 
VorsteUungen fest, die Dieht ganz gerechtfertigt ist Der 
Unterschied ist niimlieh, daB fUr die Ubw Vorstellung erst 
Verbindungsglieder geschaffen werden musseD, urn sie zwn Bw 
zu bringen, wlhrend dies fUr die Empfindungen, die sieh direkt 
fort1eiteD, entfiillt. Mit anderen Worten: Die Unterscheidung von 
Bw tmd Jlbw bat fUr die Empfindtmgen keinen Sinn, das Jlbw lallt 
hier aus, Empfindungen sind entweder bewunt oder unbewuBt 
Auch wenn sie an WortvorsteUungen gebunden werden, danken 
sie nicht diesen ihr Sewu6twerden, sondem sie werden es direkt. 
Die Rolle der Wortvorstellungen wird nun vollends klar. 
Durch ihre Vennittlung werden die inneren Denkvorglnge zu 
WahriJehmungen"gemacht Es ist, als sollte der Satz erwiesen 
werden - Alles Wissen stammt aus der auBeren Wahmehmung. 
Sei einer Oberbesetzung des Denkens werden die Gedanken 
wirklieh - wie von au6en - wahrgenommen und darum fUr wahr 
gehalten. (Das lch und das Es, SA, 1923, ill: 291-292): 
The distinction between "unconscious feelings" [unbewujJten Empfindungen] and word 
(re)presentati(:>DS, as well as the vicissitudes of their "transmission" [fonleiten] from the 
unconscious to consciousness bring to light a seldom explored territory within Freud I s 
conception. Two issues emerge from Freud's astounding remark: on the one hand, the 
capacity of feelings to elude the representations of memory which reside in the 
preconscious, and yet still remain susceptible to repression; on the other hand, the need 
for word representations -not of words only- to render visible the speechless thought 
process which governs desire and repetition, and to clarify· the confusion of perception 
regarding the provenance of thought, due to its "overcharge" [aberbesetzung] of energy 
in the primary process. The uneasy. relation between the obscure notions of unconscious 
'"We then come to speak, in a condcr.sed and not entLely correct manner, of 'unconscious fcclings', keeping up an 
analogy with unconscious ideas which is not ahogdher justifIAble. Actually the difference is that, whereas with Ucs. 
ideas connecting links must be created before they can brought into the Cs., withfulings, which are themselves 
transmitted directly, this does not occur. In odter words:thc distinction between Cs. and Pcs. has no meaning where 
feelings arc concerned; the Pcs. here drops out - and fuelings are either conscious or unconscious. Even when Ihey 
au aIIoched 10 'WOrd-preselllaJions, Iheir becoming conscious is 1101 due 10 lhal circumslance, bUilhey become so 
direclly. The put played by word-presentations now become perfectly clear. By their interposition internal thought-
processes arc made into perceptions. It is like a demonstration of the theorem that all knowledge has its origins in 
extema.l perception. When a hypercathexis of the PJ"OCC01S of thinking takes place, thoughts are actually perceived 
- as if the came from without - and are consequently held to be true. (FP, 11: 361) 
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feelings and sensations, and between conscious feelings and perceptions, as well as 
between pri~ry thought processes and unconscious feelings, leads to an intricate 
conceptual conflict when Freud seeks to elucidate the role of pain and culpability, and 
the resulting model of the inner conflict between the super-ego and ego, or the origins 
of the perceived sensation of anxiety. 61 
Language remains a marginal province, an ancillary means of thought in the 
presence of the rising force of feelings, wordlessly bursting into consciousn~s. The 
experience of the wordless -meaningless- perception of feelings, of their autonomy 
regarding thought, the experience either of the immediateness of their arousal or of the 
absolute concealment of their impulse, the awareness of the capacity of feelings to 
escape the labyrinthine deferral of words in which desire is caught, or of the 
unconditional surrender of feelings to the force of repression, the experience of the 
independence of feelings from desire, reveal an unsuspected quality both of psychical 
processes, and of feelings themselves. Moreover, feelings become an object of 
reflexive consciousness, and the speech which informs the meditation of consciousness 
on its own feelings arouses, in turn, unformulated feelings. However, the particular 
nature of feelings, the source of their singular quality, and the temporal heterogeneity 
they introduce in the psychical process becomes a marginal topic of Freud' s conception 
of the psychical structure. From the theoretical conditions of this exclusion it is 
possible to infer the nature of the resistance of psychoanalytic conception to explicitly 
face the nature of pain and its impact upon the structure of subjectivity: pain appears 
both inherent in Freud • s conception of desire and memory, and foreign to the 
fundamental assumptions of psychoanalysis. 
The immediate consciousness of feelings casts a dazzling light upon the nature of the 
"subordinate", though paradoxical position of word traces in Freud's theoretical 
scheme. Words introduce a vaguely understood "delay" in the path of thought towards 
consciousness; they appear as an intermediate stage in the passage of the reflexive 
thought from mute, "physiological" and "dynamic" dialogue to the expressiveness of 
speech. In Freud's early theoretical scheme, the word, conceived as a necessary 
condition of the conscious perception _ of thought, also determines the reflexive 
• 
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movement of consciousness. Consequently, the word appears as an intrinsic attribute 
of the consciQus perception of unconscious "judgement", despite the external conditions 
which determine the meaning of the word as object. The word, once perceived, once 
acknowledged as an outer object, transforms itself within the subject's psychical sphere 
into a mere memory trace. It is precisely as a word trace that this shadow of language 
informs the whole secondary process of thought as if the sources of meaning were the 
internal psychical processes themselves; simultaneously, the perceived word p~rves 
the features of foreign, outer objects. 
The imernal1llltUre of word traces is different from the image of the word as 
it is perceived from outer sources. However, the memory traces of these words, 
regardless of its exterior origin, completely lack any particular feature that reveals their 
provenanee. The word conveys, because of this non-betokened origin, what appears to 
the subject as an absolute, timeless though uncertain meaning: the word constitutes a 
radical mirage which embodies the subject's whole symbolic universe. Nevertheless, 
word traces, confined within a layer of the psychical apparatus, acquire an absolute 
command of the subject's notions of reality and truth. And this absolute power of the 
word, its autonomous nature, and its uncertain yet cardinal function in the system of 
memory, transform the enigmatic origin of the word into the mirage of truth: 
Dei eiDer Oberbesetzung des Denkens werden die Gedanken 
wirklich - wie von au8en - wahrgenommen und darum fUr wahr 
gebalten. (Dos Ich und das Es, SA, 1923, ill: 292r. 
These features confer on thoughts the strange dignity of a non-subjective truth. Word 
residues constitute a complex, articulated though autonomous system within the 
preconscious . 
WortvorsteUungen sind Erinnerungsreste, sie waren einmal 
Wahrnebmungen und kOnnen wie aile Erinnerungsreste wieder 
bewuBt WC2'den (Dos Ich und dos'Es, SA, 1923, m: 289r-
However, word traces differ completely from the other representations contained in the 
"'When I bypctcathexil of the proceaa of thinking takes place, thoughts are actually perceived - as if the came from 
without - and are conaequendy held to be true. (FP, 11: 361) 
--rbeae word presentations are residues of memo~; they were at one time perceptions, and like all mnemic 
residua they can become conscious again. (FP, 11: 358) 
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preconscious, and from other memory traces. This notion of word traces as material 
residue whicJl allows the conscious appearance of thought processes introduces in 
Freud's conceptions an additional tension concerning the role of time in the structure 
of subjectivity. Words originate a peculiar set of memory traces. However, these traces 
are both sources of memories, and the means by which consciousness can engage in 
self-reflection, and signs able to set the focus of attention; thus, word traces establish 
the moment, rhythms and intensities of desire, the expectation of the desired obj~t and 
the thread of the fiction which displays the subject's phantasies. 
Evocation appears as the unfolding of associated images; it indicates, in Freud's 
scheme, a" discharge of energy along distinct, divergent paths. What appears to the 
consciousness as a sequence of images has its origins in the expanding web of memory 
traces. Thus, the trace is not only a residue, but an active ferment likely to create 
significance. The notion of trace thus implies a complex entanglement of processes 
with distinct rhythms and evolving patterns: the trace remains, but not only as that 
which has been left aside, the lasting evidence of an extinguished event. It is also a 
potential, unbounded sign, the source of the sense of an imminent unfolding of 
representation, of an endless expansion of the vast web of traces which may be 
charged, in tum, by the increasing intensity of internal energy. This expansion of 
internal energy rules memory and representation. Nevertheless, this driving energy is 
governed by the principle of constancy, which seeks to abate the mounting internal 
energy and lead the psychical apparatus to a discharge, chiefly when excess energy 
breaks the barriers of perception: the dynamic engendering of pain. 
-
The association of representations themselves informed by the wordless and 
divergent -neither comparable nor contradictory- experiences of pleasure and pain, 
may induce the psychical apparatUs to delay or hasten the discharge. The experience 
of expectation, the complex behaviour of internal energy that manifests itself as 
attention -an increase in the level of energy which simultaneously expands the spectre 
of potential perceptions and associations, and intensifies the charge of energy in the 
circumscribed domain of the traces related to the loved object-, produces the 
experience of non-completeness, the foreshadowing of an impending yet uncertain 
presence; the future is then invented as pure potency_ The attention springs either from 
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pain or from the shades of affection which anticipate it. Malcolm Bowie has stressed 
the relevance. of the past in Freud's explanatory framework, and of the preeminence 
of past over the suggestive power of the future. The dominant impulse of thought when 
it faces the disquieting silence of the future is to invest it with the affections and images 
from the experiences, to tum it into a coherent image made from shreds of 
reminiscences. 
past always had a logical as well as chronological priority over 
the present aDd the future; and it always had more explanatoty 
force.62 
Freud was no exception. However,. he hesitates. Anticipation and desire -this opaque 
grasp of future time-, the longing for the object once present in the origin of the 
I 
subject's chronologies, mould the emerging images ofimrninent and remote times. This 
images attenuate or even suffocate the subject's own perception of the anxiety which 
arises from the dissipation of the future. These distorted experiences, which create the 
images of the future with the allegorical transformation of the past, undermined 
Freud's striving for a conclusive explanation of the role of desire in the forging of the 
images of future. 63 Because phantasy is regressive and it enacts a allegorical, 
hallucinatory restoration of the experience of satisfaction, it appears always as 
repetition. 
The unconscious recall of suffering endured in the past, joined to the excitation 
aroused by the non-signified traces of the desired object, inform the experience of time: 
the evoked threat of the loss of the primordial object and its momentary attenuation in 
the wake of the experience of satisfaction, the paradoXical temporality inherent in 
repetition, the time of the disappearance of the loved object and its hallucinatory 
return, punctuate the sequence of memory in the subject's experience. The folding back 
of thought and memory upon the primal painful experience engenders the experience 
of density of time. 
Association produces, indeed, an "interpretative" movement about the traces of 
the object of love, about the source of the repetition which seeks to restore the primal 
experience of satisfaction. Thus, the associative web is not only the source of the 
creation of sense; its disquieting metamorphosis engenders a "pulsating" relation as 
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well -the subject both becomes attached or is tom away from real objects. Each time 
the image o~ a previously fixed image is restored, the routes of excitation are 
drastically altered, and the boundaries of the perception are irreversibly redefined. 
Evocation, conceived as the conscious allegorical enactment of inner speechless 
thought, is, nevertheless, nothing more than a sort of reflexive interpretation the spring 
of which remains untraceable. But this interpretation is in itself constrained by the 
dynamic conflict provoked by the intense, shapeless effusion of energy stirred .by the 
memory of primal experiences. 
Freud's meditations on the evoked images reveal, like an image reflected by a 
negative mirror, the dynamic conflict of the repression, the temporal tension produced 
by hallucination -conceived as a regressive restoration of primordial experiences-, 
. 
and the coi1jectural, future-creating capacity of the day-dream. 
Freud's notion of experience is complex. It implies undefined conceptions of the 
psychicallepresentation of time, of memory, of expressiveness and of the significance 
of perception, of the role and the nature of evocation, and a notion of the subject's 
action as creation. Despite the cardinal position of the notion of experience in Freud's 
theoretical scheme, it remained virtually undeveloped. Moreover, Freud's empiricist 
convictions led him to imagine, at the culminating stage- of his theoretical enterprise, 
a temporal circularity in the genesis and expression of the unconscious processes. In 
this reflection, he seems to have unwittingly transformed Locke's account of the origin 
of ideas. Indeed, Locke wrote: 
But, our ideas being nothing but the actual perceptions in the 
mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of 
them; this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory 
signifies no more but this, - that the mind has a power in many 
cases to revive perceptions which it once had, with this additional 
perception annexed to them, that it"has had them before.64 
However, Locke's conception was to be drastically transformed by the incorporation 
of the allegorical images of the "psychical" apparatus -the traces, the remains- which 
also redefine Locke's notion of memory in terms which completely revoke the 
conditions imposed on philosophical thought by the notion of an undivided, unitary 
subject, of mind as a whole. In fact, Freud overturned his "empiricist" heritage: 
bewu6t werden kann nur das, was schon einmal Bw 
Wahrnebmung war, und was aoBer Gefiihlen von innen her 
bewuBt werden will, moB versuehen, sieh in iuBere 
Wahrnehmungen umzusetzen. Dies wird mittels der 
~uren mOglich. Die Erinnerungsreste denken wir uns 
in Systemen enthalten, welehe unmittelbar an das System W-Bw 
ansto6en, so daB ihre Besetzungen sieh leieht auf die Elemente 
dieses Systems von innen her fortsetzen kannen. Man denkt bier 
sofort an die Halluzination und an die Tatsache, daB die 
lebhafteste ~ immer noch von der Halluzination wie von 
der Iu.Beren Wahrnehmung unterscbieden wird, allein ebenso 
raseh stellt sieh die Auskunft ein, daB bei der Wiederbelebung 
einer Erinnenmg die Besetzung im Erinnerungssystem erhalten 
bleibt, wfihrend die von der Wahmebmung nieht unterscheidbare 
Halluzination entstehen mag, wenn die Besetzung nieht nur von 
der Erinnerungsspur auf das W-Element iibergreift, sondem 
vallig auf dassell>e fibergeht (Das Ich und das Es, SA, 1920, III: 
288-290r 
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Freud introduces a subtle difference between two related notions which refer to these 
remains of the word: memory-trace [Erinnerungspuren] and mnemic residues 
[Erinnenmgsreste]. Each of these concepts stresses particular features of the unfolding 
path of ~on. Each of them and their relation seem to reproduce the image of the 
subject's stratified memory and the conception of their dynamic difference. Thus, they 
differ both in their genesis and in their role. While the mnemic-trace becomes an 
intrinsic element of the primary processes -the condition of the stratification of the 
psychical apparatus-, the residues appear as the relics of process which have a direct 
intrinsic relation to the memories of language. The relation between these Freudian 
notions -the trace and the residue-, calls to mind that between the image of the non-
representable, primal relics of memory, and the signal which has the capacity to restore 
the pereeived image of the absent object, it is language. The asymmetry between these 
·only aomc:thing which has once bcm a Cr. perception eM become conscious, and that anything arising from within 
(apart from feelings) that acck to become conscious must try to transfonn itself into external perception: this 
becomca poui)lc by ~ of mcmory-traccs. We think of mnemic residues as being contained in systems which 
arc directly adjacent to the .ystem Pept. -Cr., so that the cathexes of those residues can readily extend from within 
on the dcmcnta oflhc IaIer sy&b::m. We inuncdiatcly think here of hallucinations, and of the fact that the most vivid 
memory is always di8tingWshable both from hallucination and from an external perception but it will also occur to 
us at once that when a memory is revived the cathexis remains in the mnemic system, whereas a hallucination, 
which is not distinguishable fonn a perception, can arise when the cathexis docs not merely sptead over from the 
mcmory-trace on to the Pept. clement, but passes ove( to it entirely. Verbal residues are derived primarily from 
aUditory perception., 10 that the system Pes. has, as it were, a special sensory source. (FP, 11: 358) 
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notions resembles that between interpretation and interpreted matter. 
Phanfa:sy, day-drearn.ing, as well as hallucination and perception itself occupy 
different though definite positions in this temporal circularity of traces, residues, 
perceptions and language. What phantasy and day-dreaming narrate, find its coherence 
in the certainity of the existence of a definite link between the allegorized, fictional 
representation of the fading primordial object, and the elements of the perception of 
certain object which have remained associated to the mnemic images of the experience 
of satisfaction. Despite its unyielding opacity, phantasy appears as a clearly 
recognizable fiction, able to display its own pace, an identifiable plot, an 
understandable, logical sequence. Phantasy might be conceived, thus, as the allegorical 
expression which originates from both the "symbolic" manifestation of the speechless 
structures of primary thought, and the images of everyday perception which echoe the 
mnemic residues of the subject's primordial experience, inextricably bonded in a 
disquieting palimpsest of elusive significance; the constellation of opacities, of scraps 
of expressive matter which perturb the clarity of its narrative unfolding, resembles the 
Baroque anamOtphosis. Phantasy thus appears, in the Freudian text, as an anamorphic 
image, an optical ruse which creates a mysterious efigy that reveals and conceals, 
displays a jeu de masque and the emblems of death, inscribes upon its facade the signs 
of transience and the metamorphoSis of the gaze and its image. Both anamorphosis and 
phantasy seem to reveal, if seen from certain specific angle, the figure of a foreign 
time, the evidence of an autonomous, complete, yet unspeakable signification the force 
of which pervades the whole narration and even obliterates its explicit sense. 
Moreover, in phantasy, as in the Baroque anamorphosis, these isolated signs strives for 
a definite meaning, the destruction of its own expressive power. 
In the metamorphosis of temporalities and the distorted signs engraved in 
allegory, phantasy abruptly exposes the unprono~nceable core of primary thought; it 
is the intermittent exposure of this forbidden object that is capable by itself of arousing 
the subject's excitation. This reappearance of the shade of the primal object seems to 
be enough to disquiet consciousness. The closeness of the adumbrated primal object of 
love, evoked in both phantasy and fetichism,65 seems to account for the excitation 
stirred by their unusual and astounding images. 
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In 1926, Freud abruptly redefined his notion of anxiety. It ceased to be the 
consequence . of repression, the non-signified, non-sayable, non-representable 
perception of the effusion of energy unleashed by a shattered utterance. Anxiety turned 
out to be, in Freud's later meditation, a response to what he considered to be the 
human, deeply rooted experience of hollowness, of abandonment. Dispite the thorough 
reconstruction of this notion, his early conviction of the absolute dominion of anxiety 
over all the other experiences still prevailed. A brief, clear formulation of the 
supremacy of anxiety appears in his 1909 analysis of linle Hans: 
Wenn einmaI der Angstzustand hergesteUt ist, so zehrt die Angst 
aile andercn Empfindungen auf; mit fortschreitender 
Verdringun& je mehr die schon bewu6t gewesenen 
affekttragenden Verstellungen ins Unbewu6te riicken, kOnnen 
sich aIle Affeckte. in Angst verwandeln. (Analyse der Phobie 
etnesfiJnDllhrlgen Knaben, SA, 1909, vm: 3Sf 
However, in 1926, this conception of anxiety was to be fully revised, and then 
conceived in completely different terms: it ceased to be the subject's reflexive 
peroeption of the mounting, internal energy prpduced by the collapse of the psychical 
lepresentation which has yielded to repression. In this later, disconcerting account of 
anxiety, explicitly presented in his work Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (1926), it 
appears as the origin of subjectivity, and not as a result of a shattered representation, 
rather, it appears as the very source of representation itself. Anxiety was conceived as 
a primordial, autonomous experience, free from the constraints of representation, and 
brought about by the loss of the primal object of love. Anxiety stands, in the subject's 
experience, as a token both of the lost object, and of the -loss itself. 
die Angst wird bei del'Verdr8ngung Dieht neu erzeugt, sondern aIs 
Affektzustand nach einem vorhandenen Erinnerungsbild 
reproduziert. Mit der weiteren Frage nach der Herkunft dieser 
Angst -wie der Affekte iiberbaupt- verlassen wir abcr den 
unbestriuen psyrhoIogischen Boden'und betreten das Grenzgebiet 
der Physiologic. Die A.ffektzusUJnde sind dem Seelenleben als 
Niederschltlge UTalter trcr.rmotischer Erlebnisse einverleibt und 
werden in Ilhnlichen Situation en wie Erlnnerungssymbole 
-When once a state of anxiety establishes itself, the anxiety swaUows up aU other feelings; With the progress of 
rqnaaion, and the more thote ideas which are charged \l(jth affect and which have been conscious move down into 
the uncolllCioul, all affects are capable of being changed into anxiety. (FP, 8:191) 
wachgerufen. (Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, SA, 1926, VI: 
239): 
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The sheer intensity of physiological energy becomes itself a signal of the primal 
absence, a perceivable sign of the disappearance of the object and the tangible evidence 
which stands for the missing object; anxiety burst upon the reflexive perception as a 
non-articulable sign, as the ersatz. of a deep and incurable experience of helplessness, 
offiniteness; however, it is this experience of finiteness inherent in the self-pe~tion 
of anxiety which sets the boundaries of the self, and makes posible self-identity. 
Anxiety is, in the light of Freud's late contribution, both the germ of the subject's 
identity, and as a violent force which veils and dissolves the variety of experience, 
which subdues the whole spectrum of perceptions and obliterates the identity of the 
self. 
The chief feature of anxiety, like that of desire, is repetition. Anxiety emerges 
only to restore paradoxically the original dissipation of identity, the overwhelming, 
annihilating presence of the silent effusion of energy, and the mythical moment of the 
origin of the subject's identity. 
In this significant reflection, Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, it is not a 
shattered word but the primal, wordless representation of loss which arouses anxiety. 
The affective state [~tandl of anxiety is created by the intrusion of the memory 
of a primordial catastrophe; thus, anxiety is not a primary condition of the subjectivity 
but a sequel of the occupation [Besetzung] of a unarticulable mnemic image 
[ErinnenmgsbildJ, the effect of which is perceived by reflexive thought. A disquieting . 
conclusion seems to derive from this set of related notions. The source of experience 
[Er1ebnisse] is not restricted to outward perception. Experience is also achieved by the 
thorough observation, perception and remembrance of the subject's inner 
metamorphosis, of intimate sensations, of those feelings [GeftlhlJ which burst into 
consciousness without the aid of the word residues. 
"Anxiety is not newly created by the repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with the already 
existing mnemic image. If we go further and inquire into the origin of the anxiety -and of affects in general- we 
shall be leaving the realm of pure psychology and entering the borderland of physiology. Affec~v~ stat~ h~ve 
become incorporated in the mind as precipitates of p~aeval traumatic experiences, and when a Similar situabon 
occurs they are revived like mnemic symbols. (FP, 10: 244) 
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Anxiety, as a memory-symbol [Erlnnerungssymbole), perturbs the indiffereace 
of ptzeeption regarding the temporal regime of surrounding signals. Anxiety anticipates 
and enacts the repetition of the loss, it betokens the imminent reappearance of the signs 
of an episode which would represent again that primordial [uralter) traumatic 
experience. An astounding consequence is that the mnemic images reveal themselves 
as signs of the subject's reflexive interpretation: they are signs the sense of which is 
referred to the perturbaIions, emotions and disquiet experienced by the subject. Anxiety 
is, thus, a definite sign which demands an allegorical interpretation; it is an opaque, 
non-articu1able sign which remains meaningless, but significant. 
For Freud, there ought to be a relation between the ojfective state of the subject 
and the mnemic image of this inner perturbation, which determine the original paradox 
of a meaningless signiftcance of the primordial loss. Beyond the subject's experience, 
in the indifferent collapse and resurgence of the world, there is neither loss nor 
absence, there is only non-elistence and disappearance. Loss appears as the sense of 
the subjective experience of disappearance. Without language the only sign of loss is 
the irretlexive response to the imprinted memories of pain, the motor and 
physiognomical response to the inner sense of an overwhelming effusion of energy 
which has destroyed the sheltering barriers of perception. 
There is thus a parallelism between anxiety and phantasy. They are both allegories of 
a primordial, inarticulable, primal experience. But, while anxiety seems to manifest 
allegorically the imminent repetition of the loss, phantasy reveals, through an 
obstinately repeated narrative scheme which informs the complex weave of primordial 
and perceptual signs, the force of the primary structures of thought which aim at the 
object of primal satisfaction. Anxiety, however, preserves itself as a meaningless, 
unfathomable signal; contrariwise, phantasy appears as the narration of an invariant, 
timeless, articulated scene. Yet, the persistent symbolic scheme of phantasy displays 
itself as a set of variations, the significance of which lies beyond hermeneutic inquiry. 
Thus, the allegorical nature of phantasy and anxiety have in themselves no other sense 
that the evidence of a loss; phantasy and anxiety are different kind of signals of a non-
representable object whose sense is, in th~ last analysis, only the absolute limit of the 
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subject's symbolic sphere. What can be seen as the narrative consistency and coherence 
of phantasy ~erives from the capacity of language to veil the force of the silent signs 
embodied in its expressive matter. Phantasy is comparable to the dream and what Freud 
identified as the secondary revision, which shapes the fictional development of oneiric 
signs. 
The unconscious expressions transformed by the secondary revision (se/qmdllre 
Bearbeitung] condense in different Baroque patterns distinct orders of temporality and 
modes of perception, qualities of silence and representations of absence in discourse, 
the different motks of narration involved in unconscious productions and the different 
kinds of pleasure --actual physical discharges of energy and hallucinatory satisfaction-
brought about by phantasy itself. Secrecy and allegory are privileged forms of 
expression which inform unconscious representations. 
Serge Andre has remarked the importance of this non-said that cleaves, 
dismembers, and punctuates narrative pace. He recalled that Breuer himself witnessed 
both the shifts of Ana O. among several different languages, and her obstinate mutism, 
and he observed as well that this shifting between languages or the defmite election of 
silence was the consequence of the singular experience of the exhaustion of her own 
language. 
Breuer avail deja observe qu'il arrivait que les mots manquent a 
Anna 0., au point qu'elle ne puisse plus s'exprimer que dans une 
autre langue que la sienne -eUe en connaissait quatre ou cinq-, 
OIl qu'elle soit frappee de mutisme durant plusieurs jours. Or, ce 
mutisme avait etC declenche par la rencontre .avec un certain etat 
du corps, plus precisement par la confrontation a une partie 
inanimee de son corps [ ... ] Ce mutisme soudain d'Anna 0., 
comme <:elui, plus ponctuel, d'Emmy, semblent pouvoir etre 
rapportes au trou, a la lacune par quoi Ie reel manifeste sa 
presence dans la parole. II ne s'agit pas simplement d'un vide, 
mais de la presence de quelque chose d'innommable qui impose 
I'interruption, la coupure de la chaine du discours. Emmyen 
donne une representation imaginaire dans un fantasme qu'elle a 
construit a partir d'un fait divers relate dans Ie journal: un jeune 
~ serait mort de terreur apres qu'on lui ait fourre une souris 
blanche dans la bouche.66 
The discourse collapses. The often untraceable gaps in the discourse then become 
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evident They do not exhibit only the exhaustion of words or a sudden weakening and 
shattering of .meaning, but also the abrupt encounter with an unavoidable, material 
presence of silence. This presence becomes in itself an unsurmountable barrier, the 
signal at the edge of the subject's experience. According to Andre, Emmy's phantasy 
is just an imaginary representation which envelops this present silence, this tangible 
brink of hollowness; phantasy is then conceived as a narrative development of a series 
of signs woven into an expansive surface about a fixed but unnamed, unn3J!leable 
presence. 
As Freud himself pointed out in Die Traumdeutung, the narrated phantasy is 
often astoundingly detailed and displays a perfect weave of images.67 There is, 
nevertheless a deep gap between the logic of the narration and the dynamic, agonistic 
, , . 
relation among the perceptions and expectations aroused by desire. This gap is filled 
with silence, the token of an unfathomable source, of an absolute, non-apprehensible 
form of the significance of silence itself. 
Freud clearly recognized this breach between the unconscious elements and the 
narrated scene. However, taken as an isolated term, the category of secondary revision 
[sekundlJre Bearbeitung] -put forward by Freud to account to the logical congruence 
of non-consistent images brought by different psychical processes into a singular 
narration- does not give a full aCcount of the profusion of temporal folds inherent in 
the narrated phantasy, and of the lavishness of its representations. Freud himself asserts 
the poverty of any possible taxonomy of the cycles, of the temporal layers 
simultaneously present in the interlocking episodes of phantasy, of the different 
. 
evocable episodes interwoven in the seemingly simple narrative line. The secondary 
revision, Freud admits, does not come after a primary, original construction. In the 
Traumdeutung, Freud recognizes'that, paradoxically, in the sources of subjectivity 
primary processes, secondary revision and the multiple threads of phantasy are woven 
together: 
Geht es etwa so vor sich, daB die traumbildenden Faktoren, das 
Verdichtungsbestreben, der Zwang, der Zensur auszuweichen, 
und die Riicksicht auf Darstellbarkeit in den psychischen Mitteln 
des Traumes, vorerst aus dem Material einen vorliufigen 
Tramninhalt bilden und daB dieser dann nachtraglich umgeformt 
wird, bis er den Ansplii~hen einer zweiten Instanz moglichst 
geodgt 1 Dies ist kaum wahrscheinlich. Man mufJ eher 
annehmen, dafJ die Anforderungen dieser lnstanz von aI/em 
Anfang an eine der Bedingungen abgeben, denen der Traum 
genQgen soli, und dafJ diese Bedtngung ebenso wie die der 
Verdichtung, der Widerstandszensur und der Darstel/harkeit 
gleichzeitig auf das grojJe Material der Traumgedanken 
induzlerend und QUSWahlend einwirken. Uoter den vier 
Bedingungen der Traumbildung ist aber die letzt erkannte 
jedenfalls die, deren Anforderungen fUr den Traum am wenigsten 
zwingend erscheinen. (Die Traumdeutung, SA, 1905, IT: 473f 
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Thus, the dream is forged by secondary revision together with all the other factors at 
the very origin of representation. Phantasy appears as the projection of a vast spectrum 
of inconsistent, and even conflicting, layers of memory in a recognizable sequence 
which then becomes acceptable, although it sometimes exhibits a fairly unbelievable 
series of images.6I Moreover, this' "logical" (for it derives from a formally coherent 
relation of the elements of fictional construction) and "non-logical" (for it is 
incongruous and inconsistent with regard to conventional logical schemes) disposition 
of the complex narration of phantasy undergoes a further fusion of temporalities. The 
evoked chronologies, the mixing of memory and desire, of the timeless experience of 
the loss and of its anticipation, the simultaneous presence of the immediate perception 
and the appearance of the transfigured testimonies of a crowd of experiences, engender 
a pattern of embedded chronologies. Freud, in Der Dichter und dos Phantasie stressed 
the conflicting temporalities of the dominant sequence of events in phantasy: the 
depiction of the scene precedes the introduction of a detailed description of events, the 
relation of which adumbrates the transfigured desired object. The phantasy "wraps" 
itself around this transfigured, deceiving, yet cardinal point of the narration. However, 
the development of phantasy as a whole tends to constrain the interpretation to its 
discernible significance. Phantasy -Freud insists- emerges only as fragmentary 
• Are we to suppose that what happens is that in the first instance the dream-constructing facton ~e tendency 
towardI condenJation. the necessity for evading the censonhip, and the considerations of representability by the 
physical means open to dreamI- put together a provisional dream-content out of the material provided. and that 
this content is subsequently n>CUt 10 as to confonn so far as possible to the demands of a second agency? This 
is scarcely probable. WelftllSt osslllfte raJher thatfrom the very first the demands ofthts secoltdfactor constitute 
OM of tIN condJlioft.J which tIN dream mlLSt satisfj and thai this condilion, like those /aid down by condensation, 
the ceft.Jorship impo8«l by ruUlDIICe, and conSiderations of represelllabilily, operates sinudlaneously in a 
co~ and selective sense II{KJn the mass of mole rial preselll in the dream-thoughts. In any case, however, of 
the four conditions for the formation of dreams, the ~ne we have come to know last is the one whose demands 
appear to have the 1cut cogent influence on dreams. (FP, 4: 641) 
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mixture of perception, memory and desire; it thus involves different kinds of silence , 
the violence of different disappearances, the changing words in which it is possible to 
perceive partial signals of the memories of pain, of isolated threads of conflicting 
histories, charged with nameless emotions aroused by scattered senseless signals. 
Das Verhftltnis der Phantasie zur Zeit ist Oberhaupt sehr 
bedeutsam. Man dart sagen: eine Phantasie schwebt gJeichsam 
zwisdx:n drei Zeiteu, den drei Zeitmomenten unseres VorsteUcos. 
Die seelische Albeit kniipft an einen aktuellen Eindruck, einen 
AnIaB in de Gegenwart ~ de imstande war, einen de groBen 
Wiinsche de Person zu wecken, greift von da aus auf die 
ErinDerung eines friiheren, meist infantilen, Erlebnisses ZWilck, 
in dem jener Wunsch erfiillt war, und schaffi nun eine auf die 
Zukunft bezogene 'Situation, welche sich als die Erfiillung jenes 
Wunsches darstellt, eben den Tagtraum oder die Phantasie, die 
nun die Spuren threr Herkunft yom Anlasse und von de 
Erlnnerung an s;oh tragt. Also Vergangenes, Gegenwartiges, 
ZukUnftiges wie an de Schnur des durchlaufenden Wunscbes 
aneinandergereiht. (Ver Dichter und das Phantasie, SA, 1908, 
X: 174. Emphasis added). 
Phantasy involves the conjunction of three chief, distinct moments of experience. An 
actual, contemporary perception of an object or certain of its features, immersed in the 
temporal flow of the experience, unleashes a regressive movement and the 
corresponding excitation of desire, arousing in the same impulse a fulfilling fictional 
construction, partially repressed but experienced nevertheless as intimately satisfying. 
But this three-stage construction is not exclusive to phantasy. The 
representational content of the mnemic image implied in the experience of satisfaction 
reveals the evidence of the similar temporal structure of the primary processes and 
other formations of the consciousness. The charge of energy of the mnemic traces, 
which is experienced as anticipation, and the obstinate impulse of desire, which appears 
as compelling repetition, defines rhythms and times which belong exclusively to the 
schemes of primary thought. Yet, anticipation and Sheer repetition are not comparable. 
"The relation of pMnlaBy to time is in general very important. We may say that it hovers, as it were, between three 
times -the three momc:nt.s of time which our ideation involves. Mental work is linked to some current impressions, 
some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From 
there it harks back to the memory of an earlier experience (usuaUy an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; 
and now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfillment of the wish. ~ ilthus creates is 
a day-dream or phonIosy, which carries about it traces of its origins from the occasion which provoked it and from 
the memory. Thus past, present and future are strun8.. together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs 
through them. (FP, 14: 135) 
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As distant poles in the temporal spectrum of the dense representation of time in the 
subject's experience, phantasy differs from the persistent, speechless tension of mere 
anticipation; phantasy exposes, in each of its variations, allegorical changing images 
of the restoration of the primordial conditions of satisfaction. 
Repetition acquires, in Freud's theoretical framework, the relevance of an explanatory 
notion, related intrinsically to his image of the form and the manifestations of the 
subject's experience of time, and to his conception of the relentless dynamic regulation 
of the principle of constancy and of the primal thought. 
Yet, Freud's rejection of the early theorical conception of abreaction as 
repetition and its therapeutic relevance invigorated the role of hallucination as 
allegorical repetition on Freud's theoretical horizon. It became a touchstone in early 
psychoanalytic theory, despite its conceptual precariousness. 
Hallucination, a universe of psychical phenomena frequently conceived as an 
isolated symptom, seemed to reveal, nevertheless, unexpected similarities to everyday 
psychical life and their unacknowledged common roots; their evidently discordant traits 
were thought to be linked by a common thread: hallucination, fantasy, daydream and 
even dream revealed themselves to Freud, as Romanticism lucidly foretold, as 
manifestations of similar structures exposing the symbolic relics of experience; they 
were shown to be invariantly and atavistically attached to the subject's own original yet 
forgotten early experience of plenitude. The common thread was provided by the 
complex armature of language, by its deceiving and enduring, yet mutable substance, 
by the vast repertory of its metamorphosis. Moreover, memories and traces of language 
persist as transformed images of the subject's ciphered, intimate history, of his 
obstinate love attachments and devotions; the destruction of the web of word-residues 
makes apparent the pervading experience of absence. 
The capacity of phantasy, hallucination and dream to expose obliquely, 
allegorically, the wordless structure of desire makes apparent another structural 
similitude between them: their reiterative narrations are not only figurative exposures 
of the silent vicissitudes of primary thought dominated by desire; they exhibit in a 
different expressive matter the condensed, dphered, unutterable history of the relation 
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of the subject to its own language as 1fIe means to express and unveil desire.69 Phantasy 
also reveals $it words alone may arouse a reflexive desire of language, of sense, of 
expressiveness. Phantasy is seen to express in the grammar of fiction and in the 
astonishing arrangement of evoked images and perceived features of actual objects, the 
subject's attachment to the mere physiognomy of words, which stand as autonomous, 
tangible objects. The relation between the fictional grammar of phantasy and language, 
sheds a distinct light upon the surface of signs that link phantasy to drama, drama to 
hallucination, hallucination to body, and body to language. 
IlL Freud's layers ofaUegory: theory as a map of sediments 
Freud's two "topographic" models of the subject's psychical apparatus, evince the 
unsurmountable difficulty in clearly defining the frontiers of the different agencies of 
subjectivity. There is an asymmetry between the "boundaries" of the different systems 
and agencies C?f the psychical apparatus: the barrier between conscious and unconscious 
is thin and pervious, elusive, difficult to define. Nevertheless, both agencies -the 
conscious and the pre-oonsciou9- form, as a whole, a congruous space which stands 
against the dark, abysmal sphere of the unconscious. Freud's metaphorical image of 
the limits between these contrasting and conflicting agencies, is that of a creased 
membrane, the folds of which penetrate the sphere of the preconscious-conscious 
system. But the dynamics of the unsteady, inner tensiofls of memory turns into an 
abstract allegory. Some repressed representations succeed in invading the sphere of the 
preconscious, by distorting or "disguising" themselves. Consequently, there seems to 
be a displacement of the frontiers of repression; an expansion or contraction of the 
sphere of the unconscious; either the metaphorical vessel of bodily energy swells, 
forcing the boundaries, penetrating the restricted territory of consciousness, or it 
shrinks driving the former boundaries to a new position. The action of repression 
strengthens itself as each fold penetrates into the conscious-preconscious system: Freud 
envisions this process as an epical, abstract struggle between cosmic forces; each new 
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intrusion of unconscious elements intensifies repression which tries to push them 
backwards. However, this is not a barren allegory: it lead Freud to a twofold 
conception of censorship as a dynamic model of the genesis of the layers of memory 
and its constraints; as well as an unprecedented insight of the obscurities of the relation 
between satisfaction and representation. 
Wir sehen, daB AbkOmmJinge des Ubw als Ersatzbildungen und 
als Symptome bewuBt werder in der Regel nach gro8en 
EntstelIungen gegen das Unbewu8te, aber oft mit Erhaltung vieler 
zur Vcrdrlngung auffordemden Cbaraktere. Wir finden, daB viele 
vorbewuBtc Bildungen \DlbewuBt bleiben, die, soUten wir meinen, 
ihrer Natur nacb sebr wohl bewu8t werden dUrften. Wahr 
scbein1ich macht sich bei ihnen die stirkere Anziehung des Ubw 
geltend. Wir werden darauf hingewiesen, die bedeutsamere 
Differenz nicbt zwieschen dem BewuBten und dem VorbewuBten, 
sondem zwischen jIem V0rbewu6ten und dem Unbewu6ten zu 
suchen. Das Ubw wird an der Grenze des Vbw durch die Zensur 
zurQckgcwiesen, AbkOmmlinge des selben kOnnen diese Zensur 
umgeben, sith hoch organisieren, im Vbw bis zu einer gewissen 
IntalSilit der Besetzung heranwachsen, werden aber dann, wenn 
sie diese Qbcrscbritten haben und sich dem BewuBtsein 
aufdrlngen wollen, aIs AbkOmmlinge des Ubw erkannt und an der 
beUeD Zensurgrenze zwischen Vbw und Bw neuerlich verdrlngt. 
t>ie erstere Zeusur funktioniert so gegen das Ubw selbst, die 
letzta'e gegen die Vbw Abkommlinge desselben. Man kOnnte 
meiueo, die Zensur habe sich im Laufe der individuellen 
Eutwicklung um ein StUck vorgeschoben. (Die Unbewu,Pte, SA, 
1914, m: IS2-1,3f 
However, in his late, second theory of the psychical apparatus (1923), Freud creates 
an astounding, yet misleading, optical and dramatic allegory to explain the dynamic 
tension which determines the subject's own sensations and symbolic-oriented 
behaviour: the super-ego glowers at the ego, which offers itself as a "visible" presence 
to this relentless enquiry. It is this allegory that guides his meditation on the sources 
°00 the ODe band, we find that dcrivativCl of the Ues. become conscioua as substitutive fonnations and symptoms 
- genenlly, ita iI true, after having undugone great di ;tortionl compared with the unconscioua, though often 
rctainina many oharaeteriatiCI which caD for represlion. On the other hand, we find that many prcconscioua 
i»nnations remain unoonaciouI. though we should have expected that, from their nature, they might very well have 
become conscioua. Probably in the latter cue the stronger attraction of the Ues. is asserting itself. We are led to 
look fOr the more impo~t diltinction as lying, not bc:twccn the conscioua and the prcconlcioua, but between the 
PrcoolllCioua and the unconscioUi. The Ues. is turned back on the frontier of the Pes. by the censorship, but 
derivatives of the Ues. can circumvent the censorship, achieve a high degree of organization and reach a certain 
imensay of cathexis in the Pcs. and the C3. Thus, the fint of these censorships is exercised agalnlt the Ua. itself, 
and the ICCOnd against its Pes. derivatives. One might suppose that in the course of individual development the 
censorship had taken a step forward. (FP, 11. 197-198) 
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of morality and feelings of CUlpability. This allegory, composed of a series of images 
which rep~t in fictional terms the genesis of pain, enlivened by the intimate 
exp«ience of culpability, is immediately interpreted by the theory in terms of the web 
of flows of energy discharge which shapes the subjet's identity; the struggle between 
super-ego and ego exposes the fictional nature of the subject's psychical processes, as 
a narrative counterpart of the dynamic outcome of the inextinguishable, destructive 
tension between energy states and processes. This tragic tale 1Illn'ates the imJJo.sibility 
01 the human being to fulfil its own ideal. Yet, this allegory lacks a complete, 
consistent plot; it is a fragmentary tale, a sequence of abrupt and compelling, isolated 
episodes of conflicts between characters. Different images enact the vicissitudes of 
anxiety; narrations of culpability and pain of the ego intrude in Freud's theoretical 
exposition in which mythical characters echoe the powerful allegory of the struggle 
between the opposing forres of Nature. In the psychoanalytic meditation on the origins 
of human suffering, and on the self destruction of the soul, an allegory folds back upon 
the other. 
Allegory illuminates the inextricable yet discordant relation between Freud's 
metapsychological view (economic, topographical and dynamic), and the fictional 
expression of self-consciousness; it displays the escatology of existence, the images of 
its inconsequential tragedy. The Conflicting implications of the meta psychological view, 
exposed by precarious, fictional means cast a diffuse light upon the "landscape" of pain 
and of memory. The impossibility of the ego to satisfy the demands of the ideal, 
chiefly imply the debasing involved in the exorbitant, exacting maxim: "you must say 
. 
the truth, all the truth"; the ideal, as we have previously asserted, involves an 
unexpressed cruelty veiled by the imperative of transparency. The destructive quality 
of secrecy springs, in psychical processes, from the understated violence of the 
metamorphosis of the ideal into the violence of the super-ego: 
Das Ober-Ich ist aber Dieht einfach ein Residuum der ersten 
Objelctwahlen des Es, sondem es hat auch die Bedeutung einer 
energischen Reaktionsbildung gegen dieselben.[ ... ] Das Ichideal 
ist also der Erbe des Odipuskomplexes und somit Ausdruck der 
mlchtigsten Regungen und wichtigsten Libidoschicksale des Es. 
Durch seine Aufrichtung hat sich das Ich des Odipuskomplexes 
bemAchtigt und gleichzeitig sich selbst dem Es unterworfen. 
Wahrend das Ich wesentlich Repriisentant der Au6enwelt, der 
Realitit is~ tritt ibm das Uber-Ich als Anwalt der Innenwel~ des 
Es, gegenuber. Konflikte zwischen Ich und Ideal werden, darauf 
sind wir nWl vorbereite~ in letzter Linie den Gegensatz von Real 
und Psychisch, Au6enwelt und Innenwel~ widerspiegeln. (Dos 
Ich und das Es, SA, 1923, ill: 301-302r 
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The conflict between psychical agencies mirrors and allegorizes Freud's Baroque vision 
of the contrast between the inner and the outer realms of subjectivity. The surface 
which envelops the subject and shapes its identity, folds inwards, and becomes an inner 
surface the fold of which creates autonomous yet heterogeneous agencies. 
Consciousness emerges from this sundering of a primordial identity; it thus appears, 
in tum, signified by the metaphor"of a fold, one of its faces turned outwards, to the 
external world, completely dominated by the logic of the faculty to perceive, while the 
other faCe"" turned inwards; as well, language capabe of naming the inner, mute 
disturbances of the soul, takes note of the distinct intensities of the charge of word-
residues, provoked by the effusion of energy through the memory traces which govern 
the impulses of desire. Consequently, super-ego appears as an uncertain fold of 
consciousness: it gives rise to certain perceptions, certain kinds of conscious behaviour 
and sensations, and yet, it is also an emanation of the unconscious history of the 
subject, an image of primordial, unconscious history of agonistic love and loss. 
IV. The Baroque substance: language as fold 
1. Words as membranes 
Freud envisioned the subject's memory of language -a necessary condition of the 
performance of speech- as a disarranged group of memories of signals; it was 
conceived as a marginal, almost recondite, autonomous psychical sphere of the 
-The supcr~go is, however, not simply a residue of the earliest object~hoices of the id; it also represents an 
energetic radion-fonnation against those choices [ ... J The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex, 
and thUi it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. 
By setting up this ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and at the same time placed itself in 
subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is CISaltially the representative of the external world, of reality, the supcr~go 
stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal 
will, as we are now prepared to fmd, ultimately reflect .the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, 
between the external world and the internal world (FP, 11: 374-376). 
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preconscious, likely to distinguish the nature of perceptions and sensations. In a sense, 
language w~ conceived by Freud as the main resource for the formation of the 
psychical identity; nevertheless, in the soul, the word stood for the absent object, and, 
consequently, was the privileged support of phantasy; it brought about deceiving 
remembrances, and prevented the subject from immediatly apprehending surrounding 
phenomena; yet, language was as well the subject's chief instrument for the building 
of a complex, open and ever-changing representation of the objects of the world .. Thus, 
language appears both as an inner dynamic boundary and as reflexive evidence of the 
subject's finiteness. 
Freud's early conception of the word evolved from a seemingly simple, vaguely 
delineated scheme of the relation between circumscribed mental representations, to the 
. 
image of language as a surface which both separates and weakens the force exerted 
upon psychical agencies by an increase of inner energy. Forrester clearly defines the 
ambiguous character of language, which, nevertheless, was to be considered a 
constraining and ordering device, an inhibitory web of representations capable of 
deferring and dissipating the intensity of discharges; and a means of attenuating the 
harshness of the immediate stimulus; Janguage thus intervenes as a reflexive, symbolic 
grid of settled mental images likely to rule the pleasure principle: 70 
Speech allows the '" system to suspend both imperatives of the 
pleasure principle; it allows thought concerning pain-producing 
objects to take place as easily as with relatively neutral memories, 
and it ensures that thought does not get 'stuck' pursuing 
immediate pleasure.71 . 
It stands as an inner frontier between pain and pleasure, and marks the boundaries of 
the subject; it embodies in its tight weave representations which shield the self and 
settle its limits. And yet language cleaves the subject. It allows consciousness to 
apprehend the evolution of forms and identities,' and thus to anticipate the failure of 
actions, attenuating the devastating force of absence and the intensity of pain. 
Paradoxically, it enables the subject to inhibit and intersperse the continuous response 
to the exacting conditions of the environment, construed as imposing but abysmal 
exigencies of the world. Language is the locus of psychical representations of uncertain 
qualities, simultaneously internal and extez:nal, subjectively determined and foreign to 
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the inner constraints of the representation: pain and impulse, the sources of the 
subject's action. It constitutes, within subjectivity itself, a closed and dense autonomous 
universe. 
Since Freud's first conception of language, broadly sketched in the Entwu1f, 
words were seen to convey the signs of quality which made it possible for the subject 
to distinguish between memories and pen:eption. Language appeared then as the means 
of identifying the perceptions which come from beyond the boundaries of the subject. 
A peculiar inflection of the sense of experience derives from this vision of 
language. As has been said already, truth, as conceived by Freud in the Entwu1f, is not 
conceived as the name of a definable correspondence between the word and its object. 
The ~ropriate correspondence between word and object is only achieved through the 
complex aSsortment of memory, primary thought, attention, and potential or actual 
action. It does not derive from an ontological condition either of the word itself, or of 
the world, but from the singular role of the word in the assortment of heterogeneous 
psychical processes in the subject's desire. 
Freud's suggestive images of the deep cleft between language and thought, and 
between thought and truth become essential conditions for the genetic and dynamic 
relevance of his conception of language in his notion of psychical processes. Freud's 
explicit conception of language, formulated early in his psychoanalytic work, albeit 
excluded from his late works, will, nevertheless, silently inform his fundamental 
theoretical constructions. His notion of judgement -thought of as the outcome of 
primary, speechless thought- essential for the comprehension of the dynamics of 
repression and which upholds the entire psychoanalytic framework bears a crucial yet 
intricate and obscure relation to the formal rules of speech. The mnemic system of the 
signs of language does not only serve the need for achieving a specific action, but also 
informs and renders perceivable conscious thought. It is the reflexive power of 
language that forges its relative autonomy and preserves it from the exigencies of 
primary thought. By the means of reflexive language it becomes possible for the subject 
to discern the outer provenance of a perceived signal; thus, the possibility of reflexion 
makes consciousness able to distinguish between the signs originating in the inner 
process, and those which derive from the perception of the world. Consequently, 
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language is capable of inhibiting the discharge of inner energy, whenever the outer 
signals enliveJ:l in the memory of language the representation of the imminent failure 
of the action. The principle of reality -as Freud named this resource of reflexive 
Ianguag&- is essentially linked to the possibility of deferring the discharge because of 
outer warning signs, the significance of which are revealed by reflexive language. 
Wir werden UDS zur AMahme entschlic8en m11sscn, daB diese 
Lust- und Unlustentbindungen autornatisch den Ablauf der 
Besetzungsyorginge rcgulieren. Es hat sich aber splter die 
Notwendigkeit herausgestellt, zur ErmGglichung femerer 
Leistunaen den Vorstellungsablauf unabhlnaiger von den 
Unlustzeichen zu gestalten. Zu diesem Zwecke bedurfte das 
~ysImI eigener qualitlten, die das BewuBtsein anziehen 
kGnaten, und erbieIt sie hGchst wahrscheinlich durch die 
VerknOpfung der vorbewu8ten Vorglnge mit dem nicbt 
qualitltslosen Erinnerunpsystem der Spracbzeichen. Durch 
die QuaIiWc:n dieses Systems wird jetzt das Bewu8tse~ das 
vorher nur Sinnesorgan fUr die Wahmehmungen war, auch zum 
Sinnesorgan fUr einen Teil unserer Denkvorglnge. (Die 
Traumdeutrmg, SA, 1900, IT: 547f 
It is unpleasure and, more compellingly, pain that drives the psychical apparatus to the 
unfolding of the capacity of language: the need for its relative autonomy, the 
independence [Unabhlingigkeit] of language from the pressure of primary thought. The 
need to delay a discharge, which might lead to unpleasure and pain, imposes on word-
residues a growing dependence upon perceived surroundings; word-residues acquire 
the force of anticipatory signs; they either betoken coming satisfaction or impending 
pain. The cleavage of reflexive representation and the autonomy of the evocative power 
of language confer on desire the capacity to create the subject's experience of time and 
the need for future; desire is also the source of the need for the perceived intensities 
of a pain. 
This dual and intermediate nature of the 'Yord is that of other psychoanalytic 
objects: consciousness, drive and pain -this latter explicitly considered by Freud as an 
We are thus driven to conclude that these releues of pleasure and unpleasure automatically regulate the course 
of the cathectic processes. BUI, ill order to mob more delicalely adjusted performances possible, it /IJler became 
necessary to moIce IIu course of ideas less depmt/nallIpOn the presence or absence of u"Pleasure. For this purpose 
the Pes. system Metied to have tpIIJIitW qfils own whiCh could allract consciousness; and it seems highly probable 
that it obtaiMd thnn by IWcing IIu preconscious processes with the mnemic systma of the language signs. Through 
these qualities, consciousness, which had hitherto been Ii sense organ for perceptions alone, also became a sense 
organ for a portion of our thought-processes. (FP, 4: 729-730) 
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"intermediate thing" [Mineiding]-, which paradoxically both obscure and mark the 
limits of self. The relation of language to pain remains ambiguous, unfathomable: both 
are uncertain objects; however, pain remains foreign to language and, as has already 
been remarked, it even appears as a non-symbolic physical catastrophe able to confer 
on the body a peculiar symbolic shape, to build its fictional nature, informing the 
subject's imagination and representation of its own flesh, and to create the subject's 
own sense of identity. The opaqueness of pain remains intractable within Freud's 
horizon. 
Language exhibits an ambiguous quality: it shapes the experience of time and 
is likely to call up the presence of the loved object confering on it a clear sense both 
of timelessness and of foreigness. Language spreads the web of associated memories 
that veils and disperses the intensities of pain. It is by the means of a silent, non-
signifying process that language dissipates the compelling and violent increase of 
energy due to the failure of primary thought; the broadening breach between the 
perception of language and the experienced, mute violence of primary thought, 
paradoxically informs the sense of pain, and gives it a conscious representation. It 
brings about the meaningful figures of pain and its associated images as an abstract, 
chimerical yet efficent object of reflexive consciousness. 
Thus, language, in the eariy psychoanalytic conception, contravenes the belief 
in the referential meaning of words. Moreover, it completely rejects the conception of 
words the sense of which might be free from the subject's affections. As Freud 
suggests, the experience of the word is alone a synthesis of the subject's heterogeneous 
experience of time, a fusion of manifold memories of actions and objects and the ruling 
force of habits of speech, a perceived figure at the crossroads of desire and the 
perceived signals of the world. Language does not only point towards an external 
universe of beings, it also appears as a twofold object: one of its faces turned to 
psychical process, while the other is the perception of a foreign object itself. 
2. The double inscription: folding and negation 
Freud's outstanding work, Die Vemeining (Negation) (1925), begins with a series of 
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seemingly trivial examples of negation, extricated from the psychoanalytic dialogue: 
Freud quotes.an imaginary patient who addresses him: "Sie fragen wer diese Person 
im Traume sein leann. Die Mutter ist es nicht" . • The immediate interpretation of this 
negative statement given by Freud is of a discouraging, misleading simplicity: ·Wir 
berechtigen: 'Also ist es die Mutter'"." The naivete of this "deductive" procedure, 
articulated as a facile inversion of the sense of the question, the outcome of which 
amounts to the obvious suppression of the negative particle, masks its own labyrinthine 
and disquieting theoretical implications. Jean Hyppolite emp~ized the unusual 
strangeness of this simple resource of the psychoanalyst: it does not only involve a 
profound revision of the theoretical notion of subjective truthfulness, but also a peculiar 
interpretation of the position of the symbolic particle of negation -nein- in the 
dynamic relation between the subject and his own discourse. 
Hyppolite perceives in the Freudian quotation not only a simple negation, but a 
complex act: a sort of dis-judgement [de-Ju~ement]. Hyppolite expounds the complex, 
reflexive folding of the negative statement upon itself, involved in the simple act of 
denying the recognition of a certain dreamt character. What Freud seems to be 
emphasizing in the quotation is that while the denial seems an appropriate, non 
unsettling answer, the subjective"knowledge involved in the act of recognition is not. 
The destructive violence which ensues from this immediate disavowal of the identity 
of the evoked image, is not originated in the very nature of the reference of the 
judgement to its object, but in the complex constraint which inhibits the full appearance 
of the sought identity, which incites the subject to the denial of the reappearance of the 
repressed image. Negation involves both the rejection of the actual image of the desired 
object, and the veiling of desire, which amounts to disregard the sense of desire itself. 
The dis-judgement alluded to by Hyppolite thus 'involves a deferral, a suspension of 
sense. Giving such a relevance to negation, Freud particularly stresses not the 
irrelevant, fleeting phrase which occurs in the dialogue, but the primordial relevance 
-You ule who thil penon in the dR*n can be. It is not my mother. (FP, 11: 431) 
-We emend this to: So, it is hiJ mother. (FP, 11:431) 
of the act of negation in the structure of subjectivity. 
Die Vemeinung ist eine Art, das Verdringte zur Kenntnis zu 
~ ei~ schon eine Aufbebung der Verdringung, aber 
freilich keme Annahme des Verdringte. (Die Vemetnung, S~ 
1925, lli: 373r 
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Hyppolite prevents the reader of the Freudian text from hastily and thoughtlessly 
interpreting this mention to the "lifting" [A'4fhebung] of the repression in this context. 
Presenter son atre sur Ie mode de De l'atre pas, c'est vraiment de 
cela qulil slagit dans cette Aujhebung du refoulement qui n'est pas 
une acceptation du refoule. n 
To consider negation a sort of "inverted ontological meaning" of the presentation of the 
recalled object bears disquieting consequences. As in irony, the clue to the inverted 
meaning of the presentation relies on the belief in a certain natural essence of the 
world; both irony and negation suspend the referential meaning of language. Irony 
demands, to be clearly understood, a radical semantic inversion. In it, the sense of the 
utterance as a whole swerves from its expected meaning, despite the fact that the actual 
words seem to have an accetable form and aim at a virtual reality. There is nothing in 
the surface of the judgement that reveals the surreptitious invenion of the sense, save 
perhaps a subtle accent or a peculiar stress of the body. Irony emerges from the crevice 
between evocation and perception: The Freudian conception of negation, conceived as 
an act of denial, also stress its perceivable duality of sense, but a more unsettling one: 
the words express what the subject wishes to believe, while the presence of negation 
betokens an unnoticed, uncertain yet poignant sense, the evidence of which is veiled 
by the force of the negative particle. 
Thus, according to the Freudian scheme, the negation involved in the act of 
denial is nothing but the residue of the repression suffered by the reappearing, 
metaphorical, tranfigured images of the primordiai object of love. In this context, the 
meaning of the negative particle is neither logical nor semantic; it is a pure relic, debris 
of an inner conflict, of a tension which signals the limits of the subject and of the 
expressive capacity of language. The negative particle lacks any reference, any 
*Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is rq>JCSsed; indeed it -is already a lifting of rq>ression, though 
not, ofcoune, an acceptancc of what is rq>re&sed. (FP, 11: 438) 
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meaning; as part of the act of denial it exhibits itself as an inert word. However, this 
noticeable sign of negation, in Freud's words, the certificate of origin 
[Ursprungszertijikat], the "Made in Germany" (quoted by Freud in English) of the 
repression, adumbrates the weakening of the violence exerted by of repression on 
reflexive consciousness. The "no" [nicht] does not only reveal itself as a visible vestige 
of the repression which has already taken place -just as anxiety will be interpreted in 
the later works of Freud as a signal of the looming, threatening obsolescence of the 
object. It also betrays the partial failure of repression. 
This attenuated, "marked", "symbolized" lifting of the repression casts some 
light upon the opaque notion of acceptance [Annahme] put forward by Freud, as an 
intermediate state in which a heavily charged image that springs from the primary 
thought, has been emptied of its affective charge through the act of negation. This 
acceptance embodies both the time of the presentation, of the utterance, and a 
transfigured, inert image of the wished-for object. What the notion of acceptance seeks 
to illuminate is, perhaps, the sense of negation as a fold of language which allows the 
originally repressed object to appear through the veil of the negative, meaningless 
signal. 
Yet, this veil does not obliterate the memory and the representation of the 
primal object. Negation creates a supplementary image, a distorted, inert resonance of 
the primal object which remain in the subject's memory. Negation engenders an image, 
a fold of language which displays the lifeless, debased image of the primordial object, 
the sprouts (Freud) of which will coexist in consciousness with the lingering, inane 
emanations of itself both invoked and stigmatized by the "not". Thus, the lifting 
[Aujhebung] of the repression is the evidence of this complex assembly of 
representation offered to the subjeCt's reflexive consciousness. 
Language embodies this negative sign the role of which differs abruptly from 
the others; it is a strange, opaque sign, likely to exhibit a singular relation to the 
images which emerge from the primordial stage in the genesis of the subject's identity. 
It is a foreign sign in the midst of meaningful words, the evidence of an non-significant 
token which informs the whole system" of language. 
The structure of this duality of the Iepresentation of the primal object, its bare 
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image duplicated by negation which will coexist with its own traces, calls to mind the 
terrifying ex~ence of the uncanny, depicted by Freud: in negation, the repressed 
image of the wished-for object remains confined within the unconscious, while its 
distorted duplicate, its negated image, reappears in consciousness as a perceived, 
threatening, foreign object. However, the experience of the uncanny differs from 
negation in that in the former the duplicated image which looms in the subject's 
perception stirs intense affection, the violence of which repeats that of the ot:iginal 
experience of loss. 
What arouses terror is the clear pereeption of the fold itself, what Freud named 
the projection. Projection suspends the subject's awareness of his own limits: it is 
neithe~ the actual uprooting nor the embodiment of the threatening image of the 
.. ' 
subject's oWn prim8l object. This optical metaphor, which haunts Freud's writing from 
its very beginning to his last work, reveals the complex theoretical relevance of the 
notion of projection, its twofold topographical sense. The projected image strikes the 
subject as a condensed sign which enacts its own fragmented history, its own origins 
and the impulses which determine its own fate. The projection has the features of 
allegory; the fragment acquires an autonomous, appalling meaning that encompasses 
a closed and complete universe of sense. The particular intensity of the terror stirred 
by the uncanny seems to rely upon the exact correspondence between the image 
associated with the traces of the Primal object, and its "reflected" image, in spite of its 
unaccountable physiognomy, of its radical strangeness to the subject's consciousness. 
Although the projected image has its own identity as an object of the world, its . 
conventional meaning vanishes; the sign seems to be intrinsically bonded to the 
subject's intimate, unspeakable memories. 
Negation, on the contrary, suffocates the emotion incited by the projected 
image. The denied identity of the evocation seems to bring about in the subject IS 
consciousness a quietness which seems to be due to the absolute unawareness of the 
violence of the image. However, that which suffocates terror in the act of denial is the 
folding back of negation upon itself; the act of denial merges in a sequence the 
negation and the obliteration of the threatening image: the subject acknowledges the 
actual identity of the image and, without effacing it from consciousness, recognizes it 
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as something it is not, only to abandon it immediately. Yet, this abandonment is not 
a mere exclusipn. In Freud's conception, it is the expression of a negative judgement 
which bears a moral sense rooted in the subject's identity. The identity of the image 
has been condemned [velUneilen] and this "condemnation" derives from the allegorical 
sense engendered by the act of denial itself. It is denial that dooms the image to 
disappearance and meaninglessness; it repeats and negates the memories of the 
threatening loss of the primordial object. 
Freud's allegorical sense of condemnation [Veruneilung] imposes on the 
theoretical interpretation a disturbing meaning: negation as condemnation does not only 
involve the strict sense of the act of denial, it also alludes to rejection, projection and 
abjection. It is the moral allegory of condemnation [Veruneilung] as abjection that 
illuminates obliquely the intimate alliance of negation and secrecy, its definitive 
position in the construction of the subject's identity; condemnation sets the boundary 
of the tolerable, the qualities of the proper sphere, of that which is congruous with the 
subject's identity; it defines the limits between purity and contamination, of the inner 
and the outer. 
Freud's empiricist, peculiar "Lockean" heritage73 is simultaneously confirmed 
and negated by the allegories of negation. Negation implies what Hyppolite has named 
"the formation of the myth of the subject's inner and outer dimensions": 
n me semble que pour comprendre son article [Die Vemeinung], 
iI !aut coosiderer Ia negation du jugement attributif et la negation 
du jugement d'existence, comme en ~a de la negation au 
moment oil cUc apparait dans sa fonction symbolique. Au fond, 
II y a un premier mythe du dehors et du dedans, et c'est la ce 
qu'tl s'agit de comprendre.74 
The puzzling dualism of negation had been adumbrated by Freud since his early works, 
and alluded to obliquely in the discussion of several issues. It was implied in the 
puzzling conceivable coexistence of two images of the same object in different 
territories of the psychical apparatus, the possibility of different memory traces of the 
same object, likely to endure different psychical processes, and submitted to different 
dynamic constraints: the theoretical incongruence of the simultaneous existence of an 
unconscious and a conscious image of the same object, which Freud narned "the double 
inscription" of a representation. 
daB die Bw Phase der Vorstellung eine neue, an anderem Orte 
befindlicbe Niederschrift derselben bedeute, ist unzweifelhaft die 
grobere, aber auch die bequemere. Die zweite Annahme die einer 
bloB funktionellen Zustandslnderung, ist die von ;omherein 
wahrschcinlicbe, aber sie ist minder pJastisch, weniger lcicht zu 
handbaben. Mit der ersten, der topischen Annahme ist die einer 
topischen Trennung der Systeme Ubw und Bw und die 
MlJglichkett verkniJpft. daft etne Vorstellung gletchzettig an 
zwei Stellen des psychischen Apparats vorhanden sei. ja, daB 
sie, wenn durch die Zensw- ungehemmt, regelmiBig von dcm 
einen Ort an den anderen vorrQcke, eventuell ohne ihre erste 
Niederlassung oder Niederschrift zu verlieren. 
Das mag befiemdlich aussehen, kann sich aber an Eindnlcke aus 
der psychoanalytischen Praxis anIehnen. (Vas Unbewuftte, SA~ 
1915, m: 134): 
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In his 1915 paper, Freud put forward the idea of a two-phase representation. While one 
trace remains unconscious, the other lingers as a new image in consciousness. 
However, Freud envisaged the distinct phases of representation as joined by a negative 
relation. The theoretical relevance of this issue was not to be adequately grasped until 
ten years later: in Die Ve17leinung, the vicissitudes of the different symbolic regimes 
of different representations of the same, unconscious object were approached through 
a previous insight: the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to a common process aroused 
both in primary and secondary processes, in speech and desire, in reflexive discernment 
and in silent, unutterable judgement. In a crucial passage from Jenseits which foretells 
the significant relation of pleasure and unpleasure to the "double inscription" Freud 
wrote: 
Jedenfalls moB das, was am Erregungsvorgange die 
Empftndungen von Lust rind Unlust entstehen liBt, beim 
Sekundiirvorgang ebenso vorhanden sein wie heim 
Primlrvorgang .. (Je!JSeits des Lustprinzip, SA, 1920, m: 271r-
-The fint of the two pos.ibilities which we considered -namely. that the Cs. phase of an idea implies a fresh 
registration of it, which is .ituated in another pla~ is doubtless thc cruder but also the more convenient. The 
ICICOnd hypotheaia ~ of a lIICftly jIIItcIIoMJ change of state- is a priori more probable, but it is less plastic, less 
easy to manipulate. WillI the first. or topographical, hypothesis is bound lIP thai of a topographical septlTation of 
the system Va. and Cs. and abo the pombiJily thai (l1I idea may exist simMlttmeously ill IMIO p/Qcu ill the mntJtJl 
appaTaIIu -indeed. that if it is not inhibited by the ceIUIonhip. it regularly advances from the one position to the 
other. possibly wiIhollllosing ilsjirstloctlllon or registration. 
This view may seem odd. but it can be supported by obscrvations from psychoanalytic practice. (FP. 11: 177) 
"'Whatever it is that causes the appearance of fcelingll of pleasure and unpleasure in process of excitation must be 
present in the secondary process just as it is in the primary one. (FP. 11: 337) 
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Freud's development of the idea that what aroused sensations [Empjindungen] of 
pleasure and unpleasure must exist in both consciousness and unconsciousness, offers 
a purely dynamic model of the double inscription and it adds an unexpected, yet subtle, 
abstract tum to the allegories of negation, rendering negation exclusively in terms of 
energy. And yet the allegorical images of negation as the crucial psychical process in 
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Chapter IV 
Aphasia: towards the biological sovereignty of silence 
L The unfolding of aphasia 
1. Freud as a reader of his own work 
The affinity of Freud's writings ~th Baroque expression is apparent not only in the 
embedded structure of theoretical metaphors and allegories and in the crucial role 
played by contrasting scatological notions -the beginning and end of life- in the 
development of his theory, as well as in his passion for paradoxes, finiteness, 
transience, death and pain. It is also evident in cardinal features of its writing: both in 
the aim to expose the tensions involved in the construction of his own writing, and in 
the crucial role acqUired in it by the reflexive reading of his own text, a clear 
manifestation of his consciousness both of the limits and the striving for totality which 
commanded his theoretical endeavour. A singular alliance between writing and reading 
stresses the Baroque tension of, the temporality of writing in the unfolding of the 
Freudian text. His writings exhibit an unusual chronological structure made of 
interlocking and embedded series of added and overlaying texts and commentaries. He 
corrected tirelessly his most important texts. The number, nature and date of the notes 
and remarks he himself successively added to the earlier editions of his work are 
explicitly indicated and simultaneously embodied in the text. They constitute a sort of 
parallel text, almost as detailed., disquieting and fruitful as the main body of the text 
itself -Freud's notes sometimes show his abrup.t and crucial hesitations, signalling 
several abysmal and unresolved opacities in the theory. 
Moreover, these additions are medculously dated. They bear the signs of their 
original appearance. They appear as archeological residues, as evidence of the 
unresolved inconsistencies in the theory. Freud exhibits himself as his own most 
demanding and devoted reader, yet a peculiar one. He expunged paragraphs, even 
pages. He mutilated his previous exposition-or deliberalely weakened its argumentative 
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structure. This effort shows a strange contradictory impulse: it seems to reveal a 
restrained, self-vigjJated writing, expressing thriving and lavish theoretical imagination. 
He seems to strive covatly for a style; he often betrays in his writing his wish 
for an auvre, which, had it been expressed, would have contradicted his own 
epistemological principles. His ambiguous attitude regarding literature -simultaneously 
exalted and reticent- made of it an often tacit, yet sometimes oppressive ideal which 
seems to have inci1al him to build a monumental, coherent work, while preventiJ1g him 
from deliberately engaging in the tempting utopia of a congruent and exhaustive 
interpretation of the enigmas of subjectivity. Freud seems to have envisaged truth as 
a final end, as the implicit outcome of the coherence and congruence of the system 
built throughout the vicissitudes of his writing: this closely resembles the Baroque 
" . . 
imperativeS which implicitly informed the Romantic poetic enterprise that Freud so 
deeply admired. Indeed, his endless collection of fragments was imbedded in a larger, 
yet dismembered structure of other texts that seem to obey faithfully the Romantic 
project as Benjamin saw it: 
Das Absolute war fUr Friederieh Schlegel in der Athenlumzeit 
allerdings das System in der Gestalt del Kunst Aber er suchte 
dies Absolute Dieht systematisc~ sondern vie1mehr umgekelut 
das System absolut zu erfassen. Dies war das Wesen seiner 
Mystik.-· 
Absoluteness and finiteness are two inextricably bonded faces of the vertigo 
experienced in face of death. It is the primacy of the Absolute that evinces the 
finiteness of all human efforts, the weakness of the symbolic means to comprehend the 
intense violence of the dialogue between the imperiousness of the absolute and the 
tangible, discomfiting experience of finiteness. Benjamin saw as a characteristic of 
Romanticism the non systematic search for the System, the non systematic quest for the 
Absolute, for a timeless system of representations the completeness and wholeness of 
which should evidence the transcendental unity of the work. The desire for the 
Absolute joins the longing for an illuminating but inconclusive symbolic system. It 
"In the age of Athmaeum, for Friederich Schlegel, the System as the form of art, was the Absolute. But he did not 
sedc this absolute in a systematic way; on the contrary, i!.e sought the comprehension of the System in an absolute 
way. This was the essence of his mystic. (My translation) 
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constitutes a common ground for both the Baroque and the Romantic enterprises. 
This confluence of the imperative of both closeness and openness reveals also 
a perceivable tension in the Freudian work. However, Freud' s unavowed endeavour 
to apprehend the Absolute is explicitly rejected by him and silenced by a clear and 
acceptable claim: his resolute belief on the power of observation turned itself into a 
promise of truth. Thus, his devotion to a positivistic conception of truth appears as the 
consequence of the desire of the end of reflexion, to encounter the edge of thought, to 
contemplate its twilight, and to accept the blame for the failure of the a:uvre. Freud did 
admit, tacitly, as a necessary impulse in the origin of his writing, the delusive promise 
of the a:uvre. Freud's retrospective reading of his own work leads him to implacably 
introduce additions and corrections, which appear as an implicit pledge of future 
illumination: the intrusion of the late achievements into the early enquiries, a violent 
rejection of the increasing power of an evolving theory. Also, he explicitly devoted 
himself to fill in the gaps of his own theory, to repair the inevitable early fractures, to 
build a dense and congruent theoretical web, to sketch the future achievements of his 
theoretical enterprise and to add them to past texts; he intrudes in the temporal 
unfolding of his own text, incorporating incongruous, non pertinent issues in the 
middle of the expositon; he even suggested that well after his death, beyond the 
boundaries of his own work, there would be a much more accurate, biological 
explanation of certain notions, which appeared then as intolerably speculative. A 
future, biological truth would redeem his theory from present enigmas and obscurities. 
The mirage of an everlasting work is dominated, however, by the sense of a 
never achieved certainty. The progressive settlement of textual folds, the abrupt 
accumulation of encroaching, later texts upon the early wavering exposition, the 
sudden, premature appearance of illuminations of future developments of his own 
theoretical thought rarefyied the reading of texts with future refutations. This puzzling 
weave of temporalities is not evidence of the progressive approach of the text to the 
sought truth, but of the striving for pUrification. 
In his doctrinal fragments, Friederich Schlegel wrote2: 
Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden~ ja das ist ihr 
eigentliches Wesen, daB sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein 
kann.· 
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According to the Romantic conception, the unity of the auvre is that towards which 
the being is driven, that which the subject seeks even with assumed hopelessness and 
in silence. 71Ie transcendental ideal o/the unity o/the subject, o/the soul, becomes an 
intrinsic condition 0/ being, which ensures the actulll progress o/the theory. There is 
no evolution 0/ the being without a will to achieve sameness. 
Perhaps, beyond the constraints of the Romantic imagination, Freud's own 
conceptual work is haunted by the spectre of infinite writing. For him, speculative 
thought -which he openly rejects- moves in a closed circle: the text forges its own 
autonomy, its own isolation. It evolves by folding in restlessly upon itself; the 
. .' . 
illuminating capacity of its theoretical constructions is inextricably related to the 
aesthetic emotion aroused by the affection involved in writing itself. It is this intrinsic 
relation between illumination and aesthetic emotion that constitutes, paradoxically, the 
openness of writing; thus, writing itself ~ght be thought of as an infinite "work-in-
progress" as it develops into an inexhaustible theoretical and aesthetic expansion. 
None of Freud's texts was conceived as a closed universe nor as part of one. 
Paradoxically, his rejection of the isolation of theory led to an encompassing movement 
of writing, which seemed to revolve around a fixed yet unreachable, non-depictable 
point. The historical scope of each book thus becomes meaningless: the boundaries 
between a text and its surroundings, the internal cohesion of each text and the sequence 
of its arguments are negligible. Freud's· auvre is not to be found in the collection of 
texts and uneven and dispersed writings; they, indeed, reject categorization as an 
achieved, finished work. Yet, Freud's rejection of the closure of his own writing did 
not eradicate his passion for the auVre, it merely reinforced an understated link: truth 
should emerge from an autonomous whole, from the dismembered auvre which, 
nevertheless, experiences an imperceptible and permanent metamorphosis. Each of the 
cardinal works of Freud exhibits a spectrum of dated fragments originating at different 
stages of hi·s theoretical development; entangled traces of successive and mutating 
'The romantic poetic fonn is alwaY' becoming, this is its proper being, that it becomes infinite, never ending. (My 
translation) 
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chronological readings, relics of past stages of thought, suddenly fold back upon 
previous textual fragments; the writings swerve suddenly and violently from the main 
stream of argument. Freud's text becomes an imaginary crowd of residues of writings 
which expose the confluence of widely diverging impulses of thought and experience. 
Freudian thought exhibits the paradoxical endeavour to create a timeless text; a sense 
of timelessness emerges from the obsessive accumulation of traces of dated reflections. 
This timelessness evokes the invariant nature of the fictional system, a transcen~ental 
structure able to exhibit the immutability of truth. Freud devotes himself to the building 
of this mirage of a conceptual system. The image of a closed, timeless work was seen 
to confinn the truth of the awvrt, as well as the auvre as truth. 
, The certain, quiet force of the textual metamorphosis does not only seem to 
have guided Freud's writing; it also, and even more compellingly, governed Freud's 
reading of his own work. The imposibility of the auvre as consistent, unitary text, 
which Freud exhibited as a proof of genuine scientific thought, became then, 
paradoxically, the guarantee of the permanence of Freud's achievement, beyond the 
failure of his own thought. 
The exhausting and detailed metamorphosis of his previous text, brought about 
by the writings which sprang from his own reading, numerous marginal remarks and 
notes, exhibited Freud's paradoxiCal longing: the persistence of his name and his ideas, 
beyond the vicissitudes of text. 
Freud's "will to style" embodies his deliberate striving for fragmentariness, and 
his wish to achieve a careful, meditated shape in his phrases, in his unfolding 
arguments and in his persuasive exposure of his clinic evidence. Moreover, Freud's 
writing exhibits the effect of other visible constraints, of contradictory historical 
models for the construction of eVidence, of the subtle pressure exerted upon the 
psychoanalytic thought by his unresolved aim both to achieve the ideals of 
Enlightenment and to embrace the Romantic exploration of the limits of human 
experience frequently burdened by reappearing images of death; Freud's text conveys 
the force of contrasting self-images, of the exacting demand which stems from his 
contradictory self-chosen portrait, engendered paradoxically by his urgent need for a 
definite identity. 
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His work, like the archeological, Baroque cities he cherished, is made up of 
inlaying pieces of meaningful remains of monuments and relics originating at different 
stages of contruction; landscapes formed by rising, foreign evidence of already 
destroyed universes surrounded by a prodigal variety of live elements. Many of these 
abrupt monuments do not even bear a simple sign which would permit the recognition 
of the source, the origins, or even the date of their construction. As with archeological 
relics, only interpretation, the poignancy of an obstinate enquiry, the devotion of 
exegesis, has patiently forged a singular and encompassing perception of Freud's work: 
the roughness of the text might be seen as the result of the gradual settling of his own 
conflicting readings of himself. Despite its Baroque form, the Freudian text does not 
demand a thorough, but hopeless deciphering. Rather, in what may seem an unexpected 
paradox, it demands a meditative reading. Each embedded fragment allows unsuspected 
inflections of sense, the reappearance of notions that would linger as potential 
illuminations or emerging opacities condemned to remain unnoticed or disfigured. The 
interpretation of former texts is perturbed by the shadow of later potential senses, of 
which only dim traces are recognizable. Each shred of the later written reflection 
embedded in an earlier text either evokes still unknown stages of the built up theory, 
or carries implicit, subtle echoes of displaced or distorted concepts; later meanings 
which remain unattainable but in"scribed in earlier texts seem to demand the reader's 
acquaintance with the whole Freudian auvTe, an acquaintance which the text itself 
explicitly denies. 
There are also countless veiled and obscure passages of earlier text, which 
reappear in later works as relics of former constructions. Freud scatters over the text 
elusive signs which mayor may not conduce us to his successive writings. This 
accumulation of fragmentary teXts"and reformulations arouses in the reader the need 
to assume the existence of a suspended sense. 
The date inscribed in the notes arouses in its reader, paradoxically, a sense of 
the non-temporality of its meaning. The texts are not acknowledged as passing, 
transient and wasteful expressions of restricted validity, the significance of which will 
be soon outweighed by new ones. Freud seems to see his own texts as freed from the 






privileged means to expound the relation between sexual and self-preserving instincts, 
which lead him to the crucial notion of narcissism, clearly related to this election of the 
object. The promotion of the Anlehnung to a definite allegorical status preserves 
essentially its dark and non elucidated facets. 
But the chief effect of the deliberate oblivion of Zur Auffassung and its context 
was, perhaps, that it enhanced the allegorical resonance of psychoanalytic discourse. 
Freud's suppression of the traceable sources of psychoanalytic thought, the di~ming 
of the context which determined the outcome of his path of thought, and the forging 
of a fictional autonomy of the theory, set conditions which seem to tally with those of 
allegorical expression as conceived by Benjamin. The omission of the source and 
context of the word gives rise to the allegorical sense of the tale of the "origins" of 
psychoanalysis. While trying to expound other related topics, the allegorical sense of 
Anlehnung and Trieb will shape the narration of Freudian cosmology: sexuality and 
autoanalysis, memory and the "talking cure", Oedipus and Rome, desexualization and 
sublimation, ego, super-ego and ide 
3. The historical construction of muteness 
Q. The medical invention of muteness 
In the Enlightenment, a subtle and unexpected social consciousness of perversion, 
deviation and monstrosity emerged, stirred by the new conception of an individual, 
. rational identity and the parallel ascension of medical knowledge and social policies. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the dominant conception of reason led to the 
definition of contrasting profiles of certain differen~ kinds of psychical aberrations and 
the open recognition of sexual perversion as an expression of monstrosity. The 
taxonomies of deviation exhibited the invigorated social awareness of normal patterns 
of behaviour and extravagance. Joined to the prestige of observation as the definite 
empirical source of knowledge, the ascending prestige of medical discourse on 
psychical diseases and the new visions of sexual aberration led to the creation of new 
dominant taxonomies of abnormality. In IUs description of melancholy, Kant alludes 
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to the vicissitudes of the sublime conceived as a degenerative processes, which gave 
rise to a classification that included the extravagant, the monstrous, the fantastic and 
the lunatic. The dark side of the sublime, that which is beyond the boundaries of the 
realm of nature, brings about monstrosity. 14 These aberrations of the sublime fused in 
a single category of monstrosity and the aesthetic and moral judgements of deviation; 
dispassionate description and passionate belief also had their source in conventional 
biological explanations. Later in the century, the conceptual sphere which h8.(l bred 
current images of monstrosity turned into positivistic medical criteria. Lanteri Laura 
broadly depicts the landscape of the medical attitudes towards these monstrosities by 
the end of the nineteenth century: 
la clinique mirnltieuse cb pcnersioos conduit l'homme de science 
• isoler tout un groupe de conduites qui, malgre leurs vari6t6s, De 
suscitent que Ie rire au l'horreur, et pr6sument que leurs auteurs 
apparticnnent soit a cette monstruosite dont la zoophilie rcste Ie 
temoignage Ie plus evident, soit a ce grotesque dont la mise en 
scene, dans la maison d'illusioos, denonce si bien l'irrCalite. 
Nous voyms aimi que tout un groupe de comportements 
pervers se trouvent d6cri~ avec des caracteristiques qui font 
passer du pitoyable et du ridicule au monstrueux et a l'homicide, 
sCmiologie precise, mais pr6cisement devalorisante. I S 
At the end of Enlightenment, biological and medical explanations seemed to have set 
firm, definite frontiers within which the unexpected, the outrageous, and even the 
unacceptable could find a new rational sense. In the settling of these boundaries, at 
least four relatively autonomous trends of knowledge converged: aesthetics, ethics, 
history and biology. Dominated by the biological and medical model, the conception 
of the soul and of the self gave rise to the vague notion of personality and of 
psychological symptom -conceived as a functional perturbation of physiological 
processes- which seemed to Yield to the constraints imposed by natural order. Not 
only did biology appear as an autonomous and relevant domain of knowledge, but as 
the indisputable inheritor of Newtonian physical determinism. Through the path of 
biology, of medical models, the taxonomies of the cerebral pathologies and the 
anatomic descriptions of the nervous tissues brought together the classifications of 
perversions and those of the maladies of language: 
Par la mCme [la doctrine des localisations cerebrales, prescote par 
Broca et develope par Charcot] I'etude des perversions entre 
natwelIement dans la pathologie cerebrale et s'organise avec des 
modeles rendues familiers par I'etudes des aphasies. 16 
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The monstrosities of sexual behaviour, the afflictions of the nervous systems and the 
aberrations of language came to be understood on a similar natural basis, by a common 
model and an identical anatomical and physiological set of principles. 
The conception of language in the last years of the eighteenth century ambiguously 
expressed shades of the Baroque conception of the subject, which bloomed in the 
shadow of Rousseau's distinction between music and metaphor: 
[des accents, des ~s, des plaintes] voila les plus anciens mots 
invenres, et voila pourquoi les premieres langues furent 
chantantes et passionnees avant d'etre simples et methodiques [ ... ] 
L'image illusoire offerte par la passion se montrant la premiere, 
Ie langage qui lui repondoit fut aussi Ie premier invente~ il devint 
ensuite metaphorique quand Ilesprit ecIaire reconnoissant sa 
premiere erreur nlen employa les expressions que dans les memes 
passions qui I'avoient produite. 17 
According to Rousseau, language signalled the limits and the path of human decay: it 
involved both the full expressiveness of primordial language which conveyed the force 
of human passions, and the crePuscular fading of the spoken word stifled by the 
formulas of convention, as well as the vigorous impulse of tone and musical expression 
and the weakening of the force of communication evinced by writing. 
A mesure que la langue se perfectionoi~ la melodie en s'imposant 
de nouvelles regles perdoit insensiblement· de son ancienne 
energie, et Ie calcul des intervalles fut substitue a la fmesse des 
inflexions [ ... ] L'etude de la philosophie et Ie progres du 
raisonnement ayant perfectionne la grammaire oterent a la langue 
ce ton vif et passione qui I'avoit d'abord rendOe si chantante. 18 
Rousseau conceived language as an instinctual response to the perception of the 
sameness of the other, and to the desire and needs which this sameness stirs. It is 
ingrained in the subject's own perception of his fellow men. Language is thus 
intrinsically historical and simultaneously rooted in the biological nature of human 
beings. The historical vicissitudes of language display emblematic images- which signal 
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both the ruin of humanity, and, paradoxically, its ultimate means of redemption. 19 
Modem Janguages were to be seen as evidence of a lost pure nature, as a proof of the 
decay of expressiveness and the victory of a monotonous and deceiving clarity. 
Rousseau affirms: 
Par un progres natureI toutes les langues lettrees doivent changer 
de charactere et perdre de la force en gagnant de la clart6, que 
plus on s'attache i perfectionner la grammaire et la logique plus 
00 aa:elCre ce progr~ et que pour reodre bienrot une langue froid 
et monotone it DC faut qu'etablir des academies chez les peuples 
qui la parle. 20 
The progression of the rationality of grammar involves the suffocation of its capacity 
to bear the subject's primal emotions. The progression of language yields to its own 
inesca,ab~ fate which is both the extinction of the preeminence of rhythm, metaphor 
and passion, and the achievement of the complex evolution of formal patterns brought 
about by historical and natural forces. The last paragraph of Rousseau's reflection on 
the origins of language leaves unresolved the intrinsic circularity of its sources and 
determining factors: 
Ce seroit la matiere d'un examen asses pbilosopbique, que 
d'observcr cbn Ie fait et de montrer par des examples combien Ie 
caract6re, les moeurs et les inrerets d'un peuple influent sur sa 
langue.21 
The social concern for the moral progress of humankind, which constituted a crucial 
issue of philosophy and ethics throughout eighteenth century, lead to a thorough 
reflection upon the moral consequences and systematic procedures of education. 
Reflection showed a profound concern about the conflicting, puzzling consequences of 
progress. Throughout the late Enlightenment there is a hesitant struggle against the 
humiliating judgement of Rousseau:· it was necessary to prove that social progress was 
not necessarily bound to degrade progressively the expressive power of souls. The 
progressive, conflicting and ambiguous evolution of language did not seem to be, as 
Rousseau had emphatically posited, a late, somewhat perverse and impoverishing 
outcome of the capacities of humankind, which is not necessarily doomed to an 
inextinguishable longing either for primal, passionate, musical expression, or for the 
rhythmic appearance of silence, while i~ yields to the debasing clarity of logical 
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argumentation. 
Thus, muteness is not a strange primal state, which exhibits animal, bodily 
expressiveness and the virtue of a pure universally understandable expression of 
grimaces, gestures and objects, as Rousseau had once asserted; animal muteness, 
silence, is not the primal fabric of communication subdued by the force of the passion 
of humankind, as he had forcefully affirmed in the &sm. For, if Rousseau conceived 
muteness as an essential feature of animal behaviour, the destiny of language appeared 
both equivocal and daunting: while the primordial age dominated by the musical 
eloquence of the word faded, the word detracted from the expressions of passions and 
emotions, and its meaning was restrained to conventional, lifeless images. 
,Nevertheless, simultaneously, the philosophy of Enlightenment encouraged a 
slightly different conception of language and its relation to the human faculties 
-Condillac is an outstanding example-, with the exaltation of the virtues of formal, 
conventional language. It was passionately denied that the evidence of the evolution of 
language was either a set of symptoms ,of degradation, or the emblems of the 
humiliation of human life brought about by civilization. Consequently, the 
monstrosities exhibited by language -muteness, aphasia, insanity, lunacy- were no 
longer seen as astounding ominous presages: a divine reply to a humanity that had 
ignored the ends of nature. Rather, these distortions were seen as tokens of the 
development of the individual organism, as signs of its natural disposition, of its 
biological transformation, as well as of its historical conditions. 
Thus, monstrosity ceased to be seen as the sign of the radical solitude of a 
chosen, doomed or purified soul. Muteness appears both as a monstrosity, and as a 
malady, as a destiny and as a biological perturbation which could be healed if 
appropriately treated. In the twilight 'of eighteenth century, reason was seen to be able 
to .rectIh the designs of nature. The mere existence of pedagogy and of the systematic, 
positivistic approaches to education, the effort of reason to transform the nature of a 
devastated, or immature reason, the reflexive action of reason upon itself for the sake 
of its own perfection, became the testimony of the triumph of positive knowledge and 
of the calculated, scientific transformation of the self. Educatior:t began its 
metamorphosis into a science of the ruled, rational, positivistic moulding of the soul. 
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However, the notion of disease had changed; any inhibition of the faculties 
-muteness, deafness-, joined the sphere of the monstrosity which shaped, as a 
negative archetype, as a contrasting, feared, potency, the new profiles of 
consciousness. 
In 1799, an obscure though symptomatic episode occurred in the province of 
Saint-Serrnin (France). A boy was captured; incapable of articulated language, he 
resembled an animal. The legal authorities of the village tried to describe him; "his 
habits exhibit something extraoIdinary which resembles the state of the savages"22. The 
inadmissible, non classifiable muteness of a boy at the crossroads of animality, 
madness, ~vagism, childhood, idiocy or mere lack of education, perturbed the 
institu~onal policies of the hospital. It required, "both the attention of the police and . 
the devoted curiosity of observers and naturalists"n. Later, unable to deal with the 
monstrous phenomenon, the political and legal authorities tum him over to an 
educational institution. Michel ltard, a renowned therapist profoundly influenced by 
Condillac, takes charge of the boy. 
Victor d'Aveyron se constituy6 en el objeto parad6jico de 
empiesas divergentes: ladelimitaci6n de los alcances positivos de 
la especulaci6n sensualista de Condillac, la definici6n de sus 
limites, la ponderaci6n de sus fracasos; aI mismo tiempo, la 
detinici6n de las estategias de confinamiento y "curaci6n" 
institucional de las perturbaciones del alma., que afincaba la 
relativa validez de la medicina moral de Pine~ que irrumpia 
como una incipiente fractura en la concepci6n del alma humana., 
y que anunciaba los difusos comienzos de la psicoterapia. -24 
Michel !tard invoked the prestige of positiVistic methods of ~ucation when he initiated 
his ill-fated attempt to heal the Boy of Aveyron of his strange malady: an irreparable 
muteness provoked by isolation, by abandonment; a shattered capacity for language 
brought about by. the absence of discipline. ~deed, ltard' s enterprise was to 
systematically force the boy to acquire an imaginary language, to endow the boy with 
the illusory faculty of perfonning an impossible language; but the effort was useless. 
Victor d'Aveyron was the paradoxical object of divergent [scientific and philosophical] endeavoun: the delimitation 
of the empirical posibilitiea of the sensualist speculation of Condillac, the defInition of its limits, the weighing of 
its failures; simultaneously I the definition of the strategies of confmement and of the institutional cure of the 
maladiea of soul, which sought to base on solid ground the moral medicine of Pinet which appeared as an incipient 
fissure in the dominant conception of human soul ..and which foreshadowed the uncertain beginnings of 
psychotherapy. (My translation) 
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Itard adopted as instruments in this exacting and disciplined task a set of technical 
procedures originated in Condillac' s conception of language. 
Pedagogy, as it emerged from the Enlightenment, gave rise to an institutional 
prddice of education conceived as the consequence of the positivistic knowledge of the 
self and of the systematic training of reflexive consciousness. The formation of the 
subject's character and of his own personality, the physiognomy of his soul, were 
conceived as the result of the diff'erent contributions of each of the faculties and ~ses. 
The doctrine of the relative autonomy of the faculties as derived from Condillac' s 
meditations and from the contributions of the Enlightenment -chiefly due to the 
resonances of Kantian thought-, was joined to the prestigious physiological doctrine 
of the localized, specialized and differentiated sources of cerebral activity which had 
~ .". 
a definitive- influenCe on the disciplines of education. 
To teach Victor d' Aveyron the usages of language, the recognition of spoken 
and written words, to overcome the conceivable barriers of muteness, was also to 
expWlge the stigma of monstrosity. Muteness emblematically begins then its equivocal 
history in the institutional grid of the nineteenth century as a hardly definable malady 
at the confluence of biology and ethics, of the modern, emerging disciplines of 
psychiatry and anthropology. 
However, the severe linguistic diScipline imposed on Victor d ' Aveyron derived, 
in last analysis, from the eurocentric conviction of the supremacy of the "European" 
race. The peculiar trends of an emerging anthropology and the historical and 
nationalistic obsessions bred throughout nineteenth century beset the reflection on . 
language. Muteness was to be vaguely associated with the obscure history of other 
radical perturbations of the self: the mute joined the fate of the animal, the idiot, the 
mad and the aborigine. Darwin- asserted: 
Idiots also resemble the lower animais [ ... ] One idiot is described 
as often using his mouth in aid of his hands, whilst hunting for 
lice. They are often filthy m their habits and have no sense of 
decCncy; and several cases have been published of their bodies 
being remarkably hairy.2S 
Throughout the nineteenth century, literature offered an exhaustive portrait of the 
horizons of poverty, exclusion and margtnality -from.Dickens, to the utopias of the 
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flesh ofRestif de]a Bretonne and the exacerbated, obsessive images of Sade's Society 
of the Friends of Crime, from the Naturalist to the Psychological Novel- and prepared 
a whole scenery for the new kinds of social, biological and anthropological monsters: 
the mad, the perverse, the child, the aborigine and the woman -who joined also this 
vast taxonomy of deviants: 
diffcnnces between women and men, or between one race and 
another, WCI'C considered essential; that is to say, they involved 
'natural' differences (a significant term), and not specific or 
accidental features. Simple biological descriptions, whether 
depicting reproductive functions, the symptoms of intelligence, 
physical attributes, or genetic heritage, were believed to construe 
the true nature of gender or ethnic identity, using the powerful 
language aDd 'evidence' of science. 'Femininity' or 'negritude' or 
'oricutaI' characteristic were conceived as inborn or given features 
with which 'nature' axlowed people. 26 
The Enlightenment had prepared society for the arrival of education as science 
-pedagogy-, and for conceiving it as the particular cure of the hindered evolution of 
the "ignorant" self. It reinforced the conception of the infantile stage as a malady of 
evolution; the monstrosity of childhood joins that of ethnic differences -seen as a 
malady of cultural evolution-, and difference of gender. Monstrosity was then to be 
perceived as the set of symptoms of an arrested, "fixated" self. 
The overlaying of social and philosophical taxonomies of deviation and those 
of medical monstrosity was to define the new trends of biological thought, the sources 
of medical taxonomies which sought to expound the relation between sickness and 
language. It is not by accident that the new physiognomies of the maladies of language 
did not appear in the field of medicine but in that of anthropology. Broca's discovery 
of the specific anatomical location of aphasic perturbations, in 1861, acquired an 
ambigUous significance: while it founded the new conception of language on the 
~u1iar morphology of the brain, it offered a firm ground for speculations on the 
relation between culture and biological morphology, and for the belief in the 
supremacy of a particular race. 
'There is an issue almost definitively established by compared 
anatomy, because of the anatomic and physiological parallelism 
of human races, and. finally. because of the comparing of the 
different varieties of namaI, abnormal and pathologic men of the 
same race: that the higher cerebral faculties -which constitute 
the operations of understanding proper, as judgement and 
reflection-, reside in the frontal circumvolution, while the 
circumvolutions of the temporal, parietal and occipital lobes are 
dedicated to the feelings, the inclinations and the passions. 27 
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Broca's discovery agitated the universe of medicine, undermining the prevalent belief 
in the "essential" traits of the human faculty of language; he tried to found on a 
positivistic enquiry the anatomical conception of political, racial and cultural 
hierarchies, which, in tum, was to legitimate the struggle of Western Society against 
those who exhibited a • different racial disposition" . 
II n'y a la rien d'~gina1, et, sauf exceptions rarissimes, les 
anthropologucs do X1Xe siecle, apres Buffon ou Linne, ont 
aftirm6 a la fois Ia n6cessitC de c1asser les especes - ce qui est une 
opCration intcDectueDe caract6ristique de notre culture - et de lcs 
hi6rarchiser. • 
A cet 6gard, la aaniologie et la mesure du cerveau n'ont fait que 
sucreder a d'autres criteres en vogue a la fin du XVIDe siecle, par 
excmple I'angle facial, qui fomnit une 6cheUe aIlant de l'animalite 
au type gree. 
De mSme, Ia gCnetique, la d600uverte des groupes sanguins qui, 
en ell~ De deboucheut sur aucun jugement de valeur, ont 
etc utilisees pour l'alOUVeler Ie systCme d'interpretation 
hi6rarchiquc. 
On ~ ('importance des debats sur I'origine des differences. 
Ces debats, interdits, voire impensables, durant Ie long age 
theologique, s'imposent avec la decouverte de Ia diversite 
natureUe. . 
Polygenistes et monogenistes s'y opposen!, dans Ie 
prolongement do XVIDe siecie, mais avec des informations et des 
arguments de plus en plus nombreux.28 
The emerging discoveries of cerebral anatomy, morphology and physiology sought to 
expose the underlying ground of the essential differences of human beings. Darwin, 
quotating the naturalist Karl VOBt, writes: 
It is a rmuutable circumstance, that the difference between the 
sexes, as regards the cranial ~avity, increases with the 
development of the race, so that the male European excels much 
more the female, than the negro the negress.29 
The weakened struggle between the inherited and the acquired was to be enlivened in 
the nineteenth century by biology and natural history, which continued and transfonned 
the controversy between Locke and the rationalists. Two relevant forces which 
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informed the institutional framework of the nineteenth century strengthened the 
positivistic conviction of the nature and significance of brain disease: on the one hand, 
the therapeutic impulse and its logic, and on the other, the notion of education founded 
on a taxonomy of deviations and of the correspondent remedies for the maladies of the 
mind. Muteness was to appear as a social as well as a biological disease, either as a 
sign of the breakdown of the civilizing enterprise, or, on the contrary, as evidence of 
the inherited degradation of the individual, which evidenced the difference between the 
biological predisposition to mental sickness and degeneration. 
The case of !tard in France exhibits this bewildering confrontation between the 
non-physiological muteness and the institutional policies it generated and strengthened: 
the pedagogy of language appeared as the social cure of a malady of the soul. The 
brutal immersion of Victor d' Aveyron in the overwhelming and violently symbolic 
--chiefly linguistically ruled- universe might well be seen as a sort of severe, crude, 
"talking cure· . 
b. The appearance of aphasia 
The notion of aphasia, conceived both as a disease and as a tragic monstrosity, brought 
to light the privileged position of the perturbations of language and of the distortion of 
the temporal phases of language acquisition in the conceptions and beliefs regarding the 
subject's evolution. A noticeable trait of aphasia is that it manifests itself as a singular 
perturbation of the subject's response to actual constraints on utterance. His expressive 
performance enacts past constraints; it obeys unbecoming' or inappropriate impulses, 
The sequence of symptoms which were seen to indicate the evolution of aphasia went 
from a fixation, a mere arrest of the development of the faculties of language, to a 
steep involution of the subject's patterns of speech. Fixation was then associated with 
a discernible trace left by a mechanical injury or a disease of the nervous tissue, a 
trauma which provoked a perceptible regression of the subject's behaviour to ancient 
and well established patterns of response; the psychical apparatus seems to return to 
early stages of its linguistic development as the physiological destruction expands to 
deeper layers of the nervous tissues. Both notions, fixation and regression, were 
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definitive acquisitions of the medical conception of aphasia; they implied the notion of 
involution, of degradation both of behaviour and of the physiological performance of 
cerebral functions. 
The doctrine of faculties -JCl hezitage of the eighteenth century- rejected the conception 
of the negative progress of the expression of the passions, as it had been exposed by 
Rousseau in his fable of the origin of language. Every faculty was to be conceived as 
potency, as an essential condition of the self. Thus, the self was the ground of 
confrontation of numerous forces: not only did the spectrum of faculties, the 
conglomerate of separate regions of self, have different and opposing regimes; these 
regiOns also exhibited divergent and incongruous developments. Thus, each faculty was 
thought of ilS having its own evolving sequence of stages; the self was created by the 
discordant maturation of this spectrum of faculties. The primacy of evolution in the 
conception of cerebral functions and the conception of the biological nature of the 
struggling forces of the self favoured the enthronment of the biological model as the 
appropriate framework for the unveiling of the nature of the subject's identity. 
Two different spheres of knowledge and of institutional policies, psychiatry and 
anthropology, were transformed by the power of the biological model. A common 
enigmatic topic, the disorders of language, imposed on the biological interpretation an 
unforeseeable strain. The studies of Galton and Broca, from very different points of 
view, were pervaded by echoes of the historical notion of inheritance. This notion had 
acquired an unexpected epistemological dignity, and was endowed with an explanatory 
capacity which derived both from its vague affinity to the notions of biological identity 
and evolution, and from its historical, political and anthropological resonances. 
The notion of inheritanCe was introduced into the realm of biology along a 
strange speculative path: that of the rejection of death, the persistance of being and the 
rejection of the discontinuity of identity. However, Darwin's belief in the possibility 
of inheriting the incorporated memories of the experiences and practices of the 
predecessors introduced a complex and subtle assertion of the preservation of the 
identity of beings. 
The notion of inheritance, though vigorously upheld by the views of biology, 
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had become a crucial notion for the inteIpretation of social and national history, for the 
conception of the cohesion and stability of the social bonds, as well as an instrument 
of self-legitimization of the political, imperial and economic enterprise of European 
countries. Evolutionist theory still offered a refuge against dread, but was also a means 
of legitimization of political despotism. The conditions of property had undergone a 
definitive transformation as the economic regime evolved into its modem patterns and 
the social regime adjusted to the violence of the Industrial Revolution. The pro~ve 
mutation of the conditions of reciprocity evinced the rotting of the conventional moral 
principles that mould the images of the self. However, inheritance involved a vague, 
yet powerful significance concerning the fate of individual identity and the meaning of 
death. As Giddens has written: 
Modernity, it might be sai<L breaks down the protective 
framework of the small community and of tradition, replacing 
these with mudllarger, impersonal organisations. The individual 
feels bereft and alone in a world in which she or he lacks the 
psychological supports and the sense of secwity provided by 
more traditional settings. 30 
The escatological significance of the notion of inheritance still manifests itself to-day 
in the realm of justice, which seeks to assure the continuity of the identity of the 
lineage beyond the death of the ~dividual. The social conceptions of death obliquely 
determined the vicissitudes of the notion of inheritance. The conceptions of inheritance 
supported by anthropology and natural history throughout the nineteenth century, 
evinced the conflict between the notions of continuity and discontinuity of individual 
identity implied by those of kinship and lineage. 
Thus, inheritance appears as the point at which the economic, biological and 
social discourses, as well as institutional policies converged. The tensions provoked by 
the mutation of civi11ife, the pressures put on the faJniliar traditional regime diversified 
and dissipated the emerging meanings of the notion of inheritance. However, this 
notion signals, as a crude symptom and in spite of its vastness and plurality of 
meanings, the intense social urgency of a collective understanding of duration, 
finiteness, death, and the obscure boundaries of pain. 
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Freud's theory shared with the discourse of evolutionism a common concern and a 
specific approach to the logic of the continuity of beings, and the image of their decay 
and death. Freud's vigorous Darwinism implied the acknowledgment of a disquieting 
topiC:31 the enigmatic means by which a species achieves the transmission of experience 
from one generation to the other. There should be a ciphered, secret transmission of 
experience, which enables the organism both to adapt itself to the new conditions of 
the environment -a metamorphosis-, and to preserve the species. This .secret 
transmission is the clue to evolution itself. The answer to the enigma of the inheritance 
of the individual experience, constrained to the terms of chance and adaptation, was 
to be poor and deceiving: it only implied the belief both in the existence of a silent, 
secret register, of a mysterious code, of an enduring, puzzling memory of the body's 
response to the surrounding conditions and in the secret transmission of this ciphered 
information from one generation to the next. 
Moreover, Darwin's conception involved the appearance of corporeal 
expressiveness as an unconscious, yet meaningful response which serves the finality of 
nature, the preservation of the species. He wrote: 
Actions of all kinds, if regularly accompanying any state of mind, 
are at once recognized as expressive. These may consist of 
movements of any part oftbe body, as the wagging of a dog's tail, 
the shrugging of a man's shoulders, the erection of the hair, the 
exudation of perspiration, the state of capillary circulation, 
laboured breathing, and the use of vocal or other sound producing 
instruments. [ ... ] That the chief expressive actions, exhibited by 
man and by the lowec animals, are now innate or inherited -that 
is, have not been learnt by the individual,- is admitted by 
everyone. 32 . 
However, his conviction adumbrated the image of a secret transmission of the 
organism's identity as an unfathomable sequence {)f cryptic messages. Thus, the 
mutation of species was to be conceived as a silent, unfathomable metamorphosis of 
self-identity, as an abysmal, ciphered chro'"'cicle of the history of the struggle and of the 
inadvertent survival of the species, encrypted in the body --conceived as a precise, 
detennined device. The theory of evolution made conceivable a biological theory of the 
significance of corporeal expressions unleashed only by silent, wordless. perceptions, 
sensations, and emotions. Instinctual expr~siveness could be seen, from the point of 
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view of the Darwinian imagination, as the foundation of sexuality, as the privileged 
response to the exigencies of the preservation of the species. Furthermore, sexuality 
was seen in itself both as an intrinsic outcome, and as the condition of expression. 
In nineteenth century, Weismann I s germ-plasm theory -which was to deeply 
impress Freud- offered an unexpected, suggestive, but dubious, chimerical support for 
the conception of the infinite transmission of the immutable identity of certain beings. 
Its almost unsustainable biological postulates implied an essential conviction: id~ntity 
has a primordial origin; the changing physiognomies and shapes of the organisms 
veiled the force of invariant traits buried in countless layers, which preserved the 
essential immutable core of primordial beings. Not only simpler, but also ancient 
species, exhibited amazing means to preserve their own life and identity, which move 
them to adOpt a peculiar pattern of reproduction, the simplest of them, bipartition, the 
engendering of their own double. Bipartition resembles an aberrant asymmetric mirror 
in which one image is a decaying individual, while the other becomes a new vigorous 
creature, a faithful reproduction of the original organism; it becomes a replica, a 
selected sample of a potential1y countless set of identical beings; these elementary 
beings seemed to be able to perpetuate themselves identically, to expand their own 
biological confines. 
Nevertheless, this topic did not explicitly appear at the early stages of the 
psychoanalytic thought, but rather at the moment when Freud was confronting a 
definitive challenge: the explanation- of the alliance between repetition and 
unpleasureness, between the "will to self-destruction" and pain. That challenge led him 
to postulate the existence of another psychical realm, that of the death instinct, the 
impulse of live beings to return to primal inert matter. Death instinct, paradoxically, 
is thought of as the inherent impulse of live beings to exacerbate the domain of pleasure 
principle so as to drive the organism to seek its own disappearance, the total 
dissemination of its cohesive forte. The death instinct is the exuberance, the lavishness, 
the exasperation of the pleasure principle, its extreme unfolding, its last and intolerable 
progression.- However, the death instinct, as we will see later, 33 neither replaces nor 
obliterates the pleasure principle. It coexists with it as its negative co~terpart: it is 
both its necessary consequence and·its contorted image, its negation. Both antagonistic 
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forces struggle, in spite of the fact that one of them, ruled by the death instinct, is but 
the magnification and the exacerbation of the other, within the biological limits of the 
same organism. 1be conception of the death instinct was to pose, in Freud's universe, 
a never resolved paradox, a speculative enigma, a delicate conjecture, the support of 
which was, strangely enough, the expression of Freud's scatological Spinozist belief 
in the supreme impulse of the organism to persevere in the struggle for life. 
Psychoanalytic thought experienced the impact of these conceptual ten~ions, 
which contributed to shape nineteenth century thought. The tension between the 
continuity and the discontinuity of the subject's identity determined the evolution of 
Freud's conceptual framework. It did not only upheld the conception of the intrinsic, 
potential boundaries of the evolution of the inner structures of subjectivity and its 
agencies, but also to define the dominant trends of normal sexuality, its metaphysical 
ends, and its deviations. 
Freud' s works not only enact the striving for discontinuity as an ideal of 
scientific discourse; they seek to expound the paradoxical force of inheritance, of 
continuity, in the psychical life, and also the intrinsic discontinuous nature of psychical 
processes. Freud does not depict the coherent and uncontaminated nature of the soul, 
but the shattered st:ructtires of subjectivity and of speech which manifest themselves in 
experience. 
However, psychoanalysis put forward as its own utopia the subject's 
achievement of a non-fragmentary discourse at which psychoanalytic interpretation 
should aim: to restore ate continuity of the subject's speech, to heal it from the 
intrusion of silence, of secrecy, of discontinuity . 
The patient should achieve this utopian continuity of his own speech so as to 
overcome its perturbations, the silence ingrained in his own language. 
Evolutionist thought determined the main topics and trends of the history of the 
biological conception of the mind in the nineteenth century and of certain Freudian 
notions which upheld his conception of SUbjectivity. According to it, the psychical 
app&Iatus appears as a settlement of successive layers of memory and a progressively 
complex anangernent of its intrinsic relations: evolution and involution were conceived 
as inverted reciprocal images; degradatioQ becomes the inverted mirror image of the 
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increaSing complexity of life. The development of the faculty of language involved two 
conflictive conceptions of the discontinuity of its own process: on the one hand, the 
evolution of the faculty of language is thought of as a continuous enhancement of the 
complexity and the expressive capacities of speech, suspended, punctuated by its own 
reappearing, rhythmic, cyclical destruction; each new stage involved either the partial 
or total destruction of the previous one, or its significant reorganization; on the other, 
language is seen as informed by a successive overlapping and interweaving of newly 
developed stages of experience; discontinuity appears as an imperfect eclipse of former 
experiences, as a partial veiling and distortion of the previously formed layers of 
articulated facets of language. This last conception of discontinuity was that which 
determined the path of psychoanalytic reflection. 
According to nineteenth century notions of language and aphasia -and specially 
that put forward by Hugbling Jackson-, the successive stages of the psychical 
evolution of language necessarily implied the preservation of early memories of 
language. Aphasia involved the dismembering of the distinct components of the word 
and simultaneously revealed the emerging remains of previous, even primordial stages 
of language acquisition; it was thus conceived as a debased functional performance of 
the language apparatus, a momentary or lasting suspension of speech, a degradation 
of meaning and the intrusion of silence; apahsia ought to have its source in the 
particular structure of language itself, in the heterogeneity of its elements, in the 
fragility of the internal relations of the facets and components of the word, in the 
precarious stability of the internal and external factors that concur to the act of speech, 
in the manifold processes -motor, affective, cognitive, perceptual- that contribute to 
the proper significance of the word. Degradation derives from the structure of the word 
itself; thus, it is foreign to any reflexive enquiry, to any attempt to expound, in terms 
of language, the intrinsic nature of the limits of the words. Language cannot explore 
and exhibit by itself, by the means of a reflexive comprehension of its analytical 
capacity, its own destruction: the maladies of silence, the shattering of the language 
capacity, deceive and resist the analysis of language; they even remain beyond 
comprehension, beyond the reach of the reflexive speech of the suffering subject. 
Hugbling Jackson convincingly depiCted the degradation of language both as an 
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enfeebling of the meaningful, conventional use of speech, and as an enhancement of 
its affective expressiveness, but also as an involution, as a withdrawal of the capacity 
of language from its current stage into primordial stage of development, or as a 
restraint upon the variety and complexity of its potential associations. It is not only 
destruction but stillness that threatens the increasing expressive virtues of language. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, aphasia was to be clearly 
discernible from merely unfortunate utterances, from the intrinsic, abrupt batriers 
inherent in the dialogue and the reflexive usage of language, as well as from the violent 
implantation of silence and perplexity in the midst of speech; aphasia seemed to be 
clearly discernible from the sudden fog that often covers interpretation itself, and which 
seems f:O have no identifiable, but only a conjectural source. However, the symptoms 
of the true" destruction of language, the visible token of the malady of words, the 
lasting silence of aphasia, which both surrounded and pervaded the curtailed capacities 
of speech, did not seem to stem unmistakably from the organic wound, from rotten 
tissues; it exhibited an uncertain locus, an elusive source, a nomadic seWement. Its 
etiology was to be forged by medical interpretation. 
Wit steUen fUr die Beurtheilung del' FUDCtioo des Sprachapparates 
unter pathoJogischen Verhiltnissen den Satz von Hugbling 
Jackson voran, class aile diese Reactiosweisen FAIle von 
functimeIler Riickbildung (Dis-involution) des hochorganisirten 
Apparates darstellen, und somit 1i'flheren Zustandes in dessen 
functiooeller EUtwickelung entsprechen. Es wird also unter allen 
Bedingungen eine spit entwickelte, hOher stehende 
Associationsanordung verloren gehen, eine friih gewonnene, 
einfachere erhaIten bleiben. (Zur Auffassung der Aphasie: 89f 
The concepts of fixation, dis-involution and regression were incorporated, yet 
reinterpreted and rearranged in Freud' s theoretical framework; some of the concepts 
advanced in his early non-psychoanalytic papers suffered a harsh reconstruction in his 
late psychoanalytic work; but some of them remained tacitly unchanged. In his late and 
fundamental Jensdts der Lustprinzips (1920), Freud insists in the essential role of 
-In aucuing the functions of the apecch apparatus UDder pathological conditions we arc ~pting as a guid~ 
principle Hughling Jacbon'. dodiiue that alllhcsc modes of reaction represent instances of funclOnal ~~lOn 
(di'-mvolution) of. highly organized apparatus, and therefore correspond to earlier states. of Ita fu~nal 
devdopnea. 111is means that under aD circumstaDces an arrangement of associations which, haVIng been acquired 
later, bcJoop to • higher level of functioning, will be lost, while an earlier and simpler one will be preserved. (CA: 
87) 
fixation in the comprehension of the sources of malady: 
Ocr Knmke sci an das Trauma sozusagen psychisch fixiert. 
Solchc Fixienmgen an das Erlebnis, welches die Erkrankung 
ausgclOst bat, sind uns seit langem bei dec Hysteric bdamnl 
(Jensetts tier Uutprlnzlps, SA, 1920, m: 223f 
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Regression, a most powerful and disquieting concept in the psychoanalytic theory can 
be traced back to Freud' s meditations on Hugbling Iackson' s explanation of aphasia: 
the concept of regression emerges from a theoretical approach to memory, from the 
anatomical and physiological view on the fixation and preservation of the previous 
stages of psychical development; thus, it is founded upon certain hypothesis about 
memory and'representation; regression was seen to reveal the mechanisms of the self-
PresetVJtion of experience. A ~le feature of the concept of regression is that 
it involves the amazing "archeOlogical" model of the mind, put forward by Hugbling 
Jackson and adopted and transformed by Freud to suit his dynamic conception of 
psychical processes. Jackson contemplated the progressive destruction of aphasia and 
the retrogression of the performance of the "language apparatus", as a regression of the 
physiological response to inner layers and previous stages of linguistic experience; he 
envisioned the· "language apparatus" as an organ made of overlaying layers of memory, 
incrtAsing with experience and the tmnsfonnation of linguistic experience, heightening 
the depth and enhancing the variety of the cerebral layers of memory. Perhaps, the 
crucial contribution of Hughling Jackson to the Freudian imagination was his thesis on 
the perpetuation of memories: accordirig to him, the remnants of seemingly "lost" 
episodes and experiences of the subject" are thoroughly PJ'CSCrved as indelible traces 
embedded in the subject's mind, and yet,' they are' inaccessible to reminiscence or 
evocation; they remain eclipse4, keeping however, the power to inform memory, to 
shape the perceptions' of the inner and outer. stimulus; thus, the subject hold 
. emotionally to early acquired residues of language which determine the course of the 
subject's affective response. 
But perhaps the most disquieting feature of Hugbling Iackson's portrait of the 
mind, of the image of memory as clustering layers of remnants of experience, is the 
-the patient is, as one might say, fixated to his trauma. Pix!tions to the experiece which started the illness have long 
been familiar to us in hysteria. (FP, 11: 282) 
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assertion that these enduring vestiges of the subject's history remain as timeless tokens 
stripped from any trait able to reveal their singular chronologies or their peculiar 
history. In the deeper layers of the mind, memory becomes, as Hugbling Jackson 
suggests in the light of the clinical evidence of aphasic patients, a purely allegorical 
thought, made up of signs that have "forgotten" their contexts, and of autonomous, 
loose representations of experiences, able to arouse abrupt and timeless images of the 
past, to bring about undeliberate evocations, to encompass in a single image a whole 
peculiar and autonomous universe of enigmatically fused images. 
Furthermore, Freud also inherits from Hughling Jackson several notions besides 
this evolutionist, "archeological" model of the mind: the idea of the relevance of 
repetition and the fixation of certain patterns of linguistic usage, the image of the 
psychical apparatus likely to obstinately reproduce certain invariant associations that 
inform the subject's experience of language; the image of indelible paths fixed in the 
cerebral tissue by early experiences that govern the mechanisms and the intensity of the 
discharge of energy -which will give rise to the conception of experience of 
satisfaction in later enquiries of psychoanalysis-, the picture of expanding series of 
chained associations of words brought to light by reflexive thought. In Hugbling 
Jackson's conception the immersion in the "archeological" depth of the layers of 
memory involved an increasing intensity of the affective content of the memories and 
the weakening of the symbolic force of the memory traces of the word, the word-
residues. In the deepest layers of the soul the conventionality of signs disappears. In 
such primordial, deep layers of the soul,the abiding memories are only meaningless, 
yet expressive, emotionally charged, shreds of speech-like sounds; fragments of 
language which bear intense emotion, aroused by a primordial image. The depth of 
layers, the growing sediment of memories of different ages, involves also a progressive 
estrangeness of memory concerning the aims of consciousness. Memories of language, 
in the deepest layers of the mind, are foreign to time, intention and consciousness. 
These "Jacksonian" contributions call to mind, no doubt, the structure of levels 
of Freudian· psychical apparatus and stress the remarkable enigma of the nature of 
expressiveness and its relation to language. 
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Il Hysteria as a metaphor of aphasia 
1. The Baroque muteness 
Informed by a powerful yet contradictory religious expression, threatened by social 
affliction and disbelief, the Baroque conceptions of soul and body, their horizons of 
knowledge and universes of belief and the social moulding of the identity of the self 
were dominated by the experience of the exhaustion of reflexive language: The 
corporeal enactment of intense emotions prevailed. Baroque constructions -spiritual 
and material- reflected an intense. contrast between the fragrnentariness of language 
and . the impregnable authority, the proliferating discordance and circularity of 
interpretatiQllS; the aftermath of the schism of the religious universe was the emergence 
of an accute perception of the self, of the inner agitation of corporeal forces, of the 
raptures of reflexive reason and the affection aroused by visible and figurative imagery; 
Baroque expressions exalted analogy as the dominant means for a legitimate 
apprehension of the world, as well as the primacy of mirror images and identification 
as the methods for the comprehension of theological mysteries; the Baroque sensibility 
celebrated the parables, the passion for scenery and theatrical images, the exemplarity 
of contrasting emotions -joy ~d pain- as fictional motives and the end of moral 
discipline, the weakened relevance of conventional meanings of language and the 
tribute to illumination beyond significance. 
The work of Ignacio de Loyola, as a relevant expression of the Baroque 
atmosphere, achieved and displayed the fusion of the dominant trends of the aesthetic, 
religious, moral, and disciplinary currents of thought; it exposed the fundamental 
tensions of the Baroque which lead to an image of knowledge dominated by the desire 
for illumination. Loyola conceives the understanding [enlendimienlo] as "ilucidated by 
divine virtue" [ilucidado por 10 virtud divina] and endows the "internal feeling and 
taste of things" [el sentir y gustar de las cosas inlemamenle] with a cardinal place in 
the disciplines of faith, a privileged method for the discernment of the signs of God. 34 
Loyola's Fjercicios espirituales, one of the monuments of the Catholic Baroque, often 
displays analogous yet contrasting images of soul and body; they appear as malleable 
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stuff, surrendered to a rigid, puriting discipline. However, the discipline of the soul 
is forged as a faithful image of the disciplines of the body: 
asi como el pasear, caminar y correr son exercicios corporales, 
por la mesma mantra todo modo de preparar y disponer el anima, 
para quitar de si todas las afecciones desordenadas, y desputs de 
quitadas para buscar y hallar la voluntad divina en la disposici6n 
de su vida para la salud del anima, se Haman exercicios 
spirituales.3S• 
Thus, the discipline of the soul involved severe rules of behaviour, of calculated 
suffering, of serene resistance to the lure of evil, and an impatient apprehension of the 
subject's own feelings; the body was subdued by an abstract will which imposed on it 
the harsh displine of the soul. Body represents allegorically the intimate presence of the 
Apocalyp~, and the site of the deluding signs of evil which struggle against the 
salvation of the soul. Body remains the tangible, undeniable evidence of impending 
death, the putrefied flesh; it displays the landscape of the scatology of existence. A 
crucial stage prescribed for each of the Ejercicios composition [composicion] -the 
evocation of an allegorical vision which constitutes the imagined scenery of the 
prayer- emphasises the scatological sense of body: 
Ia composici6n sera ver con la vista imaginativa y considerar mi 
8nima ser encarcelada en este cuerpo corruptiblel6·· 
However, the discipline of the soul also exacted a disciplined body. Loyola defines 
corporeal rhythms, schedules, gestures, positions and an ascetic rule of feeding. But 
chiefly, the Ejercicios, impose on the follower of the Ignatian discipline a cyclic path 
which took the devout believer through a sequence of allegorical images leading to an 
accute perception of the silent signs of God, the proof of which was only the exulting 
experience of consolation and the joy of the soul, hallowed by suffering and pain. In 
the Ejerc:icios, discernment confounds itself with illumination. The mute signs of God 
were to be only discernible either in the feelings of joy or pain, or in the ectasis of 
consolation. 
-Por just as strolling, walking, and running are bodily exercises, so spiritual exercises are methods of preparing 
and disposing the soul to free itself of all inordinate attachments, and after accomplishing this, of seeking and 
discovering the divine will regarding one's life orientation for the health of one's soul. 
-the composition will consist of imagining and considering my soul imprisoned in its corruptible body. 
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However, even these signs were not seen as unequivocal; both evil and divine 
tokens engendered indistinguishable feelings of delusive resemblance: 
acostumbra comtinmente el enemigo proponerles placeres 
aparentes, haciendo imaginar delectaciones y placeres sensuales, 
por mas los conservar y aumentar en sus vicios y peccadoS.37• 
Evil and divine mute tokens arouse similarly ambiguous and deceiving mner 
experiences, the definite sense of which would advent to the soul as a deferred 
confirmation: only final virtue, a scatological meaning, an illuminated thought or 
action and a rejoiced spirit will bring to the soul the final certitude of the sense of the 
true signs of God. Only the sensation of pain provoked either by the regret for evil and 
sin, or by the identification with the passion of Christ would prove its inequivocal, 
divine origin: 
demandar 10 que quiero, 10 cual es proprio de demandar en 1a 
passi6n, dolor con Cristo doloroso, quebranto con Cristo 
quebrantado, lagrimas, pena interna de tanta pena que Cristo 
pass6 por mi. 38·· 
The creature reflects in the purifying convulsion of the fallen flesh, which allegorically 
enacts the passion of Christ, the true presence of God. 
The Ejercicios strive against idle speech; words should acquire sense only by 
serving the subject's salvation; the only desirable meaning of austere acts and words 
should be consolation. Speech should be constrained to a single act: prayer. However, 
prayer was conceived by Loyola as an image of the speech of human love. The image 
of speech displays its manifold allegorical power: the dialogue between friends became 
. 
the allegorical model for prayer, and, in tum, prayer itself became an allegory and 
model for every human use of language. Moreover, prayer, in the Ignatian Ejercicios, 
did not involve the full, expressive use of language, the exploration of the subtle 
capacities of speech. Prayer becomes a ancillary ~ worthless, transient instrument for 
the achievement of a lasting illumination; it is reduced only to a sequence of fragments; 
lthe enemy] He thus causes them to imagine sensual delights and pleasure in order to hold them more and more 
easily and to increase their vices and sins. 
-to ask what I desire. In the Passion the proper thing to. ask for is suffering with Christ suffering. a broken heart 
with Christ heartbroken. tears. and inner pain because of the great pain that Christ endured for me. 
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each single word, abstracted from discourse should be only a means to recall visions 
and resemblances, to arouse inner comforting feelings, to bring to mind images of 
Christ, which, in turn, appeared as allegorical models of the life and destiny of the 
subject himself. 
la persona, de rodillas 0 asentado, seglin la mayor disposici6n en 
que se halla y mas devocion Ie acompafia, teniendo los ojos 
cerrados 0 hincados en Wllugar sin andar con ellos variando, diga 
Pater, y este en la consideracion desta palabra tanto tiempo, 
quanta halla significaciones, comparaciones, gusto y consolaci6n 
en consideraciones pertinentes a la tal palabra, y de la misma 
manera haga en cada palabra del Pater noster 0 de otra oraci6n 
cualqiliera que desta manera quisiere orar [ ... ] si la persona que 
contempla el Pater noster hallare en una palabra 0 en dos tan 
buena materia que pensar y gusto y consolation, no se cure pasar 
adelante, aunque se acabe la hora en aquello que halla, la cual 
acabada, mla resta del Pater noster en la manera acostumbrada 
[ ... ] si en una palabra 0 en dos del Pater noster se detuvo por una 
hora entera, otro dia cuando queera tomar a la oracion diga la 
sobredicho palabra 0 las dos seglin que suele, y en la palabra que 
se sigue inmediatamente comience a contemplar.39-
Loyola depicts a labyrinth of reflected images. The vision of imagination represents, 
in his conception, the theological enthrownment of a non-corporeal vision forged by 
a silent theatrical imagination which multiplies the allegorical, inner enactment of 
theological images of God; ideal i~ages which should mould the action and the world 
of sinners. 
The Ignacian enterprise sought to overcome through purification, silent 
understanding and mute illumination the violence of the inner and inherent 
meaninglessness of ordinary language. Barthes wrote: 
il s'agit de produire des regles generales qui permettent au sujet 
de trouver quoi dire (invenire qUid dicas), c'est-a-dire tout 
simplement de parler: il y a certainement au depart de la 
metorique et de la meditation ignaciennes (dont on veera Ie detail 
The person may be kneeling of sitting, whichever suits his disposition better and is more conductive to devotion. 
He should keep his eyes closed, or fIxed on one position, not permitting them to wander about. He should then 
say, "Father," and reflect upon this word as long as he fInds meanings, comparisons, relish, and consolation in the 
consideration of it. He should then continue the same method with each word of the "Our Father," or of any other 
prayer that he may wish to contemplate in this manner [ ... J during the contemplation on the "Our Father." if he 
finds in one or two words good matter for thought, and relish, and consolation, he should not be anxious to pass 
on, even though he spend the entire hour on what he has found. When the hour is over, he will say the rest of the 
"Our Father" in the usual way [ ... J if he has spent the entire hour dwelling on one or tw(l words of the "Our 
Father." on another day, when he wishes to return to t~e same prayer. he may say the abo"P'1lentioned word or 
two in the usual way, and begin the contemplation of the word which immediately follow" 
minutieux, comme s'il fallait reagir Ii ehaque minute contre une 
inertie de parole) Ie sentiment d'une aphasie humaine: I'orateur et 
l'exercitant se debattent Ii l'origine dans une carence profonde de 
la parole, comme s'ils n'avaient rien Ii dir~ et qu'il faille un effort 
achame pour les aider Ii trouver un langage. C'est sans doute pour 
cela que I'appareil methodique installe par Ignace, reglant jours, 
horaires, postures, regimes, fait penser, dans sa minutie extreme , 
Ii les protocoles de I'eerivain (il est vrai, en general, mal connus, 
et e'est dommage): celui qui eerit, par une preparation reglee des 
conditions materielles de l'ecriture (lieu, horaire, camels, papier, 
etc.), qu'on appelle communement Ie "travail" de l'eerivain et qui 
n'est Ie plus souvent que la conjuration magique de son aphasie 
native, tente de capturer "I'idee " (ce a quoi I'aidait Ie rheteur), 
tout comme Ignace cherche Ii donner les moyens de saisir Ie signe 
de la divinite.40 
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Freud shares with Loyola the conviction of the existence of a primordial aphasia, an 
intrinsic weakness of language; both 'profess a fundamental belief in the vainness of the 
expressive breath of language. From his early medical inquiries on aphasia and his 
experience with hysteric patients, Freud construed language as a purely ambiguous, 
intermediate object, as a mere passage into an intimate illumination of the truth of the 
subject's own history. The language of psychoanalysis, like that aimed at by Loyola's 
Ejerddos espirituaies, was upheld by the utopia of the final, scatological, reconciled 
powers of expression; at the end, the subject would fulfil his aspiration to a purified 
language able to redeem the self from the foulness of its own history. The mutilated 
expressiveness of hysterical language, as that of a sinner, was to be overcome by the 
disciplined body and word; the promise of redemption of the Ignacian Ejercicios 
adumbrates a remote, final sphere of significance. 
The work of psychoanalysis might be depicted', in the early years of its 
discovery, as a sort of methodic, magic conjuration which sought to heal the original 
aphasia of hysterics. The "talking cure" of psychoanalysis offered to the hysteric a 
supplementary, fragmentary discipline of speech', an exiguous rule for the discovery 
of her own history, a winding route to the realm of a silent memory, a means for the 
appropriation of sense which lied beyond the limits of her own evocation and speech. 
The "fundamental rule" of psychoanalysis, "free association", was conceived as a 
verbal and bodily discipline for overcoming the functional aphasia of the hysteric, the 
pain which burdened and hampered her speech. The language that stemmed from the 
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unrestricted application of the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis becomes only a 
marginal, transient discourse which reveals, in tum, the essentially neutral, restrained 
expressiveness of language. 
Yet, certain relevant traits of language, envisaged as an inherently transitional 
object, were to be evinced by the rule of free association, which gave evidence of the 
strength and the menace of neutral objects. As Blanchot has pointed out, 
Ie neutre est ce qui ne se distribue dans aucune genre: Ie non-
general, Ie non-generique, comme Ie non-particulier. n refuse 
l'appartmanre a la categorie d'objet quIa celIe de sujet. Et cela ne 
veut pas seulment dire qu'il est encore indetennine et comme 
hesitant entre les deux, cela veut dire quIll suppose une relation 
autre, ne relevant ni des conditions objectives, ni des dispositions 
subjectives [ ... ] L'inconnu est toujours pense au neutre. La pens6e 
du neutre est une menace et un scandale pour la pens6e.41 
Neutrality is a quality which pertains to an uncertain, non-conclusive order; neutrality 
of language refers to a facet of verbal expression which refuses any taxonomy, and 
remains on the fringes of meaning. It hints at the boundaries of codes, the uselessness 
of naming, the denial of any significance likely to evoke any identifiable object, any 
depictable intention or finality. 
Freud I s psychoanalysis envisioned vague, conjectural objects on the fringes of 
representable experience: consciousness and the drive [Trieb], word and memory, pain 
and unpleasure, fear and anxiety, body and sexuality, all of them conceived as means 
for the depiction of the essential fabric of the soul; the objects of psychoanalytic theory 
exhibited a common, neutral condition. Indeed, the intermediate, neutral attribute of 
Freud I s conceptual object were the result of an obliteration of his own topographical 
image of the psychical sources of representations. Those notions acquired, in Freud I s 
universe, an intangible profile, an uncertain theoretical locus. 
Allegory is a fundamental feature of Freudian writing; it is forged by a discourse which 
has yielded to the paradoxical impulse to expose its own finiteness by exhibiting its aim 
of achieving a faultless, all encompassing theoretical discourse. Allegory appears as the 
only figure able to signify the neutral, non-classifiable, yet cardinal relation between 
language and pain. 
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The history of psychoanalysis has taken a peculiar path. From its origins, it was 
chiefly concerned with the destiny of language, with its weakness, with the regime of 
its decline: psychoanalysis might be conceived as an effort to comprehend the 
exhaustion, the collapse of language, and the decay of its expressive force. Thus, 
psychoanalysis can be seen as a lasting meditation on the crumbling of representations, 
on their metamorphosis, and on the action of devastated, residual signs in the core of 
memory upon the course of the subject's experience; paradoxically, language becomes, 
in psychoanalysis, both a consequence and a veil of unnoticed, unsuspected thought 
processes, which constitute the subject's psychical structure. Language seems to 
emerge from an indiscernible history adumbrated by other signs written in the fragile 
matter of the subject's own primordial memory. The intimate history of the soul is 
. .' . 
revealed by language like a tom map composed by shreds of language, silenced but 
nevertheless capable of subduing the subject, of forcing him to accept a tacit, 
unprescribed end, foreign to his own will. 
From his pre-psychoanalytic study, Zur Auffassung der Aphasie, to his last 
written, obscure contributions to psychoanalytic theory -the enigmatic aphorisms 
written shortly before his death- Freud seems to have been haunted by a passion for 
the extreme fragility of words, by the spectre of shattered speech. The whole Freudian 
enterprise seems to have been built upon the certainty of the wreck of the 
expressiveness of language and the settling of its vestiges beyond consciousness, joined 
to the belief in the apparently infinite endurance of memory. It is not language but its 
devastation which lured on Freud's thought on throughout his life. His thought lingered 
on the puzzle of lasting disquiet aroused by the non-said, by the enduring work of 
silence ingrained in the subject's experience of words. The Freudian text exhibits the 
traces of an imagination tantalized ·by the enigma of the mute persistence of residues 
of words, by the affects tied to the meaningless relics of significant expressions, by the 
silence and the oblivion embodied in meaningful words. After psychoanalysis, history, 
both of humankind and of the individual, may be thought of as the evoked narration 
built by the successive disintegration of the manifold bonds among diverging and 
elusive components of language, and by the tacit, spectral, yet compelling constraints 
on its use - this enigmatic "use of language.:' [SprachgebrauchJ to which Freud alludes 
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as a guiding light along the heuristic path of psychoanalytic theory. 42 
2. Aphasia as a "disease of association" 
The illusion of the discovery of the laws of thought -and, as a "natural" consequence, 
the laws of language- has bred countless controversies, and theoretical and intellectual 
enterprises since the nineteenth century. Fechner's physiological works, the logical 
models of George Boole, Franz Brentano' s first sketches of what would beco~e the 
phenomenological approach to consciousness, the singular phenomenology of 
pragmatism (phaneroscopy) of Ch'.S. Peirce, the psychological reflections of Stuart 
Mill's Logic, among innumerable others, exhibit the will to knowledge which, in 
moderriity f turned to the self and the mind as privileged objects, trying to find in its 
manifold incarnations the trends of psychical and symbolic development. 
However, with the appearance of the Freudian discourse on aphasia, defined as 
a disorder of psychical association, a mutation of the idea of the laws of thought 
occurs: both association and aphasia illuminated unsuspected facets of thought, and at 
the same time ,acquired unconventional meanings. Association came to designate, in the 
framework of the successive reformulations of Freudian discourse, a constant 
displacement of energies along passages drawn on a chimerical anatomy, residues of 
words [Wonresten]; memory became the register of countless movements of significant 
amounts of energy among remains of words which emerged as potentially reappearing, 
fragmented utterances. Association also displayed a vague but persistent spectrum of 
meanings: it alluded to unstable, complex sound patterns that aroused an unaccountable 
web of meaningful relations, informing the subject's universe of unformulated and 
isolated evocations. Association thus "migrates" from the physiological substrate to the 
linguistic environment, from the physiological nature of the language apparatus to the 
intangible sphere of meanings, from the physiological body to the core of the soul. As 
Forrester has stated: 
Freud used an array of anatomical facts to show that it was such 
connection fibres that were important in cerebral functioning. 
Such an argument also implied the functional 'anonymity' of these 
fibres. The model thus invoked was a homogeneous field of 
connection fibres. an abstracted physiology that could now be 
converted into a purely psychological space. Any attempt to 
segment the field of language was vigorously resisted: at the level 
of the brain, connective fibres were fo~ while at the level of 
psychological space? there was only an assorted sphere of 
mterdependent functions derived from association. 43 
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This metamorphosis of the notions of association and aphasia was fundamental to the 
development of Freud's conceptions. It indicates not only a definitive turning point in 
the historical development of his theory, but also suggests a limit, the exhaustion of 
theoretical thought. 
However, the notion of aphasia will endure a characteristic transformation: it will be 
literally effaced from Freud's later, psychoanalytic discourse, yet, its sense will be 
preserved as an implicit model of his understanding of hysteria. As Freud engaged in 
the therapeutic use of hypnotism, he also accomplished a thorough revision and 
criticism of the anatomical and physiological theories of aphasia. Illuminated by the 
findings of the current physiological research of Wernicke, Meynert, Briicke and, as 
outstanding though somewhat marginal contributions in the German world, the works 
of Hughling Jackson and Charcot, Freud's vision of hysterical symptoms approached 
an allegorically construed image of the aphasic muteness; hysteria could be seen as the 
display of the obscure signs of a curtailed, hindered evocation.44 It revealed itself 
unexpectedly as a psychical mirror image of physiological and anatomical aphasic 
disturbances.45 The image of hysteria, as it emerged from clinic experience, was that 
of a puzzling mixture of disturbances of memory and speech, due to the experience of 
a brutal although un signified perception. Nevertheless, this psychical image was not 
a faithful duplicate of the physical disease. In the hysteric, psychical muteness, the 
unfathomable barrier which obstructs the subject's memory, was to be thought of as 
a manifestation of a metaphorical disease, or an· imaginary injury. The therapeutic 
experiences obtained from hypnosis, which led Freud to his aetiology of hysteria, 
drove the psychoanalytic reflection to a singular but decisive point. 
The term aphasia would be uprooted from the Freudian discourse together with 
the physiological model of the psychical apparatus. However, hysteria was to be seen 
implicitly as a certain kind of aphasia, a ~uliar "functional" impossibility of uttering 
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a complete, structured piece of narration. Hysteria, according to the early Freudian 
scheme, appeared as a disorder of language irreducible to a physiological disturbance 
or an anatomical injury. Aphasia was extirpated from the body of psychoanalytic 
topics, but was to reappear on the theoretical scene, as an unuttered allegory, as a tacit 
but distorted model of the remarkable muteness of hysteria: the tacit model of aphasia 
led Freud to conceive hysterical symptoms as the outburst of a pure narrative silence, 
as a functional, unacknowledged psychical impossibility, as a hindrance to memory; 
the symptoms of this psychical muteness manifested themselves as evidence of the 
subject's surrender to a psychical silence and his "election" of oblivion as an intimate 
fate. Thus, aphasia became the unstated allegory of hysteria: the unfathomable image 
of psychical muteness mirrored the enigmatic process, the insoluble enigma of the 
physical destruction of language. The precarious similarity between them was not the 
sequel of a sudden revelation, but perhaps a devious image incited by Charcot's theory 
of the relation between hysteria, aphasia and language. Indeed, Charcot posits in his 
Le~ons -translated to German by Freud in the period of his attendance at Charcot's 
courses in La Salpetriere-, an explicit relation, and an accurate distinction between 
organic aphasia and hysterical aphasia. It was for Freud only a short step to conceive 
the hysterical symptom as a sort of spiritual aphasia. 
Subtly, the image of hysterical aphasia transformed itself into the notion of 
hysteria as aphasia. Freud conceived the hysterical malady as the outcome of the 
subject's experience of the sudden disintegration of the psychical components of 
language, the abrupt dismembering of signs, the impossibility of articulating words and 
. 
recognizing the sense of speech, provoked by the experience of a certain intolerable 
episode. However, the faculty of language did not exhibit a visible lesion, a depictable 
wound; language underwent the "functional" severing of its elements, which impeded 
the subject's evocation and narration of this catastrophic, revolting scene. The 
manifestation of functional aphasia paralleled the symptoms of hysteria: 
aHe Aphasien auf Associations-, also aufLeitungsunterbrechung 
beruhen. Aphasie durch Zerstorung oder Lasion eines "Centrums" 
ist fUr uns nicht mehr tmd nicht weniger als Aphasie durch Lasion 
jener Associationsbahnen, die in dem Centrum genannten 
Knotenpunkte zusammenlaufen. (Zur Auflassung der Aphasie: 
69r 
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The postulates of the aetiology of hysteria, like those of previous physiological models 
of aphasia, were s':'PPOrted by the hypothesis of the existence of different kind of 
"centres": anatomical, cerebral, hysterogenic, which determined and governed the 
specific behaviour of the apparatus. This hypothesis seems to underly Freud I slater 
assumptions regarding the erogenic zones and his postulates as to the source of 
repression, conceived as a localized agency, a fixed psychical locus. These functional 
nodes were envisioned as the site of the capacity for unleashing a significant, 
symptomatic discharge of energy. The testimonies of Charcot's sessions leave no doubt 
about ~e weight he gave to the notion of centre in his conception of hysterical 
,. 0"' ,.. 
symptom. However, there was a supplementary feature in Charcot's conception: these 
centres were not only visible but touchable, located in the body. Not only were they 
perceivable, but also sensible centres, specifically circumscribed zones of the subject's 
perception. 
The resemblance between aphasia -which involved anatomical centres- and 
hysteria -recognizable for its hysterogenic centres- was too seducing to be 
overlooked. Moreover, hysteria seemed to transform the silence of aphasia into 
confined tokens of primal dispersed bodily and verbal expressions, the malady changed 
into an incipient yet unyielding muteness, theatrical gestures, bodily pain and 
fragmented and straying utterances; hysteria, like aphasia, caused the subject's speech 
to revolve around primal, unrecoverable, fixed signs. The subject was driven to debase 
progressively the significance of its own expressions. 
There is an immediate relation between hysteria and the breaking of the 
associative links which integrate the language apparatus. In hysteria, language eludes 
the impact of local, physical destruction, but it is hindered by unpleasure, by 
impending pain. The morphology of the symptom is elusive: there are no definitive, 
clearly depictable physical, anatomical symptoms; the only recognizable signs were 
"We fceljustificd in rejecting the differentiation between the so-called centre or cortical aphasias and the conduc~on 
(association) aphasias, and we maintain that all aphasias oripnate in interruption of associations, i.e., of conductIon. 
(CA: 67) 
those of the "functional mutations" of silence: 
Der Sprachapparat wahrseheinlieh nieht bloB Localenzeiehen 
gebe, sondem auch eine besondere Natur des Krankheitprocesses 
durch eine Ablnderung seiner funetionellen Symptomatik 
verrathen dUrfte. (Zur AujJassung der Aphasie: 72f 
256 
Psychoanalysis acquired its unprecedented theoretical relevance in its complex vision 
of the non-said. From the time of his early work, Freud encountered, observing the 
enigmatic effects of hypnosis, the oblivion exhibited by hysterics, their resistance to 
recall specific episodes of their past life, their obstinate attachment to an unuttered 
narration of a past and nevertheless ~g experience; the hysterical symptom was 
seen as informed by the unaccountable yet undeniable presence of engraved psychical 
remain$ of a brutal episode, which .determined its oblique, obscure manifestations of 
the symptoms and governed the subject's action. During hypnosis, the physician's 
commands seemed to penetrate the unconscious of the hysteric, and the words acquired 
an autonomous sense; they merged with other memories, only to rise from the core of 
subjectivity as if driven by the subject's own desire. They seemed to obey an 
ineluctable mandate, unaffected by the presence and voice of the physician. Recalling 
his early experience with hypnosis Freud summarizes: 
der Vorsatz im Geiste jener Person in latenter Form oder 
Wlbewu6t vorhandm war, bis der gegebene Moment kam, in dem 
er dam bewu6t geworden ist Aber nieht in seiner Ganze ist er im 
BewuBtsein aufgetaueht, sondem nur die Vorstellung des 
auszufiihrenden Aktes. Aile anderen mit dieser Vorstellung 
assoziierten Ideen - der Auftrag, der Einflufi des Antes, die 
Erinnerung an den hypnotischen Zustand -, blieben aueh dann 
noch unbewu6t (Einige Bemerkungen aber den BegrijJ des 
UnbewujJten in der Psychoanalyse, SA, 1912. III: 31r· 
The image of a latent web of ideas associated with a compelling memory able to govern 
surreptitiously the subject's actions foreshadowed the notion of repression. But contrary 
to the current ideas about hypnosis, Freud maintained that the veil of memory neither 
·probably a lesion of the speech apparatus did not only cause localizing signs, but that the special nature of the 
disease process might be revealed by a functional modification of its symptoms. (CA: 70) 
-the order had been praenl in the mind of the person in a condition of latency, or had been p~ent ullco~ciou.sIy, 
until the given moment came, and then had become conscious. But not the whole of it emerged mto conscIOusness: 
only the conception of the act to be executed. All the otJter ideas associated with this conception -the order, the 
influence of the physician, the recollection of the hypnotic state, remained unconscious even then. (FP. 11: 51) 
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concealed inert residues of experience in the core of the psychical apparatus, nor 
created isolated tokens foreign to the active psychical life of the subject. On the 
contrary, these residues, these remaining traces silently determined the unsignified 
action and the unacknowledged, real behaviour of the subject. 
A vast arrangement of associated, active memory traces yielded to the 
suffocating forces which kept them from emerging from the depths of memory. This 
image of a suffocating pressure -which would itself give rise to the notic:>n of 
repression- imposed on a singular universe of associated ideas, arranged in a peculiar 
constellation, not only gave Freud the clue to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis 
(free association); it also illuminated an specific trait both of phantasy and daydream: 
its distinctive narrative and visual expressions changing both in content and affective 
charge, yet able to adumbrate obliquely a repetitive impulse of desire. 
Freud's personal account of contemporary notions of hysteria must be seen in 
the context of this encompassing metaphor of aphasia: the appearance of silence both 
veils and betokens a singular, harmful experience: an episode the unbearable, even 
abject, sense of which takes roots in the history of the subject's sexuality. In hysteria, 
Freud posits, a·non-signified early sexual experience bursts upon speech, shattering the 
inner bonds of signs and impeding the actions associated with it. The psychoanalytic 
allegory of the phantasy of seduction,46 which so strongly determined the destiny of 
psychoanalytic reflection, can be thought of as bred by an effort to understand the 
power of this non-significant memory,· the shattering of the word which freed the 
charge of energy linked to its representational bond. . 
The dismembering of the word which, according to Freud, characterized 
hysteria, revealed the threefold structure of word representation. Word appeared as a 
precarious unity formed by the perception of the matter of signs -either the sounds of 
spoken word or the shapes of the written word-, and the mental image of the 
perceptible or imaginary features of the object of the word, as well as by an ancillary, 
diffuse, physical component of the sign: a charge of energy. 47 The dismembering of the 
sign is due to an extreme psychical reaction to the perception of an unspeakable 
experience. 
Both asymbolic aphasia and hysteria seemed to stem from a collapse of speech, 
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but only as pure functional disorder, without involving any specific damage to the 
physiological substrate. 
Asymbolisdle SprachstOrung ohne Complication (mit Erbaltung 
aller Wortassociationen) kann sich vielleicht auch durch einen 
b~oss functiooellen Zustand des ganzen Sprachapparates ergeben, 
cbm Manches deutet daraufhin, dass die Verbindung von Wort-
und Objectvorstellung der erschopfbarste Theil der 
Sprachleistung is~ gewissermassen ihr schwacher Punkt. (Zur 
Auffassung der Aphasie: 8Sf 
This early comprehension of the dismembering of the sign profoundly modified Freud's 
clinic approach to hysteria, and gave rise, also, to the theoretical construction of the 
notion of repression. It signified the appearance, on the psychoanalytic scene, of an 
expe~ence which altered the understanding of sexual identity; according to Freud's 
.' . . 
conception-, subjectivity can be conceived as emerging, paradoxically, both from the 
intrinsic incapacity of the word to represent the primordial experience of love, to evoke 
the shape of the loved object and the subject's affection attached to it, and from the 
irrevocably dominant presence of language in the subject's life. Sexuality has its origin 
in the inescapable conflict between the subject's requirements of energy and the 
curtailed expressive and representational capacity of the word. The hysteric's 
experience of a hollow utterance, of a lost, yet undefinable link which would have 
consolidated his own narration,· of a gap in the subject's own history, echoes the 
destruction of the internal relation between the components of the word. However, the 
emotions aroused by the energy unleashed by the destruction of the word evince the 
relevance of the subject's oblivion. The harsh silence of the shattered word, betokens 
a broken memory, excluded, however, from the subject's evocations. A meaningful 
narrative fragment has been effaced from the immediate memory, frustrating the 
accomplishment of the narrative act. Shreds of the disintegrated word remain as frrm 
though concealed vestiges which encumber the subject's discourse; hysterics display 
the compulsive though unperceived emptiness of their discourse, the diminished 
potency of evocation. 
·Asymbolic speech disorder without complications, i.e. without disturbance of the word .as~oci~tions, maya.lso 
result from a merely functional state of the speech apparatus as a whole; there are some mdlcatlOns that the ~k 
between word association and object associations is the most easily exhaustible component of the speech function, 
its weakest point as it were. (CA: 83) 
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Moreover, in Freud's early texts, most clearly in those which refer to aphasic 
disorders which implies an oblique allusion to hysteria, the sense of the non-said is 
neither that of a merely concealed word nor of a forgonen, unfortunate unerance; the 
aphasic silence was not to be conceived as an isolated blunder, but as a sombre 
breakdown of the act of speech, as a na"ation dominated by a persistent yet befogged 
affliction. Hysteria is the evidence -displayed by the symptom- of the disruptive 
arrest of the will to na"ate, and of the failure of the narrating act: the hys~ric's 
impulse to narrate has been pushed to a crucial point: the hysterical imagination 
exhibits the oblivion of its own historical origin; narration has been stripped of its own 
temporal tokens; reminiscences become a mere nomadic yarn, a fiction which openly 
exhibits the essential omission of its temporal links and its digressive impulse.48 
3. Oblivion and repression: the spring of hysteric muteness 
Repression -the cardinal concept derived from the conception of hysteria- like most 
of Freud's essential concepts underwent a continual and fundamental revision 
throughout his theoretical enterprise. However, from the time of the early formulations 
it appeared as a crucial notion· which implied the convergence of the dynamic, 
topographical and economic dimensions of psychoanalytic reflection, as well as implicit 
considerations on the symbolic nature of the psychical process. From its first 
appearance, repression was not simply a description of the conflict between the 
agencies of subjectivity. In its first and most powerful and sl1ggestive sense, repression 
was neither the image of forgetfulness, nor a term referring simply to the subject's 
defense against the intense energy stirred by an appalling episode already experienced. 
In the Freudian constellation of concepts, repression and censorship preserve their full 
suggestive power: they incite the conceptual imagination to envision an allegorical 
struggle between incarnated forces. Repression and censorship acquire an unsettling 
relevance in the Freudian theory; yet, their epistemological nature is ambiguous: they 
are both allegory and description. They have the power to enact, to render into a 
theatrical, mythical struggle the psychical dynamics of memory residues, actions and 
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discharges of energy, intensities and tensions which provoke the breaking of word 
residues; however, the mere fictional plot evinces the symbolic nature of the process. 
Repression is not reducible to a mere physiological response; rather, ir refers to the 
psychical, symboli~ representation of bodily energies. The allegorical power of the 
notion of repression and its fictional development, seem to uncover and expound the 
symbolic nature of hysterical oblivion; thus, they depict by fictional means -a mixture 
of representations, metaphors, characters and figures- the tensions between psy~hical 
representations and their ambiguous sense. Freud's astounding achievement is to have 
envisaged repression as a pure symbolic process; moreover, this notion proved to be 
the cornerstone of his contribution to the understanding of hysterical malady. Jean 
Hyppolite remarked: 
. 
Janet parlait, dans l'hysterie, d'una dissociation du moi, ou d'une 
impuissance du moi a synthetiser, a s'unifier. Freud parle de 
refoulement. La description de Janet n'est precisement qu'une 
description, celie de Freud est une comprehension. 49 
The concept of repression implies a radical desegregation undergone by both speech 
and Janguage. But it clearly appeared that this dismembering of the word was neither 
innocuous nor incidental. The dissolution of the internal links of the word was not a 
simple, meaningless calamity. It liberated unbounded energy. However, the intrinsic, 
grammatical and semantical relations of speech offered uneven resistance to the 
intruding, shattering force of inner energy; the cohesion of discourse forces a 
displacement [Verschiebung] of the energy; signs and utterances associated with 
repressed representation acquire an exorbitant, unbearc!ble energy content which 
manifests itself in a desultory narrative imagination, as well as in a sensation of anxiety 
which defaces the image of the self. 
The notion of repression does not depict ~e dynamic dismemberment of the 
word, but its unforeseeable sequels. The dismembering of the word resists reflexive 
thought. However, its effects are visible as symptoms, and construable from the web 
of silence and emotions aroused by language itself. When the memories of the words, 
the subjective relics of language, convey conventional meanings, consciousness is 
capable of immediately evoking them; however, the mnemic residues associated with 
an unbearably painful incident remain beyond the reach of active memory, but burst 
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upon the the subject's consciousness as unidentified, albeit distressing emotions. 
As has been obstinately -and almost universally- remarked, Freud explicitly 
denies that the mnemic traces of the signs can convey any sense of temporality, for 
they are confined within the limits of the subject's unconscious. so Unconscious 
representations, Freud has emphasized, are completely foreign to any temporal 
reference. Memory traces can only bear the sense of temporality by the various kinds 
of associations of simultaneous and sequential perceptions; perceivable objects ~o not 
bear recognizable marks of their own temporality. However, against current 
interpretations, it is possible to assert that a sense of temporality, is, indeed, implied 
by the patterns of unconscious representations. Temporality is inherent in association: 
it involves a proximity in time and space, a coexistence or a concomitance, a 
. . . 
discernment of a sequence or of a resemblance; association also conveys, implicitly the 
sense of precedence or causality. Freud's theory of repression -and its resonances in 
his distinction between primary and secondary repression, his visions of fetishism, the 
conception of cathexis [Besetzung] and his tortuous understanding of masochism-
alludes to an elusive though adequate notion of an unconscious sense of time and 
duration, aroused not by memory-traces but by their associations built by primary 
thought, by the silent discernment of unconscious processes. 
Consequently, the crucial feature of the concept of repression is its transitional 
nature: it enables Freud to move from the horizon of physiology to the sphere of sense. 
Hyppolite remarks: 
Les sympromes de l'hysterie ne sont pas des troubles physiques 
quelconques sans rapport avec la totalite d'une vie et d'une 
histoire. Us ont un sens; il raut remonter de ces significations au 
sens originaire qui est Ie leur dans une histoire particu1ier. Sl 
The symbolic manifestations of repression con~ense the chronicle of the subject's 
psychical genesis and development, the stages of his affective life, the history of his 
love attachments. The outcome of this condensation, the obscure sense of the sequence 
of collapse and gathering of memories, the veiled relics of the loss of loved objects or 
of their abandonment, forge themselves the history of inner, successive failures of 
language. However, repression is still a privileged yet uncertain key to the 
understanding of the subject's creation of sense, which rises enigmatically from the 
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underlying, unaccountable fabric of the physiological processes. 
Perception projects the spatial relations into a memory of proximity, and, in 
turn, into a peculiar experience of time. Thus, the sense of time arises from primary 
thought -which go~erns desire-, by the silent judgment which links memory and 
perception, and perhaps even from the enigmatic relation between physical energy and 
psychical representation; Freud explicitly posited the idea that time appears as the 
outcome of the pulsating nature of cathexis [Besetzung] , of the appearan~ and 
disappearance of the representation of the loved objects. 
Freud's frequently quoted expression: "Repression proper, therefore, is actually 
an after-pressure" (FP, 11: 147) [Die eigellliiche Verdrllngung ist also ein 
Nachdrllngen (Die VerdrlJngung, SA, 1915, ill: 109)] accounts for the distinctive 
." . . 
chronologieS of reptession. Freud explicitly seeks to reformulate Kant's notion of time 
as a formal condition of intuition. 
Ich gestatte mir an dieser Stelle ein Thema fluehtig zu beriihren, 
welches die grOndlicbste Bebandlung verdienen wOrde. Dec 
Kantsche Satz, daB Zeit und Raum notwendige Formen unseres 
Denkens sind, kann heute infolge gewisser psyehanalytischer 
Erkenntnissc einer Diskussion unterzogen werden. Wir haben 
crfahren, daB die unbewuBten Seelenvorginge an sieh "zeitloss" 
sind. Das heillt Z1lnachst, daB sie Dieht zeitlieh geordnet werden, 
daB die Zeit nichts an ihnen verindert, daB man die 
Zeitvorstellung nieht an sie heranbringen kann. Es sind dies 
negative Charaktc:re, die man sieh nur durclt Vergleiehung mit den 
bewuBten seelischen Prozessen deutlieh Machen kann. Unsere 
abstrakte ZeitvOrsteUUDg scheint vielmehr durchaus von der 
Arbettsweise des System W-Bw hergeholt zu sein und einer 
Selbstwahmehmung derselben zu entsprecben. Bei dieser 
Funktionsweise des Systems diirfte ein ~derer Weg des 
Reizschutzes beschritten werden. Ieh weill, daB diese 
Bebauptungen sehr dunkel kligen, muB mieh aber auf solebe 
Andeutungen bescluiinken. (Jenseits des Lustprinzips, SA, 1920, 
ill: 238f 
OAt this point I shall venture to touch for a moment upon a subject which would merit the most exhaustive treatment. As 
a result of certain psychoanalytic discoveries, we are to-day in position to embark on a discussion of the Ka~tian theorem 
that time and space are 'necessary fonns of thought' . We have learn that unconscious mental processes are In ~hemselves 
'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them In any way 
and that the idea of time cannot be appticd to them. These are negative characteristics which can only be clearly understood 
if a comparison is made with the conscious mental processes. On the other hand, our abstract idea of time seems to be 
wholly derived from the method of working of the system Pcpt.-Cs. And to correspond to a perceptio~ on its ~wn ~ ~f 
that method of working. This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield agamst stImuli 
I know that these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints. (FP, 11299) 
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The conscious experience of time, as it follows from psychoanalytic theory, has its 
roots in the reflection of consciousness upon itself: the folding, the turning back of 
discernment upon its own self perceptions [Selbstwahrnehmung]. Consciousness 
contemplates itself, and discerns the nature of its feelings, attachments and perceptions; 
that which arises from the sustained meditation of consciousness upon the images of 
its own processes constitutes the abstract representation of time .. 
Freud's celebrated, and inevitably quoted formula: "hysterics suffer from 
reminiscence", unveils the dense representation of time implied by his conception of 
hysteria: this significant aphorism comprehended a relevant, often neglected feature of 
the experience of time: its relation to pain. Freud's hysterics are subdued by the force 
.. .". . 
of their own impeded memory, yet they are unable to overcome the sense of 
timelessness which pervades their own history. This aphoristic expression also 
illuminates a disquieting contradictory feature of the hysteric's narration: the 
scandalous image of reminiscence without evocation; the hysteric's reminiscences are 
stale, a pure painful affection without image or concept, empty, a failed act of 
narration, arrested speech, a collapsed tale stirred by unrecoverable memories. Yet, the 
most relevant feature of Freud's dazzJing aphorism, is his stress on the intimate relation 
between the lavish nature of time experience and the unrecognizable, secret yet 
distressing source of perceptions of pain. Hysteric's reminiscence, as seen from Freud's 
point of view, reveals the inextricable alliance of pain, functional aphasia, a broken 
psychical universe, a mutilated memory, a restricted language, discernible in the wreck 
of the narrative act and of the untruthfulness of its signs. 
Hysteria bears testimony to an extinction of the narrative power of signs; a yet 
unfathomable -sexual- experience~ has left behind, as only evidence, a meaningless, 
intense affliction, conveyed by the narration of the subject's own devastated history. S2 
Hysteria appeared, in the Freudian universe, as the affirmation of the subject's identity 
by negative means: the exhibition of his own ruined and dismembered history. 
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III Allegory and conceptual dualities: territories of psychical processes 
Broca's striking findings after his studies of the cerebral regions, and his conception 
of memory as an anatomically located set of vestiges settled the chief trends of the 
Localizationist School which became a stablished paradigm of medical conceptions on 
language in the nineteenth century. However, Freud rejected Broca's views and the 
developments put forward by his German followers, Wemike, Meynert and Bruce 
amongst others. He asserted, qUite adventurously, following the insights of Hugbling 
Jackson, that the psychical correlate of representation is not a certain cerebral locus but 
ajUnctional process. Jacques Nassif; analysing Freud's early theoretical constructions, 
,posited. that the explanatory power of the notion of process in psychoanalysis, can be 
seen as 'ail inheritance from HughliDg Jackson's neurological studies: 
la neurologic jacksonienne, en mettant en avant Ie concept de 
"proces" , permettaif d'arracher la question de la conscience a la 
probl6matique des rapports de l'arne et du corps, puisque, nos 
allons Ie d6m0ntrer, Ie concept de praces 6chappe a ces deux 
categories du psychique et du somatique. S3 
Wernike's "p'ositional" theory (cortico-centric) of cerebral structure, as well as 
Meynert's contributions to the knowledge of aphasia, both of them developments of 
Broca's localizational conception, would undergo, in Freud's theory, a profound 
metaphorical transformation. The force of the anatomical description of the location 
of linguistic capacities faded; Werniket~ description of cortical nervous tissue turned 
into Freud t s metaphor of consciousness, which stressed only its topographical sense. 
In psychoanalytic theory, consciousness has neither an actttal, anatomical location nor 
a tangible substance: with the metaphorical mutation, the notion of anatomical position 
lost its spatia1 and material reference and acquired a functional sense with all its 
implications regarding temporality. The landscape of consciousness allegorically 
exhibited the duration and manifold temporality of psychical processes; the notion of 
memory trace -rooted in anatomical-descriptions- underwent in Freud t s proposal, a 
thorough revision. The traces of evoked figures no longer had their abode at a definite 
anatomical site; they lost their own territory; the relics of memory ceased to be 
conceived as psychical vestiges likely to evoke a con4ensed, frozen image of a past 
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perception; rather, they appeared as flashing representations, created by the movement 
of excitations which enlivened a narrative display of the subject's experience. Allegory 
confers on consciousness the tangibility of an anatomical tissue: it appeared as the 
envelope of the soul, the palpable yet unalterable screen of memory, the membrane 
which keeps note of sensations and feelings, the psychical epidermis which isolates the 
subject from its environment. Thus, Freud interpreted the description of anatomical 
position as a metaphor which bore an unexpected, yet illuminating sense of 
temporality, relevant to his conception of the psychical processes. 
But the concept of process, alone, as illuminating as it might be, did not 
obliterate the uncertainty and ambiguousness of Freud's distinction between body and 
soul [Seele]. Freud envisioned psychical processes as Baroque arrangements of 
contrasting spaces ~ obscure, only partially illuminated physiological space and the 
brightness of perception and consciousness-, which did not clearly correspond to any 
sharp distinction between inner and outer spaces. Both remained similar but 
irreducible, parallel, consLrasting universes. However, the explicit formulation of the 
parallelism between psychical processes (mind) and physiological processes (body) 
introduced disquieting, contradictory resonances in Freud's conceptual imagery. 
Freud's notion ofpamUelism, echoed literally, perhaps involuntarilly the arguments of 
John Stuart Mill regarding the psychological enquiry. Indeed, Mill wrote in A System 
of Logic: 
[that] every mental state has a nervous state for its immediate 
antecedent and proximate cause, though extremely probable, 
cannot hitherto be said to be proved, in the conclusive manner in 
whim this can be proved of sensations; and even were it certain, 
yet every one must admit that we are wholly ignorant of the 
characteristics, of these nervous states; we know not, and at 
present have no means of knowing, in what respect one of them 
differs from another; and our only mode of studying their 
successions or co-existences must be by observing the 
successions and ~stences of the mental states, of which they 
are supposed to be the generators or causes. The successions, 
therefore, which obtain among mental phenomena, do not admit 
of being deduced from the physiological laws of our nervous 
organization; and all real knowledge of them must continue, for 
a long time at least, if not always, to be sought in the direct study, 
by observation and experiment, of the mental successions 
themselves. 54 
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The notion of process, which appeared in the polemics about aphasia, broadened the 
breach between the organic and the psychical, but it prefigured perhaps the most 
significant contribution of Freud's theory: the radical heterogeneity of body and soul 
(mind) foreshadows the advent of the Freudian notion of the unconscious. Indeed, 
Freud puts forward an explicit relation between both foreign processes -the psychical 
and the physical-, which is neither causal nor determined. Freud wrote: 
Die Kette der physiologischen Vorginge im Nervensystem steht 
ja wahrscheinlich nieht im VerhaItniss der Causalit!t zu dem 
psychischen Vorgilnge. Die physilogisehen Vorginge hOren nieht 
auf, sobald die psyehisehen begonnen haben, vielmehr geht die 
physiologisdle Kette weit.er, nur dass jedem Glied derselben (oder 
einzelnen GliederD) von einem gewissen Moment an ein 
psychisches Pbanomen entsprieht. Das Psyehisehe ist somit ein 
Parallelvorgang des Physiologischen ("a dependent concomitant") 
(Zur AujJassung der Aphasie: 56-57f 
This parallelism does not refer to any direct causal determination, but to a reciprocal 
echoing of psychical and physical processes. Thus, psychical processes can be 
conceived as the unforeseeable outcome of the pressure exerted by the biological 
constraints upon the representational apparatus of subjectivity. 
This "Concomitant dependency", which Freud had already posited and stressed 
in his early neurological studies, did not refer to an abstract, equivocal, omni-
comprehensive process. What Freud denies is the existence of a causal, reciprocal, 
determining link between the physical and the psychical sphere. Rather, each process 
preserves its own logic, exhibits a characteristic development. The energy of the 
physical realm contrasts with the energy of psychical proces~s in ways which can only 
be grasped by allegorical images. 
The early sense of the concept of process precedes and prepares the way for the 
appearance of the functional and spatial metaphor,of facilitation [Bahnung]. Like the 
notions relevant to the physiological approach to aphasia, the notion of facilitation 
appeared at an early stage of psychoanalysis only to be seemingly abandoned almost 
immediately: it provided a spatial image which combined the notions of resistance, 
"The relationship between the chain of physiological events in the nervous system and the men~1 processes is 
probably not one of cause and effect. The fonner do not cease when the later set in; they tend to contmue, bu~, f~m 
certain moment, a mental phenomenon corresponds to ea<:h part of the chain, or to several parts. The psychical IS, 
therefore, a process parallel to the physiological. "a dependcnt concomitant". (CA: 55) 
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fixation, and repetition, in a single metaphor charged with resonances of aquatic and 
topographical meanings. It enabled Freud to put forward the image of the self as a 
depictable topogmphical map, as the allegory of a web of fixed passages which defmed 
the profiles and responses of psychical processes; the ego was only an elusive 
incarnation of an immutable diagram of pathways for the discharge of excitation 
-which, in tum, prefigured the late concept of ego. However, for these pathways he 
offered no material evidence: the specific "topography" of ego and desire is an ~stract 
image construed from the visible "topography" of silence and muteness. Different 
notions converged in an entangled series of metaphors: psychical energy --conceived 
according to the thermodynamic distinction between free and bounded energy- gave 
rise to a hydraulic metaphor, which, in tum, supported the dynamic conception of ego, 
later incarnated in an allegorical ch3.racter involved in countless intrigues and violent 
encounters with the other psychical agencies. The "functional" topography of aphasia 
produced a proliferating series of metaphors, in which psychical processes found a 
corporeal figure. 55 
However, the notion of process itself preserved its explanatory efficacy. The 
privileged place of the notion of representation in psychoanalysis can only be 
acknowledged if we see it as a synthesis of topographical and temporal models of 
psychical processes: 
Was ist nun das physiologische Correlat der einfachen oder der 
fUr sic wiederkebrenden Vorstellung? Offenbar nichts Ruhendes, 
sondem etwas von der Natur eines Vorganges. Dieser Vorgang 
vertrAgt die Localisati~ er geht von einer besonderen Stelle der 
Hirnrinde oder langs besondere Wege. IS! dieser Vorgang 
abgelaufe, so hinterllsst er in der von ibm afficirten Himrinde 
eine Modification, die MOglichkeit der Erinnerung. Es ist 
durchaus zweifelhaft, ob dieser Modification gleichfalls etwas 
Psydliscbes eotsprich; unser Bewusstsein weist nichts dergleichen 
auf, was der Namen "Iatentes Erinnerungsbild" von der 
psychischen Seite rechtfertigen wUrde. So oft aber d~lbe 
Zustand der Rinde wieder angeregt wird, entsteht das Psychische 
als Erinnerungsbild von Neuem. Wir haben freilich nieht die 
Ieiseste Ahnung davon, wie die thierische Substanz es zu Stande 
bringen mag, so vielfliltige Modificationen durchzumachen und 
auseinander zu halten. ( ... ) Lasst sich nun am physiologischen 
Correlat der Fmpfindung der Antheil der "Empfmdung" von dem 
"Association" lIDterscheiden? Offenbar nicht. "Empfmdung" und 
"Association" sind zwei NameD, mit denen wir verschiedene 
Ansichten derseJbc:-J Processes belegen. Wir wissen aber, das 
beide Namen von einem einheitlichen und untheilbaren Process 
abstrahirt sind. Wir kOnnen keine Empfindung haben, ohne sie 
sofort zu associiren; mOgen wir die heiden begrifflich noch so 
scharf trenn~ in Wirklichkeit hingen sie an einem einzigen 
Vorgang, der, von einer Rindenstelle beginnend, uber die 
gewnmte ~ diffimdirt. Die Localisation des physiologischen 
Correlats 1St also fUr Vorstellung und Association dieselhe und 
das Localisation einer Vorstellung nichts Anderes bedeute~ a1s 
Localisation ihres Correlates, so mussen wir es ablehnen, die 
Vorstellung an den einen Punkt der Hirnrinde verlegen, die 
Association an eine anderen. Beides geht vielmehr von eine Punkt 
aus, ODd befinden sich an keinem Punkte ruhend (Zur Auffassung 
der Aphasie: 58f 
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Despite the extreme density of his exposition, Freud makes clear the metaphorical 
notion of process. Freud took a further step, a fundamental one, articulating sensation--
[Empjindung], association [Association] -"in reality they belong to a single process" 
[in Wirklichkeit hlJngen sie an einem einzigen Vorgang]- and representation 
[Volltellung] -"The localinltion of the physiological correlates for representation and 
association is, therefore, identical. "--- [Die Localisation des physiologischen Co"elats 
ist also tar Vorstellung und Association dieselbe]-. This relation between 
heterogeneous psychical process leads to an abstract image of anatomical space. Both 
"What then is the physiological correlate of the simple idea emerging or re-emerging? Obviously nothing static, but 
something in the nature of a process. This process is not incompatible with localization. It starts at a specific point 
in the cortex and from there spreads over the whole cortex and along certain pathways. When this event has taken 
place it leaves behind a modification, with the possibility of a memory, in the part of the cortex affected. It is very 
doubtful whether this physiological event is in any way associated with something psychic. Our consciousness 
contains nothing that would, from the psychological point of view, justify the term "latent memory image". Yet 
whenever the same cortical state is elicited again, the previous psychical event re-emerges as a memory. We have, 
of course, not the slightest idea how animal tissue can possibly undergo,. and differentiate, so many various 
modifications. But that it is able to do so is proved by the example,of the spermatozoa in which the most varied and 
highly differentiated modifications lie dormant and ready to develop. 
Is it possible, then, to differentiate the part of "perception" from that of "association" in the concomitant 
physiological process? Obviously not. "Perception" and "association" are terms by which we describe different 
aspects of the same plVCCSs. But we know that the phenomena to which these terms refer are abstmctions from 
a unitaJy and indivisible process. We cannot have a perception without immediately associating it; how~ver sharply 
we may separate the two concepts, in reality they belong to one" single process which, starting from one point, 
spreads over the whole cortex. The localization of the physiological correlates for perception, and association is, 
therefore, identical, and as localization of a perception means nothing else but localization of its correlate, we 
cannot possibly have a separate cortical localization for C8Gh. Both arise from the same lace and are nowhere static. 
(CA: 56) 
-We do not follow here the very dubious translation of the notion of Empfindung which appears in the English 
translation of this text as "perception". 
-rile English translation use the same term for Freud's notions of sensation [Empfindung] and (re)presentation 
[VorstelJung): perception. This fusion and confusion of tenns introduces a significative deviation which has serious 
consequences for the interpretation of Freud's text. 
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representation [Vorstellung] and association [Association], he suggests, refer to the 
same physiological correlate. Thus, the psychical notions of "sensation", 
"representation" and "association" acquire a purely.functional meaning, paradoxically 
detached from their anatomical territory, yet linked to an intangible, allegorical path. 
Freud asserts that the "possibility of remembrance" involves necessarily the 
modification of this fictional, physiological substrate [so hinterlllsst er in tkr von ihm 
aJJicinen Himrinde eine Modification, die MiJglichkeit der Erinnerungf; whic~ does 
not involve, in tum, the actu3.I correlative alteration of consciousness. S6 Psychical 
processes have become abstract images, beyond the reach of consciousness and have 
acquired a disquieting autonomy. 
In one of his latest and most revealing, condensed accounts of his own theory, 
Nom abet der "Wilnderblok" (1925), Freud repeated an unexpected, even odd, 
metaphor, forged by Meynert. This metaphor had been quoted by him, not without 
some ironic remarks, many years before in Zur Auffassung der Aphasie, in the context 
of a different conceptual discussion. Later, he resorted to the same metaphor to 
persuasively account for the relation between the conscious and the unconscious. In 
spite of the drastic transformation of the context, Freud's metaphor acquired a 
suggestive theoretical relevance: consciousness is envisioned as growing tentacles 
[Ftlhler] which embrace and incOrporate foreign matter': 
Es wire so, aIs ob das Unbewu8te mittels des Systems W-Bw der 
AuBenwelt Fiihler entgegenstrecken wOrde, die rasch 
zurilckgezogeo ~ nachdem sie deren Erregungen verkostet 
baben. Ieb IieB also die Unterbrechungen, die beim Wunderblock 
von auBen her geschehen, durch die qiskontinuitAt der 
Innervationsstromung zustande kommen, und an Stelle einer 
wirklichen Kontaktaufhebung stand in meiner Annahme die 
pcriodisch eintretende Unerregbarkeit des 
Wahmehmungssystems. Ieh vermutete ferner, daB diese 
diskontinuierliche Arbeitsweise des Systems W-Bw der 
Entstehung der Zeitvorstellung zugiunde liegt. (Notiz aber den 
"Wunderblock", SA, 1925, m: 369ro 
°it leaves behind • modification, with the possibility of memory. in the part of the cortex affected. (CA: 56) 
it is as though the unconscious strdcbel out fc:cIen, through the medium of the system Pcpl. -Cs. I towards the 
extcrnaI world and hastily withdraWi them u soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it. 'J!tWl the 
~, which in the cue of the My.tic Pad have an external origin, were attributed b~ my'hypo~ealS to the 
dilcontinuity in the current of innervation; and the ac::tua1 breaking of contact which occun m the M~s~c Pad ~ 
rq>1accd in my theory by the periodic non-cxcitability o(the perceptual system. I further had a suspIcion that this 
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But in this summarized presentation -as frequently occurs in Freud's work- the original 
conceptual tension between conscious and unconscious led to another: the oposition 
between inner and outer subjective spaces. The spatial boundaries of the self arise from 
symbolic processes: they are fictional resonances of a primordial psychical process. 
The perception of rhythm, ofperiodicity,S8 does not only appear as the subject's means 
of defining the frontier between the outer and the inner stimulus, but as the w.ay of 
recognizing the essential difference between contrasting qualities of the energy 
processes: inner energy appears as an uninterrupted flow, while external energy is 
perceived as an onrush. Thus, periodicity and discontinuity characterize the relation of 
the psychical system to the objects of the world. It is this rhythmic, fluctuating 
, ' . 
movement, --the sequence of fading and reappearance of distinct presences that informs 
both consciousness and the subject's experience of time. In a significant passage of his 
Melapsychology he had clearly acknowledged: 
Das Ich bedarf der Au6enwelt Dicht, insofem es autoerotisch ist, 
es bekommt aber Objekte aus ihr infolge der ErlebDisse der 
Icherbaltungstriebe und kann doch Dicht umhin, innere Triebreize 
als unlustvoll fUr cine Zeit zu verspiiren. Unter der Herrschaft des 
lAastprinzips voIlzieht sich nun in ibm eine weitere Entwicklung. 
Es nimmt die dargebotenen Objekte, insofem sie Lustquellen 
sind, in sein Ich auf, introjiziert sich dieselben (nach dem 
Ausdrucke Ferenczis [1909]) und slOBt anderseits von sich aus, 
was ibm im eigenen Innem UoIustanlaB wird. 
Es wandelt sich so sus dem anflinglichen ReaI-Ich, welches Innen 
und Au6en nach einem guten objektiven Kennzeichen 
unterschieden hat, in ein purifiziertes Lust-Ich, welches den 
Lustcharakter fiber jeden anderen setzt. Die AuBenwelt zerflillt 
ibm in einen Lustanteil, den es sich einverleibt hat, und einen 
Rest, der ibm fremd ist. Aus dem eigen Ich hat es einen 
Bestandteil ausgesondert, den es in die Au6enwelt wir und aIs 
feindlich empfindet. Nach dieser Umordnung ist die Deckung der 
beiden Polaritiiten:' 
Ich-Subjekt - mit Lust 
Au6enwelt - mit Uolust (von fiiiher her InditTerenz) 
wiederhergestellt (Triebe und Triebschiksale, SA, 1915, III: 98)" 
discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt. -Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time. 
(FP, 11: 434) 
"Insofar as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but. in consequence of experi.ence.s 
undergone by the instincts of self-preservation. it acqulres objects from the world. and. in ,spite of everythmg, It 
cannot avoid feeling internal instinctual stimuli for a time as unpleasurable. Under the dominance of the pleasure 
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The contrast between the expenence of a continuous intenal excitation and a 
discontinuous flow of energy defines the frontier between the different spheres of 
"objective signs". A clear discernment of this discontinuity is the evidence of outer 
energy. Yet, the memories of the contrasting experiences acquire the symbolic sense 
of the presence and absence of loved objects, which have been transformed into tokens 
by the self-reflexions of consciousness. Freud was impulsed to introduce here 
suplementary, disquieting categories: the subject's awareness of the quality of energy 
is not enough to set its own boundaries and to build its own identity as opposed to the 
outside world. The perception of the quality of inner energy must correspond to certain 
sensations: pain, unpleasure, and pleasure. Thus it is feeling, the reflexive perception 
of iriner' dynamics, that enables the subject to build up reality from the dispersed 
evidence of discontinuous perception of world objects. Consequently, the objective 
world does not emerge from pure perception, from a lucid awareness of the qualities 
of extraneous signs, but also from the vestiges of threatening, distressing stimuli which 
adumbrate the painful memory of a primordial, lost object. Freud formulates this 
conflictive dynamic of pain as the transformation of fictional characters: real ego turns 
into a pUrified pleasure-ego. 
The subtle metaphorical sense of the notion of process implicitly replaces, in Freud' s 
universe, the illuminating power of the current metaphor of anatomical regions. His 
conception of a stratified psychical apparatus, taken from the physiological enquiries 
of Hughling Jackson, engendered a further, uncomfortable metaphor: the psychical 
. apparatus appeared as chronologically assorted layers of timeless residues of perceived 
and recognized objects. Thus, the image of psychical agencies is that of encompassing 
principle a further development now takes place in the ego. In so far as the objects which are prsented to it are 
sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them (to use Ferenczi's [1909J tenn); and, on the other 
hand, it expcll whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure. 
Thus, the original 'rea!ity-ego', which distinguished internal and external by means of a sound objective 
criterion, changes into a purified 'pleasure-ego', which places the characteristic of pleasure above others. For the 
p1eaaurt>egO the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and 
a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external 
world and feell as hostile. After this new arrangement, the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject 
coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure (with what was early indifference). (FP, 11: 133-
134) 
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surfaces, folding membranes, volumes that interpenetrate; a positional conception of 
the subjective agencies turned into visual theoretical allegories: consciousness appeared 
as the outer layer of subjectivity; it is depicted as a tenacious barrier which divides 
inner and outer universes. The metaphorical mutation induces a radical ambiguity in 
this dualism of psychical territories. Inner and outer -it has often been emphasized-, 
constitute an unstable, yet definitive allegorical order in Freud's categories.59 
Freud's later conceptual oppositions between the world and inner vestiges of 
loved objects, between sensation and perception, only offer a shallow and elusive 
theoretical foundation always on the verge of a new redefinition. Yet, their ephemeral 
limits display distinct, albeit delusive reflections of the Baroque contrast between the 
inner and the outer. The ancient and enigmatic duality of body and mind, which came 
to life so violently at the dawn of rationalism, also exerted a profound influence in 
Freud's conception. The relation between the body as a whole, and the brain, which 
seems to have been the source of Freud's original physiological enquiry, acquired a 
new and unprecedented sense: the distinction between body and mind ceased to be a 
purely anatomical and physiological problem or, a question which revolved around the 
vctrious definitions of reason. The mind-body problem which triggered intricate 
philosophical debates, involved, in Freud's case, inextricable conceptual tensions: the 
distinction and representational' relation between the physical and the psychical, 
between unconsciousness and consciousness, between sensation and perception, 
between instinct [Trieb] and culture, between feeling and representation, between 
discernment and desire, between the inherited and the acquired, some of them ancient 
and unresolved cardinal philosophical problems, and which were to prove crucial 
questions for the modem conception of subjectivity. 
IV. The strangeness of the body 
John Stuart Mill, in A System of Logic -work which was probably very well known 
to Freud from the very beginning of the psychoanalytic enterprise-, described 
thoroughly and persuasively the sources of the conceptual antagonism between body 
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and mind; the apparent discord involved above all the notion of sensation. John Stuart 
Mill observed: 
It is usual, indeed, to speak of sensations as states of body, not of 
mind. But this is the common confusion, of giving the same name 
to a phenomenon and to the approximate cause or conditions of 
the phenomenon. The immediate antecedent of a sensation Is a 
state of body. but the sensation Itself is a state of mind. If the 
word Mind means any thing, it means that which feels. 60 
As it has been already remarked, Freud t s conception of parallel processes, 'which 
implies an uncertain causality -his puzzling "dependent concomitant"-, reciprocal 
resonances and endless sequence of symmetric yet contrasting topographical pictures, 
calls to mind immediately the Baroque conflict between the illuminated and the 
obscure, 9Ontiguous spaces, between the opposing senses of moving volumes. 
However, these mirrors reflect grotesque images. Freud t s model of the "dependent 
concomitant" brings into a relationship incomparable domains. This relation does not 
suggest a discernible analogy, but a radical asymmetry between both processes. The 
body --conceived as a source of energy and as the definitive origin of perceptions-
continues to be envisaged as an obscure pole, as an enigmatic realm linked by 
representation'to the psychical apparatus.61 The asymmetry involved in representation 
resembled that of a symptom whi~h had lost or radically misconstrued its own sources. 
The body emerges as a conjectural object,62 foreign even to the suggestive images 
evoked by the thermodynamic metaphor. 
Representation, indeed, was Freud t s term for the psychical outcome of 
unaccountable bodily processes. It implies Freud t s early acquired conviction that the 
knowledge of physiological transformations is beyond the reach of reflexive 
consciousness and resists evocation. A violent conclusion regarding the nature of 
subjectivity emerges: the self is uprooted from i~ own physical matter and abstracted 
from the plenitude of its own sensations. 
The body construed by consciousness is a purely functional and conjectural 
entity, the mere source of impulses, of perturbations perceived as feelings; its image 
is just that of a dense, dark source of psychical processes. Ego, although foreign to the 
body, is conceived as its shadow, its emanation, an effigy which looms from the 
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subject's memory of the original and ineffaceable paths of stimulus and response; the 
identity of ego is built up from the paths between accumulated, settled residues of the 
perceived objects and actions_ Its shape has been moulded by an unfathomable regime 
of perception. 
Body will preserve in psychoanalytic theory its image of an outer rind, of an 
object, the alien identity of which is inherent in its boundary position: 
Der eigene KOrper und vorallem die Oberf1ache desselben ist ein 
Ort, von dem gleichzeitig au&re und innere Wahrnehmungen 
ausgehen kOnnen. Er wird wie ein anderes Objekt gesehen, ergibt 
aber dem Getast zweierlei Empfmdungen, von denen die eine 
einer inneren Wahmehmung gleichkommen kann. Es ist in de 
Psychophysiologic bin reichend erortert worden, auf welche 
Weise sich de eigene Korper aus de Wahmebmungswelt 
heraushebt. Auch de Schmerz scheint dabei eine Rolle zu 
spielen, und die Art, wie man bei schmertzhajien Erlcrankungen 
eine neue Erkenntnis seiner Organe erwirbt, ist vielleicht 
vorbtldlich ftJr die Art, wie man Qberhaupt zur Vorstellung 
setnes etgenen KlJrpers kommt. Das Ich ist vor allem ein 
korperliches, es ist nicht nur ein Oberflichenwesen, sondem 
selbst die Projektion einer Oberfliche. Wenn man eine 
anatomische Analogie fUr dasselbe sucht, kann man es am ehesten 
mit dean "Gehirmnannchen" de Anatomen identifizieren, das in de 
Himrinde auf dent Kopf steht, die Fersen nach oben streckt, nach 
hinten schaut und, wie bekannt, links die Sprachzone tragt. (Das 
Ich und das Ef, SA, 1923, III: 294. Emphasis addedf 
In accordance to Freud, inner perception -and its extreme and singular manifestation: 
pain- fashions the experience of the body as an image which delimits the frontiers of 
the psychical world. The body is, in this view, the source and the outcome of the 
experience of pain which evinces the limits of per~ption and the failure of 
consciousness. 
Pain appears as an overwhelming, intense energy, which dissipates the contours 
-A person's own body, and above aU its surface, is a place from which both external and internal perceptions may 
spring. It is seen like any other object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be 
equivalent to an internal perception. Psycho-physiology has fully discussed the manner in which a person's own 
body attains its special position among other objects in the world of perception. Pain, too, seems to playa part in 
the process, and the way in which we gain new knowledge of our organs during painful illnesses is perhaps a model 
of the way by which in general we arrive at the idea of our body. The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is 
not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for 
it we can best identify it with the 'cortical homunculus' of the anatomists, which stands on its head in the cortex; 
sticks up its heels, faces backwards and, as we know, has its speech-area on the left-hand side. (FP, 11: 364-365) 
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of the perceived, giving rise to an exorbitant, pure feeling which not only pervades and 
constitutes the image of the body but also arrests psychical representation; indeed, 
perceived pain reveals the radical eclipse of perception; it involves an intensity of 
energy which debases the qualities of the perceived object; it becomes a pure sensation 
which lacks the range of distinct, discernible sensual qualities. However, pain remains 
an ambiguous notion: it refers both to a psychical disturbance provoked by a discharge 
of energy into the psychical system, and to its perception and representation in the 
realm of consciousness. This duality allows Freud to conceive an unperceived, 
unconscious pain, despite his firm denial of the possibility of conceiving "unconscious 
sensations" .63 
The intrinsic bond between body and pain reveals itself to be unaccountable: 
pain appears only as an uncertain, fluctuating, discontinuous burst of energy into the 
perception of a non-significant body. It introduces in the subject's experience a blazing 
discontinuity and engraves in the flesh the poignant evidence of the fmiteness of the 
body; it signifies its confines. Pain arouses the subject's singular awareness of the 
body, it endows it with a paradoxical, fictional yet tangible sense of materiality; pain 
confers on the subject's own body an absolute but alien and hostile intimacy. The body 
acquires a perceivable reality after the outburst of pain; its violence creates the body 
out of those perceptions which reveal its sudden crumbling, which foreshadows its 
disappearance; it creates the image of the body while exposing its fragility and its 
impending destruction; pain forges the body as negative matter, as a substance which 
should acquire its identity at the moment of its own eclipse: thus, the everyday 
perception of the body emerges from the rhythmic effusion of pain and its eclipse; the 
body can be seen as the aftermath of painful experience. Pain forges the existence of 
the body as a totality from the mute devastation, from the remains left by the suffering 
experience in the territories of the body; its ephemeral, dispersed intensity gives rise 
to the congruence of its image. Pain becomes a perceptible quality, a presence in itself 
which pervades the body and prevents its forgetfulness; it reveals its totality by 
severing it; exposing the painful segments as debased traces of life. The silent 
familiarity of the body, its ellusiveness·, its unnoticeable density emerges as the token 
of the pure transience of pain. 
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The overwhelming intensity of pain, Freud insists, may be considered an 
essential resource for the complex building of the subject's image of the body. In the 
psychoanalytic conception, pain shapes the physiognomy, the sense and the density of 
the perceived, symbolic body. The body is conceived as a folding surf~ce, an 
lmapprehensible membrane interposed between the subject and the world. Yet, it also 
appears as a tangible facet of the psychical apparatus, turned into a protective envelope. 
In Freud's terms, the body appears metaphorically as a folding surt:ace; it 
confers on the subject the capacity to distinguish the outer from the inner; to build the 
identity of the self as dense flesh. However, it also engenders a psychical identity. Ego 
itself is conceived by Freud as a psychical simile of this enveloping membrane; it is 
moulded by the projection of the body upon psychical processes; but also, by the settled 
remains tit experience; ego takes the form of a progressively dense layer of fixed 
energy conduits, vestiges of perceptions both of the body and of outer images, 
memories of achieved or failed actions, of hallucinatory and real satisfaction; ego is 
thus the result of the permanent encounter of silent, primary thought with the 
"necessities of life". It is conceived as a later agency, as an aftermath of the struggle 
of primary thought with the elusive and painful spectre of world objects; it is the 
outcome of the progressive unfolding and transformation of the inner, primal qualities 
of the psychical apparatus; ego is also conceived as the mute assortment of the 
memories of the subject's loss of his love objects. Moreover, the complete psychical 
apparatus is envisioned as a series of membranes which proliferate after the primordial 
cleavage of the subject's identity. 
Freud's early image of the breach between body and brain anticipates the 
conceptual tension between psychical and physical, between mind and body: the 
original physiological duality -bOdy and brain- transforms itself into an abstract, 
metaphorical image: the unity of the subject is seen as the relation between a biological 
layer enveloped by a psychical stratum, which is, in turn, formed by overlaying 
psychical coverings. Each new folding, each new envelope involves a cleavage, a 
distinction between incomparable features of the subject's agencies. This sequence of 
cleavages multiplies the echoes of the Cartesian enquiry regarding the enigma of the 
relation of body and mind. 
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However, psychoanalysis found in the notion of drive [Trieb] a firm but 
mythical explanation -as Freud himself admitted- for the constitutional cleavage 
hetween body and mind. 
Indeed, one of Freud's lasting contributions to the psychoanalytic conception 
of subjectivity is, undoubtedly, the notion of drive (instinct, in Strachey's version). 
This Freudian notion acquired a theoretical relevance comparable to that of 
representation; it refers to a conjectural process that blends in a single fig4re the 
uncertain conception of psychical energy, the hypothesis of the concomitance between 
psychical and physical orders, the notion of an active force and the assertion on the 
symbolic nature of the process of thought; it also became the metaphorical image at the 
core of the notion of desire. Freud himself did not hesitate to acknowledge explicitly 
. 
the speculative -mythical (Freud)- nature of this concept. 64 This peculiar conceptual 
extraterritoriality of drive accounts for its uncertain position and relevance in Freud's 
theory: 
Die Trieblehre is sozusagen unsere Mythologie. Die Triehe sind 
mythisehe Wesen, gro6artigen in ihrer Unbestimmtheit Wir 
konnen in unserer Arbeit keinen Augenblick von ihnen absehen 
und sind dahei me sieher, sie scharf zu sehen. (Neue Folge de 
Vorlesungen zur Einfi1rung in die Psychoanalyse, SA, 1933, I: 
529f 
Thus, drive [Trieb] depicts the action exerted by excitation upon the psychical, 
symbolic response, the figurative and representational resonance of unfathomable 
intense corporeal energies. It names both the capacity of the psychical sphere to 
represent the physical, unaccountable force of biological energy and the capacity of a 
physical, shapeless energy to unleash symbolically governed psychical, object-oriented 
energy. Drive, as has been tirelessly emphasized by different readers of Freud's work, 
has the structure and the elements of representation; yet, it is also an impulse which 
brings together both universes; it is neither psychical nor physical, both pure impulse 
and representation. 
"('he theory of the instincts is to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities. MAgnificent. in their 
indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disre,gard them, yet we are never sure that we are seemg them 
~~ear. (FP, 2: 127) 
Wenden wit uns nun von de biologischen Seite her de 
Betrachtung des Seelenlebens zu, so erscheint uns de "Trieb" aIs 
ein ~begriff zwischen Seelischem Wld Somatischem, als 
~ RepriIsentant de aus dem KOrperinnem stammen~ 
m die Seele gelangenden Reize, als ein MaB de 
Arbeitsanforderung, die dem Seelischen infolge seines 
Zusammenhanges mit dcm Korperlichen auferlegt ist (Trieb und 
Trlebschilcsale, SA, 1915, m: 85f 
278 
It is this intermediate position of the drive between both spheres that determines the 
relevance of the drive in Freud's conception of subjectivity: drive appears 
simultaneously as an impulse, as an action, as a relation, even as an object endowed 
with a meaningful content, completely foreign to the purely dynamic tensions of the 
corporeal discharge of energy. 
However, the autonomous, invariant regime of the drive, its symbolic 
performance, veils the nature of the physiological functions and their behaviour. The 
biological ground in which drive -understood as a symbolic, dual structure- takes root 
is beclauded by perceived and spectral images which it itself informs. Drive [Trieb] 
stands by itself; its own extraneous mechanisms lead it to tum appart from its physical 
foundations, yet echoing them as an alien and opaque image. Its own, specific symbolic 
form is detennined by its own intrinsic structure: "its 'pressure', its 'aim', its 'object' 
and its 'source'" (FP, 11: 118) [Drang, Ziel, Objek/, Quelle des Triebs (Triebe und 
Triebschicksale, SA, 1915, ill: 85)]. The mixture and collision of energies, which 
constitute the represented event, its re~erence, clearly appear as pure conjecture, a 
speculative image which provides a finn but perturbing hermeneutical clue to the 
mysteries of desire. 
It is clear, however, that Freud's conception implies two distinguishable 
energies: on one side, a physiological energy, free from any constraint othe~ than that 
of physical laws; on the other, psychical energy which appears as a token, as an 
impulse likely to represent the disturbances of the psychical stability; it carries a 
meaningful content and is governed, in the orientation and intensity of its discharge, 
'"If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a hiological point of view. an 'inst~ct' appears ~o u~ 
as. a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the ~tunuli 
originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mmd for 
work in consequence of its connection with the body. (FP. 11: 118) 
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by sheer symbolical determinations. 
The singular allegories of body, constructed by psychoanalysis, illuminate the 
enigmatic relation, posited by Stuart Mill, between body, sensation and feelings. 
Indeed, despite the fact that body and feelings are clearly opposed concepts, they also 
establish, in Mill's view, an intrinsic, causal dependence. Thus, sensations and feelings 
become closely related phenomena in Mill's terms, and reveal themselves to be the 
fundamental processes of the mind, foreign to biological constraints and vet reacting , J'. 
to their inherent changes and processes. However, Mill's distinction was to be 
reformuJated by Freud, in a late contribution: while sensation and feelings spring from 
inner sources, perceptions respond to intrusions of energy from without: 
Wir wissen schon, wo wir hiefUr anzukniipfen haben. Wir haben 
gesagt, das Bewu6tsein ist die Oberflache des seelischen 
Apparates, das heillt, wir haben es einem System als Funktion 
lllgeschriebeu, welches riilmllich das erste von der AuBenwelt her 
ist. Rllumlich Qbrlgens nicht nur im Sinne der Funlction, sondern 
dies11lQJ ouch 1m Sinne der anatomischen ZergJiederung. Auch 
unser Forschen muB diese wahmehmende Oberf1iiche zum 
Ausgang nebmen. Von vomherein bw sind alle Wahmehmungen, 
die von au8cn herankommen (Sinneswahmehmungen), und von 
iDDen her, was wir Empfindungen und Gefiihle hei6en. (Das lch 
und das Es. SA, 1923, m: 288f 
1. Visual metaphorsaod the symbol: projection and representation 
As we have remarked, . the notion of body, in Freud's theory, emerged as a dazzHng 
metaphor: it lost its concrete profile and designated an opaque substrate of the flows 
of energy, inaccessible to reflexive consciousness. 
The fertility of this image results from the conjunction of diverse oonceptual 
constellations and disciplinary ~omains. In the final decades of nineteenth century, at 
the zenith of an unprecedented traDsformation in the revolution in optical technology, 
the invention of photography and the rudiments of cinema, at the peak of crucial social 
transformations which enlivened a powerful new regime of visibility, Meynert 
-We already know the point from which we have to start in this connection. We have said that ~e ~nsci~usness 
is the Sll1'jQc6 of the mental apparatua; that is, we have ascribed it as a function to a system whlC~ IS .pa~iaUy the 
fint one rachcd tom the cxtemal world -and Ipatially not only in the functional sense but, on thIS occation, also 
in the sense of anatomical dissection. OUf investigations too must take this perceiving surface as a starting point. 
AD pcaupCions which ~ reccived fiorn without (scnse-~rccptions) and from within -what we call sensation. and 
feelings- are Cs. from the start. (FP, 11: 351) 
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proposed, in the context of his discussion on aphasia, an optical concept to expound the 
constitution of the body's image: the notion of projection. 
Optical and anatomical metaphors proliferate in Freud' s theory; the term 
projection sprung from the attraction exerted on him by Meynert's metaphor of the 
retinian image, which condensed in a simple figure the unaccountable process by which 
the vast web of currents of the corporeal stimulus converged into a single, flow of 
sheer energy. However, the retinian image conceived as a "point-by-point" 
physiological icon of the world, created by the eye, accounted only for a partial phase 
in the scheme of flows of energy of the whole body. 
Wie gestaltet sich nun die Abbildung des Korpers in der 
Gehimrinde, welche durch solche Bahnen mit der Peripherie 
verbanden ist? Meynert nennt diese Abbildung eine "Projection", 
und einige seiner I3emerkungen lasse schliessen, dass er in der 
That eine Projection, db. eine Abbildung Punkt, des Korpers in 
der Himrinde annimt. In diesem Sinne dent z.B. der so haftige 
Vergleicb der Hinrinde mit der Retina des Auges, einem 
Endorgan, dessen Nervensubstanz von mehreren Autoren ein 
"Stuck vorgeshobenes Rindengrau" gennant wurde. (Zur 
AujJassung der Aphasie: 49f 
Projection, as an optical metaphor, seems to rise from the constraints imposed by 
scientific conceptions on the emerging psychology; science resorted to the imperious, 
legitimate triumph of visibility; nineteenth century scientific discourse, captivated by 
the new potencies of observation, yielded to the biological, evolutionist imagination, 
and to the philosophical speculations which surrounded it. 
Freud a ere fascine, au debut de sa carriere, par l'aide 
inappreciable que les perfectionnements du microscope 
apportaient a ses travaux d'histologie, et par la personnalite de 
Charcot, "un visuel, comme il se nommait lui-mcme, un voyant 
(ein Seher)~ qui s'emerveillait "qu'oo puisse voir soudain de nou-
velles choses - de nouveaux etats morbides - qui pourtant etaient 
vraisemblablement aussi anciennes que l'espece hurnaine". Les 
etudes de Freud sur l'hysterie l'oot mis en presence de patients qui 
"donnent a voir" et chez lesquels iJ s'est interesse particulierment 
aux troubles de la vision. iviais c'est aussi a leur contact que sont 
nes ses premiers doutes sur la possibilite d'acceder a la verite 
"In what way, then, is the body represented in the cerebral cortex which is connected with the periphery by means 
o~thcse tracts? Meynert calls this representation a "projection". and some of his comments indicate t~a~ he actually 
~nvisages a projection, i.e. a point by point representation. of the body in the cerebral cortex. This IS. suggested 
by the frequent analogy he draws between cerebral CQrtex and retina. The latter is an end organ which several 
writers have called an outlying piece of cortex. (CA: 47) 
comme on coratemple une image, de tenir sous son regard, ainsi 
que Ie .chirurgien fait d'une tumeur, la scene lraumatique ou Ie 
souvcmr transparent penncttant de remontar jusqu'i I'origioc du 
mal. Ce qui cst en jeu, I'inconscient, n'est jamais donne dans une 
image, mais DC peut qu'atre conjectur6, mis en perspective par 
1'6tab1issemcnt de rapports, passant f0rc6ment par Ie langage, tel 
quill fonctionnc dans la cure analytique.6S 
281 
The knowledge of body revealed itself as a mirage, reduced to the landscape of a 
functional self-image of the mind. The acuteness of the inward vision, the reflexive 
consciousness turned upon sensations and feelings, made up the image of the self and 
empbazised the enigma of flesh. Projection appears as an meagre image of the inner 
bod~. The "topographic" images of the brain, the language apparatus, the psychical 
apparatus and the body were translated into functions and vestiges. The representation 
of body exhibited its own fragmentariness. The notion of projection forged a dimmed 
image of the flesh, and rendered it into a bare functional figure; the optical metaphor 
uncovered the fictional nature of sensations. 
The early Freudian notion of projection, blended into a single image not only 
the optical metaphor of the formation of images, but also Wernicke I s fluvial metaphor 
of the stimulus, which strengthened and unfolded the insinuating power of the optical 
allegc)ry. 
Wie gcstaItet sa nun die Abbildung des K6rpers in der 
Gebirnrinde, welcbc durch solche Bahnen mit der Periphcrie 
vClbamdco ist1 Meync:rt nennt diese Abbildung eine "Projcction", 
und cinigc seiner Bemerkungcn lasse schIiessen, dass er in der 
That cine PrQjcction, d.h. cine Abbildung Punkt, des K6rpers in 
der HimriDde 'IDDimt In diesem Sinne dent z.B. del" so biftige 
Vergleicb der Hinrinde mit der Retina des Auges, einem 
End6rgan, dessen Nerveosubstanz von mehreren Autoren ein 
"Sud vorgeshobenes Rindengrau" gamant wurde. (ZII' 
Aujfossung der Aphasie: 49f 
Meyneit's metaphor cOnveyed the idea of an implicit but unavoidable assymetry 
between centre and periphery -a relation which resembles the opposition between the 
m whit MY, tbal, ill the bOdy Iq)fCICIIted in·the cerebral cortex which is connected with the periphery by rncaDI 
ofthc. trIdI? Me,nm calli this repraentation wprojection-, and lOme of his comments indicato ~a~ he adUaIly 
awiaagela projodion, i.e., a point by point reprcsentation, of the body in the cerc:t>ral cortcx:1bis 1I.IUgated 
by the tnquent analogy be draWl between cen:bral ~rtcx and retina. The Iaucr II an end organ which several 
wrikn have called an outlying piece of cortex. (CA: 41) 
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body and the mind-, and also echoed the definitive tension between the inner subjective 
sphere and the outer world. Moreover, this notion of projection introduced an 
unsettling image of the body: it construed it as a foreign, extraneous object transformed 
by a secret code into an amalgam of energy and stimuli. Freud accepts and develops 
Wernicke's insights, only to encounter the confines of the explanatory power of his 
fluvial images. Following the physiological findings of Henle, he acknowledges the 
curtailed image of the body produced by the structure of the nervous sys~m. A 
consequence of this theoretical approach was the notion of body as a peripherical 
duster of nomadic energies moving along fixed and dissipating trenches. The image 
of this peripherical body endures a radical transformation while it travels through the 
gray masses. The poorness of the metaphor of the retinian image -a point-by-point 
- . 
internal, physiological, reproduction the external world- and the simultaneous though 
deceiving illuminations of the fluvial metaphor, which seemed to elucidate the 
emergence of the body's identity, led, nevertheless, to a disquieting consequence: the 
body was envisaged only as a distorted, fragmentary image bred by the stimuli of the 
body fused into the spinal cord. The word body named an obscure web of flows of 
energy, which enveloped the central organs. 
Wir ersehen nur so viel, dass die nach Durchsetzung von grauen 
Substanzen in der Hinrinde anlangenden Fasem zwar noch eine 
Beziehung zur Korperperipherie enthalten, aber kein topisch 
iihnliches Bild derselben mehr geben konnen. (Zur AujJassung 
der Aphasien: 55f 
The image of the body dissipates; the immense variety of the body's excitations fuses 
into a pure flow of nervous stimuli. Moreover, the suggestive force of the notion of 
. representation, which also implied an elliptic reconstruction of the scheme of the body, 
was also a product of the captivating eloquence of optical devices. In this early context 
of optical metaphor, representation was seen to' display an heterogeneous and, in a 
way, distorted image of body, which turned out to be, in itself, a surrogate image of 
projection: 
'\\'e can only presume that the fibre tracts, which reach the cerebral cortex after their passage through other. grey 
masses, have maintained some relationship to the peripilery of the body. but no longer reflect the topographIcally 
exact image of it. (CA: 53) 
die Abbildung in Ruckenmarksgrau eine Projectio~ so wird es 
vielleicbt passend se~ die Abbildung in der Grosshimrinde eine 
~~ ~ beissen und sagen, die KOrperperipberie sei in 
de Hrrnnnde rucht StUck fUr StUck enthalte~ sondem in einer 
minder detaillirten Sonderung dUTch ausgewihlte Fasem 
vertreten. (Zur AujJassung der Aphasien: 52f 
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The conceptual asymmetry between projection and representation does not refer to 
unequal quantities of stimuli. Representation does not only offer a broad image of the 
perceived inner corporeal alterations, it also integrates the selective corporeal resPonses 
into an open spectrum of the intruding stimuli. The image of the body has its source 
in an uncertain physiological scheme. Thus, the notion of representation refers to the 
visible totality of the non-representable, subtle complexity of the physiological system, 
which . giv~s rise to the body's decieving, psychical image. The notion of body 
allegorically portrays the wholeness composed by shreds and mixtures of disjointed 
excitations, a rough image made of porous matter offered as tangible evidence to 
consciousness. Freud, indeed, alludes to the nature of the represented body in a 
compelling allegory: 
[Die nach Dw'chsetzung von grauen Substanz in de Hinrinde 
anlagenden Fasem] Sie enthalten die KOrperperipherie, wie-urn 
ein Beispiel dem uns bier beschattigenden Gegenstande zu 
entIebnen- ein &dicht das Alphabet enthalt, in einer Umordung, 
die andere Zwecken dient, in mannigfacher Verknupfung der 
einze1nen topischen Elemente, wobei die einen davon mehrfach, 
die anderen gar nicht vertreten sein mogen. (Zur Auffassung der 
Aphasien: 54-55)" 
The allegory of the poem, since this first seemingly incidel!tal appearance in Freudian 
text, has never been extirpated from the repertoire of the favorite psychoanalytic 
images; not only is it particularly meaningful to psychoanalysis, but it might be seen 
as a subtle contribution to a never formulated poetics of subjectivity. Envisioned as a 
simile of biological organisms, the text seems to acquire the features of a living being; 
"If the way in which the periphery is reflected in the spinal cord is called a "projection", its counterpart in the 
cm:bral cortex might suitably be c:alIed "representation", which implies that the periphery of the body is contained 
in the cerebral cortex not point by point, but through selected fibres, in a less detailed differentiation. (CA: 51) 
-[the fibre tracta,which reach the cerebral cortex after their passage through the gray masses) .contain the body 
periphery in the same way as -to borrow an example from the subject with which we are concerned here- a poem 
contains Ihe alphabet. i.e .• in a completely different arrangement serving other purposes, in a manifold association 
of the individual elements, whereby some may be represented several times, others not at all. (CA: 53) 
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in tum, the alphabet, referred to as a set of signs, significant only for their relative 
position, lacking any possible autonomous sense, suggests the relations between 
different bodily sources of excitation and its psychical image. This allegory adumbrates 
a singular pereeption of the body which integrates the stimuli of autonomous layers in 
a functional structure which completely transfigures the original content of such 
selected excitations that have been allowed into the representational link. 
Thus, the effigy of body, from the very beginning of Freud' s reflection was .' 
portrayed as an array of functions which have lost even their singular spatial and 
anatomical qualities: 
dass das Prinzip (the reconstitution of spinal projection into the 
brain cortex) derselben ein rein functioneUes ist, und dass 
topische Momente nur insoweit beibehalten werden, a1s sie mit 
den Anfordenmgcn der Function zusammenfallen. Da nichts dafiir 
spridl, dass in drr Hirminde diese Umordnung wieder riickglngig 
gemacht wird, um cine topographisch vollstlndige Projection zu 
ergeben, so diirfen. wir vermuthen, dass die KOrperperipberie in 
den hOheren Himtheilen, wie auch in der Hirnrinde, iiberhaupt 
nicht mC'hr topiscbe, sondem bloss functionsgemass enthalten ist. 
(Zur AujJassung der Aphasie: 55f 
The abstract metaphor of the body seems to derive from the asymmetric structure of 
projection. Since ~r A'4i!assung der Aplwsie, the psychoanalytic image of the body 
was nothing more than a conjectural Object. However, the illusion of a functional 
substrate of psychical processes builds up a persuasive image of body and sexuality. 
The allegorical image of the body. was to confer on the conception of sexuality 
an unexpected sense which excluded it from the current trends of reflexion. Sexuality 
was to be thought of as a peculiar, autonomous process of generation and discharge of 
energy.; as a cluster of functional physical and psychical processes that condenses 
bodily energies, gathered from different and untraceable sources disseminated in the 
body, and which stir specific psychical representations. Thus, sexuality should be 
conceived as the outcome of the confluence of a vast web of energy flows, with its 
'"If it were possible to follow in detail the rearrangement which takes place between the spinal projection and ~e 
cerebral cortex, one would probably find that the underlying principle is purely functional, and that the topographiC 
relations are maintained only as long as they fit in With the claims of function. As there is no indication that this 
I'CarTangement is revencd in the cerebral cortex to produce a topographically complete projection. we may suppose 
that the representation of the body periphery in the higlJer parts of the brain, and also in the cortex, is no longer 
topographical but only functional. (CA: S3-S4) 
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origin in countless dispersed regions of the body, which lack any specific, singular 
character considered from a strictly dynamic point of view. The image of sexuality 
turned into that of a peculiar machine for the distribution of energy flows and ruled by 
the symbolic patterns set by primary thought, by obscure constraints foreign to 
consciousness. It is an image of entangled and fading, reappearing signals, which 
illuminates the dark, unrelenting impulses of sexuality, its thresholds, its decline, and 
the exhaustion and suffocation of desire. 66 
With the allegorical abstraction of body, the distinction between projection and 
representation acquired a definitive place in psychoanalytic theory: it stressed the 
obscure identity of the physiological body and the elusiveness of sensation; it 
strengthens, paradoxically, the interpretative explanation of sexuality conceived as a 
. . . 
symbolically driven energy response. 
A slight but crucial change of the dominant trends of Freud's thought would 
become evident later, in the MerapsychologicaJ papers. In this set of astounding works, 
the dominant optical metaphor which underlays Freud's thought will acquire 
unprecedented overtones: projection turns into the inverted image of introjection; the 
oposition between them puts a disquieting additional accent on the previous notions of 
the inner and the outer dimensions of subjectivity, distorting abruptly the extension of 
their meanings, imposing on them suplementary, marginal, yet definitive senses: that 
of the struggle between pleasure and unpleasure, of the distinction between the object 
of love and the perceived object, of the contrast between the obscure depth of 
physiological energy process and psychical excitations, of the conflict between the 
symbolic sense of assertion [Bejahung] and negation [Vemeinung]; projection and 
introjection thus involved the opposition between the identity of the subject and of 
foreign objects, between preservation and destruction. The sense of the optic metaphors 
acquired an unforeseen richness, embodying the whole process of the formation of the 
psychical identity and its development. 
Projection, as conceived at the later stages of psychoanalytic thought, seems to 
name the act by which the subject construes an actual, experienced situation as the 
repetition of a previously unsuspected, secret representation, "expelling" an inner, yet 
unackowledged representation. The notion of projection neither depicts a real 
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transformation of the primordial memory, nor evidences an actual expulsion of a 
distressing object. Projection does not dissipate the inner anxiety of the subject, 
separating and shielding him from the appalling, visible image of his own debased yet 
unrecognized nature; projection construes an inner, secret image of a seemingly 
foreign, threatening appearance which informs perception and remains as a conscious 
image. However, throughout Freud I s work, the notion of projection preserved and 
enhanced its optical meanings: it often implied the subject's forging of a visible iplage; 
projection closely resembles the scenic composition of a dream; yet, in projection the 
subject's experience corresponded to actual perception. Projection suspends the 
consciousness of the delusive nature of an enacted dream or a created chimerical 
image; projection builds the image of inner tensions as incarnations of intensities and 
qualities ot the energy processes, as visible portraits, as theatrical scenes which loom 
up like mirages, as threatening, unanticipated presences. 67 
Projection -which preserve a vague resonance of an actual ejection 
[Awstoftung]- is informed by the act of negation. The projected image is built up from 
the relics of the unbearable memories of the subject's own psychical world, it is the 
visible sign of inadmissible, repressed remains of the self, just as the negative particle 
appears as the visible verbal signal of the suffocated residues of primary thought. Thus, 
projection, like negation, is a symbolic manifestation -image or word- which both 
sets and exhibits the boundaries of the psychical identity and signifies its finiteness. 
2. Intangible epidermis: the allegories of consciousness 
From the early stage of Freud's thought, the enigma of consciousness occupied a 
fundamental and yet disquieting place in his work. It was both an issue in his most 
violent controversies against philosophy, especially against those "philosophies of 
consciousness" -which encompassed almost the whole of Western Philosophy- that 
excI uded the notion of the unconscious, and an obscure facet of his own theoretical 
construction. The notion of consciousness proved to be crucial, and one without which 
the central notion of the unconscious would have appeared as a sheer speculative 
invention. Consciousness became a central concern of Freud's theoreticaI endeavour. 
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On several occasions he expressed his wish to write a specific work devoted 
specifically to this notion and related topics. However,. this work was either never 
written, or destroyed. 
As we have already remarked, Freud resorted to a metaphorical parallelism 
between the "position" of consciousness in the psychical apparatus and the anatomical, 
enveloping position of the cerebral cortex. Consciousness appears both as a shield and 
as an abstract membrane which enables the psychical apparatus to "commerce" wi.th the 
world, while protecting it from the unforeseeable violence of its surroundings. 
However, with the notion of consciousness Freud reverses the path of other 
metaphorical constructions: the dissiPation of the spatial and anatomical features of the 
body, interpreted by metaphors of function and time, corresponds to the 
characteri7ation of functional features of psychical agencies -conscious, unconscious-
in terms of energy, by metaphors of anatomical and corporeal formations. 
Consciousness eventually appear as an intermediate layer between the outer and the 
inner, a membrane which envelops the internal psychical agencies, protecting and 
isolating them from the exterior world [Al4Penwelt]. The notion of memory no longer 
refers to some·material sign eventually deposited in the psychical apparatus as a residue 
of experience, but to the functional displacements of energy. Thus, consciousness does 
not only appears as a diagram, as a coating, but also as a topographical image of a 
vague, anatomical organ. This topography had lost its specific characteristics and 
appeared as an uncertain scheme, as a functional map of the psychical sphere. 
However, Freud preserves with it his distinction between the self's reflexive . 
identity and the experience of the outer object. He resorts to the difference between 
sensation and perception in his effort to understand how the subject draws the 
boundaries between the inner and the outer. Thus, consciousness itself appears as the 
bQundary between the inner and the outer. Consciousness and perception are envisioned 
as a single, pervious system; the stimmuli passes through them without provoking a 
lasting transfonnation; this system preserves no trace of experience. Perception keeps 
no evidence either of the world or of its own experience; it behaves as a neutral, 
immutable witness of psychical inner transformations and of the world ~ s events, just 
as consciousness does. 
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However, the "neutral" condition of consciousness represents, in Freud I S 
conceptual sphere, a privileged feature of psychical processes. Freud had already 
anticipated this unalterable condition of consciousness in his most significant early 
work, the EnIwu1f einer Psychologie. In it, he depicted the neUlral, -impanial-
[wwomngenommen] nature of the neurons involved in perception, which appeared as 
both capable of being influenced, while remaining unchanged by these persistent 
mutations of their own state of excitation: 
Die Neurone' sonen also sowohl beeinfluBt sein aIs auch 
unvertndert, unvoreingenommen. (Entwurf einer Psychologle, 
GW, Nachtragsband: 391)· 
This' conjunction of the capacity of being influenced while remaining unchanged will 
be, in ~teudts conception, a definitive feature of consciousness. In a "speculative" 
fragment of Janseils des Lustprlnzips (1920), Freud seems to realize the consequences 
of this early image and to explore them in a new theoretical context. He ventures an 
explicit description of the neutral position of consciousness, resorting to a puzzling 
physiological image which he had spurn iii his early non-psychoanalytic period: 
Da etas Bewu8tsein im wesentlichen Wahmebmungen von 
Erregungen liefert, die aus der AuBenwelt kommen, und 
EmpfindWlgen von Lust und Unlust, die nur aus dem Innern des 
seelisdxn Apparates stammen konnen, kann dem System W -Bw 
eine riumliche Stellung zugewiesen werden. Es mufJ an del' 
Grenze von aufJen und innen liegen, der AuBenwelt zugekehrt 
sein und die anderen psychischen Systeme umhiillen. Wir 
bemerken dann, daB wir mit diesen Annahmen nichts Neues 
gewagt, sondem uns der lokaIisierenden Hirnanatomie 
angeschlossen haben, welche den "Sitz" des BewuBtseins in die 
~ in die 8u8erste, umhiillende Schicht'des Zentraiorgans 
verlegt." (Jenseits derLustprinzip, SA, 1920, ill: 234. Bolds are 
mine,RM.r-
However, consciousness did not only appear as a ~erely passive, inanimate device, or 
0[ ... ) neurons must be both influenced and also unaltered, unprejudiced (SE, I: 299) 
"'What consciousncss yields consists cssentiaUy of perceptions of excitations coming from the external world and 
of feelings of pleasure and unp1casure whch can only arise from within the mental apparatus; it is .therefore JX:'ss~ble 
to assign to the system Pcpt.-Cs. a position in space. It must lie in the borderline between the outside and the IOslde; 
it must be turned tOwards the external world and must envelop the other psychical systems. It will be seen that there 
is nothing daringly new in these assumptions; we have merely adopted the views of localization- held by cerebral 
anatomy, which locates the 'seat' of consciousness in the cerebral cortex -the outennost, enveloping layer of the 
central organ. (FP, 11: 295) 
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as a region of the mind where the inner processes unfold themselves as sequels of 
desire, displaying a series of evoked figures and representations; it was conceived as 
a folding membrane, as an outgrowth of the inner layers of the psychical apparatus, 
which turns both inwards and outwards, offering a certain resistance to the emergence 
of rising impulses, linking the deep regions, the source of feelings, with the outer 
motifs of perception. 
Despite the abrupt changes in Freud's train of thought, the early image ~f the 
parallelism between the psychical and the physiological processes will be preserved, 
yet deeply transformed by singularly coined, non-conventional concepts.68 The 
theoretical consequences of Freud's parallelism challenged even the illuminating 
capacities of both metaphorical and fictional discourses which determined the 
development of the concepts in the history of psychoanalysis. 69 
Freud's theory embodies odd, yet suggestive, reiterative and evanescent images of 
consciousness -antennas and tentacles- and subtle, fictional and theoretical versions 
of opposing terms. Freud alludes vaguely to consciousness in his narrative vision of the 
primordial, allegorical struggle between Eros and Thanatos, love and destruction, while 
seeking in Empedocles' fables a philosophical support for his own conjectures; the 
elucidation of consciousness calls 'for the powers of metaphor, of ellipsis, of narrative 
and fictional devices and even conventional, isolated images -in a peculiar 
argumentative sense-, as privileged supports for the fragmentary allegorical display. 
Consciousness became a simile of a cortical surface, a fictional, almost 
allegorical psychical reference of an imaginary anatomical topography. 70 
3_ The interior unfolding of anaclasis [Anlehnung] 
Despite the strong implications of the notion of parallelism, which sunders the body 
from the mind, the notion of anaclasis occupates an essential place in Freud's theory. 
Since its early appearance, the concept of anaclasis [Anlehnungfl both deepens and 
diSsipates the precarious distinction between the physical and the psychical. Anaclasis 
290 
refers to the reciprocal and undetermined transformation provoked by the relation 
between physical processes and symbolic action. Not only does the bodily outburst of 
energy transfonn the course and the end of symbolic action; symbolic action, in tum, 
informs and determines the production, rhythms and ends of excitation, distorting the 
autonomous regime of the biological body. This concept evinced a cardinal, 
challenging enigma. However, the intrinsic paradox involved in this notion has often 
been neglected by translators and commentators; even in canonical psych~ytic 
reflection. Laplanche and Pontalis did not hesitate to affirm: 
In our opinion the notion of anaclasis has not yet been fully 
extricated from Freud's work; for the most part, consideration has 
been given only to its part in the conception of object-choicc -
a ~which, far from furnishing a complete definition of 
anaclasis, presupposes its existence in the heart of any theory of 
instincts.72 
Anaclasis encompasses uncertain contradictory notions -parallelism, representation, 
mirror image, concomitance and allegory- which relate biological processes and 
psychical agencies. These covert, metaphorical notions display a contrasting landscape 
of relentless forces exerted upon Freud I s aesthetic aims and his scientific 
argumentation. Moreover, the original, implicit dualism of anaclasis and the uncertain 
causality involved in the bond between psychical and physical determinations, led 
Freud to a further distinction: he confronted the challenging enigma of the difference 
between sexual and non-sexual psychical experience. Sexuality, evisaged 
metaphorically as the undetermined convergence of inner flows of energy which both 
inform and subdue the symbolic patterns of psychical life,· conferred on the notion of 
anaclasis a peculiar sense. In a late text, Freud I s notion of anaclasis, freed from the 
dense echoes of physiology and the ~plications of the notion of parallelism, gave rise 
to a profuse unfolding of metaphors. 
Anaclasis embraces, together with the relation between body and mind, the 
metaphor of sexuality and its metamorphosis. The development of subjective processes 
implies the transformation of the link between the symbolic triggering of desire and the 
source of hallucinatory satisfaction and its biological basis. The exigencies imposed on 
the primary thought by the surrounding universe produces a progressive cleavage of the 
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subject's symbolic response. Sexuality becomes absolutely foreign in its aims and 
sources to the bodily sources of energy, and yet, it remains bounded up with them. 
However, the features of their relation are progressively obscured. Laplanche writes: 
la pulsion sexuelle s'ctaye sur une function non sexuelle [ ... ] ce 
qui est dCcrit comme ctayage c'est un apput, II l'origine, de la 
sexualitC infantile sur I'instinct, si ron entend par instinct ce qui 
oriente cette "fonction corporeUe essentielle a la vie". 73 
Anaclasis thus implies a complete metamorphosis of the experience of satisfaction 
which turns apart from the search for a pure discharge of energy, and becomes 
completely determined by primary thought and arising memories. Indeed, psychical 
representation, although it springs from a physical source, is essentially guided by 
perception, the memory traces of the experience of pleasure and the vestiges of lost 
loved objects. However, perception is not a simple, sovereign facet of consciousness; 
it is also a limit condition of the self: perception is likely to turn to inner processes of 
excitation -the perception of the discharge-, to focus on pleasure and its symbolic 
source, as well as to extraneous objects. Thus, anaclasis conjoins in a single concept 
the inextricable series of symbolic and bodily processes; it involves the perception both 
of the object and of the inner source, the rhythm and the intensity of excitation, of the 
sensation of pleasure, as well ~ of the memories of objects and actions, primary 
thoughts and the subjective experience of time governed by reflexive consciousness. 
The physiological process appears not as a direct cause, but as a "remote" 
though necessary source of the representational process. Physiology responds to a 
"pure" representation of the loved object; it is this mere representation of the object, 
which could be both a delusive image and an actual perception, that should lead the 
dynamic bodily process not only to a mere discharge, but to the actual achievement of 
pleasure; the energy processes culminates in a rapture of consciousness. The fulfilment 
of the conditions of the dynamic stability of the body is thus achieved by the complex 
convergence of the actions governed by primary and secondary autonomous symbolic 
processes, symbolic constraints and perception. 
Freud acknowledged, from the time of his writings on aphasia, the vague, yet 
necessary and compelling force of physiological processes. Nevertheless, Freud's 
dualism -the undetermined parallelism -between both domains of the subject's 
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identity- transpose the causal relation between excitation and its representation. The 
sources of excitation differ from its cause. While the sources of excitation might be 
conceived as dispersed anatomical centres which contribute with their own flow of 
energy to sexual arousal, the cause of the sexual impulse is attributed to the presence 
of a symbolic object. An exacting dualism is preserved in the radical cleavage of 
sexuality which differentiates the sources and the causes of subject's desire. Moreover, 
Freud's two components of the paradoxical explanation of the genesis of desire and 
sexuality are not mutualy exclusive; they bring about a complex image of psychical 
causality. However, the obscure link between the physical substrate and the primordial 
elements of thought -the ineffaceable primordial set of traces of the loved object-
remains an elusive, abysmal and disquieting issue: 
Unser Bewusstsein weist niehts dergleiehen auf, was der Namen 
"Ialentes Erinnerungsbild" von der psychischen Seite rechtfertigen 
wilrde. So oft aber derselbe Zustand der Rinde wieder angeregt 
MfCi, entstebt das Psyehische als Erinnenmgsbild von Neuem. 
Wir haben freilich nieht die ieiseste Ahnung davon, wie die 
thierische Substanz es zu Stande bringen mag, so vielflUtige 
Modificationen durchzumachen und auseinander zu halten. (Zur 
AujJassung der Aphasie: 5Sf 
, 
The state of corporeal excitation prompts the psychical apparatus to restore a previously 
formed and preserved latent mnemic image [latentes Erinnerungsbildj, which, 
nevertheless, remains inaccessible to consciousness. Surprisingly, at a definite point in 
the discussion Freud suddenly confesses his absolute ignorance of the nature of the 
whole process. His ignorance will be never cleared up. Rather, this enigma will persist 
in the fabric of psychoanalytic concepts. In the Enrwuif (1895), the notion of 
representation supports Freud's incipient and hesitating attempt to understand the nature 
of psychical experience and the correlated and essential notion of desire. Desires, 
according to Freud, imply a complex, articulated labyrinthine web of representations 
which stem from the image of the primal, mythical encounter with an object of love, 
likely to relieve the primordial pain caused by the peremptory laws of necessity. 
'Our consciousness contains nothing that would, from the psychological point of view. justify the lenn 'latent 
memory image'. Yet whenever the same cortical state is elicited again. the previous psychical event .re-eme~ges 
as a memory. We have. of course, not the slightest idea bow animal tissue can possibly undergo, and dlfferenbate, 
so many various modifications. (CA: 56) 
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However, constrained by the obscurity which surrounds his implicit conception of pain, 
Freud's notion of desire will acquire, later in his work, an uncertain content; the role 
played by the undetermined, yet crucial conception of pain led him to the unresolved 
paradoxes of masochism, discussed in his significant paper of 1924, Das iJkonomische 
Problem von Masochismus. 
V. The rejection of destruction: the Psychopathological symptom 
The history of Freud's notion of representation redefined, in tum, the scope of the 
notion of symptom. This notion summarizes the implications of the dynamic conception 
of repression and strengthens the 'postulate of the transitional nature of the drive 
[Trieb]. The notion of symptom reveals the impact that the conception of parallelism 
between psychical and physical processes had on Freud's theoretical constructions, and 
the perplexities it brought about. The "dependence concomitant" offered no clear place 
for the notion of symptom. A seemingly irreducible chasm between physiological and 
psychological processes and the shattering of causality threatened the significance of 
the notion of symptom. Symptom was conceived as an uncertain token of the finiteness 
or the failure of the subject's psychical response to the requirements of the world. As 
in an optical device, the image of the psychical process created by the symptom reflects 
an uncertain, diffuse shadow of the elusive inner agitation, the nature of which rejects 
any definite image. Consequently, the visibility of the psychical symptom produces an 
optical aberration: the image forged by the symptom of its"own internal cause moulds 
and often creates, in turn, the identity of its own actual malady, of its own origin. 
Symptom appears as a sign which stems from the malady but, in turn, determines the 
malady itself. Contrastingly, discordant images -fused into the elusive matter of a 
symptom which remains attached to a deceiving and untraceable, "functional 
perturbation" of the physiological process. However, what Freud obstinately refers to 
in his early work as "functional perturbations", "functional diseases", primal references 
of symptom, remained unfathomable. 
The unavoidable abstraction of the symptom from its perturbed physiological 
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origin conferred on this singular set of corporeal and psychical signs of suffering an 
allegorical meaning which confounds itself with the aetiological description of the 
malady. 1be significant assymetry of Freud' s symptom becomes evident: it is a set of 
visible, corpt>real aberrations of the expected behaviour, of distressing, unspeahble 
emotions turned into tokens unlikely to reveal any visible, discernible origin. The 
psychical symptom is only a set of shadows, echoes, resonances which do not rise from 
a perceivable physical wound, or rotten tissue, but from a conjectural wreck of 
memory: there is no clinical evidence of the malady save distorted and astounding signs 
that exhibit anxiety and delusion, the rarefying of love, the isolation of the self and the 
decay of desire. 
An enigma seems to have haooted Freud's theoretical imagination from the days of Zur 
Auffassung: the spectre of destruction. In the logic of nineteenth century medical 
enquiry, the evidence of anatomical destruction was necessarily linked to symptom. 
However, some clinic eviden~ was of an enigmatic nature: aphasia, for example, 
displayed a range of symptomatic behaviour, the cause of which was not to be found 
in the destruction or decomposition of tissues. Paraphasic perturbations offered some 
puzzling evidence. Paraphasia was well defined, in Freud' s Zur A14/fassung, as a sort 
of "minor" aphaSic perturbation: deviant usages of words were assumed to be caused 
by similarities of sound or meaning, or by partial confusions of phonetic articulation. 
But this paraphasic behaviour appeared- either in states of tiredness, or as sequels to 
distressing affections [stiJrender Affecte] and emotional shocks; it thus appeared in . 
perfectly healthy [Gesunde] people. The boundary between pathological "symptoms" 
and normality had become uncertain: 
An diesel' Stelle sei nUl' erwahnt dass die bei Kranken beobachten 
Paraphasie sich in nichts von derjenigen Wortverwechslung und 
Wortverstiimmlung unterscheidet, die der Gesunde bei 
Fnnudung, bei getheilter Aufinerksamkeit, bei Einfluss storender 
Affecte an sich beobachten kann, durch die z.B. unsere 
Vortragmden uns su hAufif das Zuh6ren peinlich machen. Es lieg 
nabe, die Paraphasie im weitesten Umfange fur ein rein 
functionelles Symptom, fur en Zeichen minder exacter 
Leistungstahigkeit des Sprachassociationsapparates anzusehen. 
(Zur Auffassung der Aphasie: 13-14r 
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The notion of symptom ceased to be a sign of abnormality or disease; rather, it became 
the visible emanation of a slight, untraceable, diffuse perturbation. This dilution of the 
clear boundaries between normal and pathological states usualy implied by symptom 
led Freud to the exploration of dream and the psychopathology of everyday life. Thus, 
any symptom of insanity, but also every hint of deviation in everyday experience, 
could evince the fundamental nature of the psychical apparatus. Entirely foreign to the 
compelling cause-effect relation, the notion of symptom was thus upheld by two main 
uncommon notions: functional penurbation and dislanJ action. The symptom was not 
to be conceived as a sign immediatt:ly referring to an altered psychical state; rather, it 
should be seen as a contingent, variable, historically defined token. 
Symptom and trauma, linked at the begining of Freud's reflection by a weak 
resemblance, progressively broadened the breach between their respective 
interpretations. Each of them acquired different senses and a specific, yet 
uncomparable relevance to the psychoanalitical discourse. 
Their" original confusion, which take roots in the effect of the analysis of 
aphasic disorders, led to a sharp differentiation. Aphasic symptoms seemed to be 
provoked by the sudden accumulation of energy at a definite "point" at which the flow 
of nervous excitations was interrupted -either by a foreign agent or by inner functional 
perturbations. Gathered at a certain point where the destruction had occured, the 
congested flow of stimulus discomposed the regularities of language. The images 
associated with this explanation are still invoked by Freud's later usage of the notion 
of trauma, which will appear, twisted by the optic of the unconscious, as an allegorical 
version of the medical term; this allegorical shade was cast upon the notion by the 
paradoxical scenic display of hysterics: the experience of perceived but unsignifiable 
signs and silences. 
• At this age we only want to mention that the paraphasia observed in aphasic patients docs not differ ~m the 
incorrect usc and the distortion of words which the healthy person can observe in himself in states of fabgue or 
divided attention or under the influence of disturbing affects -the kind of thing that frequently happens to our 
Iccturcrs and causes the listener painful embarrassinent. It is tempting to regard paraphasia in the widest sense as 
a purely functional symptom, a sign' of reduced efficiency of the apparatus of speech associations. (CA: 11) 
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Moreover, symptom in Freud' s work does not only embody a metaphor of 
corporeal energy, but a theory of representation conceived as distant fICtion; symptoms 
hint at a functional perturbation of the soul, discernible only within the fuzzy field of 
interwoven symbolic actions and physical responses. Freud shows from the very 
beginning of his reflection a lasting concern for this distant action [Femwirlamg] 
-probably a heritage of mesmerismus and his own work with hypnoD- of perceivable 
signs which did not reveal organic but functional damage. However, the destiny of the 
notion of Femwirkung in psychoanalytic thought was to remain a strange, unpredictable 
name of the irreducible strangeness of psychical representations; yet it was to support, 
implicitly, the notion of original repression: a • I nucleus of crystaJ1i zation' capable of 
attracting other incompatible ideas without the intervention of conscious intention .• 74 
Trauma, on the other hand, took its place in certain psychoanalytic arguments about 
the progressive settlement of residual signs of experiences on successive layers of the 
psychical apparatus, engendered by the need to govern the outburst of internal energy. 
It became a sort of monument, a memory of silent internal catastrophes which bore no 
reference to a definite causal experience but only to the inner perception of the 
irruption of meaningless pain. Fixed memories -an essential feature of trauma-
acquired the shape of archeological evidence. They bear witness, paradoxically, both 
to the intrusion of oblivion and to the tenacity of memory. 
Distant and undetermined, the sources of the perturbations of language 
engendered a manifold display of aberrations in verbal behaviour. The expressive 
"richness" of the symptoms was not to be seen either as the expected aftermath of 
physical destruction, or as a deviant functional process: 
Nor wissen wir, dass die Theile des Gehims, deren Erkrankung 
sich Oberhaupt d1,lJ"Ch Symptome verrath, uns immer nur 
Localsymptome ergeben, wobei es uns uberlassen ist, aus 
Nebenumstanden des Falles oder aus dem Verlaufe der Affection 
die Processdiagnose zu errathen. Der Sprachapparat aber verfiigt 
Ober einen solchen Reichthum an symptomatischen 
Ausdruchsweisen, dass wir von ibm aUein erwarten konnten, dass 
er rueht nur die LocalitAt, sondem auch die Natur der Lasion 
durch die Art tmd Weise der FunctioostOnmg verrathen wird (ZUT 
Auffassung deT Aphasie: 29f 
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The poignant visibility of the symptom contrasts with the imperceptibility of the lesion: 
once the function becomes the source of the disease, the signs of sickness only reveal 
a cleavage in the fictitious fabric of the mind; destruction was not to be seen as a 
tangible process, but as a conjectural, befogged, fictional plot, which had material, 
brutal and painful effects on the subject's life. The only evidence of illness was the 
rhythmical display of significant signals, which exhibit themselves as debris of a veiled 
and ciphered decay and breakdown of the subject's desire. Yet, these isolated, 
neglected clues to malady inlaid in language or in the body are provoked by the silent 
moulding action of drives. The singular historicity, the evolution of the fictional 
physiognomy of symptoms, imposes another condition on its visible display: they 
reappear, they persist, they obstinately trespass upon the flow of speech or upon the 
flesh. 
Freud's thesis on the indestructibility of memory traces and their relentless 
action seems to account for the obstinacy of symptom and its resistance to change. By 
a subtle tum,. the repetition of symptom turns itself into a symptom. The early 
experiences of Hughling Jackson with aphasia illuminated and supported the legitimacy 
of this reversion. However, the comprehension of repetition was to require, in Freud's 
theory, a supplementary notion: death instinct. The obstinacy of the symptom, a token 
in itself, led Freud to explore the subject's experience of time and finiteness, to assume 
the speculative teleology of nature inherent in nineteen~ century physics: energy 
systems as well as living beings seemed to be bound to drain the energy from their own 
system, to drive themselve to a physical state of inertness; this "physical fate" aroused, 
in tum, a psychical spectre: the impulse to destruction; it stirs the subject's unspeakable 
hurling into death and the tacit wish for it; the experience of time leads to the aim for 
stillness. Forrester observed: 
"lfleaiona of the brain give rise to symptoms at all. conclusions as to the localization of the damage can be drawn. 
whc:ra.s We have to· guess the diagnosis of the pathological process from special circumstances of the case or from 
the COW1C ofthc iIlneu. The speech apparatus, however, is exccpcional, in saving at its disposal "such a wealth of 
symptoms that it may be expected to betray, by the type.and manner of the disturbance of function, not only the 
lite but ala.> the nature of the lesion. (CA: 27) 
to a first approximation the distinction between the language of 
the symptom and speech can be expressed as follows. The 
symp~~ i~ marked by its permanent character, its 'chronicity' 
(even if It IS a question of repeated 'acute', rather than 'chronic' 
~). ~ language of~e symptom is characterized by its 
relative unpenousness to discoursive change, a permanence 
seemingly independent of all 'external' factors. In the Project 
Freud called it an 'immovable symbolization'. 7S ' 
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The indestructibility of the memory traces of language was to be a lasting contribution 
. 
ofHughling Jackson's work which prevailed in Freud's conception of the unconscious. 
However, the conjecture of the persistence of memory traces aroused paradoxical 
resonances: it upheld the myth of the subject's longing for the return to a primordial 
state and for self-destruction; it settle a theoretical frame for the understanding of the 
desire for the extinction of excitation and for the plenitude brought about by 
insensibility and inorganic quietness; yet, it also offered an explanation of the subject's 
the denial of self-destruction, the perseverance of images and the tireless outburst of 
desire. In this light, destruction acquired a suplementary sense in psychoanalytic 
thought which enhanced its relevance to the comprension of symptom and desire as an 
intrinsic for~ in psychical processes. Freud's enterprise may be conceived as a vast 
and thorough meditation on the fragmentation, limits and destruction of psychical life: 
a philosophical reflection on the psychical significance of traces and remains. The 
resonance of his positivistic theoretical statements adumbrate another, more powerful, 
perhaps poetic, enquiry into language; fragments of representations, of words 
informing the unconscious, emerge as tokens pertaining to a sort of negative language: 
the significance of fragmentation itself, the significance of the destruction of meaning, 
the sense of muteness, the eloquence of traces and residues, the significance of the 
signs left by the disapperance of presence, by the perseverance of love despite the 
destruction of bodies. Yet this significance is foreign to meaningful expression. A 
barren, purely residual evidence of the disappearance of language, arises, in Freud's 
view, from silence and pain, from the demolished core of the logic and meaningfulness 
of language. Other regularities moulded the senseless shreds of silence: perhaps the 
rhythms of this visible yet opaque, secret, negative language -a language foreign to 
collective signs, even to meaning itself-, the expressive, unaccountable and crude 
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accents of emotion, and the insistent exhaustion and uselessness of meaning which 
arouse empty cadences of speech, constitute the main concern of psychoanalysis. 
Laplanche and Pontalis begin their reflection on the memory-trace with an 
unsettling remark: 
The psychological notion of the memory-trace, which Freud 
evokes constantly in his metapsychological works, implies a 
conception of memory that he never fully expounded. 76 
Memory names the persistence of word-remains [Wortrest], of a fragmented language; 
it is a map of isolated, allegorical wounds in the subject's fictional identity. Freud 
made of Wernicke's words a cornerstone of his theory of subjectivity: "memory as the 
foundation of all intellectual operations" . 
Symptom represents memory in its primal dimension; it appears as an 
encompassing expression which enacts oblivion as the pure, meaningless expression of 
memory. The symptom -memory- governs the singular dynamics of the impeded 
expressions of malady, the reappearance of emotional discharge, the rhythms and 
symbolic expression engendered within the psychical apparatus. 
Thus, the images of the vestiges of words confound themselves, from Zur 
Aldfossung onwards, with those of fixed, energetic, purely emotional [krc2ftigen Fluch] 
but meaningless expression, with.imprecations the only possible sense of which is the 
crude manifestation of emotion. The heritage of Freud's brief meditation on aphasia 
will exert a lasting influence in his later psychoanalytic thought. What is preserved as 
a token of the destroyed faculty of language is a residue of language [Sprachreste], 
engraved upon the layers of the psychical apparatus as·a local sediment of words 
charged with energy. It is no longer language, but meaningles signs, the subject's last 
resort regarding the actual demands of reality and the exacting rules of language; 
language dissipates· only to give rise to the oppressive power of broken and senseless 
reminiscences. These vestiges of language seem to expose the unsignifiable, intractable 
regularity of primary thought; yet, they are related in an uncertain way to soul 
disturbances. In Freud's exacting enquiry, the obsession for destruction took the form 
of a passionate denial which revealed its brutal evidence and its intrinsic presence in 
the subject's soul. 
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and as a wbridge W which eases the wlnmslation· of the symbolized conflict into a definite physiological 
response. Nevertheless, in the complex theoretical developments of Jenseits tks Lustprin:ip, Freud alludes 
to the opposition between the Wuse of languageW[SprachgebmuchJ and the wfeeling of languagew 
[SprachgeftJhl] as a cardinal distinction relevant to the psychoanalytic approach to language. wExiste un 
II)()(I)IUo cardinal eo eI texto de Fnud, IDl)' proximo a la apertura de la discusi6n: Ia primera confrontaci6n 
COIl eI enigma de Ia cuItura esti marcada por una frase sin circunscripci6n possible. Para definir los rasgos 
de fa cultu~ - escribe Freud - hay ~ tk~e llevar por el uso tkllengutJje {Sprtlth"brtlllchl. Esta frase 
es la huella-" de otra indecisi6n exlubida en el texto. Inmediatamente, Freud corregira. No. Deberd 
abandontuse al sentimienlo dellmgutJje {SprtJehg,/Iihll. Esta vacilaci6n de Freud es un indicio. Quiza es 
possible admitir, a putir de esta indecisi6n de Freud, la urgeneia de pensar Ia cultura como edificada sobre 
una presi6n disgregante de dos 6rdeoes cuya primac!a es indetenninada: una tStica del lenguaje, un juego 
a la vez dominado por Ia exceotricidad del lenguaje abierto a un campo de regulaci6n cuya materia es 
fluctuante, imposible de ser admitida 0 incluso recobrada como totalidad; 0 bien una esttStica radical, 
marginal, que 80mete ellenguaje a otra torsi6n, a otro despojo: doblegarse ante Ia tensi6n surgida desde 
so propia materia dtspiendkla de todo apeao a Ia Signif"IC8Ci6D. wThere is a crucial point in Freud's text, 
which paves the way to the full exposition of an important discussion: Freud's first encounter with the 
eoigrm of cu1ture is signaled by a phrase for which we have no possible framework of interpretation: [ •.. J 
At once, Freud will try to rectify: ... He hesitates. And this hesitation shows his necessity to think culture 
as if built under a pressure which stems from two different orders the primacy of which remains 
undetermined: either an ethic of language, a game dominated by the intrinsic eccentricity of language, made 
of the weave of an un&tbomable matter, Ii universe without circumscription, which cannot be apprehended 
as a totality, or a radical, marginal aesthetic which imposes to language certain disquieting contortion; 
language is stripped from its own attachment to meaning. W (Raymundo Mier, 'Cesar Vallejo: etica y 
fragilidad; cultura y evocaci6n en Freud', Anmnoifosis, 2, (December 1992). (My translation» 
43.John Forrester, p.22. 
44.Forrester bas remarked the relation, in Freud's aetiology of hysteria, between the hysteric's almost 
Udraceable sileooe, and asymbolic aphasia. WOo the model of the word/object systems, what bas happened 
is that a relation between the specific word presentation and the specific object association bas been refused 
-a similar mecbaDism to that which F~ called symbolic aphasia. W (John Forrester, LongutJge and the 
Origin.r of PsycJrotmolysis, p.ll). However; what must be expounded is the root of this double specijicily, 
foreign to the structure of the word itself, but related to ~ singular nature of the narrative failure, the 
cqnditions which impeded the uttering act. 
4S.In DIIJleroUS passages, Freud's description of hy!'teric symptoms almost resemble a detailed account of 
the disturbances of aphasia. In the early years of the Freudian enquiry, in one of his first works on hysteria, 
Ober den psychischen Mechonismus hysteriscMr Pht'lnomene (1893), Freud writes: wEin Beispiel von 
SprichstOrung Iiefert die wiederholt erwibde PabeUin Breuers. Diese sprach wibreod eiDer .lang~ Peri~e 
ihrer Knmkbeit mr english; wedel' sprach, nor verstand sie das Deutsche. Dieses symptom lieS slch auf e~ 
Ereignis noch vor Ausbruch ihrer Krankbeit zuriikfiihren. In einem Zustande gro8er Angst versuchte sle 
ZU beteo, fand &her keine WOIte. W (Ober den psychisclren Mechanismus hysterischer Ph/JnomeM, SA, 1893, 
VI: 19) [Breuer's patied, to whom I have so often referred, offered an example of a disturbance of speech. 
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For a loog period of her illnees she lpOke only Eoglish, and could neither speak nor uuderstand German. 
1bis s~ was traced bac~ to an eva which bad happeoed before the outbreak of her illness. While 
she wu m a state of areat anxiety, she bad attempted to pray, but could find DO word. (SE, m: 33) 
46.Julia Kristeva has tnmslatecl into semiotic terms this enigmatic sexual sceae which determines the 
c::oostructioo of the Ieo&e of sexuality itself. ·ee que DOU8 appelous un sens est Ia C8pKiU de I'infms l en 
reJistrer Ie sipifiam du dtSsir pandaI et l s'y inc1ure allUllli«e propre, c'est-l-dire en manifeetaDt lee 
aptitudes Hmiotiques clout it est capable l ce IDODleIJt de son cWvelopemem et c:,Ii lui permeueot one 
maIIriae, au Diveau des proceIIU8 primairea, d'un a non encore autre - (de Ia Chose) inclus dans lee ZODeI 
6ropnee de eel infons 84Smi0tisam •• (Julia Kristeva, Soleil noir, p.73) The lOll', acknowledgement of the 
parent's desire is the nucleus of the phantasy of seduction, which remains non-sipified, as •• corps 
.... er· in a DOlHayable, forbidden, yet unfonmalated facet of the subject's experience. 
47.AodnS Green streI8e8 this pimnltaoeoos and paradoxical autonomy and heteronomy of the symbolic forms 
which coovey the affective energy: ·la repnSsemation se dtSploie dans les sens divergents du fantasme et du 
Iaopge, I'affect s'4ble de .. tom.les plus brutes. ses &Its les plus 1I\I8Ids. (Andn Green, Le discours 
vivant (Paris: Press Unn .. itaiNI Fraag .... , 1973), p.lOO). The threefold nature of the sign was to be 
1ater, radically transformed in 1926, with the redefinition of the notion of anxiety. 
48.1'bcs ~ c:pIOted passage of 77Je ~cious: -The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. 
they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have DO reference to time at 
all. Reference to time is bound up once again, with the work of the system Cs. - (FP, 11: 191). This early 
but obstinate iduitioo about time, was recovered by Freud and stated almost with the same words in 1920. 
Freud confronts then Kant's notion of time and puts forward an unexpected connection: Kant's notion of 
time as iduition may be fully comprehended, in Freud's terms, as the comparison [Vergleichung) between 
the two psychical different temporalities. A negative temporal quality of primary processes related to the 
experimce of time and a perceived quality which stems from a reflexive movement of consciousness upon 
itself, the CODItructioo of a self perception [Selbstwahrnehmung): -At this point f sball venture to touch for 
a moment upon a subject which should merit the most exhaustive treatment. As a result of certain 
psycboaDalytic discories, we are tcMIay in a position to embark on a discusion of the Kantian theorem that 
time am space are 'necessary forms of thought'. We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in 
themselvee 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not 
change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them. These are negative 
characteristics which can only be clearly understood if a comparison is made with conscious mental 
processes. On the other band, our abstract idea of time seems to be whoDy derived from the method of 
working of the Pcpt.-Cs. and to correspond to the perception on its own part of that method of working. 
This mode of functioning may perhaps constitue another way of providing a shield against stimuli. I know 
that these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints. (FP, 11: 300). (lch 
gestatte mir an dieser Stelle ein Thema ffiicltig m beriihren, welches die griindlichste Bebandhmg verdieaeo 
wiirde. Der Kantsche Sm, da6 Zeit und Raum bOtwendige Formen unseres Denkens sind, kann heut~ 
infolge gewisser psycboanalytiscber Erlct'.lOdnisse einer Diskussion unterz6gen werden. Wir haben erfahren, 
daB die unbewu8ten Seelenvorginge an sich -zeitlos· sind. Das heiSt zunichst, da8 sie Dicht zeitlich 
geordnet werden, da6 die Zeit Dichts an ihnen verindert, da6 man die ZeitvorstelJung Dicht an sie 
heranbringen kann. Es sind dies negative Charaktere, die man sich nur durch Vergleichung mit den 
bewu8ten seelischen Prozessen deutlich machen kann. Unsere abstrakte ZeitvorstelJung scheint viel.mehr 
durchaus von der Arbeitsweise des Systems W-Bw herg~bolt zu sem und einer Selbstwahrnehmung 
derseIbeo m edsprecheo. Dei dieser Funktionsweise des Systems diirfte em anderer Weg des Reizschutzes 
beschritten werden. fch weiS, da6 diese Bebauptungen sehr dunkel klingen, moB mich aber auf solche 
Andeutungen beschriinken. -(Jnaseils des Lustprinzips, SA, 1920, ill: 238») 
49.Jean Hyppolite, 'Pbilosophie et psychanalyse' (1959), in Figures de ILl pensee philosophique. I, p.4lO. 
50. For a comrasting poid of view in the discussion of the notion of the experience of temporality. specially 
related to Bergson's conception, but which might cast some light upon Freud's discussion, see Maurice 
Merieau-Ponty, La phhtomhwlogie de ILl perception (paris: 1945; repr. Paris: Gallimard, 1992), pp.469-
493. 
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SIJean Hyppolite, 'Psycbaoalyse et phiIoeopbie' (1955), in Figura tk Ia penUe phibophique, I, p.37S. 
S2.See below, p.3S6 
S3.Jacques Nassif, Freud. L'incomcient, p.123 
S4Jobn Stuart Mill, If Sy8tem oJLogk. p.591. 
SS.1acques Derrida bas atn.dy remarked the meaningful theoretical force of this notion. Cfr. 18CCJUe1 
Derrida, 'Freud et Ja seD de l'kriIure', 1968. 
56. The abruptDess of this statemed may be .u,., ... ted if its pre-psychoanalytic character is taken into 
account, and if it is seen as a preliminary outline of his later conception of consciousness; its ~
derives from the fact that it may offer certain hints of the relation between CODSCiousneu and wprimary 
proceaes-. 
57.See pp.289, 366 
5S. The idea of a periodical proce88e1, as analogical reproduction of the object by the frequency of the 
stiJwII,as·wu originally sugeated by~. Later, Kant sought the explanation of the nature of illusion 
autlDlKh1ess in similar models. Freud redefined this notions according to the basic postulates of his neuron 
theory: there seems to be a direct relation of Freud's efforts to incorporate this notion in a congruent 
systematic tbeoreticaI proposal with the delusive attempts of Fliess to apply his theories in his own medical 
treatments. Indeed, the concept of rhythm, derived from Fliess' exorbitant idea of periodicity and found its 
place early in psycboanalysis history, and perhaps could be traced in certain conceptions: psychical cycles, 
returns, alternations, inversions, which pervade Freud's entire work. 
59.See for example: -in other problematic contexts, Freud carefully avoids ontologizing or substantializing 
the limit between outside and inside, between the biophysical and the psychic. But in the PsycoptJlhology, 
aut eJsewbeR, he ~ this limit not ooIy to protect this fragile, enigmatic, threatened defensive state that 
one calls _oormaIityw but also to circumscnbe a solid context (oDCe again stereotomy), the unity of the field 
of coherent and determinist interpretation, that which we so calmly call psychoanalysis itself. - (Jacques 
Derrida, 'My Chances/Mes chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies', in Talcing 
Chances: Derrida. Psycltoanalysis and Litemture, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, I98S), p.25. (The italics are J.D. 's, the holds are added.) 
6O.John Stuart Mill, If System of Logic, p.SS9. 
61. The nature of the body appeared as an insoluble enigma for the reflexive consciousness. It exhibits the 
absolute limit of the subject's introspective power, which delimit the se~e of self identity. 
62.Pontalis bas remarked an essential, inverted metaphor in the freudian discourse: -Freud DOUS a ItSgutS 
deux grandes rMtapbores du psychisme: fa metaphore du syst~me nerveux et ceUe de I' animalcule 
protoplasmiquew (pontalis, I.-B., wLe. psychisme comme metaphore du corps" in EnJre Ie rive et la 
Jouleur, Paris, Gallimard, 1977, p.219. Siinilarly, Elizabeth Gross has emphasized the position occupied 
by the metapbor of the body in Freud's conception of the ego ond the super-ego, a metaphor that offers an 
lucid explanation of the dynamics of the second theory of the psychical apparatus. See Elizabeth Gross, 'The 
body of significations', in Abjection, Melancholia and Love. The Work of Julia Kristeva, ed. Andrew 
Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1990). 
63.See above, p.60 
64.See above, p.277 
65.Max Milner, On est pril de fermer les yeux (paris: Gallimard, 1991). p.254. 
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66. The ~rtance ~f the. thesis of Ernest Jones on the aphanisis, often neglected, should deserve a detailed 
and senous analysIS which, nevertheless, goes beyond the scope of the present work. 
67. The complex exposition of his notion. of projection appeared in his reflexion on the "optic fable" of 
B.T.A. Hoffmann, Der Sandmann. See Sigmund Freud, Das Unheimlich, SA, 1919, N, pp.243-274. 
68.These concepts might be thought of as non-significant, as terms resisting a clear definition and even a 
depictable s~~e. Nic~las ~b~ proposed the term anasemic to name the particular quality of the 
psychoanalytic s use of Its notJoos: Le langage de la psychanalyse ne suit plus les toumants et les toumures 
(tropot) ~ parler et de l'kriture habituels .. Plaisir, c;a, Economique, Dynamique, ne soot pas metapbores, 
metonynues, syneodoques ou cathacreses, ils sont, par la vertu du disco\lfs, des produits de de-signification 
et constitued des figures nouvelles, absemes dans les traites de rhetorique. Ces figures de la anti~ique 
[ ... J on proposera d'appeler par Ie nom forge d'anosemie." (Nicholas Abraham and Martha Torok, L'ecorce 
et Ie noyau, p.211) This conception of the language of psychoanalysis seems to be related to the notion of 
allegory as it has been JU forward in this work. However, the relation between anasemic terms and allegory 
demands a detailed analysis: it involves also an interpretation of writing and the theoretical relevance of 
style. It even, illuminates with a different light, Bettelheim' s reflections on the Strachey' s translation of the 
Freudian corpus. See Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and the Human's Soul (The Hogart Press: 1983; London: 
Penguin, 1989). 
69.Frwd writes: "Die Meynertsche Lebre vom Gehirnbau verdient den Namen einer "cortico-centrischen". 
In der ibm eigenen, weitgehenden Ausdeutung anatomischer Verhiiltnisse iussert Meynert, <lass die 
Hirnrinde durch die Ausserlichkeit ihrer Lagenmg rum Umfassen, zum Aufnehmen der gesammten 
Sinneseindriicke geeignet wird. Sie wird von ibm femer einem zusammengesetzt protoplasmatischen Wesen 
gleichgesteUt, das einen K6rper, dessen Bestandtheile es sich assimilieren will, iiberzieht, indem es sich zu 
einem HoWe urngestaltet. Das gesammte iibrige Gehirn erscheint als Anbang und Hilfsorgan der 
Grosshirnrinde, der gesammte Leib als eine Armirung ihrer Fiihlfaden und Faugarme, welche ihr die 
8edingungen gewiihren, das Weltbild in sich aufzunehmen und auf <lasselbe einzuwirken." (Zur Auffassung 
der Aphasien: 47) [the general problem of brain function. Meynert's theory of the organization of the brain 
deserves to be named "cortico-centric". In his far-reaching specUlations on anatomical conditions, which 
are so typical of him, Meynert expressed the view that the cerebral cortex, by its superficial situation, was 
particularly suited for- the reception and retention of all sensory stimuli. He also compared the cerebral 
cortex to a complex protoplasmic, organism which expanded over an object it wanted to incorporate by 
taking the shape of a cavity. The whole remaining cerebrum thus appeared as an appendix and auxiliary 
organ of the cerebral cortex, and the whole body as an armour of feelers and tentacles which enabled it to 
incorporate and to modify the picture of the external world. (CA: 45}J 
70.Allegories of space are found in Freud's entire work. One of his last written paragraphs is concerned 
with the Kantian debate about the subjective nature of space: Gantheret observes that Freud hesitates 
between two contradictory psychoanalytic explanations on the origin of the seme of space: "Mais d'autre 
put, dans les demieres notes thOOriques, a notre coonaissance, krites par Freud, Ie 22 aout 1938: 'L'espace 
peut etre la projection de I'etendue de I'appareil psychique. II n'est pas d'autre derivation probable. A 
I'in.,tar des determinants a priori, pour Kant, de notre appareil psychique. Psyche est etendue; elle ne sait 
rien de cela. 
71.The notion of anaclasis has a peculiar nature which is not apparent in the translation either to French 
or even to the English in the Standard Edition. Jean Laplanch~ and lean-Blaise Pontalis have made explicit 
this masking effect of the translation: "what must unavoidably escape the reader of Freud in translation is 
the fact that the concept of IUlRda.c;is AIlIe/UUDlg is a C0merstone of the first freudian instinct theory [ ... ) [the 
llC;es of AllIe/mullg) are tnUlslated in various ways, however. so that no clear pIcture of the concept emerges 
for the non-Gennan reader.· In this remark. Laplanche and Pontalis rejoin the harsh critic raised by 
Bettelheim against Strachey's English translation which has become the "official" freudian source of 
reference. 
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72Jeen I.apIaocbe and Jean-Blais Podalis, 1M Language tfPsydtoanalysis (Loodoo: Karnak Boob, 1988), 
p.3l. l.apIanche, in one of his most important contn"butioDS to the psychoanalytic reflection, makes a brief 
but acme critique to both the French aDd the English translations. See also Jean Laplanche. Vie el mort en 
psyclrontdyse, pp.30-41. 
73.Jean Laplaoche, Vie el mort en FYchanDlyse, p.3l. 
74.1ean Laplaoche and Jean-Blaise PontaIis, 1he Language of Psychoanalysis, p.393 
7S.1ohn Forrester. p.132. 
76.1ean Laplanche and lean-Blais Pomalis. 1he LangUlJge of Psychoanalysis, p.247. 
Chapter V 
p'?flles of darkness: the sexual metapho, and the allegories of 
pmn 
L In praise of the obsolescence of gender 
The denial of psychical destruction, which Freud asserted throughout his work, 
constitutes a CQI1leI'Stone of his therapeutic enterprise, despite its conflict with his own 
conception of sexuality. The conception of biseXuality, as is well known, appears at an 
early stage of the psychoanalytic enterprise. It indicates a crucial point in the 
development of his conception of sexuality. In a letter dated the 7 of August of 1901, 
Freud writes to Fliess: 
As far as I can see, my next work will be called "Human 
Bisexuality". It will go to the root of the problem and say the last 
word it is Wanted me to say - the last and most profound. For the 
time being I have ooIy one thing for it: the chief insight which for 
a long time now bas built itself upon the idea of repression, my 
core problem, is possible only through reaction between two 
sexual currents.' 
The work in question, as it occurred several times during Freud's life, was either 
completely modified or never written, even perhaps, destroyed. Nevertheless, the 
quoted passage hints at what would become a definitive issue in his enquiries: the 
hypothesis of bisexuality as a condition of the understanding of repression. This 
hypothesis was not just the mere repetition of the current, dominant view, which 
stemmed from the prominence of embryology and genetics in the scientific landscape 
of the nineteenth century, as an pUtcome of the enthronment of evolutionism. As 
Thomas Laqueur puts it: 
More gmerally the triumph in embryology, during the first thirty 
years of the nineteenth r.entury, of epigenesis (the view that 
CODiplicated organic structures arise from simpler undifferentiated 
ones rather than from preformed entities inherent in the sperm or 
the egg) would seem to undermine root and branch difference. 
Science revealed· an embryo in which the Wolffian duct, named 
after Kaspar Friedrich Wolff, was destined to become the m~e 
genital tract, and the Mullerian ducts, after Johannes Miiller, 
would become the Fallopian-tubes and the ovaries. Until about the 
eighth week, the two structures coexist F~ it was 
known by the middle of the nineteenth century that the penis and 
the ~litoris, the labia and the scr~ the ovary and the testes, 
begm from one and the same embryonic structure. The saotal 
sac, b example, is a modification of the labia majora, a version 
of the embryonic labiscrotal swelling in which the lips grow 
longer, fold over, and join along the scrotal raphe. Here, even 
more powerfully than in the early coexisting two ducts the old 
Galenic homologies seem to find new resonance. 'Modem 
repn::smtations of the development of the external genitalia bear 
a remarkable resemblance to Vesalius'or Leonardo's illustrations , 
and modem charts of genital embryology seem faithfully to 
reproduce Galen's lecture on woman as inverted male. 2 
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The hypothesis of bisexuality encounters a fundamental problem of psychoanalytic 
conception, clearly formulated in the brief commentary included in Freud' s letter. It 
presupposes the underlying existence of sexual duality: the struggle between Wtwo 
sexual currentsW from the very beginning of life. Freud was not indifferent to the 
ordinary conception of an evolving matter which begets two separate genders. An 
unusual reflection on the nature of this duality remained underdeveloped in his work: 
the enigma of sexuality, a crossroads in this work, involved two distinct, opposed, 
albeit entangled dimensions of analogous nature. 
Freud gave a .complex response to the contradictory exigences of clinical 
evidence and theoretical "constraints reganfiog the notion of sexuality. However, despite 
current opinions, psychoanalytic theory seems to be pervaded by an invincible silence 
about sexuality. The vast number of commentaries provoked by Freud' s so called 
pansexuality or by the hypersexnaliR(! core of psychoanalytic theory seems perhaps to 
contest this aSsertion. Yet, Freud himself rejected the accusations. He reacted against 
the wconventionalw notion of sexuality. Not only he did object to this vision of his work 
by offering a definite wpositivisticw depiction of sexuality according to clinical 
testimonies, but wexpandingw the notion of sexuality itself, broadening its frontiers and 
enhancening his conception with a crowd of metaphorical images and allegorical 
explanations. This broadened conception involved the image of a generalized sexuality 
rooted in a. mere bedimmed, intangible anatomy and a fictional physiology which 
suggests an allegorical reading of the splitting of genders. In the Preface to the Fourth 
Edition of his Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905) we read: 
w. abar die "Ausddu'mg' des Begri1fes dcr ScxualitIt betrim, 
die cbdl die ADaIyse von Kindem un VQIl sogenoanten Perversen 
notwendig wird, so mOgeo alIe, die von ihrem h6berea 
S~ wdchtlich auf die PsycbomaIysc herabscbaucn, sich 
ennnem Iassea, ~e nabc die crweitcrtc Scxualitlt der 
PsydIoanaIyae mit dean Elm des gOUIicbcn Plato ZWUIIDmcntrift\. 
(Drel Abhtmdhmge" zur Suua/theorle, SA, 1905, V: 46)-
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The outcome of this unfolding [Ausdehnung] of the concept of sexuality was not a firm, 
structured theory, but rather a desegregated theoretical framework. Moreover, this 
"extended" [erweite~] sexuality obliterated the boundaries of the current 
unders1anding of sex and sexual behaviour. It not only exhibited the limitations of an 
encompassing, integrated theory of sexuality, but exhibited the extreme fragility of its 
understanding of the vast collection of singularities of sexual and gender-determined 
behaviour. 
However, Freud I s encounter with sexuality seems to have had a deep impact 
in his own writing. Freud's only work devoted exclusively to sexuality was also the 
only one made up of a numbered series of essays. The genre of the essay, intrinsically 
fragmented, unfinished, precarious, seems to have not been inadvertently chosen: 
certain fissures and silences in his writing were not only visible but acceptable, even 
desirable; the essay permited the exploration of theoretically intricate and extremely 
demanding topics with oblique, narrative procedures. Freud alludes to these virtues of 
the imperfection and inconsistency of the genre in an ambiguous assertion in his 
Preface to the Third Edition to the Essays: 
Die drei AhhandJungen zur Sexualtheorie konnen nichts anderes 
enthalten, als was die Psychoanalyse anzunehmen notigt oder zu 
bestltigen gestattet Es ist darum ausgeschlossen, daft sie sich 
jemals zu el"er "Serualtheorie" erweitem liejJe", dafJ sie zu 
man chen wichtigen Problemen des Sexuallebens ilberhaupt 
nicht Sle/lung "ehmen. Man wolle aber darum nicht glauben, daB 
diesc ubcrgangenen Kapitel des gro8en Themas dem Autor 
unbekannt geblieben sind oder von ibm a1s nebensachlich 
·And u br the -strdching- of the concept of sexuality which has been necessitated by the analys~ of children ~ 
what are caI1ed pel'Ver1a, anyone who looks down with contempt upon psychoanalysis from a lupenor v~~g~poUlt 
lhould mnember how closely the enlarged sexuality of ps),choanalysis coincides with the Eros of the dlVtnC Plato. 
(FP, 7: 43) 
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vemacblfissigt wurden. (Dret AbhandJungen zur Sexualtheorle 
S~ 1905, V: 43t ' 
There were silenced, albeit "great" topics [grojltn 71Jmaas] which were excluded from 
the text, which did not find any place [nicht S~llung nehmen] in his writing. Despite 
their importance, they were not even mentioned. Thus, the reader obtained from Freud 
only the dubious relief of the assurance of his own awareness, of the acknowledged 
relevance of those "unnamed" topics to the ellucidation of the enigma of sexuality. and 
the actual exclusion of these theoretical items. Possibly, their awkward nature 
determined their uprooting from the actual written text. This incapacity to develope a 
consistent theory, was to reveal itself as an intrinsic condition of his discourse on 
sexua1i~:, sexuality was to remain a crucial, yet insoluble enigma throughout Freud's 
life. 
It is possible to read Freud's avowal of the impossibility of such a 
comprehensive theoretical apprOllCh in his exceptional remark, in Pre/ace to the Essays: 
Oberall wird em gewisser Instanzenzug eingehalteD, werden die 
aJatdentellen Momente vorangestellt, die dispositionellen im 
Hintergnmde gelassen und wird die ontogenetiscbc Entwick1ung 
vm- del" phyIogeoetischeo beriicksichtigt. Das AJaidentel/e sptelt 
nllmltch die Hauptrolle tn der Analyse, es wird durch sie fast 
restlos bewlltigt; das Dispasitionelle kommt erst hinter ibm zum 
Vorsd1ein aIs etwas, was durch das Erleben geweckt wird, dessen 
Wurdigung abel" weit liber das Arbeitsgebiet der Psychanalyse 
hinausfl.ibrt. (Drei Abhan(ilungen zur Sexualtheorle, SA, 1905, 
V: 44t-
Througbout the nineteenth century ,psychology inherited from evolutionism the 
cardinal, yet puzzling notion of "predisposition II , conceived as a specifical biological, 
"It ia inJ:pouJ,1c chat IheIe 71rr6' Br.wJy.t 011 1M 1Mory qf SGIIIlIiIy should contain anything but what psychoanalysis 
makes it necessary to usurne or poslible to establish. It ii, therefore, out of the question that they could ever be 
extrnded do a comp1dc 'theory or 1C!J11I1ly' , and ~ is natural that there should be a number of important problCllll 
of IeXUal we with which they do Dot deal at all. But th«: reader should not conclude from thiJ that the branc~CI of 
this large lubject whicb have been thus paned over are unknown to the author or have been ncg1ccted by him u 
of lman importaDoc. (FP, 7: 39-40) 
-Throupout the entire wort the various t"Idon given to the accidental Cacton. while dilpolition is left in the 
bactarouncl, and inore wci&ht is attached to ontogenesis than to pbilogcncais. For it is the accidental Cacton that 
play tho principal put in analyIiI: Ihcy arc almost emirely lubject to its inftucncc. The dispolitional ones only come 
to light after them, U lOmc:tbing stirred into adivity by experience: adequate CODJidcrations oftbcm would lead 
far beyond the sphere of psychoanalysis. (FP, 7: 40) 
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transmissible imprint which defined the peculiar, intimate physiognomy of species or 
even of a just specific, natural group of beings. Beings enibody their own history and 
preserved it beyond the reach of remembrance, construable only by an outside gaze 
from the features of the physiognomy, from their patterns of behaviour or from the 
decipherable residues of their demographic decay or expansion. Biology claimed to be 
able to decipher both the past and the destiny of a species in kinship, in morphology, 
and, later, in cellular and molecular matter. It pretended to reveal identity by exp~oring 
the accidental series of engendered physiognomies. 
"Predisposition" accounted for the supremacy of inertia as ruling principle, as 
a transcendental, unyielding stillriess of the profiles of beings. The history of the 
species was seen both to foretell and constrain the growth and the development of the 
individual. Moreover, the biological history of the individual was conceived as a 
mirror, on a reduced temporal scale, of the whole history of the species. The individual 
conveys, in its flesh, the narration of its own destiny. The speculative dual constraints 
imposed on the subject both by his accidental intimate history and the history of the 
species calls for an allegorical narration, the epics of survival in which phylogenesis 
prevails over ttte diverse and various patterns by which the individual responds to the 
exigencies of the environment. Predisposition, as a capability, as a potential force of 
survival appears also as an unuttered yet discernible promise impressed on the 
expressions, the movements, the emotions and the effusion of affection; it is a mute, 
physiological prophesy, a cipher of the future. It accounts for the virtual 
metamorphosis of identities and it names the whole range of the potential variation of 
beings. Predisposition also foretells the disappearance, the finiteness of the individual. 
The body bears the inscription of the future decay and collapse of its own identity. Yet, 
evolutionism allows the vicissitudes brought about by uncertainty; it conceives of the 
biological constraints as a loose grid which suggests blured and undetermined 
boundaries imposed on living bodies. Thus, predisposition also implies unforeseeable 
mutation; it confronts the notion of history conceived as the outcome of the inexorable 
constIaints of inertia, and as the sequence of abrupt events, of life itself, intruding and 
informing the evolution of species. "Predisposition" was conceived as the entanglement 
of agonic forces of inertial identity, mutation and chance, which although confounded, 
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depicted the struggle between the History of the species and the history of individuals. 
In the nineteenth century the belief in a rigorous parallelism between the history 
of the species and the history of the individual, between ontogenesis and phylogenesis 
ruled biological and medical enquiry; it echoed the mirror images of microcosmos and 
macrocosmos which prevailed over the philosophical thought of the Classical Age. 
However, in the psychological and medical reflection of nineteenth century, 
"predisposition" hinted at the notion of psychical malady and the deviatiQlls of 
. perversion. stuart Mill writes in a passage that foreshadows the Freudian conception: 
It is certain that the natural differences which really exist in the 
mmtaJ predispositions or susceptibilities of different persons are 
often not unconnected with diversities in their organic 
constitution. But it does not therefore follow that these organic 
differences must it) all cases influence the mental phenomena 
directly and immediately. They often affect them through the 
medium of their psychological causes. 3 
The conception of sexuality seeks to expound those bodily and symbolic experiences 
which abide on the fringes of divergent and irreconcilable experiences of time: it 
implied both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, identity and destruction, stability and 
change. 
The preference accorded to the event of trauma, "unexpected episodes" and the 
privileged significance of the "incident" (the contingent "perturbance" which "advents" 
the image of identity created by disposition [Disposition]) redefined the notion of 
"sexuality" as conceived by psychoanalysis. Sexuality ceased to be conceived only as 
a biological function, a physiological condition; Freud conceives it as lacking any 
unyielding urgent, invariable aim; rather sexuality appears as a physical impulse 
detached from the mere biological identity of its object; this detachment is foreign to 
the subject's instinctual imprinting and depends only upon the symbolic nature of 
desire; it completely rejects the vague determinism of biology. On the contrary, human 
sexuality seems to be attached to singular, irreplaceable symbolic objects, the absolute 
singularity of which seems irreducible to physical identity. Yet, paradoxically, the 
Singularity of sexual reponse seems to exhibit a conjecturable, yet inapprehensible 
regularity, submitted to implacable laws for which, nevertheless, there is no clear, 
undeniable evidence.4 
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Moreover, there is an evident paradoxical relation between a singular sexual 
object the sense of which is entirely forged by the subject itself and the variety and 
obstinacy of his sexual response; the laws of this obstinacy and the nature of the object 
of desire are essentially unthinkable. Consequently, the paradox of bisexuality both as 
origin and intrinsic feature of sexuality introduces in Freud's theory a disquieting turn. 
Bisexuality was a fundamental topic of anatomical and physiological 
conceptions which preceded and governed the sources of psychoanalysis; it was ~uded 
to in medical treatises, specuiative essays of incipient embriology, and the moral 
discourse of European society; it became the conceptual, yet veiled centre of 
psychoanalytic theory. It abides at the crossroads of the conceptual tension between the 
symbolic dimension of repression and its physical basis. 
Seitdem ich mit dem Gesichtspunkte der Bisexualitat bekannt 
gewmien bin, halte ich dieses Moment fUr das bier maBgebende 
unci meine, obne del' Bisexualiw Rechnung zu trag~ wird man 
kaum zum Verstlndnis d« tatsichlich zu beobachteoden 
Sc:xuaIIu8enmgen von Mann und Weib gelangen konnen. (Drei 
Abhandlungen zur Sexua[theorie, SA, 1905, V: 124r 
This remark on the importance of bisexuality intrudes unexpectedly: it comes just after 
a footnote that eik obliterates or blurs the conception of sexuality itself, while trying 
. to elucidate it in terms of the opposition between masculine and feminine. 
Es ist unrtIIBlicb, sidlldarzumachen, daB die Begriffe "mInliche" 
und "wcibJicbe", deren Inhalt der gew6hnlichen Meinung so 
unzweideutig ersclJeint, in der Wissenschaft zu den verworrensten 
geb6ren und nach mindeStens drei Richtungen zu zerlegen sind. 
(Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, SA, 1905, V: 123, n.lr-
This paradox is the expression of an implicit uncertainty: the beclouded sense of the 
meanin& of the terms masculinity and femininity. This uncomfortable intrusion of a 
lexical opacity in Freud's convictions adumbrated the difficulties of clearly defining 
sexual difference which was to remain unsolved throughout his work. In 1933, twenty 
"'since I have become ~ ~ the notion of bisexuality I havc regarded it u thc decisivc ~r, and without 
taking bilexuality into account I think it would acan:eIy be possible to arrivc at an undcntandmg of thc sexual 
IIlIIli.fcItati that arc actually to be oblCM',ld in men and women. (FP, 7: 142) 
il is cucotia1 to undcntand clearly that the conccpCI of 'muculinc' and 'femininc', ~ose meaning .~'.IO 
unambiguout to ordinary people, are among.the most confused that occur in science. It II pouible to dlltmgwah 
at 1eut thr" UICI. (pp,7: 141, n.1) 
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eight years later, in the Neue Foige der Vorlesungen zur Ei1flllhrung in die 
Psychoontdyse the same crucial uncertainity reappeared, in virtually the same terms of 
Drei Abhandlungen. In its original version, the different genders were charactrerized 
by a conflict between abstract qualities: 
Man gebraudl mlinnlich un weiblich bald im Sinnc von AktivlttJt 
und PastvtttJt, bald in bio!ogischen und dann im sozio!ogischen 
Sirm. Die erste dieser drei Bedeutungen ist die wesentliche un die 
in <b PsycboanaIyse zumeist vcrwertbare. Thr entspricht es, wenn 
die Libido oben im Text als m8nnlich bezeichnet wird, denn der 
Trieb ist immer aktiv, auch wo er sich ein passive Ziel gesetzt hat. 
(Drei Abhand1ungen zur Sexualtheorie, SA, 1905, V: 123, n.lf 
Freud's definition of sexual difference resorts to a synecdoche which defines by a 
single feature an ancient, inherited belief, an "ontological" commonplace for the 
definition of gender -the opposition between active and passive- of the undepictable, 
sexual identity. S But the significance of this synecdoche -a single feature represents 
the whole- is that it swerves from the trends imposed on the psychological inquiry by 
certain biological model; Freud turns to elements of popular myth, to conventional 
images -passive and active- to define the essential nature of gender. However, both 
terms are, in turn, transformed into a metaphor which depicts the abstract qualities of 
energy -libido as masculine-. This dense articulation of metaphors gives to Freud's 
conception a fictional density which will elude any positivistic conception of body and 
sexuality. Thus, Freud's notion of sexuality is, from his early works, foreign to the 
tangible experience of flesh. This exacerbated metaphorical reference to sexuality 
abruptly displays a profound "sublimation", inherent in Freud's theory. The nature of 
sexuality is, consequently, the outcome of energy displacements and its associated, 
psychical images. Freud has taken a definitive step in the de-sexualizing of sexuality 
after the first abstract metaphorical image of it as a regime of pure charge and 
discharge of energy: activity refers to the abstract quality of the driving energy. But the 
nature of this "abstractive" synecdoque is not just a simple displacement of sense. Not 
·'Muculine' and 'feminine' are used sometimes in the sense of activily and passivily, sometimes in a biological, 
and sometimes, again in a sociological sense. The fIrst of these three meanings is the essen~al o~e and ~e ,most 
serviceable in psychoanalysis. When, for instance, libido was described in the text above a~ be~g- . ma~culine , the 
word was being used in this sense, for an instinct is always active even when it has a passIve aun m vIew. (FP, 7: 
141, n.l) 
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only does masculine nature seem to be completely defined by its being active and 
eneqedc, also what is energetic and active is masculine: wLibido was described in the 
text above as masculine, because Instinct [Trieb 1 is always active even when it has a 
passive aim at view
W
• The metonymic series unfolds and acquires an unrestrained 
suggestive meaningful capacity. 6 Sexuality thus appears, in Freud' s work, not as a 
concept, but as metaphorical series, capable both of expounding gender as an 
incarnation of abstract tensions between flows of energy, and of attributing to the 
energy response an Wontologicalw feature of gender. 
The metaphor of sexuality, as a means to comprehend the identity of self and 
subjectivity, . enables Freud to redefine his picture of perversion. Moreover, it allows 
him to disregard the conventional conceptions of the psychical malady and to envisage 
an intimate presenCe of madness in the core of self. Normality, as Freud suggests, is 
only the presence of the restrained discernible signs of derangement inherent in the 
psychical apparatus, which contrast with the exorbitant signs of perversion. Hence, 
normality can only be defined as the recession of symptoms, as the silence which 
contrasts with the blatant signs of aberrations and opacities of behaviour displayed on 
the friDges of social convention. The metaphor of sexuality abstracted from the 
imposing figure of perVersion, appears to be the only means of tracing the conjectural 
profile of normality. Psychoanalysis undermines the significance of the biological 
description of gender; only the opposition between active and passive seems relevant 
to an understanding of the changing attributes of gender. This conceptual polarity 
brings about a new comprehension of action derived from dynamic models; it not only 
defines the notion of gender difference, but. casts a new light on the symbolic 
eonstraints of human behaviour, and the nature of the dominant patterns and the silent 
compelling force of conventionil values; it proposes implicitly an unprecedented 
\ 
ontological sense of being. Nevertheless, the dense metaphors of sexuality seem to have 
aroused in Freud an intense disquiet, a feeling of failure. Almost at the final stage of 
his work, Freud confesses, not without visible discouragement: 
Die Lehrc von dcr BisexualitAt liegt noch sehr im dunkeln, unci 
daB sic oodllcr.ineVcrknOpfung Mit der Trieblehre gefundeo hat, 
mQsscn wir in der PsychOanalyse a1s schwere StOrung versp~. 
Wte cbn 8ldl sein mag, wenn wir aIs tatsachlich annehmen, daB 
der Einzelne in seinem Stxualleben mannIiche wie weibliche 
W(lnsc~e befrir:mgen will, sind wir fUr die MOglichkeit 
Vorbereltet, daB diese ADspriicl1e nicbt durch das nimliche Objekt 
~ ~ und daB sie einander stOreD, wenn es Dieht gclingt, 
sle auseinanderzuhaiten und jede Regung in eine besondere, ihr 
~gemessene Bahn zu leiten. Eine andere Schwierigkeit ergibt 
SIC~ ~us, daB der erotischen Beziehung auBec der ihr eigenen 
sadistischen Komponente so hiufig ein Betrag von direkter 
Aggressionsneigung beigesellt ist. (Dos Unbehagen in der 
Kuitur, SA, 1920, IX: 235, D.2f 
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The obscuri1ia of bisexuality eobanced the unSdtling fragility and precariousness of 
the notion of sexuality. The disquiet aroused by the conceptual indetermination of 
sexuality had repercussions upon th~ fonn and meaning of other essential concepts of 
Freudian theory: not only upon repression, which was explicitely detennined in its 
scope and significance by the notion Df bisexuality ever since its first appearances, but 
also upon the doctrine of instincts (drives) and the notions which aimed at the definition 
of the psychical and symbolic identity of the subject. 
IL The allegories of sexuality: deciphering the history of the flesh 
Bisexuality not only described a primal condition of biological beings, but also its 
obstinate nature, preserved by the force deriving from an ontological, essential tension, 
an inherent "perseverence of being" (Spinoza). Bisexuality is conceived chiefly as an 
ancient and lasting charateristic of living beings, as a vestige from past eras and 
primordial species. In the context of Freud' s fictional anthropology, the myths of 
humankind, chiefly the Platonic myth of the plenitude of being achievable only by the 
suppression of sexual duality, accounted for the relevance of bisexuality as a primordial 
condition of humanity. As a poetic topic and a mythical motive, as a scientific doctrine 
'nlc theory ofbilcxtalay is ItiIl au.rroundcd by many obscurities and we cannot but feel it u a serious impediment 
in psychoanalylii, that it baa not yet bound any link with the theory of instincts. However this may be, if we usume 
it as a fad that each individual seck to satisfy both male and female wishes in his sexual life, we are prepared for 
the pouiillity that'thoIe [two IdI of) demands are not fulfilled by the same object, and that they interfere with each 
other unleas they can be kept apart and each impulse guided into a particular channel that is suited to it. Another 
dif6culy ariICI from the circumstancea that there is so C1f\en associated a quota of plain inclination to aggression. 
(FP, 12: 295-296). 
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and as· a indelible feature of beings demonstrated by biological evidence, bisexuality 
seemed to expose, in the ciphezed unfolding of certain patterns of behaviour, both the 
unconscious truth conveyed by. myth and scientific evidence of a buried, secret force 
which continues to act in the core of subjectivity. 
Howevec, the sombre e10quaJce of this ancient belief readable in the silence of 
myth cannot be reduced to a purely allegorical image of biological existence. The 
analogy between ontogenesis and phylogenesis allows the projection of this myqdcal 
metaphor of the history of speeies, of the evolution of humankind upon the subject's 
own history. Bisexuality was seen not only as a feature of primordial beings at the 
dawn of biological species. It was seen to beget and rule both the development and the 
ends of the sexual behaviour of the subject. The mythical density of bisexuality 
strengthens :the complex synecdoche of Freud's own notion of sexuality. 
Freud's synecdoque of sexuality is also discernible in the formal structure of the 
Drei Abhondlungen zur Sexualtheorlt. The implicit thematic link between each of the 
three essays in the Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheone is not sexuality itself. The 
subject's history, the notions of action and body are envisioned as inherent in the 
conception of· sexuality. Primitive bisexuality was seen to illuminate the relation 
between perversion and childhood, it evinces its concealed common root, its 
undeveloped, governing heritage. The metaphysical vision which enclosed in a single 
category primitive cultures, infancy, and perversion -homosexual relations were 
conceived as a common practice in primitive cultural pattems- inherited from the 
Enlightenment reappears as an implicit. foundation of the Drei Abhandlungen, yet 
almost completely transfigured by Freud's metaphor of sexuality. 
Man mu6 Wert darauf legen, daB die Inversion eine haufige 
Erscheinung, fast' cine mit wichtigen Funktionen betraute 
Institution bei den iIten VOlkem auf der Hohe ihrer Kultur war. 
(Drei Abhandlungen zur Saua/theorie, SA, 1905, V: 51) 
The metaphor of sexuality is thought of following the model of the threefold structure 
of action: act, aim and object. Freud referred this analytical structure to the specific 
sexual character in a peculiar way: presupposing a dense sexuality, to which he refers 
only in negative tenm at the opening of his first essay. After depicting in broad terms 
the "popular" conception of sexuality, he comments: 
Wir haben ~ allen Grund, in diesen Angaben ein sehr 
ungetreues Abbild der Wirldichkeit zu erblicken' faSt man sie 
schlrfer ins Auge, so erweisen sie sich uberreich' an IrrtUmem 
Ungcnauigkeitcn und Voreiligkeiten. (Drei Abhandlungen zu; 
Sexualtheorle, SA, 1905, V: 47): 
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Freud finds in the popular conception nothing but errors, inaccuracies, precipitation: 
nevertbe1ess, Freud's contempt for the "popular" conception of sexuality did not give 
rise to a positive definition, but to a pseudo-analytical development of this notion which 
eludes any description of itS specific characteristics. Thus sexuality remains 
unanalyzed, but enhanced with supplementary features: 
FUhral wir zwei Termini ein: heiBen wir die Person, von welcher 
die geschJechtliche Aoziebung ausgeht, das Sexualobjeld, die 
Handlung, nach welcher der Trieb dringt, das Sexualziel, so 
weist uns die wissenschaftlich gesichtete Erfahrung zahlreiche 
Abweichungen in bezug aufbeide, Scxualobjekt und Sexualziel, 
nach, deren Verhiltnis zur angenommenen Norm eingehenden 
Untcrsuchung fordert. (Dret Abhandlungen zur Serualtheorle, 
SA, 1905, V: 47. Emphasis added.r-
Freud will resort to this enhancement of a notion by negative definition, specifically 
by the analytical unfoldiag of the structure of the action' at critical moments, especially 
when he puts forward his theoretical conception of drive [7Tieb]. 8 This analytical 
structure, as in the case of sexuality, eng~ders a fictional topography and an intrinsic 
teleology: the subject faces its own object with a specific aim. The characteristic of 
sexual action is that it demands a primordial identification: the object must be an object 
of love. The object involved in the structure of sexual action is endowed here with an 
ambiguous quality: the physiognomy and nature of the specific loved object confuses 
·.,itself with the subject's own representation of it. The object and its representation no 
longer pteserve their own identities. The object is completely encompassed within the 
subjeCt~s own imaginary sphere aDd the limits that define the inner realm of subjectivity 
"'We haYe ~ reuoo 10 believe, however, chat these views give a very false picture of the true .ituation. ~fwe 
look: into than more cIoedy we IhaD find that they contain a number of erron. inaccuraciea and bally COnciUllOlII. 
(pp, 7: 45) 
I shan at thia point introduce two technjcaJ terma. Let us caD the penon from whom sexual a1tradion proceeda 
thc.r&alal objtICI and the Mit towards which the instinct tenda the saiUJl aim. Scientifically .ifted eblCfV~n. then 
.boWi that numeroUi deviations occur in n.pect of both of theae - the sexual object and the sexual aun. 'Ole 
rdatioa betweeI1 these deYiatiolll and what is Ulumcd tDbe nonnal rcquirel thorough inveatigatiolll. (FP. 7: 46) 
319 
and the outer world vanish. The object at which the subject aims, does not lie beyond 
the limits of the body; rather, it seems to abide within it, in an uncertain inwardness 
of the ·outer" space forged by the identification between the subject and the specific 
object of the love bond. Not only are the tokens of time effaced from the perceived 
object, but also the specific signals of space and substance: the object of love becomes 
timeless, its space is that of the subject's interiority, it confounds itself with its own 
image forged by the subject's psychical impulses. 
At the culminating point of a crucial exposure of the 1hree &says, James 
Strachey seems to feel a compelling impulse to incorporate in Freud's text a strange 
and apparently unhelpful remark. While Freud describes the difference between ego-
libido and object-libido, and depicts this latter as aroused by the cathecting of a sexual 
object, Stlachey comments in a footnote: 
It is scarcely necessary to explain that here as elsewhere, in 
speaking of the libido concentrating on 'objects', withdrawing 
from 'objects', etc., Freud has in mind mental presentations 
[Vontellungen] of objects and not, of course, objects in the 
external world. [originally published in the Standard Edition. 
Added lately to the German Studentausgabe.] (Drei 
Abhondlungen ZU1' Sex:ualtheorle, SA, 1905, V : 121, n.2. Bolds 
are added) 
The insinuation of obviousness. and Ute seeming worthlessness of the warning 
acknowledged by Strachey himself, is by itself noteworthy. It signals, while claiming 
a superfluous character, a constitutional, unresolved ambiguity of Freud's conception 
of object and space. Strachey's note does not expound, but indicates by a significant 
gesture an essential condition of the metaphor of sexuality ·and its structure. 
Bisexuality, as Freud himself admits, refers to physiological and anatomical 
characteristics of beings. Neverthel~s, on the grounds of clinical experience, Freud 
strips the notion of bisexUality from any reference. to flesh; it became a pure allusion 
to virtual patterns of the relation between acts and objects. But the objects thus 
metaphorically construed led to a rarefied conception of the act itself -conceived as 
an action plus its specific aim-. The sense of an "internal", a sheer psychical, 
unaccountable action turns out to be a distortion of its meaning in language. 'Action', 
, . 
'active' and 'masculinity' appear as allegorical images of psychical processes. If 
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'action' can name any psychical impulse and movement, then either the mere 
disp1acement of cathexis from one representing agency to another or the sole intrusion 
of instinct (drive) in the reflexive sphere of consciousness and perception, almost any 
non-signified inner impulses, can also be embodied in this encompassing category and 
thus acquire the 'masculine' character. The metaphorical series dissipated the 
boundaries of sexuality and, indeed, its very sense. 
Moreover, there seemed to be an additional allegorical turn: sexuality, thought 
of as a kind of act lacked, for all that, a proper end, a specific finality. Its own 
teleology either confounded itself with the mythic finality of the species 
-reproduction-, or with the inevitable aim of Nature -the absolute abatment of 
energy • Yet, clinical work offered puzzling evidence: perversion revealed that the . 
search for pleasure -the supreme aim of Nature- excluded the 'instinct' of 
reproduction -the mythical aim of species. Freud sought to preserve in his conception, 
by allegorical means, the significance of the contradictory aims and acts of sexuality. 
The singular conjectural traits of sexuality were once again embodied in the 
allegorically conceived "will of nature"; the motif of the ends of sexuality became a 
oontextual variation of the suggestive imagery of biological models. In the allegory the 
secret roots of action, the unfathomable source of active, bodily forces, the powerful 
restlessness of masculliUty fused into theilarrative enactment of the finalities of nature. 
Freud merged the enigmatic, unaccountable myth of the fmalities of nature as forged 
by the Enlightenment with a positivistic conviction and clinical observations. 
Bisexuality was not upheld by. experience, as a depictable, meaningful, 
apprehensible structure of behaviour which involved corporeal and symbolic means and 
sensations; rather, it turned out to be a mere condition of the subject's discharge of 
energy manifested in inner actions, as well as an anatomical and physiological state; 
it became an ontological condition of energy itself.· Still, Freud's notion of bisexuality 
remained a silent, unaccountable presence at the centre of the theory of sexuality; it 
was preserved within psychoanalytic theory as a latent but inexpressible truth. 
Freud's thesis of the perennial memory of the primal affective stages, implies 
that bisexuality cannot be "forgotten"; it is not effaced from the soul with the unfolding 
of sexuality. Bisexuality, as envisaged by Freud, appears as a cardinal, primal 
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condition of the form and the impulse of sexual behaviour. It prevails as an 
unsignified, moulding tension, informing the evolution of the subject's sexuality, 
whatever its destiny might be. Consequently, the ensuing stages of the subject's 
development are only deferred and ciphered expressions of its concealed presence. 
Hence, bisexuality belongs to a sort of primary, speechless memory of the flesh. 
The evolution of the subject's sexuality has a paradoxical outcome. Each stage 
of development is evinced by a series of corporeal tokens the memory of which 
remains changeless; each stage preserves its own accumulated vestiges, its memories 
of needs and objects, of fusion and loss, which remain active in the psychical 
apparatus. The culminating stage of sexuality preserves the previous stages and its 
vigorous, yet veiled patterns. Freud's thesis on the specific processes of repression and 
regreSsion implies that sexuality is, irideed, a simullaneous, multiple sexuality. Its later 
stages must coexist with the submerged, archaic ones, with the uninhibited albeit silent 
presence of bisexuality and memories of passed loved objects, and with traces of 
partially evolved actions driven by the sexual impulse within the psychical apparatus. 
The evolutionary convictions of Freud ~th moral and biological- introduced in his 
thesis an unres<?lved tension, which he exhibits in unexpected yet unavoidably wavering 
theoretical positions. He either praises reproductive sexuality, or deplores fixed, genital 
sexuality; he either admits perversion as·a specific outcome of sexuality, or expresses 
a notorious contempt for the unfinished sexual development of the perverse. His claim 
that psychical life is shaped in a particul~ succession of stages drove him to accept a 
specific final and culminating point in ~e evolution of sexuality: monosexuality, 
genitality, appeared as the congruent outcome, as the desireable, complete evolution 
of sexuality. Yet, the normal, harmonic regime of object election in the love bond, 
which should lead to reproduction" and genitality, was frecuently subverted by the crude 
effusion of perversion, by sexual actions marked by teleological indifference, foreign 
to evolution and the intrinsic finalities of species. 
The notions of fixation and regression emerged, with their final and 
controversial meanings, from the implications of Freud's "evolutionist" thesis on the 
development of psychical apparatus. Each of them presuppose the partial negation of 
the other: on the one hand, the destruction of the early stages of development would 
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render regression impossible; on the other hand, jixalion implies an arrest, or even the 
end of development, or at least its suspension; development stops or revolves about a 
certain fixed point, determining the intensity of the energy conveyed by the psychical 
processes, as well as their patterns and forms. The landscape of the psychoanalytic 
retlexion on these concepts exhibited an odd profile: a collection of theoretical parcels, 
a constellation of fragmentary and divergent, allegorical explanations. 
Nevertheless, the conception of psychical life as the result of an unyielding~ 
pure, non-decaying memory, and the assumption of a timeless, enduring totality of 
memory traces, imposes on Freud's conception the image of the multiple dimensions 
of sexuality. Sexuality does not only ·evolve as a linear process. It implies also multiple 
series of objects whose nature may contrast; it involves diverse qualities of desire, not 
an exclusive one; no single compelling force emanates from a centre of gravity about 
which the whole sexual identity is condemned to turn in erratic circles. The psychical 
processes are not stirred by the pressure of a unique desire but by an aggregate of 
many. In the celebrated Chapter VB of Die Traumdeunmg, Freud emphatically rejects 
the image of a single desire: 
Ich wciB DImlich BUS den im Laufe dieser Abhandhmg oftmals 
angedeuteten Untersuchungen, daB zur Bildung cines hysterisdlen 
Symptoms beide StrlJmungen unseres Seelenlebens 
zusammentreJfen mQssen. Das Symptom ist Dieht bloB der 
Ausdrurk cines realisierten unbewu6tcn Wunsches; es muS noch 
em Wunscll ausclem VorbewuBten dazukommen, der sich durch 
das nlmliche Symptom erfiillt, so daB das Symptom mindestens 
zwei!ach determinien wird,je einmal von einem der im Konflikt 
befmdlichen Systeme her. (Die Traumdeutung, SA, 1900, I: 
S42r 
The often emphasi~ notion of over-detenninfllion is a clear allusion not only to 
symptom, but to desire itself --8nd -implicitly to its manifold objects: it states at least 
two determining forces related to desires which derive from different psychical 
.. have Icaml from the ~ wbich I have mentioned so often in the course of this work that in order to bring 
abcu the formation of a hyltCrical symptom bolla currents of our mind must converge. A symptom iI not merely 
the cxpaaion of a mWzed UDCOOICiouI wiIh; a wish &om the preconscious which iI fulfilled by the same symptom 
mUll a1Io be paed. So that the symptom wiD have alleast two detcnninanrI. one arising fonn each of the system. 
involved in the oonflict. (PP. 4: 723-724) 
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instances. • Freud's rejection of the destructibility of memory exacerbates the ambiguity 
of the metaphor of sexuality: regarding sexuality there is neither progress, nor 
overcoming, nor dissipation of the early stages of the sexual development. 
III TIle corporeal ubiquity of perversion 
1. Abstract pe~ersions 
Perversion, in Freud's view, illuminates non-pathological sexuality. It appears as a 
derual of any clear boundaries between masculine and feminine or as a transgression 
of the ·factual limits between activ~ and passive in the reciprocal relation between 
sadism and masochism. But this obliteration of limits is not only a fundamental feature 
of perversion; it is its ontological condition; envisaged as a psychical disease, it turns 
into a malady of desire which involves the experiences of space and time: 
Die Pervcrsionen sind entweder a) anatomische Oberschreitung 
der fUr die gescblecbtlicbe Vereinigung bestimmten 
K6rpergcbiete oder b) Verweilungen bei den intennedilren 
Relationen zum Sexualobjekt, die normalenveise auf clem Wege 
zum endgUltigcn Sexualziel rasch durchschritten werden sollen. 
(Dret Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, SA, 1905, V: 60)-
Perversion disregards the sexual topography of the body, just as it perturbs the 
sequence of moments, the temporal rh~ms which signalled the paths of satisfaction. 
Freud creates an allegorical image of the sexual body as an abstract apparatus, a 
"sexual apparatus" [Geschlechtsapparal] taking as a modef the "language apparatus"; 
this allegorical vision conveys in itself the archeological topography of the imaginary 
layers of the web of language associations and temporal settlements of memory. The 
topography of sexuality is allegorized by unusual shapes of energy flows which 
°In the article about 'ovcr-dctennination' included in The Language of Psychoanalysis, J.Laplanche and J.-
B.Pontalis disregard this explicit reference of Freud to desire's multiplicity. Their emphasis falls upon the 
dc:termining convergence of different psychical facton. This neglect of the plurality of desire might b~ ~ue to the 
theontical tension this duality might introduce in the Lacanian conception of unconscious, and the OcdJpJC model. 
""Pervemon. arc sexual activitiea which either <a> meM, in an anatomical sense, beyond the regions of the body 
that are designed for sexual union, or (b) linger over the intenncdiatc relations to the sexual object which should 
normally be travened rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim. (FP, 7: 62) 
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resemble the imaginary topography of language. This topography set distinct, yet 
precarious limits to identity: in sexuality, as in language apparatus, there are clearly 
discernible regions, sharp distinctions between the inner and the outer, between 
constant and discrete stimuli. Freud envisions a sexual -apparatus- constituted by 
erotogenic centres scattered over the anatomical surface; organs and corporeal 
territories are unambiguously defined as focus of constant internal energy production. 
The image of erotogenic organs or centres implicit in the Freudian landscape 
is a heritage of Charcot's medical approach to the hysteric's body. Freud conceives 
them also as territories shaped and delimited in the course -of the development of the 
subject, as corporeal zones which goVern the subject's equilibrium of energies, but also 
as privileged points likely to evince the fixation of the subject's evolution. But the 
topographical taxonomy of sexual development betokened by the disposition of sexual 
organs, stresses implicitly, in the Freudian text, the primordial structure of the 
experience of satisfaction. The sexual topography of the body is also the diagram and 
the chronology of the singular, successive physiognomies and manifestations of this 
experience. Freud exhibits a proclivity to define sexuality crudely, only to enliven a 
meagre image of sexuality reduced to its sheer dynamic essence. However, if sexuality 
is thought of essentially as a non-sexual phenomenon, as a conjunction of intense 
energies and their dynamic displacement, energies the discharge of which becomes an 
absolute aim, then it is bound to remain a non-reproductive sexuality. Sexuality 
abstracts itself from its -natural-, biological teleology. Concerned only with discharge 
of energy, with the avoidance of any increase in the intensity of internal energy, the 
. 
actions involved in sexual satisfaction and its end -which implied the creation of the 
representation of an object adequate to a foreign, extrinsic reproductive finality-, lose 
their singular corporeal-quality: Any object might potentially fulfil the conditions 
imposed on the subject's sexual attachment. However, the election of the object of love 
is foreign to the exigencies of the compelling laws of energy discharge. It is only the 
unfolding of the pleasure principle into the principle of reality -the obscure 
metamorphosis of the dynamic material response into a symbol-ruled behaviour of the 
discharge- that transforms the nature; the aim and the sense of sex~ity itself. 
Sexuality becomes the uncertain region w~ere the material dynamics of energy, the 
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symbOlic creation of objects and significance meet. ~e power of sexuality to create 
its own objects cancels out the preeminence of natural finality. The indifference of the 
s:lbject regarding the actual, real object, its mere symbolic consistency rejects the 
rmons of natural teleology. The biological machine yields to the blind mechanisms of 
a dynamic machine and capricious symbol-shaped objects. The ·principle of reality· 
dissociates itself from the ends of nature and surrenders to the ruling logic of 
autonomous symbolic devices: 
Der Psychanalyse erscheint vielmehr die Unabhingigkcit dc-z 
Objektwahl yom Geschlechtes des Objekts, die gleich freie 
Verfiigung tiber mtinnliche und weibliche Objekte, wie sie im 
Kindesalter, in primitiven Zustanden und fnihhistorischen Zeiten 
zu beobachten ist, als das Urspriingliche, aus dem sich durch 
Einsddnkung nach der einen oder der anderen Seite der normale 
~ie der Inversionstypus entwickeln. (Drei Ahhandlungen zur 
Serualtheorie, SA, 1905, V: 56, n.lf 
Once again, Freud encounters here a seeming tautology: sexuality reveals itself in the 
signs of its immanent teleology. Throughout history, Freud suggests, sexuality has been 
the object of scatological beliefs: it appears as origin and as epilogue, as a primordial 
condition of being and as its fate, as the source of life and as the privileged experience 
which foreshadows death. An uncontested current conviction which aroused from the 
discourse of nineteenth century natural history seems to comply with the Spinozian 
notion of ontological finality: the species perseveres, its life is governed by the search 
for identity and the striving for its preservation. The biological endeavour of any 
species is to reproduce itself, to endure timelessly; common belief stresses that this 
essential condition drives biological beings to exhibit a sexual impulse to achieve this 
finality. But this teleology is eternal; its origins lie outside Freud's theoretical scope: 
nevertheless, Freud seeks to apprehend a delusive machine; sexuality appears as an 
accident, a material apparatus the finality of which is but a meaningless event: 
discharge of energy. 
The primacy accorded to satisfaction, conceived as the psychical, significant 
'"I»sychoanalysis cODliders that a choice of an object independent of its sex -freedom to ran.ge cqua~y over ,male 
and female objects- as it is found in childhood. in primitive states of society and early pcnods of hlst0l'!' 1! the 
original basis from which. as a result of a restriction in one direction or the other. both the nonnal and the mvertcd 
types develop. (FP. 7: S7) 
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resonance of discharge, contributes to the recongnition of the obsolescence of the body. 
The indetermination of the object of love, its indifference, its physiognomy which is 
simultaneously a representation and a tangible, foreign expression, a delusive simile 
of the lost primordial object and a contingent being, reflects the enigmatic nature of the 
experience of satisfaction itself. Even symptom, thought of as an emblem of a tortuous 
route to satisfaction, displays an unaccountable, yet perceivable relief. Symptom is the 
~ymbolic, precarious facade which exhibits the pure economic ends of energy 
discharge. 
The flesh disappears from the Freudian horizon. Satisfaction itself dims as a 
conscious perceptible experience when it joins the secret, obscure pleasures of the 
symptom; it is an aftermath of renunciation, the triumph of the veiled but compelling 
~leasures of dissatisfaction. Freud recognized them. He named these pleasures 
suggestively: primary and secondary gain from illness [Krankheitsgewinn]. 
Ten years after his 1905 definitive contribution to the study of perversion, 
Freud introduces, in 1915, an unsettling remark in his discussion of the relation 
between the similarities between hysterogenic and erotogenic zones, (-lihr] zeigen die 
nIlmlich ChOr4/aere j. He adds in a note to his original text: 
Weitere Oberlegungen und die Verwertung anderer 
Beobachtungen fiihren dam, die Eigenschaft der ErogeneiUJI 
allen KlJrperslellen und inner Organen zuzusprechen. (Drei 
Abhandlungen zur Sexuallheorie, SA, 1905, V: 90, n.l. 
Emphasize addedf 
Freud disregards the formerly expressed belief in the erotogenic centres; he puts 
~orward the idea of the dissolution of the territories of sexual arousal; sexuality, he 
suggests, spreads over an indifferent, homogeneous surface; he adumbrat:s the 
extinction of the meaningful boundaries of the flesh. From the beginning of the 
,sychoanalytical enterprise, sexual energy -as psychical energy- was seen as 
something tom from its privileged corporeal source; later, sexuality was to become a 
.nagnitude, the sum of the pure,converging, inner intensities of energy which pass 
tbwoough indifferentiated bodily territories. Having lost their boundaries, the erotogenic 
-xta- further reOection and after taking further observation into account, I have been led to ucnbe the quality of 
.rctogmlcily to aU parts oflht body OIl to ail inltnaal mgans. (FP, 7: 1(0) 
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territories dissipate; the body is left as indifferent soil, the mere ground for the 
displacement of intensified energies. Freud seems to have renounced the temptations 
of anatomical metaphors taken from the locali22tionist view of psychical processes. He 
does with hysteria what he has also done with aphasia.' He abstracts sexuality from the 
image of a bodily structure, of an image of congruent corporeal territories, of a 
harmonic, functional whole; not only has material identity been abruptly discarded, but 
also the cohesion of the body itself. The sexual allegory goes beyond the limits of 
fictional corporeal identity; it ignores its inherited inclinations, its biological imprint. 
The sexual aim and its object have become an abstract, dispersed constellation of 
attributes; it lacks the physiognomy and the consistency of a tangible, definite nature. 
In the representations of the loved object forged by the subject, there is only a 
collection of attributes which mirrors the corporeal dispersion of the sources of sexual 
excitation. Freud explicitly describes this power of the subject to dismember the 
representation of its own loved object, to obliterate the perception of the physical shape 
of the object, and to impose on it the psychical attributes exacted by desire: 
Die psychische Wertschitzung, deren das Sexualobjekt als 
Wunschziel des SexuaIbiebes teilhaftig wird, beschrlnkt sich in 
den seltensten Flllen auf dessen Genitalien, sondern greift auf 
den ganzen KlJrper desselben aber und hat die Tendenz, aile 
yom Sexualobjeld ausgehenden Sensationen mit etnzubeziehen. 
Die g1eiche OberschAtzmig strahlt auf das psychische Gebiet aus 
und zeigt sich als logische Verblendung (Urteilsschwache) 
angesichts der seelischen Leistungen und Vollkommenheiten des 
Sexualobjektes sowie als gUiubige GefUgigkeit gegen die von 
letzterem ausgehenden· Urteile. (Drei Abhandlungen zur 
Saualtheorie, SA, 1905, V: 61. Emphasis added)-
From the study on aphasia onwards, Freud envisioned -following Stuart Mill's 
semantics- the mental image of the object as an open web of represented attributes. 9 
The consequences of this image were never explicitly and fully acknowledged by 
psychoanalytic theory. A marginal consequence of this denial of the implicit notion of 
"It is only in the nuat insIanca that the psychical valuation that is set on the sexual objc:d, as being ,!,e goal of the 
scxuaI inIIinct, IlDpllhort at irs pnitals. 1M oppr«iollo,. exle1lds 10 tIu whole body o/the sexual o~JeCI aM ,eNls 
10 imoIN ""'Y smstllion derivedfrom iI. The same overvaluation spreads over into the paychologtcalsphere: the 
subject becomea, u. were, intdIectually infatuated (that is, his powers ofjudg,cn:'ent are ~cned) by.the menta~ 
achievements and perfection of the sexual object and he submits to the latter S Judgement With credulity. (FP. 7. 
62) 
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meaning and reference which pervaded psychoanalytic concepts was the restoration of 
an ancient conviction in an intrinsic teleology of sexuality -reproduction. A peculiar 
inteIpretation of the evolutionist theory of sexual development led to the paradoxical 
conception of genitality as its culminating stage. The nature of sexuality remained 
obscurely, yet definitively tied to the implicit conceptions of word and meaning, of the 
exhaustion of expression and the limits of sense. 
2. Intrinsic perversion 
Nevertheless, Freud's allegory of sexuality assumes a contradictory, challenging task: 
to prove that perversion is a necessat1 and primordial condition of sexuality itself, that 
it has its origin at the primordial stages of sexuality, at the bottom of its evolution and 
remains as an intrinsic feature of its development. Freud's notion was to exhibit the 
inescaplbili.ty of sexual abermtion, the regularities of the accidental, contingent election 
of object, the legitimacy of transgression. However, this assumptions were to introduce 
an insurmountable contradiction in Freud t s theoretical framework. Detached from 
reproduction and bound to it, the sexual body shoud respond to the unavoidable 
pressure that confines it to the memory of its own undefinable primordial experience; 
at that primordial stage, pleasure overflowed the limits imposed on it by the perceptual 
constraints of satisfaction; pleasure lacked a single object, or a privileged, defmite, 
erogenic zone. The image of a 'scattered' sexuality aroused by multiple stimuli, 
emerging from indifferent sources, conflicts with the notion of a single, primal, 
irreplaceable object of love and source of satisfaction. However, the perverse patterns 
of sexuality, like the other stages: of primal experience, would endure and prevail 
-according to Freud t s assumption of the indestructibility of memory- in the deep 
layers of the psychical apparatus. Freud reveals the intrinsic cleavage of the notion of 
pleasure and its contradictory symbolic and perceptual constraints. Primal, perverse 
sexuality ought to be guided by a purely dynamic, natural principle, by the search for 
equilibrium determined by the precarious presence of energy, both fixed and errant, 
yet intrinsic to the flesh, always on the verge of irreversible dissipation. Freud's image 
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of sexuality conjoins these conflicting images in the thread of an undecipherable, yet 
illuminating allegory. 
Indeed, Freud conceives perversion as an intrinsic, primordial stage of human 
sexuality. However, its symptoms are construed, identified and condemned according 
to the dominant patterns of current social criteria of what is normal behaviour. 
Modernity strove against signs of sexual perversion in the light of the aim of 
congruence between the finalities of nature -reproduction- and the mirage of a 
supreme stage of sexual evolution -genitality- which led to the enthronment of 
monogamy as the dominant structure of kinship in European society. 
The social images of perversion flourished in the interstices of tolerated 
sexuality and its incongruous patterns. Its physiognomy and identity emerge from the 
social regimes which decipher sexuality in the visible signs of bodies and actions. 
The perceptible signs of perversion display themselves as contradictory and 
unsettling pictures: the variety of perverse acts and their love objects -homosexuality, 
sadism, masochism, fetishism, etc- incite the violence of different patterns of social 
control and pQlitical dominance. However, this muddled, bewildering landscape of 
perversion gave rise, in turn, to certain taxonomy ruled by the social belief in the 
identifiable profile of souls -personality-, the social belief in the existence of the 
identity of the soul, construable from the visible traits and movements of the body, of 
the face, of the grimaces and gestures. Thus, the emergence of the modern conception 
of perversion may be thought of as a chapter in the history of the gaze; 10 a gaze which 
iTlUlgined material bodies as transient morphologies abie to exhibit the intimate 
physiognomies of souls. Bodies appeared as mere surfaces capable of giving ciphered 
clues to the identity of the subjeCt The truth of the souls came to light, offered itself 
to public recognition and to bureaucratic policies and controls. 
The body turned into an eloquent parable of the identity of the self; it revealed 
itself as the public theatrical character of its own intimacy. The obscurity of the body 
was denied, disregarded and outweighed by the will to comprehend the nature of 
consciousness and the truth of the self; the body appeared as a pliable fabric which 
exprosed the unuttered deviations and the inner features of personality. 11 The slightest 
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anomaly of the soul, any distortion of the aims and responses of love, any broken 
image of the self's own history, was expected to display itself as a peculiar gesture, as 
a grimace, as a visible distortion or stigma in facial expression and corporeal 
disposition; the contours of the body exhibited the signs both of a manifold history 
-anatomical, medical, moral, familiar, theological, social- and of the necessary nature 
-predisposition, inheritance, race- of every human being. 
3. Malleable, inert bodies: rationalities of perversion 
The writings of Sade were a brutal and disquieting announcement, on the fringes of the 
Enlightenment, of the new patterns of social identity, supported by the alliance between 
sexuality'and the visible nature of the identity of the self, between the theatrical, fixed 
composition of bodies displayed as an inert incarnation of the crude and devastating 
imagination of reason, and the ephemeral objects of sexuality. It is the Sadian 
"demonstrative faculty- (Deleuze) that integrated in a common universe the visible, 
descripherable bodies, and their own debasement; perversion, in the Sadian scene, 
anticipated the radical historical mutation of both gaze and sexuality, as well as their 
mutual dependence. Sade's images of devastated, shattered, debased bodies enacted the 
scandal of the flourishing of a primordial pleasure, enlivened by perversions which 
responded to the unconditional law of the imperative of pleasure created by the 
sovereignity of reason. Lockean unders~ding was taken to delusive extremes. The 
pure, rational law, put forward by Sade, incited the subject to seek pleasure, indifferent 
to pain and crime: the domineering, meditated, reasonable principle of pleasure, 
explores, in Sade, the limits of the pleasure inherent in pain and destruction. It is 
possible to read in his texts the praise for the jouissance, which stems from the 
experience of the abStract connection of bodies, from the primacy of corporeal syntax 
in" the violent suffocation of sexual avidity. 12 Acts and sexual objects were pictured by 
Sade as mere forms, density and strain; indifferent bodies turned into mere expression 
of the delusive congruence of the absolute morality of murder, governed by the 
exaltation of reason. Sade exposed the .morphology of humiliation as the outcome of 
the imperative of pleasure derived from the unlimited power of reason. 
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4. Ethics of perversion: experience and action 
The reflection on perversion in the nineteenth century showed the impact of the 
rrofound mutations of the conception of the subject that occured during the 
Enlightenment. Freud' s conception of perversion undoubltedly, if only vaguely, 
exhibits this metamorphosis of the sense of the gaze within the social boundaries which 
defined the nature, the expression and the cause of deviated sexual behavior. On the 
occasion of the Second Edition of the Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexuallheorie, Freud 
added, in 1910, this "incidental" note: 
Die eingreifendste, Unterschied zwischen den Liebesleben der 
Alt.en Welt ODd dem unsrigeo liegt wohl darin, daB die Antike den 
AIa.ent auf den Trieb selbst, wir aber auf dessen Objekt verlegen. 
Die Alten f'cierten den Trieb und waren bereit, auch ein 
ritioderwertiges Objekt durch ibn zu adeln, wlherend wir die 
Triebbetitigung an sich geringschitzen und sie nur durch die 
Vorzilge des Objekts entshuldigen lassen. (Dre; Abhandlungen 
zur Sexua/theorle, SA, 1905, V: 60, n.lf 
The awareness of the relevance of the object to the structure of the sexual development 
lead theoretical reflection to explore a vast series of resonances which involved 
sensation and feeling, consciousness and memory. 13 Sensation appeared as the 
immediate relation of the object with the subjective conditions of cognition. In the 
sequel of the Enlightenment, as a resonance of Kantian Criticism, the conception of 
understanding, subdued by the compelling authority of sensibility, deprived experience 
of the essential, enlivening contribution of freedom, of the potency of reason likely to 
create oonreptual and fictional realities. Ethical judgement, upheld by the sovereignty 
of conceptual imagination, was to remain sharply distinct from cognition. It was this 
subtle confinement of the ethi~sphere to an autonomous realm, the logic of which 
wru; founded on a psychical basis clearly separated. from cognition -ethics as free and 
non-intuitive, likely to build non-empirical, general rules of action-, that gave rise to 
"rbo IIlOIl Mriking difference between the erotic life of the antiquity and our own no do~bt lies in .the fact ~ .the 
anoiaa laid the IIIJaI upon the instinct bcIf •. whera.s we emphasize ita object. Th~ anc~tI ~rified,th~ In,stinct 
and were prepared on its account to honour even an inferior object; while we desplJC the mstulctuailife In Itself, 
and tind excUSCI for it only in the merica of the object. (FP. 7: 61) 
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what Benjamin called the "bare, primitive, and self-evident experience" [na~en 
primitiven und selbstverstllndli Eifahrung] forged during the Enlightenment. 14 This 
narrow conception of experience, also lacked a relevant comprehension of the sense of 
duration and meaningfulness, conceived as the outcome of convergent subjective and 
~ processes, as well as of historical constraints; the ensuing emergence of new 
rn~cies which rule ethical imagination gave rise to a notion of effective action which 
acquired a privileged position in the strategies of social control, and defined the 
froutiers of tolerable action. The notion of efficient action derived from a specific, 
yrevriling notion of self and of the new rationality of social morals. 
The notion of effective action" represents the enthrownment of the alliance of a 
vigilant and controlled observation with institutional policies which confirmed, on a 
. 
noc-dogmatic basis' (in Kant's sense), the boundaries of any possible conception of 
experience. IS Insight, self-control and self-discipline, the austere patterns of the 
subject's reflexive observation, the therapeutics of the soul, the utopias of the self-
moulding of personality, of the self-knwoledge and self-enquiry into an intimate 
transcendental truth, were all envisioned as intrinsic capacities of the subject. However, 
self-observation, freed from theological thought, showed the effect of the profound 
revolution in the modern conception of the gaze which merged the moral resonanres 
of both religious devotion and positivist belief in the inexorable principles of efficient 
action as an essential feature of experience. The image of perversion incorporated the 
dictates of inner visibility and the profound subversion of the notion of object by the 
new epistemological foundation of the gaze. 
Freud' s conception of experience was neither made explicit nor expounded in 
his writings; it was neither an object of analysis nor of dedicated reflexion. Yet, he 
seems to have assumed a transcendental capacity for experience as a condition of the 
psychical process, a capacity which enabled the subject to acknowledge, signify and 
acquire a lasting memory of objects, actions, sensations, and the perceptions inherent 
in satisfaction £Be/riedigungserlebnis] and pain [Schmenerlebnis] , which, in tum, 
informed the specific action. 16 
Reizaufhebung ist bier nur moglich durch einen EingrifT, welcher 
im KOrperinnem die Qtl'-Entbindung fur eine Weile beseitigt, und 
dieser Eingriff erfordert eine Veranderung in der AuBenwelt 
(Nahrungszufuhr, Nahe des Sexual objektes), welche· als 
spezifische Aktion nur aufbestimmten Wegen erfolgen bon. Ocr 
menschliche Organismus ist ZUDachst uniahig, die spezifische 
Aktion herbei.zufUhren. Sie erfolgt durch fremde Hilfe indem 
<lurch die Abfubr auf dem Wege der inneren V~g em 
erfahrenes Individuum auf den Zustand des Kindes aufmerksam 
gemacb.t [wird]. Diese Abfiihrbahn gewinnt so die hOchst 
wicldige Sekundarfunktion der Verstindigung, und die 
anflingliche Hilflosigkeit des Menschen ist die UrqueUe aIler 
moralischen Motive. (Entwurf einer Psychologie, GW, 1895, 
Nachtragsband: 410r 
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The notion of experience, implied in Freud's theoretical developments, led him· to 
distinguish in it two significant phases: a motionless phase dominated by the reflexive 
perception of feelings and sensations, which may unleash mechanical reflex act10n or 
aimless.enegetical discharges -i.e ... the scream in the early experience of pain-, in 
w~jch the subject is immersed in its own sensations and resorts to the undifferentiated 
relief of its inner tension; the other is a reflexive phase, which involves the subject's 
aN8rel1eSS of specific objects and the sensations they arouse, the enlivening -conscious 
or unconscious- of memories, of habits, of compulsive actions, of associated 
representations and thoughts which trigger the search for satisfaction and a specifiC 
impulse to discharge, oriented and symbolically governed. The notion of experience 
thus implies the emergence of a complex two-phase structure of memory: a first 
moment of solipsistic memory, dominated by the force of sensations and the sheer 
!,resence of pain, hampered by the failed effort to remove excitation; a moment of 
i~lated memory of pain closed upon itself and transformed into a mere tension, a 
~, objectless expectation likely to unfetter an aimless reaction against pain, a void, 
sheer discharge of energy which achieves an unSatisfying, yet relieving dissipation of 
pressure, the ephemeral extinction of the pain, which merges in memory with the 
looming, harmful and relieving object into a ~gle web of memories. This is the 
"'lbe J'CIIlO\I&l oltbe idmuIui ii only made posllibJe here by an intervention which for the time being gets rid of the 
release of Qrl' in the interior of the body; and thia intervention calls for an attention in the extcma1 wor~ (.~ly 
ofnourilbmcnt,proximity of tho sexual object) which, u a specflic action, can only be brought about In definite 
W&J'I. At. tint the bunwl organism • incapable of bringing about the specific action. It takes place by extraneofI.Y 
hdp, wheG the attention of aD experienced penon· is drawn to the child'. state by diacbarge along the pedl of 
demIl chInae. In this way this path of discharge acquires a secondary function of the highest ira~rtancc. that of 
Cl»1iPk63Citdeix .. and the initial helplessncu of human bcinp is the primal SOllTce of the moral mottves. (SE, 1895. 
I: 318) 
334 
moment at which the primordial shadow of the object emerges, related to the 
suspension and the arousal of pain. The second moment of experience is properly 
informed by the appearance of this primal sensation of relief, the germ of the 
experience of satisfaction. Experience of pain and experience of satisfaction reveal not 
only the presence of a non-symbolic, non-figurative, mute dimension of experience 
related to pain, dominated by the inner rhythms of the intensities of the body, but also 
another facet of experience, dominated by the expansion of space and time,. by a 
rhythmic symbolic movement defined by perceived objects and the self-perception of 
definite actions. This double nature of experience seems to underlie the primordial 
memory of the object and inhabit the origin of desire. Consequently, the manifold 
structure of experience also shapes the primal memory of satisfaction. 
Wenn das hilfreiche Individuum die Arbeit der spezifischen 
Aktion in der Au6enwelt fUr das hilflose geleistet hat, so ist 
dieses dmch retlektorische Einrichtungen imstande, die zur 
endogmen Reizaufhcbung nOtige Leistung in seinem KOrperinnen 
ohne weiteres zu vollziehen. Das Ganze stellt daDD ein 
Befriedigungserlebnis dar. (Entwurf eines Psych%gle, GW, 
1895, Nadltragsband: 411r 
However, sexuality -thought of as the allegory of a complex specific charge and 
discharge of energy caused by the symbolic constraints it itself has in formed-, appears 
as an effect of this duality of the experience founded on the primal appearance of pain. 
The psychical dimension of sexuality can be seen as the tacit sense of the fictional 
relation of the subject to the primal object, together with the quality of this relation 
-activity and passivity- and the memory of the outcome of the specific action. It . 
suggests a immanent potential core of the sense of subjectivity. Sexuality appears as the 
allegory of an experience which has the paradoxical aim of achieving a sudden 
intensifying of sensation to ensure its obliteration; the longing for a transient inertness 
wl:tich involves a frenzied agitation; sexuality enacts the paradoxical sense of the 
achievement of the extinction of inner sti~uli, of the craving for absolute death, and 
of the creation of the subject's symbolic identity. Sexuality names the veiled, singular 
"When the helpful person has perfonned the wort of abe specific action in the external ~rld ~r th~ helplc:u one, 
1he,1attcr it in the pollmon, by means of reflex contrivances, immediately to carry out an ~e mtenor of ~ body 
the activity necessary for removing the cdogcnous stimulus. The total event then constituteS an exp~ne1lC~ of 
sati.sfoctio1l (SE, 1895, I: 318) 
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paradox, which links the subject's death with the emergence of its own identity. Thus, 
what is involved in Freud's conception of sexuality, and what we name its allegory, 
involves the fictions, metaphors and conjectures of paradoxical aims aroused by the 
experience of pain, the ambivalent memory of the harmful but satisfying object, the 
eclipse of the body, the dismemberment and isolation of the bodily sources of 
excitations, also the intricate and expanded web of flows of energy, the exacerbation 
of reflexive thought in experience, the discordant temporality of psychical and physiad 
process, as well as the lavishness of memories and representations of objects and desire 
aroused by manifold though convergent bodily and psychical procceses. 
Perversion, in Freud's text; exhibits this vast and conflicting heterogeneity of 
representations, the restless mutation and its exasperated manifestations -the 
symptomatOlogy-,' the obscure displacement and disappearance of the inner frontiers 
of subjectivity. Thus, perversion is not only defined, as Freud seems to have done in 
his early writings, by its "deviated" election of non-sexual objects likely to provide the 
sought sexual satisfaction; it is not only a kind of sexuality dominated by primitive 
patterns of object election, nor a fixation of the subject's desire at early stages of the 
development of the corporeal and symbolic schemes; it is not only a deferred evolution 
of the symbolic construction of the aims and objects of desire nor the dissipation of 
corporeal frontiers and a regressive restoration of a infantile undifferentiated neutral 
surface of bodily excitation. Perversions allow the convergence of all these features and 
processes; in addition, perversion might be thought of as the metaphorical dissipation 
of the physiognomy of the object and the rarefying of the aims of the subject, of 
corporeal and psychical temporalities. Perversion reveals itSelf to be the palimpsest of 
the corporeal and symbolic schemes of the subject's identity. Freud's notion of 
perversion implies the radical, discordant coexistence of diverging teleologies in the 
allegory of sexuality. 
The notion of inversion, which arpears at the beginning the first of the Drei 
Abhandlungen (1908), alludes to the convergence of these agonistic teleologies: 
perversion appears as absolutely determined by the nature, and shape of its object, and 
is, simultaneously, indifferent to it. Not only the object of the perverse act, but the act 
itself is informed by this agonistic tension: the search for satisfaction compels sexuality 
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to encroach upon the corporeal and symbolic limits of the subject's identity. 
Moreover, the disquieting, crude features of perversion reveal themselves in the 
contrast between sadism and masochism. These manifestations of perverse action are 
not only foreign to the teleology of nature. Paradoxically enough, sexuality seems to 
turn away from satisfaction only to find it in pain: and yet, what impulses the perverse 
act does not seem to be the compulsion to forsake the wish for satisfaction and the 
achievement of pleasure, but the pressure to fmd satisfaction at the edge of 
dissatisfaction itself. In one of his most puzzling contributions to his late theory, his 
unsettling text about masochism, Das IJkonomische Problem des Masochismus (1924), 
Freud develops an unprecedented taxonomy which expounds the three distinct kinds 
and structures of masochism. He recognizes erotogenic -biological-, feminine and 
. 
morn} masochism. However, biological, feminine and moral masochism, as described • 
in Freud's text, are not mutually exclusive expressions of deviated sexuality. 
Masochism involves complex entangled trends of distinct processes of sexuality, every 
one of which involves an inherent, yet distinct experience of pain. In his search for 
pleasure, the subject is driven to explore the inner dimension of its own experience of 
pleasure. In erotogenic masochism the dominating resource of pleasure is the uncertain 
experience of the Schmerzlust, the "pain of pleasure". This intricate paradox of the 
experience of pleasure reveals another obscure relation between the physical and 
psychical forces: 
Der erstere, der erogene- Masochismus, die Schmerz1ust, liegt 
auch den beKbt anderen Formen zugrunde, er ist biologisch und 
konstitutionell zu begrl1nden, bleibt unverstandlich, wenn man 
sieh Dieht zu einigen Annahmen tiber ganz d\1llkle Verhiltnisse 
entschlie8t (Dos iJlconomische Problem des Masochismus, SA, 
1924,m:34Sf 
The three forms of masochism coexist; indeed, biological masochism, Freud posits, is 
intrinsic in the biological dimension of subjectivity itself. The manifold manifestations 
of masochism involve the concurrence of pnmordial experience, which manifests itself 
in different conditions, memories and feelings of pain, different images of the source 
"nae fint, the autogenic IDIlIOChism -pleuure in pain-lies at the bottom of the 0t.her two fortlUl-as ~ll. Its basis 
must be ~ along biological and const4utionallines and.it remains incomprehensible unless one decides to make 
certain Ulumptiona about matters that are extremely obscure. (FP, 11: 416) 
337 
of suffering and different means of achieving pleasure. Yet, after having remarked the 
manifold nature of masochism and the unresolved, enigmatic condition of the pain 
which aroused the distinct experiences of pleasure, Freud stressed the necessary 
parallelism, the simultaneity of the different kind of experiences of pain. 
In spite of the fact that the nature of masochism is rooted, Freud suggests, in 
biological ground, its resonances remain obscure. Not only does the specific dynamics 
of its sources, but also its changing and mimetic manifestations are unaccountable: 
erotogenic masochism, the deep Constitutional experience is this inextricable ambuguity 
of the ·pleasure of pain" [Schmenlust], involves a paradoxical, dynamic outcome of 
sexuality: the mounting of the iimer tension, the increase in inner energy, the 
intensification of pain inherent in the discharge of energy -and the achievement of 
satisfactiorf. 
Pontalis has remarked the exceptional condition of this complex notion of the 
"pleasure of pain" [Schmenlust]. Even its unusual and ambiguous linguistic expression 
reveals the intricate alliance, the enigmatic entanglement of temporalities inherent in 
both contrasting, apparently antagonistic processes, at the opposing edges of the range 
of sensations. I? Pleasure takes hold of the primal experience of pain [Schmerz]. This 
turning back of pleasure does not imply necessarily the simultaneity of both processes 
and the coexistence of incomparable objects and experiences; rather, it can also allude 
to an unfolding of a series of contrasting sensations, an overlaying of the rhythms, of 
the mounting and decay of simultaneous psychical processes which constitute the 
subject's experience. A settling of distinct representations, a depth of memories and 
tokens associated with the different process, the fusion of temporalities and the 
. corporeal dispersion of sexuality, determine the spectrum of the psychical 
characteristics of perversion. 
Moreover, sadism and masochisml8 appear as particularly inconsistent with 
Freud's general classification of perversions. Indeed, sadism and masochism form a 
specific class formally comprised within the disturbance showing a "fixation of 
preliminary sexual aims" [fixierung von vorliiufigen Saualtielen] (emphasis added), 
not explicitly expounded in Freud's text. In fact, these perversions are not to be 
confounded with the disturbance provoked only by an abnormal development of the 
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subjective agencies, or with diseases provoked by the subject's arrest at a non-terminal 
stage along the path towards the achievement of the sexual end. Sadism and masochism 
both seem to reach satisfaction by condensing in a partial experience the whole 
essential and constitutive dimension of the allegory of sexuality itself. Furthermore, 
Freud's conception ofbiologica1-erotogenic- masochism, which involves a "natural" 
pain essentially ingrained in the subject's flesh, stresses masochism's endless 
metamorphosis, its obstinate masquerade, the allegorization of sexuality: 
Der erogene Masochismus Macht alle Entwicldungsphasen der 
Libido mit und entnimmt ihnen seine wechselnden psychischen 
Umkleidungen. (Dos iJkonomische Problem des Masochismus, 
SA, 1924, ill: 348f 
IV. Freud's allegories 0/ paln: intensity and secrecy 
1. Freud's hesitations at the conception of pain 
a. The tranSf~nnation of the ethical principle in Freud's economic explanation 
In a letter to his friend Silberstein, written on 23 October 1874, Freud gives an account 
of his attendance at a course given by Brentano: 19 
Brentano liest zwei Kollegien, Mittwoch und Samstag abends 
ausgewahlte metaphysische Fragen und Freitag abends eine 
Schrift von Mill fiber das Nutzlichkeitsprinzip, die wir 
regelmiBiger besuchen. Bei Brentano erinnere ich mic~ daB Du 
die Absicht hattest, den Fechner zu h6ren, und ersuche Dic~ mir 
zu schreiben, was und wie er vorttiigt. •• 
Prentano's lessons'on Mill's pliiIosophy, and especially his reflections on the utility 
principle, left perhaps a deeper impression on·the young Freud than is currently 
·BlOtogcaic masochism accompanies the libido through all its developmental phases and derives from them ita 
cbangina peychical coatings. (FP, 11: 419) 
IJrentano pva two aeminan, Wednesday and Saturday afternoons on selected metaphysical problems; ~~y 
a~emoon the seminar deals with Mill's paper on the principle of utility, and this we attend regularly. Thinking 
about BJaUno, I remember you had the intention to go to hear Fechner and I beg you to write me about what he 
dca1J with and how he teaches. (My translation). 
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~mitted. Mill himself had written in the brief and outstanding book, Utilitarianism, 
probably well known to Freud: 
~ who kno~ anything about the matter are aware that every 
",?~, from EPl~ to Bentham, who maintained the theory of 
utility, meant by It, not something to be contradistinguished from 
pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with the exemption of 
pain. 20 
Mill's idea that the strong relation between the utility principle and the pleasure 
principle must rule moral behaviour, translated by Freud into psychical and 
physiological metaphors of energy, adumbrated and perhaps even engendered, one of 
the lasting, meaningful contributions of Freud's meta psychology. A year and a half 
after the lessons, Freud began to work, at the request of Brentano, on the German 
transIation Qf the twelfth volume of Mill's Complete Works and, in particular, on Mill's 
essay on Plato. Meanwhile he simultaneously read some of Fechner's articles and 
essaYS.21 The empiricist heritage of Freud was a strange fusion of the strong speculative 
views of physiology and the positivist ethical conjectures of English philosophy. Freud 
might be counted among those thinkers, in· the Western philosophical tradition, who 
inherited and developed Locke's exploration of a consciousness governed by the 
·pleasure principle" . 22 
Freud's conception of pleasure seeks to condense in a single notion two facets 
of the forces which inform the subject's structure: the Capacity of energy to become 
fixed in a definite object, and the specific. though enigmatic representational nature of 
psychical energy. The resonance of Mill's ethical conception of pleasure is perceptible 
in Freud's scheme of the energy discharge, reformulated in the light of Fechner's 
.. thennodynamic-based images of psychical behavior, and of a particular notion of the 
oorvous reflex.23 Physiologica11a'!sengender in the subject a silent history, that of the 
transformation of the ·biologica1 foundations of pain into the origins of morality. 
However, the realm of ethics and the compelling regularities of desire go beyond the 
direct determination of biological process, yet they largely transform the primordial 
structures of experience; the experience of pain abides in the core of the unfolding and 
compUlsive search for satisfaction. The rad·ical transformation of a biological 
predisposition into a moral experience has been condensed by Freud in a brief 
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statement: "Everything that we know of pain fits in with this. The nervous system has 
the most decided inclination to a flight from pain". [Alles was wit vom Schmerz 
wissen, stimmt hiezu. DasNervensystem hat die entschiedenste Neigung zur 
SchmeT7/luCht. (Enlwurfeiner Psychologie, OW, 1895, Nachtragsband : 399)]. Thus, 
Freud's conception of ethics emerges from the conflict between two metaphors: on the 
one hand, the conception of pleasure as a moral, purely symbolical issue, and on the 
other, the metaphor of pleasure as the outcome of a self-perception of an homeostatic 
physiological structure, which regulates the subject's bodily structures and preserves 
the individual. 
A singular conception of the Subject's perception of pleasure and unpleasure has 
its sOurce in this peculiar amalgam of ethics and physiology; in a subtle contortion of 
. . . 
the doctrine of utilitarianism and the allegorical resonances of a thermodynamic model 
of self-regulated systems. Freud's concept of pleasure and unpleaseure became the 
unformulated, yet real foundation of a conflicting hermeneutic of subjectivity. Freud's 
elusive but nonetheless uncompromising concern with ethics should become evident in 
several outstanding although episodic theoretical proposals and reflections: ethics 
appears either. as a social aspect of repression, or as a subjective condition of the 
symbolic interchange; it appears either as the outcome of a psychical conflict, or as the 
result of a precarious resonance of a primal, potential dialogue discontinuously 
sustained between the subject and object in its various relations. Ethics seems to 
emerge either from the violence of the ideal engendered in the relation to the loved 
figures and subtly incorporated as an inner boundary of action, or as a fateful outcome 
of the conditions imposed on the subject by the experience of satisfaction; ethics also 
. seems to have an origin either in the unavoidable restraint of satisfaction, imposed by 
the silent, threatening absence of the primal satisfying object, or in the unfathomable 
lo~ic of the presence and the demands of the love(! object. 
When Freud strives to explain the singular nature of repression, to define the 
features of the particular representations which yield to it, two factors appear to be the 
most relevant: the unavoidable pain aroused in the subject by the ruses of hallucinatory 
satisfaction, and the subject's acknowledgement of the defeat of the specific action 
which should have led to satisfaction by "flle bitter experience of life" [eigne bittere 
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Lebense1j'ahrung] . 
At a certain moment, late in his ~ork, Freud envisages ethics as the visible 
sequel of super-ego, which is envisaged, in tum, as the consequence of a mnemic 
association of the acoustic matter of the words pronounced by those loved, domineering 
figures; also, ethics arises from the remains of the wreck of the <Edipic phase. The 
Humean puzzle of the foundations of ethical truth reappears between the lines of the 
Freudian text, when he traces the origins and seeks to expound the nature of super-ego. 
Freud then conceives the foundation of ethics to be the lasting inscription of the 
residues of spoken words the force of which is strengthened by the intense, conflicting 
affections which concurred to produce the decline of the <Edipus complex. 
In Freud'S' early theoretical formufation of the hierarchy of psychical principles, his 
notion of the experience of pain precedes and informs his image of the experience of 
satisfaction; this seeming transposition of what will become in later works the 
uncontested primacy of the Pleasure Principle, maintains, however, the image of pain 
as the definite and essential trace which will determine the sequel of the primal 
experience of ~tisfaction. However, the experience of pain does not only reduces itself 
to the memory of a sensation and of the foreign object associated with it; it embodies 
also the trace of the motor reactions unleashed by the perception of the potential 
appearance of the painful agent. The implicit conception of the relation between 
memory and pain anticipates the later appearence of the notion of repression. Pain 
embodies thus a complex, condensed universe of memories -of sensations, of agents 
and of actions- which appear as the primary model [Vorbild] and also the rll'St 
example [erste Beispielj of psychical repression. Nevertheless, as if by negative 
metamorphosis, the system appears· as exclusively bound to the satisfaction of desire. 
Freud's early work reveals two stages of development regarding the specific 
relevance of pain in his theoretical scheme. In the first, the essential principle which 
governs the psychical life is the Unpleasure Principle. In Die Traumdeutung he still 
sustains the primacy of this Unpleasure Principle as the chief condition which 
detennines the psychical system, and he makes of the avoidance of unpleasure the aim 
which defines repression: 
Es ergibt sidl nun eigne interessante Gedankenfolge wenn man 
die Bezi~mgen dieser Abtlu8bemnnmg durch etas zwclte System 
~ ¥enmg durch das Unlustprinzip ins Auge faSt [ ... ] wird 
~ Primiren. Apparat die Neigung bestehen, dies peinliche 
Erionerungsbild sofort, wenn es irgendwie geweckt wird, wieder 
zu verlassen, weil ja das Oberrue6en seiner Erregung auf die 
.Wabmthmung UnIust bervorrufen wUrde (genauer: hervorzurufen 
beginnt). Die Abwendung von der Erinnerung, die nlD' eigne 
WiederholUl'lg dec einstigen Flueht vor der Wahmebmung isl, 
wird aueh dadurch er leiehtert, daB die Erinnerung Dieht wie die 
Wahrnehmung genug QualitAt besitzt, urn das BewuBtsein zu 
erregen und hiedurch neue Besetzung an sich zu zichen. Diesc 
mUhelos und regelmilBig erfolgende Abwendung des psychisehen 
Vorgangs von der Erinnenmg des einst Peinliehen gibt uns das 
Vorbild und das erste Beispiel der psychiscben Verdrlngung. 
(Die Traumdeutung, SA, 1900, I: 569)-
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Almost.im!Dediately after the crucial theoretical construction of the TraumdeUlUng, 
Freud's works clearly exhibits hesitations, significative terminological shiftings, a 
decay of the original emphasis given to the unpleasure principle as a means of 
explanation. In the Fonnulierungen Uher der zwei Prinzipien des Psychischen 
Geschehens, Freud postulates an ambiguous Pleasure-Unpleasure Principle. The final 
election of the term Pleasure Principle seems a natural evolution, a mere semantic 
progression, a conceptual contingency engendered by the simple shift of terms. The 
notion of the unpleasure principle was uprooted from his work without further 
commentary. Freud's theoretical framework seemed untouched by this apparently 
innocuous, terminological choice. 
Against the conventional view which considers this "terminological" change a 
purely stylistic or conventional decision, 24' it is necessary to.recall that for this shifting 
. to be meaningless, it should have satisfied at least a necessary condition: both 
categories must stand as fairly well defined synonyms; they must be defined as distinct 
names of identical processes. Nevertheless, Fre~d insistently stressed their subtle 
-SOme interesting reflections follow if we consider the relations between this inhibition upon discharge exercised 
by the second system and the regulation effected by the un pleasure principle. [ ... J there will be an inclination in 
the primitive apparatus to drop the distressing mnemic image immediately, if anything happens to revive it, fo~ the 
very reason that if its excitation were to overflow into perception it would provoke unpleasure (or, more prectsely 
~u1d begin to provoke it). 'The avoidance of the memory, which is no more than a repetition of the previous flight 
from the peroeption, is also facilitated by the fact that the memory, unlike the perception, does not poss~s enough 
quality to excite consciousness and thus to attract fresh cathexis to itself. This effortless and regular aVOIdance by 
the psychical process of the memory of anything that had once been distressing affords us the prototype and first 
example of psychical repression. (FP, 4: 759) • 
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rontrariety, the singularity of each of them, and their intricate, obscure relationship. 
A few years after the almost stealthy shift between the two "terms·, in Trieb und 
Triebschicksale, Freud risks a noteworthy remark: 
die Unlustempfindung mit Steigerung, die Lustempfindung mit 
Herabsetzung des Reizes zu tun hat. Die weitgehende 
Unbestimmtheit dieser Annahme wollen wir aber sorgflltig 
festhalten, bis es uns etwa gelingt, die Art der Beziehung 
zwischen Lust-Unlust unci den Schwankungen der auf das 
Seelenleben wirkenden ReizgroBen zu erraten. Es sind gewiB sehr 
mannigfache unci nicht sehr einfache solcher Beziehungen 
moglich. (Trleb und Trlebschicksa/e, SA, 1915, m: 85r 
Freud did not only contemplate this "positive" definition of pleasure and unpleasure as 
indeterminate; he admitted the existence of a deeper condition of the comprehension 
of this "quantitative" conception of the opposition between pleasure and unpleasure: 
the elucidation of a qualitative factor involved in the fluctuations of intensity. Freud 
was to show a hesitant attitude towards his primordial quantitative definition of 
pleasure. In the well known Chapter VB of the Traumdeutung, Freud comments, in a 
seemingly ironic -even rbetorical- rapture of self-criticism: 
Wir batten uns in die Fiktion eines primitiven psychischen 
Apparats vertieft, <lessen Arbeit durch das Bestreben geregelt 
wild; ADhIufimg von Erregung zu venneiden und sich mOglichst 
erregungslos zu erhaIten. Er war darum nach dem Schema eines 
Reflexapparats pam; die MotiliW, zunachst der Weg zur 
inneren Verindelung des Korpers, wat die ibm zu Gebote 
stebende Abfuhrbahn. (Die Traumdeutung, SA, 1900, ill: 568r· 
However, this "fiction of a primitive apparatus" proved to be the spinal cord of 
psychoanalytic thought. Freud, in fact, was never able to "give it up. 
Furthermore, this fictional, "undetermined" definition became, in a simple but 
compelling form, the crucial reference for the economic conception of desire, as well 
·unpleuurable feelings are connected with an increase and pleasunble feelings with a decrease of stimulua. We 
will however, carefully preserve this usumption in ita present highly indefinite funn, until we succeed, if that is 
po.sible, in discovering what sort of relation exists between pleasure and unpleasure, on the o~e hand, .and 
ftU<:tuationa in the amounts of slimulus affecting mentallifc, on the other. It is certain that many vanoua relations 
ofthiJ kind, and not very simple ones, are posible. (FP, 11: 117) 
""We have already explored the fiction of a primitive psychical apparatus whose activities are regulated by an effort 
to avoid an accumulation of excitation and to maintain itself so far as possible without excitation. For that rcuon 
it is buill upon the plan of a reflex apparatus. The power of movement. which is in the first instance a means of 
bringing about internal aherations in its body, is at its dISposal as the path to discharge. (FP, 4: 7S6) 
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as for the complex, late reflections on the death instinct and its relation to the second 
theory of subjectivity with its ponderous, epistemological consequences. 
Yet the foresaking of the unpleasure principle uncovers Freud's ambivalent 
approach to pain. Pain reveals itself, from the psychoanalytical point of view -from 
the pre-psychoanalytic works of Freud until the last ones-, as one of the fundamental 
and yet unattainable concepts of the whole thematic constellation of psychoanalysis. At 
several crucial moments in his reflection, Freud's endeavour to build the theoretical 
framework of his thought was confronted with the need to recognize the limits of 
psychoanalytic thought regarding pain. In one of his his last meaningful contributions 
to psychoanalytic theory -as Freud himself confessed in his 1935 addendum to his An 
. Auto~graphical Study (1925)25- Freud declares again his perplexity when confronted 
. '.". 
with the oliscure nature of pain: 
Wann mat die Trennung vom Objekt Angst, wann Trauer und 
wann vielleicht nur Schmerz? 
Sagen wir es gIeic~ es ist keine Aussicht vorhanden, Antworten 
auf dtese Frage zu geben. Wir werden uns dabei bescheiden, 
einige Abgrenzungen und einige Andeutungen zu finden. 
(He",mung, Sympto", und Angst, SA, VI, 1926: 306. Stress 
added).· 
Only paragraphs after he had written this meaningful confession, when confronting 
again the need to elucidate the nature of pain, Freud openly confesses: ·we know very 
little about pain either· [Auch von Schmerz wissen wir sehr wenig]. And without further 
hesitation, Freud continues to expose the main elements of his original attempt to 
explain the mechanisms which lie in the core of painful sensations. However, a deeply 
rooted, albeit frail vision of the nature of pain was an early acquisition, thoroughly 
devdoped in the unpublished papers of the Entwu1f, back in 1895. And yet, in 1926, 
date of the publication of Henimung, Symptom und Angst -nearly thirty years had 
already passed since the first consistent attempt to explain the experience of pain-, 
Freud still cannot overcome this enigmatic, theoretical barrier. He was compelled to 
insist on it as unaccountable, as an impregnable shelter of the potencies of the soul. In 
"Whc:o doc. ........ g from an object produce mourning and when docs it produce, it may be, only pain? Let ~e 
lay at once that there is 110 prospect ojinsighl ojfJllSWUing these questions. We must content ourselves with 
drawing certain distinctions and adlHUbrating certain pOssibilities. (FP. 10: 330) 
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a fundamental passage in Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920), after an exacting effort to 
clarify the nature of pain, he finally surrenders. Once more, he resorts to his reiterated, 
invariant explanation: pain results from the piercing stimulus which burst on the 
subject's protecting barriers, shattering them. Pain is only the experience of this 
shattering. Every time he encountered the presence of pain, he was compelled to repeat 
almost word by word the same original explanation. 
From this obstinate, invariant vision emerges Freud's conception of the violence 
of pain. Pain appeared always as the unbearable experience of brutal amount of energy 
that penetrates the membranes of the organism and provoke this staggering, oppressive 
excitation. However, the main feature of the painful eruption of energy -as conceived 
by Freud- was not its extreme intensity: but the crucial psychical transformation 
.. ..' . 
brought abOut by pain. Pain turns the perception of a foreign agent into a sensation 
which springs from inner sources, and incorporates the image of an exterior agent 
which can be removed or evaded, turning it into an inescapable inner, overwhelming 
sensation. This inversion dissolves the subject's boundaries: pain dissipates the sharp 
limits between the inner and the outer spheres of the subject's identity. This incipient 
conception of pain was to remain undeveloped. Freud's failure to construct a consistent 
theoretical approach to pain persist as a significant feature of psychoanalysis. 
Nevertheless, pain acquired, at different stages of Freud's writings, an uneven 
relevance to the explanation of psychical processes. Despite its central role as a 
theoretical enigma in the psychoanalytic conception, the notion of pain always 
remained extraneous to the Freudian corpus. Pain appeared as a paradoxical decisive 
yet disregarded theoretical axiom, a crucial )'et unfathomable core of the theory. This 
fundamental but displaced topic . adumbrates the limits of Freud's conception. The 
marginal position of pain. in FreUd:' s writings seems to mirror the significance of pain 
in the subject's experience and perhaps even in Freud's own history.26 
Pain, Freud suggests, exerts an immense, paralyzing power over the psychical 
processes. A Baroque constellation of allegorical spaces and allegorical images of 
energy appears ceaselessly in Freud's writing~ He seems to make no progress in the 
theoretical approach to pain. His reiterative explanation faces a challenge. In a crucial 
moment of his theoretical work, Freud cannot avoid a moving and meaningful 
confession: 
Die Unbestimmtbeit all unser Erortenmgen, die wir 
metapIydJologishei8en, riihrt natUrlich daher, daB wlr nlchls 
aber die Natur des E1'regungsvorganges In den Elemente1l der 
psychischtJn 8ysteme Wissen und lDlS zu keiner Annabrne dariiber 
,ben:chtigt tuhIetl. So operlert wir also stets mit elnem grofJen X, 
welches wir In jede neue Formel mit hinllbemehmen. (Je1l3e1ts 
des Lustprlnzlps, SA, 1920, m: 240. Emphasis added)-
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Yet the open recognition of a hollowness at the core of psychoanalytic theory., this 
"larJe X" as the only explanation of the excitatory process -a fundamental factor in 
the causal scheme of psychoanalysi»- is neither isolated nor exceptional. When Freud 
confronts the theme of pain, he modifies his rhythm of writing, his text branches and 
other related -or even unrelated- passages and references, even veiled self-quotations, . .' ., 
intrude upon Freud's theoretical exposition. His narration frequently leads to a 
unfulfillable promise of a future elucidation, which suspends the text's own impulse. 
In Trauer und Melancholie (1917), when the reflection approached a crucial point at 
which the comprehension of pain seems to be essential to the understanding of the 
ooming discussion about mourning, the text abruptly swerves from the main stream of 
arguments. Hedid not only defer the discussion of pain, but also slighted the urgency 
of the explanation of mourning. However, Freud openly acknowledged that mourning 
remains unaccountable without a clear comprehension of pain. 
WIT werden auch den Vergleich gutheillen, der die Stimmung der 
Trauer eigne 'schmerzlische' nennt. Seine Berechtigung wird uns 
wahrscheinlicll einleuchten, wenn wir imstande sind, den Schmerz 
okonomische III charakterisieren. (Trauer und Melancholie, SA, 
1917, m: 198r-
'This promised, thorough explanation of pain, never carne. The text comes to an 
unexpected end, a definitive fogging of the argumentation closed by the reiterated, 
'The indefiniteness of all our discussions on what we describe as metapsychology is of course due to the fact that 
~ know nothing 0/ th~ nallire of ~ aciJalory proc~ss thai takes plac~ in Ih~ ~leme1llS of th~ psychica~ systems, 
and that we do not fecI justified in framing any hypothesis on the subject. We aTe consequently operallng aU the 
_ with a wg, lUIlawwn/aclOr [groJkn Xl • which we are ob/igued to carry over into ~v~ry new formula. (FP, 
11: 302) 
-We should regard it as an appropriate comparison, too, to call the mood of mourning a 'painful' on~. We sh~ll 
probably see the justification for this when we are in a position to give a characterization of the econonucs of pam. 
(pp, 11: 252) 
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uncertain promise of a future illumination. r1 Freud's theoretical thought is haunted by 
the image of future elucidation: sudden, unexpected silences, stresses, shiftings of 
sense, a sort of textual punctuation informs his text, disturbing it, exhibiting its 
failures, its unresolved ends, the insurmountable silence that pervades his own whole 
discourse and obscures it 
The textual development of Freud's reflection in Die VerdrlJngung (191S) 
exhibits this critical punctuation, signaling the limits imposed by pain on the 
psycboanalytic comprehension of the unconscious. If the understanding of repression 
stands as a capital aim 'of psychoanalytic thought, then the abrupt extinction of sense 
brought about by pain illuminates one of its unnoticed facets. Freud, in Die 
VerdrlJngung, adds to his vision of pain as the breaking of the subject's allegorical, 
inner boundaries, a disquieting remark: pain not only informs SUbjectivity; it also 
foreshadows the extinction of being; the eclipse and dissipation of sense provoked by 
the overwhelming invasion of a flood of energy shatters the symbolic forms that brace 
the subject's own identity; pain not only links the primal experience of the origins of 
desire with the unutterable experience of the radical destruction of sense; it also 
adumbrates absolute death. 
Pain, Freud suggests, has also the features of a transitional, inner force, at the 
boundaries of psychical and physical processes; paradoxically, it corresponds to an 
experience of the disappearance of sense, and yet has the dual structure of 
representation. It relates a physical quantity with the universe of consciousness, with 
a constellation of associated psychical images, perceptions and motor responses; pain 
thus resembles instinct; Freud conceives pain, like instinct (drive) as an intrinsic 
physical force which informs the symbolic response of the subject, which cannot be 
eluded and, in turn, yields to symbolic patterns. Freud risks a unsettling simile: pain 
as a pseudoinstinct [Pseudotneb]. 
Wir konnen zur besseren Abgrenzung der Verdrangung einige 
andere Triebsituationen in Erortenm ziehen. Es kann vorkomm~ 
daB sich em iu6er'er Reiz, z.B. dadurch, daB er ein Organ anint 
un zerstO~ verinnerlich~ und so eigne neue QueUe bestandiger 
Erregung und Spannungsvermehrung ergibl Er erwirbt damit 
eigne weitgehende Ahnlichkeit mit einem Trieb. Wir wissen, daB 
wir diesen Fall als Schmerz empfmden. Das Ziel dieses 
Pseudotrieb ist aber nur dasAufhOren der Organveranderung und 
der mit ihr verbunden Unlust. Andere, direkte Lust kann aus dem 
AujhiJren des Schmerz nicht gewonnen werden. Der Schmerz ist 
imperativ; er unterliegt nur noch der Einwirkung einer toxischen 
Aufhebung und der Beeinflussung durch psychische Ablenkung. 
Der Fall des Schmerz ist zu wenig durchsichtig, um etwas for 
unsere Absicht zu leisten. (Die Verdr(Jngung, SA, 1914, III: 108. 
Emphasis added).· 
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His symptomatic hesitation at the very opening of the reflection suggests not only a 
reticence regarding the presence of pain, but an open exhibition of its negative presence 
in his theoretical universe. The notion of pain is sharply distinguished by Freud from 
that of unpleasure; however, both its "intermediate" character which brings it close to 
the drive [Trieb], and its paradoxical destruction of the symbolic resources of 
consciousness, assigns to it an indefinite place in psychoanalytic reflexion: thus, pain 
remains in an uncertain, extraterritorial position; it does not even acquire the mythical 
condition of drive [Trieb]. Moreover, the "opacity" [wenig durchsichtig] of pain 
(Freud) forced Freudian refiexion, to an unforeseeable acknowledgement of the 
fragility of the notion of drive [Trieb]. The theoretical hesitations about pain threatened 
the crucial notion of drive. 
The analogy between drive [Trieb] and pain [Schmerz], also illuminates the 
features which separate them in Freud I s text. While he openly asserts the opacity of 
pain, the inaccessibility of drive'remained an elusive topic, seldom mentioned, only 
partially unveiled by the equivocal and ephemeral preflX, by the meaningful token 
[Pseudo], which will never reappear, in Freud's work, in relation to drive [Trieb]. This 
perturbing particle suggests simulation, displacement, distortion of identity; perhaps, 
even a partial convergence, but it also hints at the metaphoric relation between the two 
terms that confers a strange eloquence on the allegory of pain. 
Paradoxically, the prefix, far from casting some light upon the notion of pain, 
extends over the meaning of drive the shadows of the enigma of pain. Despite the 
m order to beltn delimit rtrpra.riorl, let \II discuss some other instinctual situations. It may happen that an external 
stimulus becomes intcrnaIizaI-fOr cxap1e, by eating into and destroying some bodily organ- so that a new source 
of constant excitation and increase oftcnsion arises. The stimulus thereby acquires a far-reaching similarity to an 
instinct. We know that a cue of this IOrt is experienced by us as pain. The aim of this psewJo..instinct. however. 
is simply the ceasalion of the change in the organ and of the unpleasure accompanying it. 17ter~ is ~ othe~ direct 
pkaslUe to be anained by cessDlion of pain. Further, pain is imperative; the only thing to whIch It ca~ YIeld are 
removal by IOIDC toxic agent or the influence of mental distraction. The case of pain is 100 obscure 10 gIve us any 
help ill our purpose. (FP. 11: 145-146) 
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ambiguity of the undetennined simile, of the elusive allegorical relation between pain 
and instinct, the prefix brings to light some fundamental features of the notion of pain. 
This morphological token -pseudo- both evinces and conceals the relevance of pain 
to the structure of subjectivity. 
As we have previously remarked,28 Freud's conviction of the obscure, mythical, 
yet illuminating condition of the drive, seems to have impregnated also his conception 
of pain. 
The elusiveness of Trieb, but also its illuminating power, evidences the 
relevance of Freud's conception of pain and of its fictional expression to the 
psychoanalytical enterprise. Moreover, his acknowledgement of the fictional, mythical 
nature C?f the notion of drive, which upholds the entire framework of psychoanalysis, 
.- • i 
reveals the' poignancy and opaqueness of Freud's theory of representation. It also 
exhibits the deep silence which underlies psychoanalytic theory, and its compelling, 
challenging sense built by the proliferating unfolding of allegorical insights. 
The resonance of the concept of "myth" not only signals the cardinal concept 
of [7Web), it also pervades Freud's own writing impulse: he seems to be aware of the 
mythical nature of the discourse of psychoanalysis. The mythology of drive 
progressively rarefies itself as Freud incorporates in his theoretical view the violent, 
hollow allegorical treatment of pain. Painjoins this atmosphere of myth, yet it disturbs 
the theoretical effort of psychoanalysis: the dynamic model of Freudian thought seems 
to yield to the mythopoeic impulse which stems from the primordial psychoanalytic 
allegories of pain. This allegorical proximity of drive and pain exhibit the reticent, 
mystic inclination of psychoanalytic thought. Pontalis, in a remarkable meditatation on 
Freud's unwillingness to expound the nature of psychical pain, formulates explicitly 
the limits of psychoanalytic refleCtion. The mere appearance of pain on the horizon of 
reflection arouses in Freud a peculiar anxiety: 
une vague crainte qu'une i)laine reconnaissance de la douleur ne 
tomne at la apologetique de celle-ci, a una valorisation excessive 
dlun pur eprouve, impensable et indicible, a quelque religion 
salvatrice par I'agonie. n est vrai que cette tentation dlune sorte de 
mysticisme du negatif existe. 29 
The psychoanalytic conception of pain suggests this proximity to religion, and, 
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simultaneously, reveals their absolute estrangement; the relevance of pain brings the 
psychoanalytic dialogue close to prayer; the word in the psychoanalitic dialogue 
merges the exaltation brought about by consolation and love, the anxiety of a non-
transcendental, non-redeeming revelation, and the experienced fractures of identity. 
Thus, in psychoanalysis the revelation borne by prayer turned into self-revelation and 
the eloquence of the ritual language which surrounds and penetrates prayer, was 
radically overturned; it is the eloquence and misery of silence which remains the 
illuminating force of psychoanalytic dialogue. At this point, the obscure nature of pain, 
its secret creative force is fully exposed. 
b. Pain and the infidelities of perception 
Freud clearly discerns the dynamic process and the perception of pleasure. There is the 
"becoming perceptible" of pleasure and unpleasure. Thus, pleasure and unpleasure can 
both exist without any conscious unveiling. 
Freud names this appearance of pleasure-unpleasure in consciousness, a 
quautitative-qualitative "other" rein quantitative-qualitative Anderes]. 
Nennen wir das,. was aJs Lust und Unlust bewu6t wird, ein 
quantitativ-qualitativ Anderes im seelischen Ablauf, so ist die 
Frage, ob em solches Anderes an Ort und Stelle bewu6t werden 
kann oder bis zum System W fortgeleitet werden muS. Die 
klinische Erfahrung entscheidet fUr das letztere. Sie zeigt, daB 
dies Andere sich verhilt wie eigne verdrangte Regung. Es kann 
treibende Krifte entfalten, ohne daB das Ich den Zwang bemerkt. 
Erst Widerstand gegen den Zwang, Aufhalten dec Abfuhrreaktion 
macht dieses Andere sofort a1s Uolust bewuBt. (Dos lch und das 
Es, SA, 1923, m: 291f 
The consciousness of pain thus appears to be an.element of the series of "neutral" 
theoretical objects in Freud's fictional train of thought [Denkweg]. It acquires the same 
"Let us call what becomes conacious as pleasure and unpleasure a quantitative and qualitative 'something' in the 
course of mental eventl; the question then is whether this 'something' can become conscious in the place where 
it is or whether it must first be tran.mited to the system Pcp" Clinical experience decides for the latter. It shows 
us that this 'IOmething' behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert driving force without thc-eg~ noticing the 
compul.ion. Not until there is resistance to the compulsion. a hold-up in the discharg~reaction. does the 
'something' at once become consciou5 as unpleasure. (FP. 11: 360-361) 
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marginal, transitional condition of both language and consciousness. Like them, it 
appears as an intermediate thing [Mitterding] which recalls the strangeness of the 
threatening interior, yet foreign object, which incites in the subject the impulse to expel 
it, to reject it. The Freudian use of "other" [Andere] in this context is a singular one: 
it suggests a peculiar relation between pleasure and unpleasure [lust und unlust] in the 
light of the perception of an extraneous presence. Freud's reference to painful 
experience underwent a further displacement: pain was not to be described as a 
sensation, but as a deeply-rooted, buried dynamic process, which could be confined 
beneath the threshold of the subject's perception. Freud does not hesitate to admit the 
theoretical inconsistency, the scandal of conceiving an actual, albeit unperceived 
unpleasure or a similarly unapprehensible pleasure. Moreover, like pleasure and 
unpleasure, pain alsO is thought of as emerging from an inner disturbance of the flows 
of energy which lacks a definite identity; a psychical otherness, which can stir up 
violent psycbical processes, and still remain unnoticed: 
Ebenso Me BedWfuisspannungen, kann auch der Schmerz 
tmbewuBt bleiben, dies Mittelding zwischen iu6erer und innerer 
Wabmehmun& der sich wie eigne innere Wahmebmung verhilt, 
auch woer IUS der AuBenwelt stammt Es bleibt also richtig, daB 
80ch Empfindullgen und Gefiihle nur durch Anlangen an das 
System W bewuBt werden; ist die Fortleitung gesperrt, so 
korDl1Di sie nicht ~s Empfindungen zustande, obwohl das ihnen 
eatsprecbcnde Andere im Erregungsablauf dasselbe ist (Vas lch 
und das Ef, SA, 1923, m: 291f 
Consequently, pain, like pleasure and unpleasure, exhibits a double nature: it is bonded 
both to perception and silence, to a bold appearance and to ~ secret presence. But pain 
acquires an enigmatic quality: the· "otherness"· which defines the specific nature of pain, 
eludes reflexive power of consciousness; it is in itself a piercing intensity destined to 
shatter consciousness itself. Pain appears as a brutal, yet unapprehensible, non-
fathomable force likely to obliterate consciousness without being reached by the 
reflexive thought. Pain can appear as a silent destruction both of consciousness and of 
m the same way that tensions arising from physical needs can remain unconscious, so also can .the pain -a ~g 
inte~ bet\Wen intemal and external perception, which behaves like an internal perceptiOn even whe? its 
source it in the e:xtanaI world. h ~s true, therefore, that sensations and feelings. too, only become COnsciOUS 
through n:acbing the I)'IIaD PcpI; uthe way forward is '*!cd. they do not come into .being as. sensations, although 
the 'lomethiDg' that corresponds to them in the course of excitation is the same U If they did. (FP, 11: 361). 
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the symbolic, inner barriers which shape the subject's identity. It becomes in itself an 
foreign inner, active matter, a sensation which is signified as a token of an underlying 
presence, an inner otherness [Mittelding]. Pain, an intermediate thing [Mittelding], 
obliterates the distinction between the inner sources and objects of perception and the 
outer one. Thus, the experience of pain brings about a paradoxical perception of space. 
Pain produces the mirage of the indefinite locus of its source. It perceives the outer 
harmful presence as an overwhelming inner destruction. It is perhaps the memory of 
this dissipation of the external object and the concomitant compelling intensity of the 
painful inner perception which defines the violence of the experience of pain, its 
primordial position in the constitution of subjectivity. Even if engendered within the 
boundaries of the subject's own body, pain is perceived as an extraneous presence 
which intrudes from "another scene", from a foreign territory. Not only does pain 
create an experience of time; it also displays its own scenery, engenders its own 
experience of space. Moreover, the shattering quantity of energy arouses manifold 
memories of pain: it does not only leave traces of its outburst upon the protecting 
boundaries of the subject's identity, but it bears witness to the emergence of a singular, 
condensed primordial experience of space and time. The subjective spaces become 
uncertain, and so become the material attributes of the object and the boundaries of the 
subject's identity. Pain turns perception into a discernible, though inescapable mirage. 
c. Freud's first attempt to define pain. The metaphor of intensity as a substance 
The notion of pain, as sketched by the ambivalent, wavering Freudian writing, is not 
simply that of a plain, intense sensation. Rather, it implies the image of a sensation 
beyond itself, a sensation which has exceeded its own boundaries, which has no 
recognizeable nature. 
Wir haben das Nervens),stem so eingerichtet gefunden, dafi die 
groBen auBeren Q von 4> und noch mehr \'on tV abgchalten 
werden: die Nervenendschirme. die hloJ3 indirekte Verbindung 
\'on '" mit der AuBcnwe1t. Gibt es eigne Erschcinung, die sich zur 
Deckung bringen laBt mit dem Versagen dieser Einrichtungen? 
leb glaubc, es ist dec Scbmerz. (Entwurf einer Psych%gle GW 
1895, Nachtragsband: 399r ' , 
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The ancient, empiricist, ethical imperative of escaping pain and seeking pleasure is 
transformed into a thermodynamic fable of the transcendental end of the avoidance of 
unpleasure, of self-destruction. 
In Freud's eatly "empiricist" scheme, the flight from pain implies a 
transfonnation, definable in purely quantitative terms, of the inner dynamic conditions 
of the system: 
Die Sdunerzanlasse sind einerseits quantitative Steigerung; jede 
sensible Erregung neigt zum Sebmerz mit Zunahme des Reizcs, 
selbst der hOcbsten Sinnesorgane. Dies ist ohne weiteres als 
Versagen zu vt"lStehen. Andererseits gtbt es Sebmerz bei geringcn 
AuBenquantititen, . und dieser ist daM regelmlBig an 
. KontinuiWstremwng gebunden, d.h. iu6ere Q die auf die Enden 
der cf> Neurone direkt wirkt, nieht dureh die Nervenendapparate 
ergibt Scbmerz. Der Schmerz ist hiedurch eharakterisiert als 
hereinbrechen iibelgro6er Q nach cI> und 1J1, d. h. soleher Q, die 
von noch hOherer Ordnung sind als die 1J1 Reize. (Entwurf einer 
PsycJwlogle, GW, 1895, Nachtragsband: 400re 
Even this -Jherely quantitative~ approach to pain implies a dense representational, 
psychical activity. Pain and motor discharge inform the psychical, imaginary body, the 
psychical representation of the ~terial nature of the flesh. The suffering body is a 
pure sequence of transient intensities; it is, nevertheless, a "neutral", meaningless 
body. It even lacks a specific topography: "every sensory excitoIion, even of the highest 
sense orgaris, tends towards pain with an increase of the stimulus" Uede sensible 
E"egung neigt zum Schmerz mit Zunahme des Reizes, selbst der h6chsten 
Sinnesorgane. ] 
"We have found Ibat the nervous .ystem is contrived in such a way'that the major extcmal Qa arc kept off from ct> 
and $ti1l11lOtO from t: [by] the ncrvo-cnding 1CfemI, [and by) the merely indirect coMection between t and the 
external world. II there a pbenomeDOn which can be brought to coincide with the failure of these contrivances? 
Such, 1 tbiak, ia pain. (SE, 1895~ I: 307) 
'""Thc~g causes ofpain are,on the one band, increase of quantity: every sensory excitation, eve:" ~fthe 
bigbest serJIC orpns, tmds towa.nb pain with an incrcue of the stimulus. This is to be understood unhesitatingly 
as a iailum [of the Contrivance]. On the other hand, there is pain where the external quantity iI small, and in such 
casea thiI is rcguJarly 1inbd with a breach in continuity: that ii, an external Q which acts directly on the ends of 
the ~ neuronea and not through the nervo-eoding apparatuses produces pain. Pain is thUi - characterized. as ~ 
imJption of eXCC8Sively large Qa into ~ aDd t: that is, of Qs which are of a still higher order than the ~ stunuli. 
(SE, 189S, I: 307) 
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Freud had once acknowledged the absolute, compelling power of the unpleasure 
experience. In 1923, in the exposure of his second theory of the psychical apparatus, 
Freud remarked that, unlike the sensation of pleasure, unpleasure exerted an 
unescapable compelling force which constrains the whole system to discharge. 
Die Empfindungen mit Lustcharakter haben nichts Drangendes an 
sich, dagegen im hOchsten Grad die Unlustempfmdungen. Diese 
dtiingen aufVeranderung, auf Abfuhr, und danun deuten wir die 
Unlust auf eigne Erhohung, die Lust auf eigne Erniedrigung der 
Energiebesetzung. (Das Ich und das Es, SA, 1923,111: 291f 
The experience of pain constitutes a violent, intense yet primary, compelling force, a 
brutal subduing of the precarious, incipient patterns of perception, memory and action; 
it becomes the unutterable, secret memory of the primal deleterious moment that 
unleashes the construction of the experience of satisfaction, of memory itself. 
2. The mythical origins of pain: the hostile [feindlicheJ object 
The subject's experience of limits, which ought to lead to the settling of an ethical 
threshold, is founded upon the force of absence. Freud thus conceives the mounting 
tension aroused by the delay of the satisfaction, by the disappearance of the sole object 
likely to suppress the early suffering, as source both of the moral content of dialogue, 
and of the comprehension [Verstllndigung] of the other. Both morality and 
comprehension have a common origin, Freud suggests, in the subject's primal suffering 
aroused by the other's absence and the related experience of helplessness, which leave 
a silent trace; it is an experience achieved beyond the" margins of language. The 
unutterable experience of absence, the non-signified experience of unpleasure and the 
failure of motor response to exorcise pain, appear nevertheless as memories in the core 
of comprehension and of mutual concern; they give rise to, as well, a primal insight 
into the intimate strangeness of the self, and can be conceived as the origin of the self's 
non-depictable limits, of the strangeness of the self s most intimate yet illusory identity: 
that which attaches the subject to a singular, ineffaceable trace of a dissipated, harmful 
The sensations of a pleasurable nature have not anything inherently impelling about them, whereas unpleasurable 
ones have it in the highest degree. The later impel toward~ change, towards discharge, and that is why we interpret 
unpleasure as implying the heightening and pleasure the lowering of energic cathexis. (FP, 11: 360) 
object. 
Wird cia Brinnenmgsbild des Objcktcs (fetndltcMn) irgendwie 
neu besett.t, z. B. durch neue W[ ahmebmung], so !tellt sa cin 
~wstJnI ber, welda' nirht SdJmeu ist, abel' doch Abnlicbkeit mit 
ibm hat. Er cntbalt UnJust und die AbfubmcigUn& die clem 
ScbmcrzerIebnis cntspricht Da UnJust Niveausteigaung 
b.~ fragt cs sich mdi der HerIrunft dicscr QY)I. 1m 
eageatlichcn ScbmcrzerIebnis war cs die hcreinbrccbendc iuBcre 
Q, weIdJe das • NivCIU steigate. In clessen Rcproduktioo - clem 
A1fekt ist IU' die Q hinzugdcommcn, die Erinncnmg besett.t, und 
~ ist ~ar, ~ di~, von dec Natur einer jeden Wahmebmung, 
mcht Clgne aIIgcmcme QY)' Stcigaung zur Folgc habcn kann. 
(Enlwurfetner Psych%gle, OW, 1895, Nachtragsband: 413f 
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The central eni&matic role of the hostile, malignant object is a central one in the 
subject's constitution. It would take Freud almost 30 years, up to the publication of 
Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, to consistently develop his early insight into the primal 
experience that fuses absence and pain, and to acknowledge the relevance of this early 
insight. JO It was only with the decisive vision of the sensation of danger as a resonance 
of the primal experience of the experienced absence that the temporal complexity of the 
primal experience of pain was fully acknowledged: 
die Situation der Unbefriedigung, in der ReizgrOBen eigne 
unlustvolle H~hc erreicben, obnc Bewiltigung durch psychische 
V crwendung unci Abfuhr zu fmdcn, muS fUr den Slogling die 
Analogie mit dcm Geburtserlebnis, die Wicderhohmg der 
Gefabrsituation sein (Hemmung, Symptomund Angst, SA, 1926, 
VI: 278f-
The outburst of fear, the sensation of danger, is envisioned as a reversed manifestation 
of an absent, yet impending appearance of the hostile agent. 
Freud's late but obstinate assertion about the primacy of fear as an experience 
rooted in an early painful memory, seems to confirm an ancient insight, put forward 
"{the mnemic iImge of the (boItiJe) object is freably cathected in some way -for instance, by a fresh perception-
a atate ariaea which is not pain but which nevertheless has a resemblance to it. It includes unpleasure and the 
inclination to diacba.r&c whicb COrrespondl to the experience of pain. Since unpleuure lignifies a rile in level, it 
must be ukcd where this QrI' comes from. In the actual experience of pain it W&I the irrupting external Q, that 
raised the tlevd. In the rqJrOduction ofthc expeticnce -in the affect- the only additional Q is that which cathects 
the memory, and it it clear that this is in the nature of any other perception and cannot have as a result a general 
railing of QrI'. (SE, I: 319-320) 
""'The aituation of non-atilfaction in which the amounts of stimulation rise to an unplcuurable "height without its 
being poui)lc fOr them to be masten:d psydUcaDy or discl;\arged must for the infant be analogous to the experience 
ofbein, born, must be a repetition of the situation of danger. (FP, 10: 294) 
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by Kant as a formal thesis on the unprecedented, primal role of pain in the shaping of 
the subject. He asserted the temporal and logical precedence of pain, in the orbit of 
experience: "pain must precede any delight. Pain is always first." [mufl vor jedem 
Vergnagen der Schmerz vorhergehen. Der Schmerz ist immer das erste]31 
Pain appears as the "archeological foundation" of the sensation of danger and 
its psychical response, anxiety, which also involves the tension inherent in desire: the 
cathexis [Besetzung] of the memory traces of the absence of the desired primordial 
object. In his reflexion on the nature of anxiety and its sources, Freud recalls, almost 
without exception, his fixed images of pain. Anxiety is only an aftermath of the 
restoration of old affective states which reside as sediments [Niedersch/age] of actions 
and perceptions, on the bottom of the life of the soul [See/en/eben]. Freud's only work 
dealing explicitly with the nature of pain -Hemmung, Symptom und Angst-, despite 
its manifest failure, sheds a late yet suggestive retrospective light upon his early 
conviction regarding the singular suffering of hysterics: hysteric reminiscences not only 
enliven painful memories; they restore the primal, silent fear without language, the 
omen of a shattered object, the shadow of which pervaded the space and time of the 
subject; hysterics suffer the violence exerted on them by the present assumption of a 
future dominated by the sovereign, mute absence of the primal object. Thus, only in 
the last phase of Freud's theoretiCal work, with the drastic redefinition of the notion 
of anxiety, the bold, enigmatic profile of memory will emerge: primordial and 
unspeakable memory of pain. This conception of anxiety will evince Freud's sudden 
contempt for the scope of his own economic explanation. 
Aus dem Gesagten leitet sieh die neue Frage ab, wie es 
okonomiseh moglieh ist, daB ein bloBer Abziehungs- und 
Abfuhrvorgang wie heim Riiekzug der vorbewuBten Iehbesetzung 
Unlust oder Angst erzeugen konne, die naeh unseren 
Voraussetzungen nur Folge gesteigerter Besetzung sein kann. Ich 
antworte, diese Verursaehung solI' nieht okonomisch erklart 
werden, die Angst wird bei der Verdrangung Dieht neu erzeugt, 
sondem als Affektzustand naeh einem vorhandenen 
Erinnerungsbild reproduziert. Mit der weitcren Frage nach d~r 
Hcrkunft dieser Angst - wie der Affek1e iiberhaupt - \'erlassen Wir 
abcr den unbcstritten psychologischen Boden und betreten das 
Grenzgebiet der Physiologie. Die Af!ektzusttinde sind dem 
Seelenleben als Niederschltige uralter traumatischer Erlebnisse 
einverleibt lind werden in ahnlichen Situationen wie 
Erinnerungssymbole wachgeru[en. (Hemmung, Symptom und 
Angst, SA, 1926, VI: 239).-
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Anxiety is thus envisaged as engendered in the margins of physiological processes and 
bound up with the memory of the primal absence of the object. However, the affection 
which unleashes the images of the primordial non-existence of the object even eludes 
in itself metaphorical expression; it rejects any symbolic reference. 32 There is no 
symbolic expression of anxiety; it is a pure tension brought about by the loss of the 
loved object; yet, anxiety itself arouses the unconscious images of absence as 
allegorical means of governing the specific action of the subject. It is this essential 
allegory of absence that, in tum, informs paradoxically the conscious images of danger; 
anxiety emerges thus in consciousness as the final allegory of primal absence, as its 
unfolding into visions and images of fear and danger: 
Das Erinnerungsbild der ersehnten Person wird gewill intensiv, 
wahrscheinlich zunachst halluzinatorisch besetzt. Aber das hat 
keinen Erfolg, und nun hat es den Anschein, als ob diese 
Sehnsucht in Angst umschluge. Es macht geradezu den Eindruck, 
als ware diese Angst ein Ausdruck der Ratlosigkeit, als wUBte das 
noch sehr unentwickelte Wesen mit dieser sehnsuchtigen 
Besetzung nichts Besseres anzufangen. Die Angst erscheint so als 
Reaktion auf das Vermissen des Objekts, und es drangen sich uns 
die Analogien auf, daB auch die Kastrationsangst die Trennung 
von einem hochgeschatzten Objekt zum Inhalt hat und daB die 
urspIiinglichste' Angst (die "Urangst" der Geburt) bei der 
Trennung von der Mutter entstand. (Hemmung, Symptom und 
Angst, SA, 1926, VI: 277-278. Emphasis addedr-
-how is it possible, from the economic point of view, for a mere process of withdrawal and discharge, like the 
withdrawing of a preconscious ego-cathexis, to produce unpleasure and anxiety, seeing that, according to our 
assumptions, unpleasure and anxiety can only arise as a result of an increase in cathexis? The reply is that this 
causal sequence should not be explained from an economic point of view. Anxiety is not newly created in 
repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance ~th an already existing mnemic image. If we go 
further and enquire into the origin of that anxiety -and of affects in general- we shall be leaving the realm of pure 
psychology and entering the borderland of physiology. Affective states hove become incorporaled in the mind as 
precipitoUs of primae val traumatic experiences, and when a similar sitlUllion occurs they are revived like mnemic 
symbols. (FP, 10: 244) 
""'The child's mnemic image of the person longed for is no doubt intensely cathected, probably in a hallucinatory 
way at first. But this has no effect; and now it seems as though the longing turns into anxiety. This anxiety has all 
the appearance of being an expression of the child's feeling at its wits end, as though in its still very undeveloped 
state it did not know how better to cope with its cathexis of longing. Here anxiety appears as a reaction to the felt 
loss of the object; and we are at once reminded of the fact that castration anxiety, too, is a fear of being separated 
from a highly valued object, and that the earliest anxiety of all -the 'primal anxiety' of birth- is brought about on 
the occasion 0 f a separation from the mother. (FP, 1 <1; 293) 
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a. The cleavage between unpleasure and pain 
Despite his uncertain approach to pain, Freud exhibited only slight reticence when 
facing the nature and relevance of unpleasure. It would seem that unpleasure set the 
psychoanalytic boundaries of comprehension beyond which pain loomed as a 
speculative, obscure threat. Unpleasure seemed to be fully illuminated by the negative 
glare of pleasure. Thus, pleasure appeared early in Freud's theory as the uncertain yet 
irrenOllllCeable ground upon which his meta psychological enterprise ought to be built. 
Mais dans Ie Pl'Ojet, Freud oppose bien -et elest Ie point qui 
nous interesse- experience de douleur et experience de 
satisfadion. Le couple dlopposes ainsi mis en place nlest done 
pas, comme on poumit s'y attendre, plaisir-dCplaisir [Lust. 
Unlusl], mais, d'une part, plaisir-deplaisir (ou mieux, dCplaisir-
plaisir, processus· qui regie Ie cours de l'experience de 
satisfaction), et douleur, d'autre part. 33 
The destiny of the notion of pleasure is definitively linked to the dim presence of the 
conjectures on pain. Pain may resemble, at first sight, only an exorbitant unpleasure. 
Yet, pain and pleasure remain irreducible notions, which refer to two unique, 
unrelated ~; it is this unfathomable tension between pain and pleasure which 
lies in the bottom of the psychoanalytical enterprise. However, their opposition seems 
to derive more from a phenomenological than from a meta psychological approach. The 
complex coexistence and convergence of these founding experiences seem to define the 
scope of psychoanalytic theoretical noti~ns. 
Despite the disappearance of the notion of experience of pain, from Freud I s 
conceptual uruverse, after the first, failed attempt to give c1. complete account of their 
relation in the EntwU1f, an implicit fundamental, almost secret relation, an obscure link 
between the experience of satisfaction and the experience of pain, persisted throughout 
Freud's work. Indeed, Freud posits the existence of a tension, of a conflictive 
parallelism, as well as of an insurmountable difference between pain and unpleasure: 
Ocr Scluncrz eneugt in 1Ir: 1. gro6e Niveausteigenmg, die von <a> 
a1s UnJust empfunden wild, 2. eigne Abfuhmeigung, die nach 
gewissen Richtungen modifiziert sein kann, 3. eigne Bahnung 
zwischen dieser und emem Erinnerungsbild des 
schmcnenegenden Objektes. Es ist iibeniies keine Frage, daB der 
Schmerz eigne besondere Qualittil hat, die sich neben tier 
Unlust geltend macht. (Entwurfeiner Psychologie, GW, 1895, 
Nachtragsband: 413-14)-
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As an inner, silent, paradoxical tension inherent in the experience of satisfaction, the 
experience of pain preserves its coercive power; however, Freud's reflection, uncovers 
the compelling, repetitive impulse of pain, its aim towards the extinction of sensations: 
the shattering of the subject's identity brought about by pain serves the longing for an 
absolute dissipation of energy, for the achievement of an irreversible extinction of the 
inner intensity, for the radical exhaustion of excitement, for absolute death. Repetition 
and evocation both seem to be driven by the obscure core of the experience of 
satisfaction. Both have a contrasting fate regarding pain. Repetition seeks to restore 
immutably the original experience charging it with identical intensity, while evocation 
is the tireleSs metamorphosis of the deluding image of the painful episode which rather 
involves an attenuated shade of a surrogate of the original emotion. The fading figures 
of evocation thus elude repetition; they evince the dominating principle of similarity 
[ ... i"hnlichkeit] -not of identity-; they do not restore the primal, silenced core of 
representation, but only a transmuted, weakened cathexis of the mnemic image of the 
object: "a state arises which is not pain but which nevertheless has a resemblance to it" 
[so stellt sich ein Zustand her, welcher nicht Schmerz ist, aber doch A·hnlichkeit mit ihm 
hat].34 However, the notion of experience implicit in Freud's conception of pain, 
reveals the creative tension, the engendering force of the difference between the 
weakening energy of the fading images of memory, and the compelling, strengthening 
force of pain in psychical life. The tension between the repetition and analogy 
(evocation) also reveals the precarious dynamics of the subjective agencies which 
govern both. 
The sensation of unpleasure and the experience of pain are incomparable. Each 
pertains to a different order of the psychical and physical processes. However, 
unpleasure appears as a momentary, transient stage of the emergence of pain. Pain 
appears as an unfolding of unpleasure, which has become, paradoxically, an isolated, 
"pain gives rise in '" (l) to a large rise in level, which is felt as unpleasurc by w, (2) to an incl~nat~on to d~scharge, 
which can be modified in certain directions, and (3) to a facilitation between the latter (the inclination to dIscharge] 
and a mnemic image of the object which excites the pain. ~on.'Over, there is no question but that pain has a peculiar 
quality, which makes itself fclt along with the unpleasurc. (SE. 1895, I: nO). 
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autonomous process, foreign to the experiences which preceded it. 
The limitations of the economic model of psychical processes evinced by the 
elusiveness of the experience of pain, as well as its poignant presence in the psychical 
life and the vicissitudes of repetitioo, are clearly revealed in Freud's curious, biological 
fable of the wkey neuron w. He seeks to expound by the means of a fictional anatomy, 
an allegorical description of the physiological process, dimensions of sexual behaviour 
which mirror the development of painful experiences. 
Es bl~bt also nu.. Gbrig anzunebmen, daB durch die Besctnmg 
V~ Erinnerungm UnJust aus clem Korperirmeren entbundeu, neg 
hinaufbcftirdert wird. Den Mer.hanismus dicser Entbindung kaiiD 
man sich nur in folgeode:r Weise vorstellen: Wie es motorischc 
Neurone gibt, die bci einer gewissen Erfiillung QT]' in die 
Muskeln leiten und somit abfiihr~ moB es "sekrctoriscbc" 
N~ gcbcu, die; wenn sie crregt sind, im KOrpcriJmcm 
cntstchcn I~ was auf die cndogcnen Lcitungen nach • aIs 
Rciz wirkt, die also die Produktion cndogcner QT]' becintlussen, 
somit nidJt Qr)' abfiihrm, sondern aufUmwcgen zufiihren. Dicsc 
sekrctorischcn Neurone wollen wir "Schlusselncuronc"s heiBen. 
Sic wadm ofTenbar erst bei gcwisscm Nivcau in • crregt. DurdI 
das Schmenealebnls hat das Er[inncrungsbild] des feindlichen 
Objcktcs cipe vortreftlicbe Bahnung zu dicsco 
ScbIosscIncurme ahaItm, kraft deren sicb nun im Affekt UnJust 
eutbindet. 
Anlehnung ftlr diese befremdende, aber unentbehr/iche 
Annohme glbt dos Yerhalten der Serualentbtndung. Gleicbzcitig 
drlDgt sa die Vcnnutung auf, die endogenen Reizc bcstiinden 
bier wie dart in chemischen Produkten, deren AnzahI eigne 
crhebliche scm mag. Da die Unlustentbindung bei ganz 
geringfilgiger Bcsetzung des feindlicbcn Er[innenmgsbildcs] 
eigne auBerordcotlichc sein ~ man schlie6cn, daB der 
Schmerz ganz besondcrs ausgiebige Bahnungen hinterllBt 
(Entwurfetner Psych%gie, GW, 189S, Nacbtragsband: 414f 
'"It only nDIinI to UIUIIlC, therefo~, that.~ to the cathexis of mcmorica unplcuure ia relealCCl from the 
in1Icrior oldie body and ftahly oonvcyod up. The meManiam of thia rdcuc can only be pictured u fol1owl. JUIl 
.. there ate IIiotor DCUJ'08Ci which, whee they are fiDcd to a c::crtajn arnold, conduct QfI' into the musca and 
~ diIcIIarJe k, 10 1hIn IIlUIt be 'ICICretory' ncuronea which, wbal they arc excited, C&UIC the generation 
in the inIaior of the body of IOmedaine wbicb operata u a ltimulus upon the endogenous .,.thJ of conduction to 
.-neul"ODCll which thus infIuencc the production of endogenous QTI', and accordingly do not diJcbarge QfI' but 
lupply it in roundabout waY'. We wiD caD thac (ICICrdory) ncurones 'key ncurones'. Bvidently they arc only 
exciIed wbca a oa1aio IIMII ill • lib been teachcd. ,.. a relult of the experience of pain the mnemic image of the 
hoIIilc objeet ... acquhed .. exodbf _1jwjon to thcIc key ncuroDCI, in virtue of which (faciIDtion) unplcuurc 
it DOW relealled in the atIbct. . 
Support_ kd to thiI puzzling .. indiIpa_blc bypodail by what happena in ~ ~ of ~ual ~ 
At the ....., time alUlpicioo forc:a itlclf on us that in both instanCCl the endogenous Ibmuli COOliit of chemical 
producD, ofwhicb there may be a considerable number. Since the relcue ofunplcuurc can be an extremely big 
one when there is qu* a trivial calbcxia of the boatile memory, we may conclude that pain leaves behind IpcciaIly 
abundant facilitatioDl. (SB, 1895, I: 320) 
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Evocation does not extinguish the intensity of the original painful experience; rather 
it fashions an allegorical image which vaguely resembles the painful object, conferring 
on it the attributes composed by desire; a subtle attenuation of the original violence of 
pain blends in evocation with the slight excitation of desire. Thus, the evocated 
emotion can be seen as an uncertain, intermediate object which has acquired the 
qualities of the fictional subject's ideal, of his own moral identity; it exhibit a deceitful 
coherence which the original expresion of pain lacks; the primordial loss acquires an 
ephemeral name and a captivating figure, the pain dissipates in the form of words or 
in the lure of images. But the memory of pain does not enlivens the primal painful 
experience. Evocation does not extinguishes pain, yet it dispels its distressing force; 
it creates a net of traces of words and images which veils the original memory and 
. 
dissipates the original violence. Indeed, evocation creates a derived sense, a 
transposition of meanings; it rarefies the original experience; it recreates atmospheres 
and emotions, brightens or obscures events and actions and charges them with the 
energy aroused by the ideal. However, traces of primal pain linger in memory , 
indifferent to the figurative sproUlS of its own universe of associated, symbolical 
images. Yet, both evocation and repetition of the painful experience, expose different 
and essential facets of the enigma of the psychical invention of the self. The 
"spontaneous" extinction of the emotions provoked by evocation leaves in its place an 
empty and uninterpretable mask of chimerical expressions in which the delusions of 
ideal and desire mix with the force of the abiding pain to mould the images of identity. 
Unlike evocation, repetition enacts the exacting restoration of pain; it rejects the 
mask of the reconciled identity, of the stillness of the deciphered sense; it emerges as 
an obscure, allegorical matter the appearance of which unveils a shadow line that marks 
the obscure territory of the self where death is indistinguishable from the shattering, 
intense impulse of lost love. Allegory is never sO clear and violent as in compUlsive 
repetition, in the fixed incarnation of the anxiety of absence in theatrical images of the 
past, in meaningless or wasteful imagery which both veils and exposes the silent 
expression of primal pain. Repetition resists the impoverishment brought about by 
interpretation and disguise. The irruption upon perception of the painful experience 
restores the exact episode of the crumbling of identity which renders the familiar 
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senses, the habits and the apparent obstinacy of the subject's identity meaningless. 
Repetition brings to light a timeless, opaque sign of the destruction of the subject's 
experience, which both foretells the subject's fate and signifies the absence which 
informs the physiognomy of the subject's psychical identity. 
3. Rhythm and the pleasure principle 
Freud built upon Fechner's discoveries a substantialist, non-relational conception of 
pleasure. In the opening pages of Jenseits des Lusrprinzips (1920), Freud quotes a key 
passage b£ a "small work" [kleinen Schrift] from Fechner which preceded by forty 
seven years the appearance of JenseUs. Unpleasure, Freud will sustain -in accordance 
with Fechner's view, albeit not without reluctance-, that unpleasure arises from an 
increasing amount of energy within the system; pleasure, on the contrary, appears 
whenever a decrease of such energy is experienced. However, he faces an essential 
weakness of his explanation: the undeniable evidence of non-unpleasurable excitation 
and the complementary testimony of the unpleasurable discharge of excessive energy. 
At crucial moments, Freud's reflection focused on the odd nature of pleasure, 
remarking upon the paradoxes of the subject's perception of it: pleasure and unpleasure 
seemed to be simultaneously a perception and an non-perceivable energy state of the 
psychical apparatus, a driving tension which could manifest itself unnoticed as a 
stirring of the soul well beyond the reach of reflexive consciousness. Yet, the twofaced 
nature of pleasure and unpleasure -both perceivable and unperceivable-, the 
paradoxical conception -in terms. of Freud's own theory- of a specific state of the 
system of energy response -which corresponded to pleasure, unpleasure, pain- that 
could be momentarily isolated from perception, the thesis of capriciously unperceived, 
autonomous paths of physical energy within the body, remained an disturbing, 
unaccountable theoretical issue in Freud's enterprise. Freud needed the idea of 
unconscious pain and pleasure, which might account for his intuitions regarding the 
nature of inherent biological pain (erotogenic masochism), the exigencies of the thesis 
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of the death instinct and the theoretical consistency of a will to "secret" punishment 
derived from the dynamic tension between the agencies of sUbjectivity. 
Freud preserved unchanged his original, substantialist conception of pain, 
despite his acknowledgment of its obscure and unfathomable nature and the 
introduction of a speculative assumption regarding the dependence of perception upon 
the rhythm and sequence of energy transformations. Yet, almost 30 years after his first 
and definitive conception of pain and pleasure of 1895, at the very beginning of his 
suggestive, yet unsettling and perplexing essay on masochism, Die iJkonomische 
Problem des Masochismus (1924), Freud states a crucial objection to his own former 
theory of masochismus; the relevance of this objection to his comprehension of 
perversion and pain is that it weakens one of the cardinal elements of psychoanalytic 
theory:· the: "principle of constancy" , and its leads to a thorough revision of the sense 
of the exacerbated allegorical image of death instinct, the Nirvana principle: 
Abcr wir babel' das Lust-Uolustprinzip unbedenklich mit diesem 
Nirwanaprinzip identifiziert. Jede Uolust mUBte also mit einer 
Erh6hun& jede Lust mit einer Erniedrigung der im Scelischcz 
vorbandenen Reizspannung zusammenfallen, das Nirwana-(und 
das mit ibm angeblich identische Lust-)prinzip wOrde ganz im 
Dienst der Todestriebe stehen, deren Ziel die Obcrruhnmg des 
unstetrn Leben in die StabilitAt des anorganischen Zustandes ist, 
und wiirde die Funktion haben, vor den Anspriichen der 
Lcbenstrlebc, der Libido, zu warnen, welche den angestrebten 
Ablauf des Lebens zu stOren versuchen. Alletn dtese Aujfassung 
kann ntcht rlchtig sein. Es scheint, daB wir Zunahme und 
Abnahme der Reizgro8en direkt in der Reihe der 
Spanmmpgefiihle cmpfinden, und es ist nieht zu bezweifeln, daB 
es lustvolle Spannungen und unlustige Entspannungen einer 
solcher lustvollen Reizvergro8erung, aber gewiB nicht das 
einzige.Lust und Unlust kiJnnen also ntch(au/Zunahme oder 
Abnahme einer Quantttllt, die wir Reizspannung heifJen, 
bezogen werden, wenngleich sie ojfonbar mit diesem Moment 
viel zu tun h.aben. (Dos iJkonomische Problem des 
Masochtsmus, SA, 1924, ill: 344f 
-But we have unbcaitantingly identified the plcasurc-unpleuure principle with this Nirvana principle. Every 
unpIeuure ~ thus to coincide with the bcigbtening, and every pleasure with a lowering. of mental tension due 
to lllimulul· the Nirvana principle (and the pleasure principle which is supposedly identical with it) would be entirely 
in the ~ of the dcaIh inatilm whole aim is to conduct the restlessncss of life into the stability of the inorganic 
state and ~ would have the ~ of giving waminga against the demands of the life instincts -the libido- which 
try ~ disturb the intended counc of life. But such a view cannot be correct. It seems tha! in the series of feelings 
or fallion we have a dim::t ImIC ofthc incn:uc and decrease of amounts of stimulus, and It cannot be doubted that 
there arc plcuunble tensions and unplcasurable relaxations of tension. The state of sexual excitation is the molt 
striking example of pleasurable increase of stimulus of this sort, but it is certainly not the only one. P1eu~re and 
unpIcuurc, therefore, cannot be refmxl to an increase ot decrease of a quantity (which we describe as 'tensIOn due 
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After the radical thesis of Jenseits dI!S Lusrprinzips (1920), the pleasure principle could 
be thought of as a mere extension, as a weakened, pale expression of the implacable 
death instinct. The conception of the death instinct pictures an essential exacerbated 
impulse to discharge the inner psychical and physical energy; it forces the physiological 
process towards a state of absolute death, to its own destruction. It is an hyperbolic 
expression of Freud's former principle of pleasure. However, the pleasure principle 
does not disappears from Freud's universe. Rather, these two principles seem to 
coexist; the death instinct simultaneously encompasses and upholds the efficient action 
of the pleasure principle; and, paradoxically, the death instinct drives to a paroxysmic 
end the pleasure principle. 
In ;psychoanalytic theory, ·the complex entanglement of both principles still 
exhibited the undisputed authority of pure quantitative concepts. Freud recalled, at a 
decisive moment in Jenseits da Lusrprinzips, a notion of pleasure to which he himself 
had alluded as a fleeting image: this conception echoed the early chimerical conceptions 
of the periodicity of the organic processes, put forward earlier by Fliess. Thus, many 
years later, J:4'reud's partial, dubious answer to the insufficiencies of the substantial . 
notion of pleasure, resorted to a relational conception which reproduced Fliess 
fundamental image of fluctuation and rhythm as essential structures of psychical 
processes. Pleasure was envisioned as the effect of the serial a"angement of the 
increase and abatement of energy tensions: 
Wir haben uns entschlossen, Lust und Unlust mit der Quantitit 
der im Seelenleben vorhandenen - und nieht irgendwie 
gebundcnen - Erregung in Beziebung zu bringen, solch~ daB 
Unlust einer Steigenmg, Lust einer Verringeriing dieser Quantitat 
entsprieht. Wir denken dabei nieht an ein einfaches Verhilblis 
zwischen der Stirke der Empfmdungen und den Verinderungen, 
auf die sie bezogen werden~ ~ wenigsten - nach allen 
Erfahnmgen der Psychophysiologie - an direkte Proportionalitit~ 
wahrscheinlieh ist das MajJ der Verringerung oder Vermehrung 
to stimulus'}, although they could obviously have a great deal to do with the factor. (FP, 11: 414) 
in der Zeit das fUr die Empfmdung entscheidende Moment. 
(Jenseitz des Lustprinzips, SA, 1920, m: 220r 
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The sequence of contrasting states would provide, in Freud's view, some clues to the 
understanding of the open incongruity of the Nirvana principle regarding the experience 
of pleasure; while preserving untouched his explanation in terms of energy processes. 
The serial disposition of the intensities, understood as a punctuated, rhythmic chain of 
the I succession of drain and retention of energy, was seen as likely to arouse the 
sensation of pleasure and unpleasure which governs the aims and the impulse of all 
action. The broad scope of his drastic reformulation of the former views on pleasure, 
and the unpredictable range of its consequences might not have escaped Freud. 
Ab~doning the notions of pl~ure and unpleasure as pure concrete, substantial 
sensations; and replacing them by a "syntactic", purely relational approach, conceiving 
them as effects of alternation and rhythm of the intensities of energy in a time series 
of stagnation and discharge, Freud submitted the significance of the pleasure principle 
to an unexpected, violent strain. 
With this emphasis on rhythmical patterns, Freud' s theoretical imagination 
exemplifies a Baroque metamorphosis: rhythm substitutes the mere increase in quantity; 
movement replaces the image of pure sensation. This shift in the theoretical axis 
offered a suggestive, albeit precarious and transient answer to the issue of the double 
paradox of pleasure: the pleasure aroused by mounting energy and the unpleasure 
provoked by discharge, but also to the paradox of its conscious and unconscious 
nature. However, rhythm in itself remained unexplained. It intruded in Freud's text in 
fundamental yet ephemeral passages regarding the limitations of the substantialist 
. 'explanation of pleasure. Two definitive, speculative as well as obscure Freudian texts, 
Jenseils des Lustprinzjps (1920) and Dos iJkonomische Problem of Mosochismus (1924), 
briefly and vaguely expounded this rhythmical conception of pleasure, which became 
-We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is praent in the mind but is 
not in any way 'bound'; and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an incrtas. in the 
quanIly of eJtcitation and pleuure to a diminlllio", What we are implying by this is ~t a .~p~ relation ~ 
the strenJlh of the feelings of pleasure and unp1easure and the corresponding modificaboDl In, the quan~ of 
cxciIaIiona; Ic:ut of aD - in view of all we have been taught by psycho-physiology - are we .u~~ an~ d~y 
proportional ratio: the factor that determinea the feelin, is probably the amount of increase or diminution In the 
quantity of excitation ill Q giv." p.riod of rim~, (FP, 11: 276, Emphasis added) 
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an isolated insight without further conspicuous, theoretical resonances. This reluctance 
to explore the inherent significance of the notion of rhythm regarding pleasure and 
unpleasure would bear heavily on the future of the psychoanalytic theory. 35 
Despite this episodic late, and seemingly contingent appearance of the ideas of 
periodicity with reference to the paradoxes of pleasure, indeed, the notions of 
discontinuity and rhythm had appeared very early in Freud's theoretical horizon. As 
we have already mentioned, since his friendship with F1iess -whose delusive medicaI 
expJanations were supported by a extravagant theory of periodicity- and perhaps as an 
implicit tribute to it, Freud adopted not without ambivalence his friend's more lasting 
"contribution" to science. But Freud's work upon the concept itself required a 
strenuous effort, which gave to the notion of periodicity a latent, unforeseeable content. 
. . 
Rhythm, Conceived as a psychical force is not reducible to simple series of ups and 
downs of the energy level. Rather, rhythm, as an informing force of subjective 
processes, seems to arise from the subject's acknowledgement of his own limits and its 
confrontation with the reflexive perception of fluctuating inner intensities. 
Freud goes one step further. He makes of this intimate, unacknowledged 
experience of the rhythmic discontinuity of inner intensities the foundation of the 
subject's experience of time. In the light of the notion of rhythm, the experience of 
pleasure as a sensation which springs from the succession of tension and discharges 
becomes likely to engender, in tum, a singular subjective experience of succession, 
made up of series of presences and absences, of actions and regulat~ symbolic ends 
and of the duration of inner states. This capacity of rhythm is alluded to by images of 
expanding and encompassing membranes, of thriving· outgrowths of elementary 
organisms, and by the biological allegory of pulsating extending and contracting 
tentacles -which in Freud's fiction stood alternatively for consciousness and 
unconsciousness, indeed, as a composed reSponse of the conscious and the 
unconscious. Freud's obscure unraveling of his own allegory brought to light the 
encroachment of the unconscious upon the response of consciousness to the outer 
world: "It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of 
the system Perception-Consciousness towards the external world and hastily withdraws 
them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it" [Es ware so, als ob 
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das UnbewujJte mittels des Systems W-Bw der AujJenwelt FiJhler entgegenstrecan 
warde, die rasch zurackgezogen werden, nachdem sie deren Erregungen verkostet 
haben]. Freud finds this allegory illuminating: time can be neither a pure effect of 
perception, a purely conscious representation, nor an unconscious one; it cannot have 
the form of an intuition, a fonnal condition of the aesthetic relation between the subject 
and its object -as Kant had posited-,36 but is the effect of a reflexive, discontinuous 
movement of consciousness turned back towards the inner, pulsating dynamic process 
aroused by perception. It is the folding back, the reflexiveness of perception, the self-
perception [einer Selbstwahrnehmung tierselben] of the rhythmical forms of the 
performance [ArlJeitJweise] of the PsYchical apparatus that may account for the origins 
of subjective experience of time. As we have already remarked, Freud found this . 
insight so :illuminating that he envisaged it as the psychoanalytic alternative to Kant's 
notion of time.37 At this point psychoanalytic reflection encounters an absolute limit. 
As with similar explanations, Freud abruptly abandons the discussion: "I know that 
these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints. (FP, 11: 
3(0)" [lch weijJ, dajJ diese Behauptungen sehr dunkel klingen, m'4fJ mich aber aI4f 
solche Andeutung beschrlJnken.] (Jenseits des Lusprinzips, SA, 1920, m: 238) . 
However, five years later, the same biological allegory was to appear again in a similar 
context, with the same anti-Karitian argument about the origins of time: 
Ich habe angenommen, daB Besetzungsinnervationen in raschen 
periodischen Su>Ben aus dem Inneren in das vOllig durchlassige 
System W -Bw geschickt und wieder zurUckgezogen werden. 
Solange dis System in solcher Weise besetzt is~ empfangt es die 
von Bewu6tsein begleiteten Wahmebmungen und leitet die 
Erregung weiter in die unbewuBten Erinnerimgssysteme; sobald 
die Besetzung zuriickgezogen wird, erlischt das BewuBtsein, und 
die Leistung des Systems ist sistiert. Es wire so, als ob das 
UnbewuBte mittcIs des Systems W-Bw der AuBenwelt FUhler 
entgegenstreclcen wUrde, die rasch zuriickgezog~ ~ 
nachdem sie deren Erregungen veiicostet haben. Ich be6 also die 
Unterbrechungen, die beim Wunderblock von auBen her 
geschehen, durch die Diskontinuitat der InnervationsstrOmung 
zustande kornmen, und an Stelle einer wirklichen 
Kontaktaufhebung stand in meiner Annahme die periodisch 
eintretende Unerregbarkeit des Wahmebmungssystems. Jch 
vermutete ferner, dafJ diese diskontinuierliche Arbeitsweise des 
Systems W-Bw der Entstehung der Zeitvorstellung zugrrmde 
liegt. (Nofiz Qber den "Wunderblock", SA, 1925, m: 369f 
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Freud's notion of duration as engenderd by the self-perception of the "forms of 
performance" [Arbeitsweise] of the psychical apparatus, goes well beyond the scope of 
the notion of an immediate perception and of the transcendental conditions of 
experience.
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Freud's archeological metaphor of a psychical apparatus -integrated by 
successive sediments of indelible memory traces- hints at his complex image of 
temporality made up of fused, heterogeneous, rhythmical processes, discernible only 
in the regressive path of free association. Nevertheless, the fusion of temporalities, as 
evinced by regression, dissipates experience and dissolves its singular profiles. Freud's 
~~~ expressions of his concern. about time might be compared with the prevalence 
in his writing of the metaphor of archeological ruins. It is almost impossible for any 
reader of Freud not to be deeply struck by the force of these metaphors and by their 
fertility, their capacity to produce unforeseeable conceptual insights. Both archeological 
fictions and metaphors of time remained not only inspiring models but challenging and 
demanding patterns of thought. Malcolm Bowie writes: 
The psydJoanaIyst's victory in the contest with archeology is thus 
a spectacular one: he not only regularly discovers in his daily 
practice relics that can vie in their completeness and coherence 
with those ofPornpeiL but recognizes these relics as belonging to 
a superior order of durability. Within the all-too-destructible 
hwnan organism, within the endlessly mobile world of desire and 
phantasy that it houses, something permanent is to be found: a 
fixed psychical structure which, in its fixity, explains. 39 
In Das UnbelUlgen des Kuirur, Freud exposed, in a thorough and in a sense dramatic 
fragment of his writing, his astounding, haunting image of Rome: the narration depicts 
the various stages of the archeological excavation, the encounter with the preserved 
"My theory was that cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into 
the completely pervious system Pcpt. -Cs. So long as that system is cathected in this manner, it receives perceptions 
(which are accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitation on to the unconscious mnemic systems; but 
as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system comes to a 
standstill. It is as though the unconscious st:n:tches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pc pt. -Cs. towards 
the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it. Thus 
the interruptions, which in the case of the Mystic Pad have an external origin, were attributed by my h~thesis 
to the discontinuity in the current innervation; and the actual breaking of contact which occurs in the MystIC Pad 
was replaced in my theory by the periodic non-excitability of the perceptual system. 1 further hDd a suspicion thIII 
this discontinuous method o/Juncioning o/the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies aJ the bonom o/the origin o/the conupt 0/ 
time. (FP, 11: 433-434) 
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relics, with this looming past, the exhumation of intact residues of a city, the fictive 
preservation of the complete Roman history in the spectral scenery made out of the 
remnants of architectural structures. However, he could not fail to acknowledge at the 
same time the recognizable irreversible destruction of the archaic buildings, the 
impossible coexistence of the material presence of evidence from incomparable 
chronologies, the discordant testimonies of extinguished universes, the irreparable 
oblivion called to mind by the obliterated fragments of the city. However, Freud 
suddenly recoils at the unacceptable sight of the incongruous memory, and the 
destruction of the remains implied by these allegories of the Eternal: the residues of 
Rome revealed themselves not as emblems, meaningful in themselves, but as 
enigmatic, obscure landscapes forged by a transient, restless gaze. At one moment in 
. ." . 
the text, Freud sought to emphatically deny the evident destruction of a world, which 
seemed to obliquely contradict his ardent rejection of the destruction of memory. 
Memory, like the archeological sites of Rome, appeared unexpectedly to Freud as an 
unbearable, simultaneous display of chronologically entangled traces and embedded, 
yet mutually exclusive relics of scenes; each ruin emerged as an isolated, inaccessible 
deposit of signs, demanding from the observer, to be fully understood, an impossible 
omnipresent gaze. This is a critical moment in Dos Unbehagen der Kultur: here Freud 
confronted one of his cardinal tonvictions -the absolute indelible nature of the 
memory traces- with the spectres of his own allegorical imagination. 
However, Freud condemns to oblivion this abrupt threat to the thesis of the 
absolute conservation of memory. The preservation of "the essential" memories of the 
subject's experience had haunted the psychoanalytical scene from the very beginning 
of the theoretical enterprise and it might be said that Freud never gave it up. From his 
early founding thesis on repression till the final reflections of Konstruktionen in der 
Analyse (1937), Freud obstinately maintained the fragile thesis of the absolute indelible 
nature of the memory traces of experience: 
Man dar{ ja bekanntlich bezweifeln, ob irgendeine psychische 
Bildung wirklich voller ZerstOrung anheimfilll Es ist nur eigne 
Frage der analytiscben Techni~ ob es gelingen winl, das 
Verborgene vollstllndig zum Vorschein zu bringen. 
(Konstruktions in der Analyse, SA, 1937, Erginzungsband: 398. 
Emphasis added.)-
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Freud obstinately avoided any shadow which might have evinced the destruction of 
psychical traces or irreversible dispelling of memory. To him, the presence of past 
images was undeniably ingrained in the present and defined the future, conceived as 
a set of spectral images enlivened by the vicissitudes of the subject's desire. Present 
images embody, even in their final shape [endgQltigen Gestaltung), the significant 
remains of the early stages of the history of the subject's love attachments. Each 
structure, every trait of the subject's identity bears the impregnations of fragmented 
testimonies of its own past. The present is the delusive experience of a sediment of the 
subject's history both projected upon and informing it: 
jederzeit StUcke der friiheren Organisation neben der neueren 
fortbesteh~ und daB selbst bei normaler Entwicklung die 
Umwandlung Die vollstandig geschieht, so daB noch in der 
endgaltigen Gestaltung Reste der /rUheren Libidofixierungen 
erhalten bleiben kOnnen. (Die endliche un die unendliche 
Analyse, SA, 1937, Erganzungsband: 376. Emphasis addedr-
The essential concepts of residue and remnant, present throughout Freud's work, 
acquire, in the light of this late reflection, a meaningful yet ambiguous sense. 
Consequently, the remnant of the fixations of the libido should be understood either as 
a fragment, as debris, as an uncertain trace of the wreck of desire, as a cast aside yet 
preserved, shred of the history of libido, or as the thriving, active, psychical 
manifestation of an encrypted memory. Freud's conception implies not an election of 
one of two senses, but the acceptance of the challenge to expound the conceptual 
tension of these divergent constructions, to build a complex interpretation of the 
significance of the remains preserved from psychical destruction. 
Psychical finiteness and destruction are ollly, in Freud's terms, representable 
through a complex, articulated, accumulative and settled series of analogies, of 
-Indeed it may, u we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can reaUy be the victim of total 
destruction. It depends only upon the analytic technique whether we shaU succeed in bringing what is concealed 
completely to light. (SE, 1937,23: 260) 
-portions of the earlier organizations always persist alongside the more recent one, and ~ven in ~o~l 
development the transfonnation is never complete and ~idues of early libidinal fixations may still be retained 10 
the fmal configurations. (SE, 1937,23: 229) 
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allusions, which emerge in the dense weave of his allegorical writing. After a lifelong 
tireless struggle to prove the impossibility of the unconscious to represent the subject's 
own death -"But the unconscious seems to contain nothing that could give any content 
to our concept of the annihilation of life" [1m UnbewujJten ist aber nichts vorhani;kn, 
was unserem Begriffder Lebensvemichtung Inhalt geben kannJ-, Freud confronts the 
urgent need for a theoretical understanding of the complex anxiety brought about by 
the fear of death, a death of which no human being has any previous experience save 
the incomparable pain of mourning. The comprehension of this fear led to one possible 
explanation: the subject enacts again, in the allegorical picture of his own death, the 
primal loss of the object and the anxiety of castration. 
Die Kastration wird sozusagen vorstellbar durch die t(Jgliche 
Erfahrung der Trtmnung Yom Darminhalt und durch den bei 
der EntwMnung erlebten Verlust der mutterlichen Brust; etwas 
dem T od Ahnliehes ist aber nie erlebt worden oder hat wie die 
Ohnmacht keine nachweisbare Spur hinterlassen. Ieh halte darum 
an der Vermutung fest, daB die T odes angst als Analogon der 
Kastrations angst aufzufassen ist und daB die Situation, auf 
welehe das Ieh reagiert, das Verlassensein vom sehutzenden 
Ober-Ieh - den Sehieksalsmaehten ist, womit die Sieherung 
gegen aile Gefahren ein Ende hat. (Hemmung, Symptom und 
Angst, SA, 1926, III: 271-272)" 
The subject's own death, appears as a fictional construction which condenses the 
spectre of the future; it bears the marks of desire and exhibits the moulding action of 
the representation of loss; death is never envisioned through the veil of a previous 
experience or with the force of evocation. It is even foreign to the entangled structure 
of the temporal processes of consciousness. In Freud's thesis of the subject's incapacity 
to represent its own death, it is possible to perceive the Lockean echoes: it is 
impossible to know anything that has not previously constituted an experience. 
However, the effort to comprehend the sense of fear of death, in terms of a purely 
empiricist approach, leads to a meaningless outcome. Freud's reflections on the fear 
"Castration can be pictured on the basis of the daily experience of the faeces being separated from the bod~ or on 
the basis of losing the mother's breast at weaning. But nothing resembling death can ever have been expe~enced; 
or if it has, as in fainting, it has left no observable traces behind. I am therefore inclined t~ ad~ere to th~ view that 
the fear of death should be regarded as analogous to the fear of castration and that ~e situation t~ which the ego 
is reacting is one of being abandoned by the protecting super-ego -the powers of destmy- so that It has no longer 
any safeguard against all the dangers that surround it. (FP, 10: 285-286) 
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of death took him to a singular hermeneutic enquiry: to search for the truth of the 
indemonstrable fact, the truth of that which rejects truth. The pervading presence of 
death in psychoanalytic reflection was to strike it at its own silent, implicit foundations. 
The complex, uncertain yet definitive oppositions between free and the bound energy, 
between transience and fixation, between the ephemeral and the indelible, or between 
destruction and preservation, are only metaphorical resonances of a primordial Baroque 
conflict between life and death, between origin and end, between the energy response 
and the inert, the moving and the still, between active and passive, between lavishness 
and extinction. 
Experience is intrinsically an expectation: the present tense -Freud has 
suggested- implies the actual, immediate emergence of the fictional truth of the future, . 
and the delusive certainity of past. Experience, as well as desire and pain, reveal an 
irreducible tension between the mere disappearance of the loved object, the 
acknowledgement of its loss, its threatening presence which foreshadows the future 
arousal of an already endured suffering. The perception of the object not only apprises 
the subject of a pure presence, also it enacts its potential, future disappearance; the 
promise of satisfaction is in itself the presage of loss and death.40 
Freud's vision of transience as destiny involved the paradoxical belief in the obstinacy 
of memory and the image of the impulse to death. The Greek allegory of A vaYKq, as 
Freud recreated it, exposed the conceptual scandal of a determining, but timeless fate, 
which amalgamates, in a sudden suspension of oblivion, both anticipated and 
remembered events; also, the mythical fusion of contrasting conceptions -the failure 
. - of desire when it confronts the urgencies of life and the will to its own extinction, as 
well as the preeminence of decay and death which govern the profound impulses of 
psychica1lif&- involved in AvayKfJ resist any empiricist, analytical approach. It calls 
up images of sudden, extraneous, lacerating presences and visions, the subjet's 
surrender to a demand that seems to emerge from the indifference of objects, from a 
bodiless structure made up of incidents, transient presences, ephemeral contacts, 
mechanical, infinite cycles of identical urgencies, which derives its own, singular 
impulse from the conditions of the subject's past experiences. The mythic struggle 
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against A yard! thus involves the complex dynamics of psychical response, the 
allegorical universe of sexuality. Gantheret has briefly summarized the place of these 
"necessities of life" [Not des Lebens] in the spectrum of Freudian concepts: 
Ce soot les "exigencies de la vie", que Freud designera dans 
d'aulres text.es par A vayK7), en marquant ainsi Ie poids de destin 
et en nous laissant entrevoir ce qui serait peut-etre au foodement 
de l'inanalysable. Le reste -la oU Ie modele oe peut pas repondre-, 
c'est Ie champ de la sexualit6 humaine et son lien etroite au 
refoulement. 41 
The compelling action of A yard} is not to be apprehended without the silent presence 
of pain. Obliquely, Gantheret's _remarks cast a new light upon the enigmatic, 
"unanalysable" relation between human sexuality and pain. The "necessity of life" 
implicitly !lames the presence of pain, the denial of satisfaction, the wreck of desire. 
This conviction burdened the Freudian conception of human fate as a perpetual deferral 
of satisfaction; this deferral mirrors the subject's indefinitely postponed apprehension 
of its loved object, the ceaseless defeat of the desire of fusion, of the extinction of 
need. The temporality of A yard} resembles that of pain; it also implies a subjective, 
complex "structure" of time: it involves memory and anticipation, the vision of future 
absence and an ever unfulfilled expectation, the defeat of sense, the enduring, dim pain 
aroused by the foreshadowed ecIJpse of desire and the certainty of repetition. 
a. The duality of pain: psychical and physical 
In 1917 Freud encounters again a crucial issue. He faces a puzzling, compromising, 
obscure topic. He must explain the nature of mania, its specific manifestations, its 
~singular position among the elements of the vast and muddled taxonomy of the 
maladies of the soul. However, as had previously occured, he postponed his 
explanation of mania and of the ego's inner conflict, until he had achieved a more 
profound comprehension of the nature of bodily and psychical pain. 
Ocr Kooflikt im Icb, den die Melancholie fOr den Kampf um das 
Objekt eintauscht, mu8 ahnlich wie eigne schmerzhafte W~ 
wirken, die eigne auBerordentlich hohe Gegenbesetzung m 
Anspruch nimml Aber bier wird es wiederum zweckmABig sein, 
haltzmnachen und die weitere Aufldinmg der Manie· zu 
verscbieben, bis wir Einsicbt in die Okonomische Natur zunachst 
des korperlichen und dann des ibm analogen seelischen 
Schmerzes gewonnen haben. (Trauer und Melancholie SA 
1917, m: 212): ' , 
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Again, this illumination never came. The deferral of the comprehension of mania 
brings to light a meaningful issue: the limits of the economic model of pain and, 
furthermore, the obscurity of the relation which Freud has established between bodily 
[klJrperlichen] and psychical [seelischen] pain. The essential nature of mania seemed 
to come from the tension between these two dimensions of pain. But Freud's failure 
to apprehend the nature of mania also evinced the intractable facets of mourning, the 
enigma of its temporal inconsistencies, of its eventual decay and its informing force in 
psychical processes. 
Mourning appears as the limit expression of the Baroque condition of Freud's 
theoretical imagination. Freud describes thoroughly the splitting of the ego 
[JchspaJtung] when it faces the disappearance of the love-object. The ego engages in 
a complex series of symbolic processes which involve the whole structure of the 
psychical apparatus: it experiences a complete metamorphosis and appears in the guise 
of a foreign physiognomy, likely to elude even the action of its critical agency, the 
super-ego. The ego carries on this. masquerade as a response to the abrupt suppression 
of the object's presence. The masking is thus the outcome of the identification with the 
delusive, evoked image of the lost object. The called up representation, the deceiving 
restoration of the extinct figure, of the lost object stands for the actual presence of the 
object, as a sombre simulacrum. However, the ego identifies itself not with the absent 
object, but with its own inner spectral reminiscence. An inner mimicry, a silent 
mirroring of memories takes place in the silent, intimate landscape of the soul. The ego 
is compelled to resemble his own fantasized memory of the object. Yet, this mimicry 
is completely governed by the pervading sense of absence. In the dissolution of the link 
between the subject and its elected death object a complex structure of reflexive 
~ conflict w«hiil the ego, which melancholia substitutes for the struggle over the object, must act like a painful 
wound which calls for an extraordinary high anticathexis. -But here once again, it will be weU to caU a bah and 
to postpone any further explanation of mania until we haye gained some insight into the economic nature, tint, of 
physical pain, and then of the mental pain which is analogous to it. (FP. 11: 267-268) 
operations is built: 
Die Objektbesetzung erwies sich als wenig resistent, sie wurde 
aufgeho~ aber die freie Libido nicht auf ein anderes Objekt 
verschoben, sondem ins Ich zuriickgezogen. Dort find sie aber 
nicht. ei~ beliebige Verwendung, sondem diente dazu, eigne 
Identifizienmg des Ichs mit dem aufgegebenen Objekt 
herzusteUen. Der Schatten des Objekts fiel so auf das Ich, welches 
nun von einer besonderen InstaDz wie ein Objekt, wie das 
verlassene Obj~ bemteilt werden konnte. Auf diese Weise hatte 
sith der Objektverlust in einen Ichverlust verwandelt, der Konflikt 
zwischen dem Ich und der geliebten Person in einen Zwiespalt 
zwischen der Ichkritik tmd dem durch Identifizierung verinderten 
Ich. (TrauerundMeiancholie, SA, 1917, III: 203f 
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"Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego" [Der Schatten of the ObjekJ fiel so 
auf t!as . lch]: the ego surrenders. to the violence of the mask, of the mirage; it 
disappears beneath the distorted image of its own primal loved object. It is not the 
memory of the full relief of the object what remained as an inner relic, as an interior 
image, but a vision tinted with the shades of absolute absence. It is absence that drives 
the subject to construe the shadow of the object as a pure, essential image; it is this 
spectral nature which stands as an efigy of an actual presence; as a perpetual yet 
intimate allegory of the once loved object. However, the absence of the object becomes 
an inherent feature of its own image which has, in tum, shaped the ego's identity. The 
ego turns then into a spectral allegory of its own lost object; the allegory of an 
allegory. 
The enigma of mourning consists in the progressive dissipation of the violence 
conveyed by allegory, the weakening of the identification of the ego with 
dissappearance itself, the dissipation of dispair, and the engaging of the ego in a 
conflicting temporality of the replacement of the loved object, the complex process of 
the Ersatz. 
This conflicting temporality of the Ersatz is briefly outlined by Freud in the 
-nte object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an ~nd. But the free libi~o was 
not displaced on to another subject; it was withdrawn into the ego. There. however. It wa~ not employed many 
unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus ~e shadow 
of the object feU upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency. as th~ugh It were an 
object, a forsaken object. In this wayan object-loss was transfonned into an ego-loss and the conflict between the 
ego and the loved penon into a cleavage between ~e critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by 
identification. (FP. 11: 258) 
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description of the economic displacement of energy endured by the psychical contents 
of the experience of danger: the primordial token of danger is no longer perception of 
the threatening object; fear is aroused not by the object itself, but by the perceptions 
of the associated conditions and objects which surrounded the loss of the object. Fear 
responds to the sinecdoque of the experience of loss: 
Mit der Erfahrung, daB ein au8eres, durch Wahmehmung 
erfaBbares Objekt der an die Geburt mahnenden gefahrlichen 
Situation ein Ende machen kann, verschiebt sich nun der Inhalt 
der Gefahr von der okonomischen Situation auf seine Bedingung, 
den Objektverlust. (Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, SA, 1926, 
VI: 278f 
The object of satisfaction itself, as we have already remarked, is not only the agent of 
the su~sion of the danger, the object which prevents the reappearance of pain; it is 
in itself a disquieting presence, a presence which evokes the dim pain of transience. It 
merges the memory of satisfaction with presages of absence, past and present, memory 
and allegory, a fragile excitement and an attenuated mourning. An affective 
ambivalence is the outcome of this disarrangement of the temporal frame of experience 
and of the displacement of the threatening sense of presence to the absence it evokes 
and to the conditions which surround it. 
Consequently, the actual death and disappearance of the loved object is not only 
a mere extinction of a presence, but the settlement of contradictory memories and 
ambivalent evocations and profiles. The ego emerges from mourning as a mirage 
shaped by the reflexive allegories of absence. There is a first reflexive allegory: the 
images of the object as tokens of the abstract sense of absence. A second reflexive 
allegory: the images of the extinct object as the sign and the announcement of his own 
extinction. A third reflexive allegory: the sense of the images of the loved object as 
tokens of the senselessness of the object and. the ego. This tension between the 
allegories of absence which mirror an empty ego, increases the intensity of the 
regressive impulse, the restoration of primordial pain. The symbolic imagery associated 
with this primordial pain, together with the contrasting and mirroring allegories of 
~ the infant has found out by experience that an external, perceptible object can put an end to the dangerous 
situation which is reminiscent of birth, the content of the danger it fears is displaced from the economic situation 
on to the condition which detennined that situation, viz., the loss of object. (FP, 10: 294) 
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mourning bring about the paradoxical symbolic syntax of the experience of death. 
Freud's unwillingness to admit the incorporation in the unconscious of the actual 
representation of the subject's own death led him to resort to allegories of death to 
represent the unconscious process of mourning. Again, the allegories of theory mirror 
the subject's allegoric imagination in the face of death. The challenge to provide a 
theoretical explanation of mourning and of the subject's experience of death puts the 
psychoanalytic theory under extreme tension: the explanation of the subject's 
apprehension of its own finiteness as a folding of an empty image, erected upon the 
death of the love-object. Anxiety emerges in face of the endless dissipation of one's 
own image, a dissipation inherent to the allegories of the definitive fading of the love-
object. The subject regards, in the unsustainable mirroring of these images of absence, 
the extinction of his own life; the representation of the dark, asymmetric, radically 
excluded pole of an extremely painful experience: the death of the beloved as the 
absolute, inexorable rejection of the Ersatz, the radical insignificance of the 
replacement. Mourning becomes a synonym of memory, a remembrance of the love-
object as hollowness and as the saturating image of one's own ego, an image which 
pervades with . non-existence the dense presence of ego. But mourning preserves itself 
as an experience, as a manifestation of the affective and temporal attachments of the 
subject. 
Wir werden auch den Vergleich gutheillen, der die Stimmung der 
Trauer eigne schmerzliche nennt. Seine Berechtigung wird uns 
wahrscheinlich einleuchten, wenn wir imstande sind, den Schmerz 
okonomisch zu charakterisieren. (TrOller rmd Melancholie, SA, 
1917,11[: 198)" 
The multiplicity of the subject's objects appear also as the distinct targets of the serial 
displacement of energy. The pulsating, rhythmic, temporal structure of the subjective 
experience still remains. 
Nevertheless, Freud never succeeds in this characterization. The economic 
interpretation of pain was to remain an undeveloped, implicit, silent schematic 
persistence of the former convictions, dragged along in the course of Freud's 
. .. ful' We shall We should regard it as an appropriate comparison. too, to call the mood of mour:run~ a pam one. 
probably see the justification for this when we are in a position to give a charactenzatlOn. (FP. 11: 252) 
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theoretical endeavor. On the surface of his texts, the strange, abrupt diversion is 
meaningful. The drastic abandonment of the narrative cohesion of the argumentation 
reveals a visible fracture. The economic characterization of pain is a mere exercise in 
resistance. 
In Freud's conception, melancholia and mourning differ in their temporal 
structure. The intense tonalities of melancholia offer privileged insights into the nature 
of the temporal structure of both disturbances. 
In noch anden:n F811en g1aubt man an der Annahme eines solchen 
Verlustes festhalten zu soli en, aber man kann Dieht deutlieh 
erkennen, was veri oren wurde, und darf urn so eher annehme~ 
daB auch der Kranke Dieht bewuBt erfassen kann, was er verloren 
hat]a, dieser Fall kOnnte auch dann noch vorliegen, wenn der die 
Melaneholie veranlassende Verlust dem Kranken bekannt ist, 
indem er zwar weill.wen, aber Diehl, was er an ibm verloren hat. 
So wiirde uns nahegelegt. die Melaneholie irgendwie auf einen 
dem BewuBtsein entzogenen Objektverlust zu beziehe~ zum 
Unterschied von der Trauer, bei welcher niehts an dem Verluste 
unbewuBt ist. (Trauer und Melancholie, SA, 1917, III: 199f 
What governs the singular attachment of the melancholic to his own condition is his 
fixation to the impregnable secrecy of the lost presence. The melancholic has not only 
experienced the disappearance of the object but something else which remains 
absolutely unapproachable and secret. It is this fixation on the secret loss which 
determines the obstinacy, the reluctance of the melancholic to unfetter itself from the 
manifold tensions stemming from the primordial experience. The dialectic of loss has 
come in the melancholic to an absolute stillness. Melancholia hampers the displacement 
and dissipation of the charge involved in the experience of Joss; it defers the reflexive 
representation of the conditions of the absence or the anticipation of a virtual suffering 
which stifle the poignant intensity of the extinction of the object. The experience of 
psychical annihilation stems from the clustering of .all the facets of the experience into 
the monolithic figure of the extinguished object; the whole experience is condensed in 
1n yet other cases one feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but one cannot 
see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is aU the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot 
consciously pcroeive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss w.t'i~h 
has given rise to his melancholia, but only in a sense that he knows whom he has los but not what he has 10lt an an 
him. This would suggest that melancholia is in some ways related to an object-loss which is. withdrawn from 
consciousne8S, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscioul. (FP, 
11: 254) 
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the barren figure of the missing object, which also freezes the manifold temporal 
experience of the subject. The subject, captured and destroyed by its own mirror 
image, hurls itself into this all-embracing vacuous image. Secrecy approaches its most 
exasperating figure: the secret that there is no secrecy at all. The absolute evidence of 
a timeless, conditionless, pure, non-existent object. 
V. Masochism: allegories of pain 
1. Philosophical fables and multiplicity of pain 
In 1920, the introduction of the speculative thesis of death instinct involved at once an 
immense transformation in psychoanalytic theory, an exacerbation of its fictional 
foundations, and a broadening of its henneneutical scope. Not only did the "biological" 
fable of the antagonistic tendencies of the unicellular and pluricellular organisms endow 
the theoretical spectrum of the psychoanalytic notions with an unexpected significance, 
it also put forward an implicit ethical framework. The biological framework which had 
until then offered to Freud a wneutral", firm, though remote scientific warranty, and 
set a visible horizon for the fictional trends of his conception, appeared unexpectedly 
as an allegorical motive, an imagery which offered a means for the comprehension of 
SUbjectivity. Paradoxically, this radical tum of the biological model -from description 
to allegory- attenuated the force of the symbolic representation of death. This 
weakened vision of death turned into an abstract, theoretical intrinsic impulse of being; 
it involved the dissipation of the boundaries of the self and the extinguishing of its 
energy; energy itself incarnates a crucial character ~n a tragic landscape of the essential 
forces of universe. The notion of disposition and its evolutionist heritage acquired an 
intensified transcendental lustre. Freud resolutely invoked Empedocles's mythical 
conception of the essential duality of being as a firm philosophical support for his own 
fictional agonistic duality in the source of SUbjectivity. 
As we have previously remarked, the theory of the instincts [Trieblehre] was 
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still, in 1920, an "obscure matter" -and it remained so. Freud did not hesitate to 
acknowledge the insufficiency of its own theoretical efforts to expound the nature of 
drive; he initiates one of his crucial arguments with the unexpected confession: "In the 
obscurity that reigns at present in the theory of instincts." (FP, 11: 326) [Bei dem 
gegenwllTtigen Dunkel der Trieblehre (Jenseits des Lustprinzips, SA, 1920, m: 262)], 
which introduced his reflections on the nature and the fate of love. Freud envisioned 
the object of love as the conjunction of two irreducible forces which ruled psychical 
life: love and hate. After struggling uselessly against a vague, obscure effort to explain 
in terms of a delusive biological model the origins of sexuality and destruction, Freud 
turned to Plato. 
, ~lato's fable celebrated ~e primordial bisexual condition of being, making 
actual sexuality the aftermath of a frrst catastrophic cleavage of the original fulfilled 
being. Freud accomplished an astounding allegorical exposure of a philosophical and 
biological synthesis, putting forth a mythical image of the origins of multicellular life, 
incarnated in the efigies of Eros and Thanatos. The path followed by Freud's reflection 
dims and exhibits puzzling shades: he even confesses a relative lack of conviction in 
what he has already stated, while he prepares the reader for the unlikely explanation 
which he is about to encounter. He sketches a fiction assembled by "repeatedly 
combining factual material with what is purely speculative and thus diverging widely 
from empirical observation." (FP, 11: 333) [nachei1Ulllder TatslJchliches mil blo,P 
Erdachtem kombinien und sich dabei weil von der Beobachtung entfernt (Jenseils des 
Lustprinzips, SA, 1920, m: 268)]. Freud concludes this quite unusual reflection with 
a footnote which condenses, in a "terminological" remark, the progressive abstraction 
of sexuality from its biological ground and its metamorphosis into the mythical Eros, 
abandoning the biological finality of being which was only the reproduction of the 
species. 
Eros turns out to be the emblem of the pure force of fusion. Freud maintained 
then the transcendental nature of death instinct, confounding its origins with those of 
being.42 The death instinct appears "by the coming to life of inorganic substance" 
[durch die Belebung des Anorganischen entstanden ist]. A later additi~n to this same 
'footnote enhances significantly his earlier conception. It clearly distinguishes the 
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successive stages of the development of sadism and masochism; sadism emerges from 
the unfolding of the intrinsic, primary masochist component of the death instinct; in 
sadism, destruction aims at an outward object, later, destruction might tum in on the 
subject itself and aim at an inward subjective agency. This successive turn of the 
impulse of destruction does not obliterate the previous one, yet it accumulates 
powerful, contradictory impUlses, diverging aims and objects of the destructive 
psychical force. 
The positive unfolding of the drives -libido is either directed towards an outer 
object or towards the ego, the narcissistic drives showing a libidinal character- made 
it necessary to introduce an analogous, yet negative component: "a fresh opposition 
appeared between the libidinal (ego- and object-)instincts and others." (Emphasis 
added) [ein neuer Gegensatz zwischen libidinlJsen (Jch- und Objekt-)Trieben und 
ande,.,]. This otherness of the negative psychical forces was evinced by the psychical 
enactment of destruction. Freud's propensity to speculative schemes, forged an 
allegorical figure: abstracting the drives from their biological domain, and building 
them as pure energies oriented towards an object and governed by a transcendental aim: 
either destuction or fusion. The theoretical endeavour of Jenseits des Lustprinzips led 
Freud to the construction of a transcendental, axiologically neutral conception of the 
psychical apparatus. The outcome of his reflection was a condensed vision of the 
senseless impulse to shatter and merge impulses, to entangle and disentangle 
inextricable flows of energy and motor discharges, inherent in psychical life. Freud 
culminated his exposure with the astounding vision of destruction without pain, and 
fusion without rapture. Destruction as neutral obliteration, a sort of "induced 
dissapperance", as an indifferent shattering of psychical and material objects. 
Despite the seeming congruence between both sadism and masochism and the 
absolute transcendental finality of death instinct ~estruction-, both of them differ 
from it in a detenninant feature: they embody pain as a definite condition of their own 
structure. In tum, their irreducible difference is the role they attribute to pain. As 
Deleuze has convincingly pointed out, the relevance of pain in both sadism and 
masochism does not evince either complementary or congruent patterns, but 
asymmetrical developments and incompartlble senses. 
Au niveau des perversions, on a Ie tort de confondre les 
r.0~a~ons, I~ expressions concretes et specifiques, avec une 
gn~Je abstr81te, comme une matiere libidineuse commune qui 
fer~l.t passer dlune expression a Jlautre [ ... ] On abstrait Ie lien 
pl~lf~ des ~tioos f~elles concretes dans lesqueUes 
II s etabht. On consuiere Ie melange plaisir-douleur comme une 
sorte de matiere neutre, connnWlC au sadisme et au masocmsme . .o 
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However, Freud acknowledges the specific paradox of the dynamic conception of 
perversion. Pushing to its limits an allegorically construed reading of Weissman's 
contemporary research on biological reproduction, Freud puts forth a transcendental 
scheme of the dual cosmic forces. In this light, for life to appear and develop it 
requires an accumulation of energy, an increasing quantity of bonding energy, it 
imp~~ the predominant forte of Eros; Eros involves the increase in the level of energy . ' . 
which aroUses the perception of pain. This process gives rise to the appearance of what 
Freud names a "a fresh vital difference" [neue Vilaldifferenzen), which springs from 
living being's proclivity to dissemination: a fracture, a breach, an unforeseeable tension 
which involves the disappearance and the cleavage of the primordial structures. 
However, the action of the death instinct seems to parallel this restless cleavage and 
severing of the being; it seeks dispersion, the dismembering of living, the destruction 
of object, the abatement of the inner energy even beyond the frontiers of life. As we 
have already stressed, death in'stinct appears as the exacerbation of the pleasure 
principle, that take the subject itself beyond the limits of the preservation of his own 
life. Both processes are far from being mirror images. They are not even comparable. 
For the arrangement of their inadmissible coexistence Freud resorts to an unexpected 
and elusive expression: the vital difference provoked by the outburst of Eros must be 
"lived off" [abgeiebtf through the domain of the death instinct. The odd attribute of 
the death instinct, to live off the vital difference accounts for the paradoxical 
-strachcy's transJabon ("to live oft") holds the main sense of the use of this surprising expression. Indeed, the tenn 
resists any &era.I, simple translation. TIle Gennan word merges in a single tenn manifold senses which stem from 
the CXIraordinaly productivity of the morphological resources of the Gennan language, The com~site fo~ merges 
a scose of deviation and swerving from, yet also of detachment and undoing, as weU as the allusion to tracmg back, 
the obvious scose of negation; the use of the air prefix might even evoke a particularly. in~ stress, a ~nclusive 
sooc:m put on the action. All of these nuances confer on the verb Iebell (to live), an emgmatic sense, w~lch seems 
to aOude to a dilfere1lliolillg pressure endured by a living being. Several paragraphs later, S~chey yaeld~ to the 
inertia of reading. He translates then the tenn Ablebell, which repeats almost literaUy the prevIOus tenn, anto ~e 
'"natural" exprealion cease 10 live, which clearly avoids the previous difficulties but strips the text from one of Its 
most opaque and symptomatic expressions, 
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entanglement of these notions. 
Thus pain involved in sadism as well as in masochism, involving an outburst 
of an overwhelming flow of energy, must serve sexual excitation. Life and death fuse 
in the realm of the conditions on the energy flows regarding sexuality. Pain appears as 
a condition of life; pain seems to confront, in this image of life, its own negative 
figure: the living being's aim towards pure destruction. However, pure destruction, as 
the transcendental end aimed at by the death instinct is foreign to the experience of 
pain. Freud envisions life as embodying the creative force of an allegorical, senseless 
destruction; thus, the living being inherently strives for its own annihilation only to 
regain the plenitude brought about by the dispelling of its substance. Freud adds: the 
libido preserves itself, the subject's integrity, only by deviating outwards, towards an 
external object, the energy aimed at destruction; moreover, it seeks not only 
destruction, but a perception of destruction, the signs of pain. Consequently, both 
destruction and pleasure endure a drastic, absolute metamorphosis in this unfolding of 
masochism into sadism; the energy seems to reject the confined inner space of the 
living being; it ceases to linger as a pure, silent, untraceable process, and becomes an 
expressive, conspicuous, acting force. While the intrinsic pleasure of erotogenic 
-biological- masochism is kept beyond the reach of reflexive consciousness, both 
destruction and pleasure, become attached, in sadism, to the potency of perception and 
consciousness. In emerging as an actual, visible force exerted upon the other, 
destruction foresakes its aim to self-destruction and becomes an effective means of 
achieving the pleasure of motor discharge, as well as the pleasure of the escatological 
fulfilment of its transcendental finality. 
Ein Anteil dieses Triebes wird direkt in den Dienst der 
Sexualfunktion gestellt, wo er Wichtiges zu leisten hat. Dies ist 
der eigentliche Sadismus. Ein anderer Anteil macht diese 
Verlegung nach au6en nicht mit, er verbleibt im Organismus und 
wird dort mit Hilfe der erwahnten sexueUen Miterregung libidinos 
gebunden~ in ihm haben wir den urspriinglichen, erogenen 
Masochismus zu erkennen. (Das Okonomische Problem des 
Masochismus, SA, 1924, III: 346)" 
"A portion of this instinct is placed directly in the service of the sexual functio.n: where it has ~n imp~)fta.nt ~rt to 
play. This is sadism proper. Another portion does not share in this transposItion outwards; It re~~I~s mSlde the 
organism and, with the help of the accompanying sex'!al excitation described abo~e, becomes lIbldmally bound 
here; it is in this portion that we have to recognize the original. erotogenic masochlsmus. (FP. 11: 418) 
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The impulse to destruction splits into an unfolding force which turns outwards and an 
impulse which turns inwards taking the self as the target of its destructive aim. This 
cleavage makes of each of the divergent impulses of the death instinct irreconcilable 
forces. According to Deleuze, we should distinguish a "pure death instinct" and a 
"destructive drive": the former refers to a silent force that aims for the dissipation of 
being, and which resides at the source of both, sadismus und masochismus, a force 
which secretly abides in the core· of the subject's identity, yet driving the living being 
to the final quietude of the inorganic substance. While pure death instinct rules the 
psychical and bodily processes wuelentlessly and ceaselessly, the subject's life merges 
the action of the drives; sexuality appears as the fusion of the representations of inward 
or outward impulses, of the actual, Visible destructive actions and of the impulses of 
self-preservation and reproduction which inform the dynamic and psychical 
performance of the subject. 
1m psydloanalytiscb Gedankenkreis konnen wir nur annehme~ 
daB eigne schr ausgiebige, in wen Verhaltnissen variable 
Vermischung und Verquiekung der beiden Triebarten zustande 
kommt, so daB wir iiberbaupt nieht mit reinen Todes- und 
Lebenstrieben, sondern nur mit verschiedenwertigen 
Vermengungen derselben reehnen sollten. (Das Dkonomische 
Problem des Masochismus, SA, 1924, m: 347f 
The evidence of perversion, and especially of masochism, led Freud to recognize, not 
only the mutating nature of pain; but also the simultaneous existence of irreducible 
painful objects and processes. There is not pain alone but distinct pains, which differ 
in their inherent sources and aims, in their manifestations and in the perceptions they 
. arouse, in the psychical images to which they hold. Pain is not a single experience. 
2. The Baroque taxonomy of masochism 
Freud seems to have acknowledged the complex nature of pain in his taxonomy of 
masochism. In it, he fully expounds his intimate Baroque vision of pain. The 
·So far as the psychoanalytic field of ideas iI concerned, we can only assume that a very extensive fusion ~d 
amalgamation. in varioua proportiona, of the two classes of instincts take place, so that we never have to deal with 
pure life instincts or pure live instincts but only with miitures of them in different amounts. (FP, 11: 419) 
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phy&iognomy of masochism is shaped by the vicissitudes of the folding and turning 
movement of a primordial, escatological impulse, which springs from the essence of 
life itself. Thus, the different kinds of masochism, which Freud sharply distinguishes: 
erotogenic, feminine, and moral, do not reveal themselves to be progressive stages, 
which contribute to the final shape of the psychical structure; rather, each diff~.nt 
kind of masochism appears as a distinct, unfolding experience of pain built upon a 
previous one, as a settling fold which overlays others. The landscape of psychical 
processes ressembles that of the creased surface of simultaneously enlivened processes, 
a!sembled from a constellation of silent traces of painful experiences. Erotogenic 
mascchism appears as a process likely to breed the primordial structure of psychical 
experience. However, envisioned by Freud as an invariant painful dimension of 
. . . 
psychicalJife, bound to the transcendental finality of live beings, erotogenic masochism 
remains a representation of the force of mechanical, secret destruction inherent in the 
fabric of life. 
Masochism, in Freud's vision, acquires the structure of a disquieting phantasy; 
the notion of pain implicit in it involves a dense and lavish imagery which seek to 
expound the metamorphosis of dynamic, passive and active sexual expressions; it gives 
rise to an allegorical scenery of the corporeal display of abstract sexualities. However, 
erotogenic masochism is not the ·only disquieting dimension of Freud's taxonomy. 
Moral masochism, which involves the desire for suffering and punishment, acquire a 
peculiar opaqueness. Moral masochism does not revoke the presence of the other 
manifestations of masochism; their painful objects and representations intrude upon the 
dynamics of psychical processes, introducing a heightening tension in the intricate 
conflicts between the subjective agencies. Moral masochism imposes on the subject a 
suffmng that calls up to the conscious condensed memories and images which present 
a spectre of the painful object, brought to light by· the dynamics of regression . 
. Moreover, the folding movement of the drives was one of Freud's early 
discoveries. In the metapsychological papers, he was already aware of the the turning 
inwards of the force which originally aimed at an outward object, when he encountered 
the puzzle of identification. This early insight was to be taken almost literally, without 
significant changes, in his astounding visio.n of masochism: 
Wir werden nieht erstaunt sein zu hore~ daB unter bestimmten 
Verhaltnissen der nach au6en gewendete, projizierte Sadismus 
oder Destruktionstrieb wieder introjiziert, naeh innen gewendet 
wer:den k~ soleherart in seine friihere Situation regrediert. Er 
er81bt dann den sekundaren Masochismus, der sieh zum 
urspriingliehen hinzuaddiert. Der erogene Masochismus macht 
alle Entwickltmgsphasen der Libido mit und entnimmt ibnen seine 
weehselnden psyehisehen UmkJeidungen. (Vas iJ/conomische 
Probleme des Masochismus, SA, 1923, llI: 348f 
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Yet, this expounded insight into the folding movement of the instinct of destruction not 
only evinces the essential duality of the death instinct, it also illuminated a particular 
feature of regression itself. Regression reveals itself not as a definite return of psychical 
processes to an identical but already transcended stage; regression is not comparable 
to involution; rather, it engenders a m!rror yet distorted image of past memories; sense 
and reminiscence are engendered by regresion; regresion creates unprecedented 
variations of the abiding relics of the subject's experience; yet, these parallel albeit 
irreducible images do not replace the primordial traces; rather, they accrue to the 
constellation of preserved remains of perceptions and actions. In fact, instead of a mere 
return to what was experienced once, regression may be conceived as the creation and 
the condensation of sediments, amalgamated in the successive foldings of the drives. 
Freud did not hesitate to assert the impurity of the manifestations of the 
destruction drive -if it is to be distinguished, as Deleuze did, from death instinct-
which appears always in an intricate manifestation with life instincts: "we never have 
to deal with pure life instincts or pure death instincts but only with mixtures of them 
in different amounts." (FP, 11: 418) [wir aberhaupt nic.ht mit reinen Todes- und 
Lebenstrieben, sondem nur mit verschiedenwertigen Vennengungen derselben rechnen 
sollJen. If (Die lJkonomische Probleme des Masochismus, SA, 1923, III: 348)]. Freud 
depicted the metamorphosis, the disguises [Umkle~gen] adopted by this force in this 
regressive return of the force against its original agent. 
Sie [die Libido) hat die Aufgabe, diesen destruierenden Trieb 
unsehidlieh zu machen, und entledigt sieh ihrer, indem sie ibn 
-We shall not be surprised to hear that in certain circumstances the sadism. or ins~ct .of destruction. w~ich has 
been directed outwards. projcc:tcd. can be once more introjected. bJrned inwards. and 10 thlS way ~~s to Its ~rly 
situation. If this happena. a secondary masochism is produced. which is added to the o~gmal masochlS~. 
Erotogenic masochism accompanies the libido through aU its developmental phases and denves from them JtI 
changing psychical coatinga. (FP. 11: 419) 
zum groBen Teil und bald mit Hilfe eines besonderen 
Or~ansystems, der Muskulatur, nach auBen ableitet, gegen die 
ObJekte der AuBenwelt richtet. Er heine dann Destruktionstrieb 
Bemachtigungstrieb, Wille zur Macht. (Vas lJkonomisch~ 
Problem des Masochismus, SA, 1924, III: 346f 
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In masochism, the destructive drive appears essentially as a compelling form of 
regression; as a force which, having been exerted upon an exterior object, then turns 
back against its own source, an uncertain subjective entity. The most enigmatic 
attribute of this kind of regression -subjectivity itself- is its encounter with an obscure 
identity. The target of the destructive drive is neither the subject as such, nor a 
particular subjective agency, but being itself. The destructive force is completely 
oriented towards the destruction of being [Wesen]. The destruction drive, wrote Freud, 
"has the self as its object" [das eigene Wesen zum Objela hat]. 44 
The domineering force of the death instinct, despite its entanglement with the 
impulses to self preservation, manifests itself not only in the exertion of an active 
shattering force, actual or imaginary, upon foreign beings or upon inner subjective 
agencies, but as coercion which seeks the abasement of the other's self-image, the 
demolition of the symbolic support of his identity, of his incorporated values; the 
destruction -symbolical or physical- of the other appears as an exacerbated means of 
strengthening the will to control and the image of the self. 
3. The allegories of inner gaze: vigilance and culpability 
The fable of super-ego, put forward by Freud as a crucial element of his second theory 
of the psychical apparatus, involves his acknowledgement of the violent, lifelong action 
of the memory of primordial suffering. The traces of suffering do not remain as inert 
residues. They arouse painful new images. This memory of pain engenders a 
destructive tension which stems from the conflict between psychical agencies, namely, 
the super-ego and the ego. A violent, newly created, yet enduring perception emerges 
"'The libido has the task of making the destroying instincts innocuous. and it fulfils the task by diverting that ins~inct 
to great extent outwards - soon with the help of a special organic system. the muscul~r apparatus - towards ob!ects 
in the external world. The instinct is then caUed the destructive instinct. the mstmct for mastery. or the wtll of 
power. (FP. 11: 418) 
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as the outcome of this tension between inner, dynamic, psychical processes: the sense 
of guilt. 
Freud was fully aware of the contradictions involved in the expression sense of 
guilt [ShuldgeftlhlJ. He alluded to them emphatically on few but meaningful occasions. 
The "sense of guilt" clearly involved the representation, in terms of perceptions and 
images, of the struggle between repetition and the imagery of desire, the preeminence 
of pain as the aftermath of the memories of loss, and the failure of action; from the 
regressive impulses perceived as "sense of guilt" thus arises the experienced "need for 
punishment" . 
The main force of the argument for the existence of the 'sense of guilt' implies 
the rel~ce of inner perception, as a means not only to symbolically define the ego's 
. -' 
self perception, to build its own symbolic identity, but also as a means to represent the 
failure of desire, the wreckage of identity, the distress brought about by repetition and 
the preeminence of suffering; thus, super-ego appears as a character likely to exert 
"moral authority". Inner perception builds an abstract, austere and relentless ruling 
code of the subject's action upon the allegorical portrait of the roles of efigies which 
heM the sense-of the primordial, lost loved figures. This "inner perception" not only 
shapes the identity of the psychical agencies, but also the conscious outcome of their 
tension. 
Wir haben dem Ober-Ich die Funktion des Gewissens 
zugeschrieben und im Schuldbewu6tsein den Ausdruck einer 
Spannung zwischen Jch und Uber-/ch erkannt. (Das 
Dkonomische Problem des Masochismus, SA, 1924, III: 350r 
The experience of fear which stems from the perception of the irreducible breach 
between the agencies, reveals also the intrinsically perturbing experience of 
temporality. The super-ego condenses a disjointed accumulation of aged relics, of never 
experienced, but still active memories of past effective constraints, conveyed implicitly 
in the voice and experience of the others. The violence of the super-ego is a reflexive 
one; it is exerted, with all its destructive power, upon the ego itself. It is constituted 
by the accumulated memories not of the loved objects themselves, but of their symbolic 
-We have aUriblBd the function of conscience to the supczr-ego and we have recognized the consciousness of guilt 
as an expression ofa tension between the ego and the super-ego. (FP. 11: 421) 
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universes. Super-ego becomes the trace of the trace: the memories of the symbolic 
universe of the loved object, of its words, of the sense of its acts and functions, without 
the affective intensity which the object itself arouses, just as the ego acquired its 
sir~gular traits, from the accumulation of the traces of the lost objects. The image of 
super-ego seems to emerge from endless mirrors which reflect and distort the original 
image of the ego made up of residues of love. 
Vieillicht ist diese IdeDtifizierung uberhaupt die Bedingung, unter 
der das Es seine Objekte aufgibt [ ... ] der Charakter des Iehs ein 
Niederschlag der aufgegebenen Objektbesetzungen ist, die 
Gesehiehte dieser Objektwahlen enthaIt (Dos Ich und dos Es, 
SA, 1923, ill: 297f. 
The ego and the super-ego undergo similar processes: they are also built from debris 
. . 
of past love bonds. Each of the loved objects and its own sphere of words, attributes 
and values, repeats and transforms the other; each of them impress enduring 
hieroglyphs which inform the figure of super-ego; not an inert receptacle of mere 
abandoned shreds of memories; rather, super-ego looms as a menacing and effective 
character, a fantastic, fictional identity likely to invoke the abstract schemes of 
symbolic universe of disappeared loved figures. It becomes the living, engraved 
memory of disappeared objects and their affective load, transformed into the actual 
phantasy of a violent agent, which emerges from the dynamics of the psychical 
apparatus. 
das Ober-Ich aueh seine Herkunft aus Gehortem unmoglieh 
verleugnen kann, es istja ein Teil des Ichs und bleibt von diesen 
Wortvorstellungen (BegritTen, Abstraktionen) her dem 
Bewufitsein zuganglieh, aber die 8esetzungsenergie wird diesen 
Inhalten des Ober-Iehs nieht von der Horwahrnehmung, dem 
Untenieht, der Lekti.ire, sondem von den quellen im Es zugefiihrt. 
(Dos lch und das Es, SA, 1923, III: 319r-
The i mage of law, incorporated in the psychical apparatus as the symbolic structure 
it may be that by this identification -which Freud tends to equal ~o. introjection- is the S?U co~ilion under ~hich 
the id CQ1I give up its objt'ClS.( ... ) the character of the ego is a precipitate ofabandoned obJw-chOlCCS. (FP. 11.368) 
-it is as impossible for the super-ego as for the ego to disclaim its origin from being heard; for it ~ a part of the 
ego and remains accessible to consciousness by way of these word-presentations (concepts. abst~ctlOns). But. the 
clllh«fic mergy does not reach these contents of the sueer-ego from auditory perception (instructions or readmg) 
but from the sources of the id. (FP. 11:394) 
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which upholds super-ego, is the construed regularity and symbolic imperatives imposed 
by the loved-figures upon the subject. Super-ego, paradoxically, as a symbolic 
expressions abstracted from the memories of its objects, acquires an autonomous force 
and exerts upon the subject's ego an abstract violence. This autonomous sense of 
regularity becomes an invariant dimension of the subject's psychical expressions; it 
accompanies all symbolic behaviour of the subject. Thus, Freud maintains, it is 
transmited from generation to generation; the symbolic invariant, which constitutes the 
intimate law of the subject is apprehended, embodied and reproduced from parents to 
children, in an uninterrupted series of links. Yet, it is not the parents' image that has 
been introjected by the subject. It is an abstract, symbolic scheme, made up of the 
amalgam of the construed symbolic actions of loved, authoritative figures, which 
. 
inform the 'invariant' intimate law of the subject. Tradition, Freud suggests, might be 
seen as this serial transmission of the intimate imperatives of accumulated traces of the 
autonomous and relentless symbolic imperatives, detached from their object and 
displayed as impersonal dicta. 
The serial assembly of these abstract, impersonal, merely symbolic assortments 
of rules and imperatives, gives an expressive view of the complex constitution of the 
super-ego. However, each new transmision of these inherited images involves the 
subject's own affective history, which distorts and redefines the symbolic aura of the 
parents' image and the love history of the subject, his relation to his own authority 
figures, the peculiar encounters which condense and shape the symbolic constraints 
imposed on the self by the super-ego. Freud's fable of the formation of the super-ego 
is the narration of the progressive embodiment, the accumulative density of timeless 
'characters, stripped of their singular history, abstracted from their flesh. But these 
allegorical, timeless, symbolic rules, divested of the signs of their own historical 
singularity, endure, nevertheless, a severe subjective transformation: they appear as 
models of the self, they appear as virtual, desirable images of the ego. 
Freud, at an early stage of his research, in Zur EinftJhrung des Narzilmus 
(1914), had hastily outlined, alluding to the psychical creation of the Ideal, a crowd of 
allegories involved in the theoretical representation of what he envisag~ as 2Jl inner 
'observing' instance, the origin of moral consciousness. The allegory of the "gaze" of 
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an inner agency of subjectivity displayed a chimerical scenery. 
This early allegory preceded and probably suggested the later image of super-
ego. Ego watches the gaze of the super-ego, while the super-ego, in tum, watches the 
ego, and exerts upon him the intrinsic violence of the "inherited" abstract law, which 
"emanates" from the authoritative figures. Crossing gazes without gaze; discordant, 
antagonistic images of agencies with unfathomable identities, conflicts of grimaces of 
characters without a face, constitute a privileged moment of the allegorized portrait of 
subjectivity . 
Freud's essential means to apprehend the emergence of the subject's symbolic 
identity is the Baroque stress put on the dominant place the transient memory of the 
voice of the loved parents take in the emergence of the singular psychical conflicts of 
the individual. Indeed, in Zur Ei'l/fJhrung des Narzijlmus we read: 
Die Anregung zur Bildung des Ichideals, als des sen Wachter das 
Gewissen besteUt ist, war nimlich von dem durch die Stimme 
krit:isdlen vennittelten kritischen EinfluB der Eltem ausgegangen 
(Zur Einfohrung des NarzifJmus, SA, 1914, III: 62. Emphasis 
added)-
The super-ego .emerges from these enigmatic sediments of voice; the spoken word, the 
stress on the syllables, the peculiar force of the acts of language which confer on them 
the subtle yet peremptory authority over consciousness, account for the preeminence 
of expressivity in the edification of an ethical framework over the logical construction 
of arguments. The super-ego emerges as an uncertain sediment of countless layers of 
the other's ancient, inherited memories, insinuated in the tensions of the spoken 
sounds. Benjamin remarked that this vanishing of the tangible, recognizable context 
which arouses images of bodies and actions, this timelessness of memories of violence, 
this loss of the historical signals. of the constraints imposed on the subject, this 
abstraction and autonomy of the rule, informed by the exasperated memory of the voice 
of other are the roots of allegory. Freud I s reflection on the super-ego reveals in 
vigorous yet broad strokes his own Baroque conception of subjectivity. 
"What prompt the subject to funn an ego ideal. on whose behalf his conscience acts as a watchman. arose from the 
critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the-medium of the voice) (FP. 11: 90) 
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NOTES 
l.Sigmund Freud, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to WilMm Flius 1887-1904, p.448. 
2. Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), pp.169-170. 
3JoIm Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, p.S94. In a previous paragraph, John Stuart Mill foreshadowed the 
psycboanalytic CODOe(Xioo of object election in a language which closely resembles Freud's own terms: "The 
idea, for example, of a given desirable object will excite in different minds very different degrees of 
intensity of desire. • 
4.Rolaod Barthes stressed the paradoxical oature of this demand of modem ratiooalism, illuminated by 
psycboaualysis and pbeoomeoological specuIatioos: the logical seaMall, already adumbrated by Kant, of the 
universalization of singularity and which Barthes does not hesitate to call "matbesis singularis .. 
acknowledging its impossible coOOition. See Roland Barthes, Camero lueida (paris: Seuil-Gallimard-Cahier 
du CiMma, 1981). . 
S.The equivalence between man as active, and women as passive bas an ancient and uncertain history. 
However, this "fundamental" difference seem to have accounted, in Freud's social environment, to deeply 
rooted "ethical- patterns. FnoI stated it in crude terms: "the sociological meaning of these words descn"be 
actual behavior of empirical men aod women", [die socioligische Bedeutung [of this opposition] erhiJlI iJaren 
Inhall durch die &obaehlrulg tkr wlrlclkM exlstlertnden mJlnIIIkMn und welblJcMn JndJvldun). The 
origins of the relation between active and passive, corresponded to the dominant image of the opposing, 
historical figures of men and women. 
6. Tzvetan Todorov has stressed that metaphor can be seen as a dual metonymical structure linked by a 
common feature. Cfr. Tzvetan Todorov, 'Sinkdoques', Communicalions, 16, (1970) (Paris: Seuil). 
7.Freud's conception approaches at this pOint Max Weber's conception of action. 
S.An anaJytical approach to the notion of instinct in terms of the structure of action induced Freud to develop 
a crucial issue of his theoretical framework. In his Triebe wul Triebschieksale, Freud writes: "Wit konnen 
mm einige Tennini diskutieren, welche im Zusammenhang mit dem Begriffe Trieb gebrauch werden, wie: 
Drang, Ziel, Object, QueUe des Triebes." (Triebe wul TriebeschicJcsale, SA, 1915, m: S5) [We are now 
in the position to discuss certain terms which are used in reference to the concept of an instinct -for 
example-, its pressure, its aims, its objects and its source. (FP, 11: 118») 
9. One of the most remarkable properties of the mental representation of objects is the undefined and 
expanding web of its attnbutes. This quality acquired unforeseeable consequences when projected upon 
sexuality: the .~" of the attributes of the object does not reveal a mere passive reception of stimuli, 
but a point of attraction the energy of which is capable of .informing the vast web of represeotations 
associated to the object of satisfaction. 
1O.lt is not by accident that Kant opeoed one of his pre-critical essays alluding to the aberrations of ~ 
~ of matter and ita PlSition in space as a clear reference to the indisputable certainties of ~ewtoruan 
physics. The power of geometry seemed to confinn the infinite capacity of reason and observation: ~~ce 
aod image have enacted, since the appearance of Newtonian physics and the enthrownment of emptncasm, 
a silent struggle between opposing criteria of truth. 
11.,CIaude Lefort has mggested that modem democracy, as a coherent, imaginary set of policies issued fro~ 
the French Revolution, bas its origin in the ritual destruction of the king's body, required also the symbolic 
destruction of a vNbIe mJtre of power; from then on, .he legitimate political force abides in an intangible, 
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shapeless collective body. 
12.~~ ~ put f~rward a dazz~ina description of sadian syntta and ita relation to the transgressive 
ndlonabsm it enacted: I.e code,~ est compose d'uni~ cp out ~ lOipeusemeot detenniMee et 
nommees par &.de Iui-m&me. L lIDit4§ mininwle est Ia ftnt!ture c'ost Ia ~ ............. comb" I' . . . r-, ".- r-- 1Dfl180n que 00 
~se I~gmer car elle De r6mit c:p1'UDe action et SOD poim corporeI d'application [ ... ) Tous ces ~ 
[I opSration, Ia ~gure, ~'cSpisode] SOd soumises l des reglea de oombiuaisoas --ou de CXlIDpOIitiaa. Ces 
repes penneUraic:m ~i1emeot ~ formaJjsation de Ia langue erotique, analogue aux 'arbree' grapbiques 
pNpOIMSs par 1Dl1ioguistes: oe aenut en 80IJIIDe I'arbre du crime.· Rolmd Bartbee Satk Fourier et ' _110 
34 ,. """J"-' ~ . . 
13.See move, p.287. 
I4.Walter Berprnin, 'tiber du Programm der kommeoden Pbilosophie', in Angelus Novus. Ausgewilhltm 
Sdariftm 2 (Fnmkfurt: 1963: repro Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), p.28. 
IS.Empiricism ~ the existence of an achieved harmony between will and control, between sensibility 
am bBDSformation: a theory of the seoses joined a theory of action, the notion of direct evidence was to be 
replaced by the notion of calculable effects. 
16.See above pp.68, 73, 8. This ear1y notioo was to reveal itself as a fundamental concept of psychoanalytic 
theory. Despite its resistance to analysis, the notion of experience remained a cardinal concept of 
psychoanalysis. 
17.FnuJ had already used similar notions before. In Trieb und Triebschiclcsale, Freud seeks to account for 
the pu1Idoxical tdanglement of pleasure and unpleasure, discerruble in sadism and masochism. He states 
for the first time this idea: the unp/eQsure oj pain [die Unlust des Schmenes) which, few lines later, 
transfonns itself ilK the enjoymenI cfpain [Schmengenieflen). The expression will reappear later, in Trauer 
und Melancholie, as the term Schmerzunlust, which was translated into painful unpleo8llre. Finally, in Dos 
tJkonomiscJre PrdJIeme cfMasoclrismus, Frwd forges an similarly built concept: Schmenlust, used by Freud 
to define the overlaying of sensations which stem from the erotogenic masochism. Strachey inattentively 
tnmslated ida diffeaera expressions this UDJSUaI series of terms: the Schmenlust is rendered as pae.ure-iD-
vDpleasure. However, Pontalis -perhaps more accurately- translates literally the genitive form of the 
german expression in SchmenunJust as tUplaisir de Jouleur, and Schmerzlust as plaisir de Jouleur. This 
problem of translation does not involve only a slight deviated, interpretation. Rather, it leads the reader to 
an important misunderstanding of the complex paradoxical opposition and alliance, which remain entirely 
eclipsed, between pleasure, unpleasure and its obscure identities. 
18.Deleuze has remarked, in an acute remark, that sadism and masochism are not linked through a 
w~ersible, folding operation as Freud asserted. The complementariness of these two categories was more 
a heritage from the medical tradition, than a rigorous conclusion of psychoanalytic enquiry: -La croyance 
l \IDe unite sado-masochiste repose, non pas sur una argumentation proprement psychanalytique, mais sur 
uoe tradition pre.freudienne, faite d'assimilations hAtives et de mauvaises interpretations genetistes, que la 
psycbanalyse, iI est vrai, ,'est CCJdedee de rendre plus convaincantes en lieu de mettre en question. - Gilles 
Deleuze, PrisenJation de Sacher Masoch, p.I32. 
19.5igmund Freud, Jugendbriefe an Eduard Silberstein: 1871-1881, p.78. 
29.John S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p.447. 
2I.Another, later letter from Freud to Silverstein, descn'bes thoroughly his preferred readings: Macaulay, 
Fechner, Adam Smith. See Sigmund Freud, Jugendbriefe an Eduard Silberstein: 1871-1881, p.202. 
22.Bioswaoger remarked a special parallelism between Freud and Locke. Nevertheless, Binswanger did not 
medioned the extremely importam place accorded to pleasure in the human universe of values: -Le parallele 
entre Locke et Freud est extr&nement instruct if. ~'il s'agit chez Locke de la question fondamentale: 
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jusqu'oU s'ete~ la, ~cite de connaissance en general de I'homme, il s'agit chez Freud de la question 
~Ie: ~ aU s eteod la capacite de culture eo gtSoeraJ de I'homme. Si Locke recherche la methode 
de CODIWSSaDCe exacte, Freud recherche la methode do mode exact de vie relativement ~ la culture. Si 
Locke part de ce doute, ~ savoir: l'objectif d'une connaissance exhaustive est-il accessible ~ I'homme 
d'apres son essence, Freud part de ce doute, ~ savoir: I'objectif d'une capacit6 gOOtSrale de culture est-il 
ac~s~le ll'bomme d'a~ son ~sence? L'un et I'autre, relativement lla m6th0de, opteot pour Ia 
coosbtut1on do compose ~ partir do sunple, du general a partir do particulier. L 'un et I' autre ~oivent la 
vie de I'Arne ~mme ~ 'DlOU;ement - regulier d'el6ments simples', chez Locke les representations, chez 
Freud lea pulSlons. L un et I autre commeoceot (plus exactemeot, done, terminent) par Ie symbole de Ia 
'table rase'. L'un et I'autre soot de rigoureux empiristes psychologiques et remontent done en cela l 
Descartes. L'un et I'autre ne croieot pas prejuger d'une hypothese metaphysique. L'un et I'autre soot 
oriedcSs de ~ principalemeot seosuaJiste et nominaliste, etc. NatureUement, les differences, eUes &WIlli 
De III8IkJU8Dl pas, principalemeot dues au fait que Freud est un pur explorateur de la nature ou empirisle, 
taodis <fJe Locke n'est pas seuIemeu lUl pbilosopbe empirique, mais RUSsi dej~ critique (cf. ~ ce sujet Riehl, 
Der philosoph. Krilizismus, I [Le Philosopbe, criticisme. I)). Pour conclure. DOU8 pouvons formuler ainsi 
Ie Jl8I1lIIMe edre Freud et Locke: si Locke declare "nihit est in inteUectu, quod non fuent in sensu". Freud 
declare: "nibil est in homine cu1tura, quod non fuerit in homine natura". (Ludwig Binswanger. Analyse 
existenlielle et psychantdysefreudimM, pp.206-207). 
23.See .below, further developments of the transformation of the ethic conception of Mill into Freud's 
conceptua1 framework, p.339. . 
24.As Straclley himself did. When this "inversion" occurs he barely remarks this sudden and undeclared 
abandonment of the former category. 
25.Freud wrote in his Autobiographical Study: "Zwar babe iell in diesem letzten Dezeonium noch manch 
wichtiges StUck anaIytischer Albeit untemommen, wie die Revision des Angstproblems in der Schrift 
Hemmung. Symptom und Angst, 1926(d), oder es gelang mit 1927 die gIatte Aufk1iiruDg des sexueUen 
"Fetiscbisrms", &her es ist docIl ri<ttig m sagen, daft ich seit cler AufsteUung der zwei Triebarten (Eros und 
Todestrieb) uod der Zerlegung der psychiscbeo personlichkeit in Ich, Ober-Ich und Es (1923(bD keine 
eotscbeideodeo Beitrige mehr mr Psychoanalyse geliefert, und was ich spiter geschrieben babe, hitte 
SCbadl08 wegbleiben konneo oder wire bald von anderer Seite beigebracbl worden." (Sigmund Freud, 
Nachschrift (1935), in -SefbstdarsteUung- (1925). Schriftm zur Geschichle tkr Psychanalyse, ed. by Use 
Grubrich-Simitis (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1989), pp.97-98)(lt is true that in the last decade I have carried out 
some important pieces of analytic work, such as the revision of the problem of anxiety in my book 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anriety (1926) or the simple explanation of sexual 'fetishism' which I was able 
to make a year later (1927). Nevertheless, it would be true to say that, since I put forward my hypothesis 
of the existence of two classes of instincts (Eros and the death instinct) and since I proposed a division of 
the mental personality into an ego, a super-ego and an id (1923), I have made no further decisive 
oontn"butions to psychoanalysis: what I have written on the subject since then bas been either unessential 
or would sooo have been supplied by someone else. (FP. 15: 256-257) . 
26.See Max Schur, Freud. Living and Dying (The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 
1972). 
27.A strange temporal paradox appears in the Standard Edi1if?n: while Freud'.8 text e~Dit his eff~rts to 
create an expectation on future theoretical proposals, and he promises the cooung solution of ~ ~gmas 
he was trying to solve, Slrachey introduces an astonishing remark ~~ to. another not~, which m tum 
derives from anodler Freud's brief, early reference to the enigma of pam, this time from Die Verd~gung. 
Stracbey's new note refers to a p,uling later passage: one of Freud's unsettling specUlations of ~enseJls ~s 
Uistprinzips. This accidents of text evinces Freud' 8 resistances to approach the unresolved notIOn of pam. 
28.See above, p.64 
29.Jean-BIaise Podalis, 'Sur la douIeur (psycbKpJe)', in F.nIre Ie reve et Ie douleur (Paris: Gallirnard, 1977), 
p.256. 
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3O~acques ~ was perhaps the first to perceive the importance of the disquieting duality of the primal 
objeCt of ~factJon both strange and harmful, and its role in the emergence of the imaginary attachments 
of the subject. See Jacques Lacan, Le Sb"inaire (Paris: SeuiJ, 1973-), VB: L'lthique de '" psychantJJyse. 
31.Immanuei Kant, Anthropologie in pmgmtllischer Hinsicht, p.SSl. 
n.AB a consequ. ence of his distinction between pleasure and unpleasure Kant had carefull dicti .. _.i-bed 
betw 00" ,y -~-
" een "two co ItJOns: a ~ ~e of want foreign to any object, and the experience of the lost object. 
[Vergnugen und ScbmerzJ sind eineoander Diehl wie Erwerb und Mangel (+ und 0) sonder wie Erwerb 
und Veriust (+ und -)" [Delight and Pain are not as gain and lack, but as gain and lost J (ImmalRlel Kant 
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsichl, p.SSO). ' 
33.Jean-Blaise Pontalis, "Sur la douleur (psycbique)" , p.2S7. 
34.See above, p.3SS 
lS.Leo Bersani has lucidly explored in several texts the aporias of masochism and sexuality in Freud's 
writiop; Bersani discerns an essential contradiction, inherent in Freud's energetic conception of pleasure, 
which leads to the fundamental theoretical tensions in his conception of masochism. See Leo Versani, 1M 
FreudianBody. PsycJwalysis and Arl (New Y9fk: Columbia University Press, 1986); Baudelaire et Freud, 
trans. to French by Dominique Jean (paris: Seuil, 1981); and The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990). See above, p.379. 
36.Kam wrote in his KriIiJc der reinen Venumjt: "Die Zeit is kernen diskursiver, oder, wie man ibn nennt, 
allgemeiner Begriff, soOOem erne Form der sinnlichen Anschauung." (Immanuel Kant, KritiJc der reinen 
Vemun/t, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 vol (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), m: KritiJc der reinen Vemunjt 
I, p.78 [time is not a discoursive or, as it is often said, a general concept, but the form of the sensible 
phenomenon) . 
37.See above, p.262 
38.It is possible to perceive in the Freudian notion of duration an actual, yet distorted echo of Bergson: 
"Quand je suis des yeux, sur Ie cadran d'UDe horloge, Ie mouvement de I'aiguille qui correspond aux 
oscillations du pendule, je De mesure paS de la duree, comme on panu"t Ie croire ; je me home a compter 
des s~, ce <Pi est bien different. En dehors de moi, dans I' espace, il n 'y a jamais qu 'une position 
lIIlKp.ae de I'aiguille et du pendule, car des positiom passees il ne reste rien. Au dedans de moi, un processus 
d'organisation ou de p&aetration mutueUe des faits de conscience se poursuit, qui constitue la dunSe vraie. 
C'est parce que je dure de cette maniere que je me represente ce que j'appeUe les oscillations pass6es du 
pendule, en m&ne temps que je pe~ois I'oscillation actueUe. Or, supprimons pour un instant Ie moi qui 
pense ces oscillatioos du pendule, une seule position meme de ce pendule, point de dunSe par consequent. " 
(Henri Bergson, usai sur les donnies inunidiales de Ia conscience (pariS: 1927; repro Paris: PUF, 1991), 
p.80). 
39.Malcolm Bowie, FreuJ, Prousl and Loam: Theory as Fiction, pp.22-23. 
40.Freud encounters the dilemmas of transience, its mixture of exultation and tragedy in a brief but 
u!llSettling reflection. In it, he alludes to a conversation with a "young poet" -probably Rilke- and 
comments: "I could not see the way to dispute the transience of aU things, nor could I insist upon an 
exception in favour of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the pessimistic poet's view that the 
transience of what is beautiful involves any loss of its worth." (FP, 14: 287) [Ich lconnIe mich weder 
entschliejJen, die aUgemeine VergllnglichJceiJ zu beslreiten, noch fUr das SchOne und Vollkommene eine 
Au.snaItme zu enwingen. Aber ich bestriJt dem pessimistischen Dichter, daft die Vergllnglichkeit des SchlJnen 
eine Entwertung desselben mit sich bringe (VergilllgliclJkeiJ, SA, 1916, X: 225»). (For a suggestive reflection 
on Freud's meditation on transience, see Franco Rella, II silellzio ella parole (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981).) 
41.F~ois Gantheret, pp.117-118. 
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42.Deleuze has clearly distinguished in Freud's text two different notions implied in the discussion of the 
death instinct: "Quand nous periODS d'instinct de mort, en revanche, DOUS designoos Thanatos a I'etal pur. 
Or Thanatos comme tel ne peut pas etre donne dans Ja vie psycbique, meme dans l'inconscient: comme dit 
Freud dans des textes admirables, il est esseotielment silencieux." (Gilles Deleuz.e, PrlsenlGtion de Sacher 
Masoch, p.28). Deleuze conceives thus, the death instinct as pure negative foru different from the active 
death drive (pulsion de morte). 
43.Gilles Deleuze, Presentation de Sacher Mtl.foch (Paris: UGH, 1967), pp.64-65. 
44.1be tr'amlation of Stracbey, once again, might be misleading. It clearly exlubits the undeclared, or even 
inadvertent constraint of the psychoaoalitical tradition in English speaking cou.mriea, perhaps reticent aDd 
even foreign to the speculative trends of the Fnulian thought regarding the enigmas of masochism. Pontalis 
has noticed the subtle but steep transformation brought about in the psychoanalytic conception by this 
seemingly sli~ linguistic minu.ia: ·Un des traits marquants de Ia litterature psychaDalytique anglo-saxonne 
de ces vingt dernimes ~ est I' accent mis sur Ie self. Nous disons anglo-saxonne, nous disons self, et 
nous lMSsitoos a traduire par Ie ·soi·. Obstacle linguistique qui est aussi un obstacle episttSmologique" (Jean-
Blaise Pontalis, 'Naissance et reconnaissance du "soi·', in Entre k reve et /a doukur, p.159) 
Conclusions 
L Reading Freud 
There is no conclusive reading of Freud. Each interpretation seeks to explore a limited 
range of the potential senses, of the nuances of the exposition, Freud's silences or the 
emphasis put by him on certain obscure topics of the elipsis and rejections of essential 
aspects of human experience, of the repetitions of the text and the obstinate return of 
Freud'to certain premises and isolated assertions. The endeavour of the present thesis 
was not to offer an image of Freud's writing as a coherent exposure of a theory, or to 
present his texts as a single effort to progressively and congruously elucidate the nature 
of subjectivity. To consecrate its scientific achievements or its always polemical, 
clinical adventures was as well foreign to the primordial intension of this exposition. 
The present text sought to explore, on the one hand, the complex web of 
philosophical, aesthetic, social discourses which informed and unveiled the tensions 
between several crucial topics in Freud's universe and created the social and historical 
conditions of its relevance to the modern conception of the self; the fertility of Natural 
History, of Romantic thought, of the patterns of writing in the last decades of 
nineteenth century, of the changing epistemological relevance of the conceptions of the 
gaze; on the other, the thesis seeks to read, in the movements, folds, hollows and 
crevasses of Freud's writings, as well as in its allegories and metaphors, the strategies 
for the comprehension of the boundaries of experience, identity and behaviour which 
remain obscure and unfathomable to the reflexive consciousness and the consecrated 
means of rationality: the power of dismembered mnemic traces and residues to fashion 
the subject's experience, their effects on the subject's primal experience of the 
disappearance of the other as source of pain, as well as the wordless primordial 
experience of the subject's own finiteness, envisioned by Freud, of a primordial pain 
which gives rise both to desire and to the primal, speechless structures of thought; the 
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paradox of a symbolic yet non-conventional memory of the loved object as one of the 
driving forces of consciousness and of articulated language. 
Il The extraterritoriality of Freud's conceptual origins 
In an article written on the occation of Kant's death, Schelling wrote of him: 
II marque pr6cisement la limite entre deux epoques en 
philosophie, l\me a laqueUe iI a mis fm pour toujours, I'autre qu'il 
a preparee negativement par un sage restriction Ii ne poursuivre 
que son but, simplement critique,· 
Kant became the emblematic figure of a critical moment of intense cultural and 
political tensions socially perceived as an historical breach in modem history: what was 
. 
seen as a transition between Enlightenment and Romanticism give rise to the image of 
a cultural fracture which bred a profound disquiet regarding the nature and the sense 
of expressiveness; a moment at which a morbid and obscure pathos seemed to ally 
itself to a prodigal and live exploration of the confines of human experience: 
mesmerism and animal magnetism, hysteria and madness, dream and instinct, the 
sublime and the physiological basis of thought and sensation, the celebration of genius 
and the institutional developlment of positivistic disciplines for education, perversion 
and exacerbation of moral convention, the praising of liberty and the creation of vast 
architectural and political devices for the reclusion and vigilance, the exaltation of 
secrecy and the enthrownment of the gaze. In this web of antagonistic forces, the crisis 
of the prestiges of tangible evidence defined a new place for observation and a new and 
meaningful perception of silence; provoked the wreck of the former notions of 
. knowledge, of individual identity and the emergence of a ciphered image of the 
subject's personality and its expression; this new perception of silence enlivened the 
fervour for enigma and silently acknowledged seCrecy as a constitutional, legitimate 
form of social relation and of the modem strategies for the exertion of power. 
III Freud's writing and the Baroque 
Vienna became a privileged scene in which the tensions bred by the encounter of 
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conflicting social, cultural and political strategies emerged as a crisis of aesthetic 
expression and its exacerbation. The individual and social experience of finiteness 
adumbrated by Kant's illuminations reached a paroxysmic intensity and exhibited 
themselves in the mixture of sombre Baroque explorations of the limits of 
expressiveness and the exultant fluorishing of decorative arts, the theatrical displays, 
the enthusiasm for sceneries, and the cult for the masquerade and the facade. 
Exhuberance and bareness of expression, the passion for spectacularity and for austere 
funcionality, appeared as tokens of an acute awareness of the fracture of individual 
identity and the obliteration of the future. History and memory acquired a symptomatic 
and unsettling relevance: the social experience of time faced the sudden veiling of the 
future and the deluding images of tradition and aristocracy, while the violent and 
debasing utopias which sprung from bureaucracy and market imperceptibly pervaded 
the intimate forms of reciprocity and social solidarity; at this moment, the temptations 
of solipsism seemed to arouse, simultaneously, an intense want for individual identity 
and social patterns of relation which sprung from the anxiety provoked by the 
crumbling of the collective construction of the self. 
Perhaps, some of the most significant contributions to the understanding of the 
obscure dynamics of the Baroque were Deleuze's notion of fold -conceived as an 
operative principle of the Baroque expression- and Benjamin's conception of allegory, 
typical of the Baroque, as a privileged form likely to negatively express the intrinsic 
failure of representation. Despite their seeming foreigness, both notions seek to 
apprehend the creative force which springs from the limits of sense revealed by an 
endless serial folding and unfolding of variations and resonances of a sense the source 
of which has been lost or remains beyond any interpretation. The Baroque displays 
itself as a form which expose the dismembered evidence of an intrinsic silence, an 
unarticulable sense. Thus, secrecy appears as an essential feature of sense; it manifests 
itself both as a profuse and sordid strategy of concealment which aims at the exertion 
of power, and as intrinsic silence of language. Deleuze I s and Benjamin's contributions 
elucidate different facets of the rising and the singUlar physiognomy of the Baroque 
climate, which both enhances and transforms the classic notions of Wolfflin and d'OTS. 
Freud I s attitude towards knowledge, his striving for style and his desire were 
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meaningful factors that informed his conception of subjectivity which emerged, in turn, 
from the allegorical and metaphorical exploration of the maladies of language and 
narration, deeply rooted in this vast landscape of conflicts. 
The folding, discontinuous and heterogeneous movement of his writing built the 
modern image of subjectivity from a mixture which involved the complex construction 
of his reader and the anticipation of future interpretations, the obsessive re-reading, re-
writing and revision of his own texts, the obliquity of his allusions and the crooked 
logic and changing quality of his arguments, the frequent intrusion of nostalgic and 
paradoxical views of art conceived both as an anticipation of truth and as a 
confirmation of the legitimacy and eloquence of his own enterprise; psychoanalysis 
appeared as well as a privileged enacting of the disintegration and consecration of 
expressiveness which springs from the perturbation and maladies of the soul. Freud 
made an ambivalent use of speculative philosophy both as model and as a mythical 
prediction of the achievements of psychoanalysis, and yet as an example of construction 
of a permanent mirage, the lures of which should be refused. Moreover, his writing 
was also pervaded of acknowleged signs of reticence and exclusion, of deliberate and 
compulsive silence, of an accepted failure and of unadmitted muteness and defeat of 
his own speech. 
IV. The passion for shattered language 
From the begining, Freud's work exhibited the obsessive reappearance of two elusive 
topics a meditation on the destruction of language and the hindrances of speech. 
Aphasia and hysteria appeared as contrasting though simmilar maladies of the soul. 
Aphasia had its inequivocal source in. physical destruction of the 'language apparatus', 
yet hysteria revealed itself as an enigmatic hindrance, not of language but of the 
subject's will and his capacity to narrate, an allegorical aphasia which exhibited the 
subdued psychical force of memory, without suffering any physical damage. From its 
origins, the wreck of language exhibited the non-elucidated tension between the 
psychical and the physical domains of human identity, and with it, the obscure nature 
of their relation. 
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Freud's reflections on aphasia revealed the inherent limits of the subject's self-
image of his own body; the non-elucidable obscurity of the corporeal processes 
exhibited the intrinsic limits of the notion of psychical representation, yet, it also 
revealed its essential role in the constitution of subjectivity. The relation between the 
psychical and the physical domains of subjectivity was to remain associated with a 
notion of representation characterized by Freud as a mythical bond between body and 
mind, as a speculative image of a driving force which both brings them together and 
transforms them into "dependent concomitant", and yet introduces an irreducible 
breach between them. The allegory of aphasia illuminated the limits of the notion of 
representation and the mythical conceptions in the root of Freud's thought. Moreover, 
it revealed the invincible opaqueness of the experience of the body; the fragmentary 
. 
and delusive image of its shape, of its performance, of the weave of physical processes. 
Yet, this opaqueness led to another: that of consciousness, which eludes the artifices 
of self-reflection and the subjet's meditation on the own intimate limits of perception 
and understanding. 
Freud's failure to uncover the roots of the obscure limits of consciousness also 
exhibited his. impossibility to theoretically fathom the boundaries of the other 
construed, psychical agencies: unconscious and preconscious, the id, the ego and the 
super-ego, and the nature of their processes and transformations. In his last work, 
published posthumously, in which he attempted to summarize the complete spectrum 
of his achievements, he did not hesitate to admit: 
worin bestehen dann die eigentliche N atur des Zustandes, der sich 
im Es durch die Qualitat des UnbewiiBten, im Ich durch die des 
VorbewuBten verrat, und vorin liegt der Unterschied zwischen 
beiden? 
Nun dariiber wissen wir nichts un von dem tiefdunkeln , 
Hintergrund dieser· Unwissenheit heben sich unsere sparlichen 
Einsichten klaglich genug abo (AbrijJ der Psych analyse, GW, 
1939,17:88)" 
The attemps to solve this enigma, present throughout his entire work, lead him, 
What, if this is so, is the true nature of the state which is revealed in the id by the quality o~ being unconscious and 
in the ego by that of being preconscious and in what does the di~ference b~een the~ con~lst7 But of that w~ kn~~ 
nothing. And the profound obscurity of the hackground of our Ignorance IS scarcely Illummated by a few glimm 
of insight. (FP. 15: 395) 
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however, to astounding illuminations and insights about the nature of the psychical 
processes. In the very begining of his psychoanalytic reflection, Freud posited a 
fundamental notion of experience which can be understood as a radical criticism of this 
no'don issued from the Enlightenment. Freud's notion formulated in terms of quantities 
and displacement of energy, involved also a dynamic characterization of memory. The 
notion of experience rested upon a specUlative thesis early acquired by Freud in his 
early discussions on the theories of aphasia, inspired in the results of the research of 
Hughling Jackson: the tenacity of memory, the endurance of the remains of language 
and perception in deep layers of the psychical apparatus beyond the reach of reflexive 
consciousness. A new notion of experience emerged from an image of subjectivity 
constituted by the memory of an in<:xtricable web of images and actions, of different 
temporalities which involved not only consciousness and language, actual associated 
actions and evocations, perceptions and word representations, but also a fundamental 
and primal non-linguistic judgement, a primary thought built upon a lasting memory 
of pain. The subject's experience of time emerged from this complex web of images 
and thoughts, of words, shreds of words and wordless memories likely to transform 
desire, hallucinations and phantasies into predictions and augurs or into reminiscence 
and remembrance. The judgements of language veiled the informing power of the 
intimate force of wordless memories and secret judgements. 
Thus, what constitutes the main feature of language, as it emerges from Freud's 
theory, was not the plenitude of sense, but its inherent fragility and silence; the 
narrative act, engendered as an echoe of phantasies and ~ctional unfolding of sense, 
arised from the memory residues, detached from the apparent unity of language itself. 
The severe displacement imposed by Freud to the notion of experience inherited from 
Enlightenment touched directly the implicit notions of truth and expression, confering 
on them a purely aesthetic attribute. 
V. The allegories of body: sexuality and pain 
The allegories of the body became the privileged form of portrayal of the fragmented, 
senseless evidence of its physiological process, the figure of the trenchs which oriented 
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the movement and stagnation of energy, and the lost parcels of the corporeal sensations 
and intensities. Sexuality was to be conceived both in terms of this allegorical images 
and as a description of psychical processes likely to encompass the manifold 
temporality and the vast and intricate weave of representations which shaped the 
experience of the subject. Sexuality was envisioned by Freud, as an endless series of 
allegories: names of potencies, metaphors of forces and struggles, of attributes and 
impulses. It became associated to desire, to the name of intensities and flows 
transformed into a mute representation of a lost and unnameable primal object and its 
allegorical manifestations in the love bond. Together with sexuality, perversion and 
pain, destruction and culpability gave rise to other series of allegorical images and 
figures. 
As attested by Freud's late disquieting contributions to his previous conceptions 
of anxiety, pain became an intractable issue, and nevertheless, a cardinal piece the 
unfathomable character of which should render senseless the previous reflections on 
subjectivity. Despite the obscure nature of pain, its abrupt conceptual yet implicit 
presence was to drive Freud's conception of subjectivity, centered upon the notion of 
destruction, to a vast Baroque allegory of pain and perversion embodied in the figures 
of masochism. 
Freud's work, dense and dismembered, empiricist and allegorical, austere and 
lavish, reticent and loquacious, introspective and crudely objective, remains in itself 
an enigmatic illumination not only of the cardinal motives, processes, tensions and 
trends of modernity; it also cast an enduring light on the subject's experience of limits 
which defines the fate of its search for identity. 
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